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Making Nebraska is a history of foreign relations and power politics between the Pawnee 
confederacy and the United States over the control and governance of the greater Platte Valley 
between 1803 and 1854.  These groups never fought a war, but struggled over the meaning and 
use of power to control space at a transitional moment of North American history.  While 
nominally part of the United States post-1803, the region remained outside the federal territorial 
system. Yet, this space was central to larger strategic and policy concerns over Indian Removal, 
territorial expansion, and the survival of the Pawnee as a nation.  The struggles to create 
Nebraska reveal the hollowness of federal pretensions to continental dominance or hemispheric 
authority.  The United States pushed its frontier, only for the space, and its Pawnee residents to 
push back.  Leaders on both sides scrambled to make sense of their place at this interstitial 
moment in a space neither could fully control.  The bilateral relationship forged new 
understandings of power politics on the Great Plains. 
This was not a story of settler colonialism, or of outright military conquest, but of a 
struggle between two rising powers and the results of extended diplomatic contact.  Whether 
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state power and authority were fixed at specific sites like Fort Atkinson at the Council Bluffs or 
mobile and expansive with far-ranging cavalry forces determined the narratives of control.  
Pawnee leaders used their military power to counter federal policies regarding Indian Removal 
and shape the development of the region as an Indian Territory.  Pawnee power made the future 
Oklahoma, not Nebraska, Indian Territory.  The crises of Sioux invasions, federal efforts to limit 
Pawnee mobility, and the social crisis of disease forced the Pawnee to recalibrate their strategic 
understandings of themselves and the spaces in which they lived.  By adapting to the military 
world of the plains, federal officials limited the Pawnee ability to set the strategic framework of 
regional diplomacy.  By containing Pawnee military power and refusing diplomatic overtures for 
alliances against the Sioux, the United States curbed independent Pawnee foreign and military 
policy.  By the 1850s, Pawnee leaders looked to fixed notions of defense for national survival, 
while federal leaders adapted to a mobile military capable of enforcing an expansive, continental 
vision of control.  Nebraska became Nebraska because the United States developed the 













It was a damp, cold day in March.  The kind of day where the sun does not bother to 
come out.  It stayed hidden behind a uniformly gray wall of clouds that obscure any sense of 
warmth and make you regret being outdoors.  The kind of day where the weather hits your 
bones.  The kind where you can feel small, miserable, and alone, even in the best of company.  It 
was that day I first walked the grounds and reconstructed buildings at Fort Atkinson (active 
1819-1827) in the tiny town of Fort Calhoun, Nebraska.   
A mere seventeen miles north of Omaha, the site is now a state park with trails, a visitor 
center, the partly reconstructed fort and Indian agency, memorial to Lewis and Clark’s meeting 
with the Omaha and Otoe, and a monument to the hundreds of U.S. soldiers who died of scurvy, 
exposure, and other diseases during the disastrous winter of 1819-20.  Here, 1,120 men of the 
Yellowstone Expedition got stranded at the site due to poor planning, bad equipment, negligent 
contractors, and unrealistic expectations from the War Department.  The visitor center was 
closed for the season.  No one else was foolish enough to be walking around.   
Image 1: Approaching Fort Atkinson from the west.  Author's photograph, 2014 
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The fort sits squat and low as one approaches over the field from the west, rising little 
more than a single-story house.  A simple square of wooden barracks, storerooms, and offices 
with walls cut with musket-firing loops barely enclose a large parade ground on the bluffs above 
the Missouri River.  Formerly the channel flowed right below the fort giving the garrison a 
command of the river and a more imposing authority as one approached from the bottom of the 
bluffs.  Shifting currents pushed the river more than three miles away since 1820.   
The fort was once one of the premier military posts of the United States with one of its 
largest garrisons and the westernmost outpost of federal power on the continent.  It was the 
gateway to the fur trade of the Rockies, the burgeoning trade with Santa Fe, and diplomatic 
missions to dozens of Native American nations.  It was really a large town.  At its height nearly 
1,000 residents called it home, mostly enlisted men and officers of the U.S. Army, with a 
scattering of civilians in the Indian agency, sutlers, artisans, and their families.  Walking the 
grounds that day made all of it hard to imagine.  The buildings are simple, even crude.   
I felt a deep sense of isolation on that cold day.  One could easily imagine a solitary 
infantryman on guard duty feeling very alone in the world.  He was 200 miles from the nearest 
American settlement.  He was surrounded by people in the midst of major political and social 
upheavals.  His nearest neighbors were potential enemies.  He was only a few days ride from 
thousands of Pawnee warriors and not much more from the Sioux.  What story did he tell himself 
about his place in this foreign world?  What did he think his mission was?  How did he and his 
contemporaries in the officers’ mess, the Indian agency, and the Pawnee villages make sense of 
the profound collisions and reformulations going on about them?  This dissertation attempts to 
tell those stories by understanding the spatial transformations at work at this site and the Platte 
River Valley more broadly from the late-eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth centuries.   
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Guillaume de L'Isle, Carte de la Louisiane et du cours du Mississipi i.e. Mississippi: dressée sur 
un grand nombre de mémoires entrautres sur ceux de Mr. le Maire. Paris: Chez l'auteur le Sr. 
Delisle sur le quay de l'horloge avec privilege du roy, 1718.  The upper left shows the Pawnee, 
though is limited on the detail of their location, strength, or even names.  Image courtesy of the 






Sidney Morse and Samuel Gaston, Kansas & Nebraska, New York: Morse & Gaston, 1856. The 
Pawnee are known and contained. Image courtesy of the Library of Congress: Geography and 
Maps Division. https://www.loc.gov/item/2012583327/ 
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Introduction 
Creating a Place 
 
 
 “Nibraskier” or Nebraska, the Shallow Stream, English adventurer Sir Richard F. Burton 
told his readers, preserved the “musical and picturesque aboriginal term” for what voyageurs 
labeled La Platte, the Flat River.  The scenery disappointed the globe-trotting traveler as one “of 
remarkable sameness: its singularity in this point affects the memory . . . bounded on both sides 
by low, rolling, sandy hills, thinly vegetated.”1  Beyond the river, the soil was “either sandy, 
quickly absorbing water, or it is a hard, cold, unwholesome clay, which long retains muddy 
pools, black with decayed vegetation, and which often, in the lowest levels, becomes a mere 
marsh.”  After an expensive 75-cent breakfast of “vile bread and viler coffee,” at Kearny Station 
which made him dearly miss his time in Egypt, Burton got moving, quickly.2  He was not 
impressed.  Nebraska was merely a burden to pass through as quickly as possible.  It was boring, 
fetid, and unfarmable, with terrible, overpriced coffee.  One could imagine him agreeing with the 
pejorative label of fly-over country.  Little did he know the struggles over the spaces through 
which he travelled and the efforts to create the place he so easily dismissed as useless. 
                                               
1 Richard F. Burton, The City of the Saints, and Across the Rocky Mountains to California (New York: Harper 
Brothers, 1862, reprinted Santa Barbara, CA: Narrative Press, 2003), 34.  Ne-bres-kuh, recorded Edwin James in his 
account of Major Stephen Long’s expedition, was an Omaha phrase for “Flat water,” and the river known as the 
Platte.  Edwin James, Account of an Expedition from Pittsburgh to the Rocky Mountains Performed in the Years 
1819 and 1820, by Order of the Hon. John C. Calhoun, Sec’y of War under the Command of Major Stephen H. 
Long. From the Notes of Major Long, Mr. T. Say, and Other Gentleman of the Exploring Party, 2 vols. 
(Philadelphia: H. C. Carey and I. Lea, 1823; reprinted Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1966, all citations refer to 
reprint), 1:203; French officer and explorer Etienne Veniard de Bourgmont first related the name for what became 
the Platte River when exploring Upper Louisiana beginning in 1714.  Etienne Veniard de Bourgmont, “Exact 
Description of Louisiana,” trans. Max W. Myers, ed. Marcel Giraud, Missouri Historical Society Bulletin 15 
(October 1958): 16. 
2 Burton, City of the Saints, 34-5. 
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Yet, he recognized the centrality of the Platte to the United States’ continental expansion 
well-underway by the time he visited in 1860.  The river valley was a gateway westward and 
principal route for travelers to Oregon by the 1840s.  Fort Kearny and Fort Laramie extended 
federal authority along the road and separated the Pawnee to the north and their traditional 
enemies to the west and south.  It “is doubtless the most important western influent of the 
Mississippi,” Burton argued, “at present the traveler can cross the 300 or 400 miles of desert 
between the settlements in the east and the populated parts of the western mountains by its broad 
highway, with never failing supplies of water, and, in places, fuel.”3  Here was the problem for 
federal officials and white settlers imagining their place in the central plains: it was a space both 
central to geopolitical concerns over expansion and power, yet peripheral to common notions of 
a useful, habitable place.  The creation of this space took eons.  The creation of the Nebraska 
Burton saw took two generations. 
                                               
3 Burton, City of the Saints, 33. 
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This creation story exists in a world between two maps.  The first map—“Carte de la 
Louisiane et du cours du Mississipi” by Guillaume de L'Isle from 1718—is one of the earliest 
French maps of the Louisiana territory that charts the Missouri River as high as possibly present-
day Montana.  Centered in the upper left are notations for “les Panis” and “les Panimaha.”  They 
are an identified, but nebulously understood people occupying a space at the edge of French 
knowledge.  This is clearly Pawnee space.  Their villages are the prominent markers along the 
“Riv. des Panis,” the Pawnee River, now known as the Platte.4 
The second map—“Kansas and Nebraska, 1856” by Sidney Morse and Samuel Gaston of 
New York—was owned by President Millard Fillmore and shows a conception of the same space 
                                               
4 Guillaume de L'Isle, Carte de la Louisiane et du cours du Mississipi i.e. Mississippi: dressée sur un grand nombre 
de mémoires entrautres sur ceux de Mr. le Maire. Paris: Chez l'auteur le Sr. Delisle sur le quay de l'horloge avec 
privilege du roy, 1718. Map. https://www.loc.gov/item/2001624908/. 
Image 4: Detail from Guillame de L'Isle, Carte de la Louisiane, 1718. Image courtesy of Library of Congress: Geography and 
Maps Division. 
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138 years later.  Arkansas, Missouri, and Iowa are states.  The new territories of Kansas and 
Nebraska are being organized and simultaneously torn apart in the prelude to Civil War.  North 
of the Platte River, Oregon Trail, and Fort Kearny, the Pawnee label denotes a people still very 
much present in the landscape.  This was still the Pawnee homeland, but now it was bounded, 
known, and increasingly isolated by an expansive federal state concerned about the far West and 
Pacific coast.5   
Maps present narratives of political power as they tell stories about how to interpret space 
and who controls the land.6  These maps present a singular story of spatial transformation where 
European empires and the United States expanded into the continental interior, conquered it, and 
mapped it as their own.   
This is a false narrative that presents continental changes and the Native American 
dispossession of their lands as a fait accompli.  Conceptions of the West or the frontier are 
                                               
5 Sidney Morse, Samuel Gaston, and Millard Fillmore, Kansas & Nebraska, New York: Morse & Gaston, 1856. 
Map. https://www.loc.gov/item/2012583327/. 
6 Peter J. Kastor, William Clark’s World: Describing America in an Age of Unknowns (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2011), 1-55. 
Image 5:  Detail of Morse and Gaston, “Kansas and Nebraska, 1856.” Image courtesy of Library of Congress: Geography and 
Maps Division. 
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similar narrative inventions.  “History created them,” as Richard White argues.7  To understand 
the transformation of the greater Platte Valley requires understanding the narratives created 
during the process and represented on these maps. 
This dissertation examines the relationship of two broadly defined groups: Pawnee 
leaders and federal officials.  These groups included Pawnee chiefs like Petalesharoo and 
Sharitarish, and U.S. officials like Superintendent of Indian Affairs William Clark, Indian agents 
like his nephew Benjamin O’Fallon or John Dougherty, and army officers like Henry Atkinson.  
Together, representatives from both groups shaped the regional and continental changes at work 
in North America in the early-nineteenth century.  The Sioux, Omaha, Osage, Otoe, Cheyenne, 
Arikara, Kiowa, Comanche, as well as fur traders, missionaries, Spaniards, Mexicans, and others 
all figure into the story of the region, but it is these two groups—Pawnee leaders and federal 
officials—that provide the main focal point.  They led two political powers claiming authority 
over the greater Platte Valley.  The Pawnee never fought a war with the United States, putting 
them at odds with the familiar story of plains Indian wars in the latter-half of the nineteenth 
century.  By the 1860s, Pawnee auxiliaries even campaigned alongside the United States Army 
against the Sioux.  This project examines a people and place that do not fit the traditional 
narrative of federal-Native American interactions on the Great Plains.  It is neither a story of war, 
nor of abject decline and conquest, but of political choices about the usage of space and the 
strategic consequences of those decisions.8 
                                               
7 Richard White, “It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own:” A New History of the American West (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 1. 
8 While important to understanding the deeply violent encounters of the United States and Native Americans of the 
West, narratives of conquest do not fully account for the complexities of independent Native American power.  
These narratives often see Native Americans merely as victims, rather than co-equal partners in shaping the history 
of the West.  For nations like the Pawnee, who never fought the United States and at times served with the U.S. 
Army in the wars of the later-nineteenth century, this model of victim of imperialism does not fit.  Jeffrey Ostler, 
The Plains Sioux and U. S. Colonialism from Lewis and Clark to Wounded Knee (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004); David J. Wishart, An Unspeakable Sadness: The Dispossession of the Nebraska Indians (Lincoln: 
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The Chatiks si chatiks, the men of men as the Pawnee know themselves, occupied semi-
permanent earth-lodge villages on the Platte, Loup, and Republican Rivers in present-day 
Nebraska and northern Kansas.  The four bands, Skidi (Skiri or Loup), Chaui (Chawi, Asking-
for-Meat, or Grand), Kitkahahki (Little Earthlodge or Republican), and Pitahawirata (Man-
going-Downstream, East or Tappages) formed a confederacy that by 1750 controlled the Platte 
Valley.  Even as the bands maintained significant autonomy, the Pawnee could fight 
simultaneous wars at all compass points and range into Spanish Mexico.9  Throughout the 
period, the Pawnee faced threats and setbacks as they balanced conflicts with their competitors 
and the increasing pressures wrought by federal Removal policy.  Military and economic threats 
against the Pawnee came from multiple directions, but through diplomacy and warfare they 
preserved their independence and bargaining power to shape regional politics through the 1840s.  
Of their numerous regional competitors, none were as persistent or dangerous as the various 
Sioux peoples whose expansion after 1800 most directly threatened the Pawnee.  In the face of 
mounting pressures, the Pawnee nonetheless remained a commanding polity in the region. 
                                               
University of Nebraska Press, 1997).  Wishart’s work is the first major one to address this type non-violent conflict 
between the United States and Native Americans for the Kansas-Platte River systems.  He focuses on the market 
relationships between the Pawnee, Omaha, Otoe-Missouria, Ponca, and whites, but the Pawnee do not fit well within 
this group. Pawnee military, economic, and diplomatic power as well as territorial claims far exceeded that of their 
immediate neighbors.  Ned Blackhawk, Violence Over the Land: Indians and Empires in the Early American West 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008); Judith A. Boughter, Betraying the Omaha Nation, 1790-1916 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998); Marth Royce Blaine, The Ioway Indians (1975, reprinted Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1995), especially 139-203. 
9 When possible, I use the Pawnee names of the specific bands rather than more common Anglicized version to 
reflect the people’s own sense of identity.  While generally united in a confederacy, they remained socially and 
political autonomous.  An exception was in foreign policy as they appeared to be more united in the face of outside 
threats than not.  This did not mean a united imperial political entity on par with Pekka Hämäläinen’s conception of 
a Comanche empire, but it did mean a general consensus on broad-stroke policy goals, social norms, and actions in 
the face of outsiders.  I use Pawnee as a blanket term when thinking about the larger policies and actions affecting 
the entire nation.  I use band to refer to the individual subgroup such as the Chaui, while nation is reserved for the 
Pawnee as a whole.  Rather than tribe, nation denotes the sense of social, cultural, and political identity of a unified, 
generally homogeneous people.  A mixed Euro-Pawnee population existed with the Pawnee, but it seems that they 
generally considered themselves to be Pawnee.  Richard White, The Roots of Dependency: Subsistence, 
Environment, and Social Change among the Choctaws, Pawnees, and Navajos (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1983), 147-51, 362, nos. 4-5; Mark van de Logt, War Party in Blue: Pawnee Scouts in the U.S. Army 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2010), 13-14, 249, nos. 4-5. 
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The term federal officials is similarly a sweeping catch-all of those who claimed 
governmental authority and jurisdiction.  This group includes the United States Army, both 
enlisted personnel and officers; various explorers and scientists on government missions; and a 
variety of War Department personnel tasked with Indian affairs.  Like the Pawnee, these 
Americans had their own internal political autonomy and competing agendas even though the 
Army and Indian Bureau both reported to the Secretary of War.  Yet both these groups shared a 
broad unity in the face of external opposition, reinforcing their own political and cultural 
identities.  Federal officials consistently overestimated their capabilities and power to shape the 
Platte Valley from the initial forays after 1803 through the 1840s.  The lack of direct military 
power and inability to control trade or enforce regulations limited what these officials could do 
to reshape the region.  Persistent fears of a regional, multi-party war continually upset efforts to 
assert federal sovereignty over the region and transform the space through the 1840s.  Federal 
officials had to learn about their limitations within the space they claimed to govern. 
Indian Removal, the forced migration of Native American nations from the East to a 
newly created Indian Territory west of the Mississippi, serves as a fulcrum for the relationship 
between the Pawnee and the United States.  The displacement of Native Americans and 
establishment of federal sovereignty were long-standing, broad policies dating from the creation 
of the United States.  Removal became formally articulated and carried out to its most horrific 
extent during and immediately following the administration of President Andrew Jackson.  
While not directed at the Pawnee, Removal reshaped the Pawnee world by introducing new 
neighbors and political and economic pressures.  The federal presence in the Platte Valley 
expanded with efforts to secure a regional peace and place for the forced migrants in the West.  
Pawnee adaptations and responses to these diplomatic challenges shaped their relationships to 
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the United States, as well as their old and new neighbors.  Both the Pawnee and the United States 
struggled to understand each other’s intentions, capabilities, and their own limitations as they 
collided over the status of the Platte Valley and their relationship. 
In tracing the relationships among the polities operating in the Platte Valley, this 
dissertation asks one fundamental question:  How did Nebraska become Nebraska?  Between the 
Louisiana Purchase and the creation of a Nebraska Territory in 1854, this space largely remained 
outside the regular federal system of territorial expansion created in the 1780s.  Why did it not 
remain Pawnee land, or transform into an Indian Territory as many federal officials envisioned in 
the 1820s and 1830s?  What did government look like on the Great Plains, in the Platte Valley in 
particular, and at the interstitial points of contact between polities?  How did people understand 
their relationship to space through their lived experiences as members of a political society? 
The key to answering these questions lies in understanding the roots of political power in 
the region.  By examining the forts, council sites, villages, and larger zones of inter-racial and 
inter-ethnic contact between the regionally dominant powers of the United States and the 
Pawnee, and their neighbors, this dissertation argues that political power was military power.  
Government was militarized.  It was a place where the state writ large was a martial one, 
dependent on conceptions of individual martial masculinity and collective ability to harness 
military power in the furtherance of foreign policy.  Men derived their authority from military 
positions, battlefield exploits, or their ability to command the service of others to understand 
their place as independent men.  Their societies deployed these notions of martial authority to 
further political aims, be they federal claims of sovereignty or jurisdiction or Pawnee ability to 
control hunting grounds and defend their homes. The zones of intercultural contact were 
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therefore necessarily militarized ones, governed by a broadly understood ethos of the martial 
male. 
It bears repeating, however, that this was not a region consumed by open warfare 
between the United States and the Pawnee.   Rather, as in so many long-running standoffs before 
and after, the militarized culture of the Platte Valley emerged in a period of intense and extended 
militarized diplomatic exchanges punctuated by brief periods of violent military conflict. 
The Platte Valley between the Louisiana Purchase and the creation of the Nebraska 
Territory then is a space outside the traditional narrative of federal political expansion.  It was a 
place run by codes of hierarchical martial masculinity at odds with the democratization of United 
States political culture.  Likewise, it was at odds with prevailing notions of territorial expansion, 
which operated through the development of political institutions and incorporation.  How each 
polity understood those martial systems in relation to their place on the landscape differed, but 
the Pawnee and United States operated within the broad framework of military governance 
where power ultimately came from the ability to deploy force either in actual combat, utilizing 
threats of war, or setting narratives about their own military prowess. 
In understanding the regional governance system as one of martial power, this 
dissertation questions the notion of spatial transformation in the North American interior.  Rather 
than borderlands becoming bordered lands in a transition from empires to states, this story is one 
of transformation from a bordered land with one government and conception of power, to a 
borderland of competing ideas and governors within broadly similar conceptions of power, and 
back to a bordered land with the replacement of Pawnee for federal sovereignty.10   
                                               
10 Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the Peoples in 
Between in North American History,” American Historical Review, 104, No. 3 (June 1999): 814-841. 
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The story of the Platte Valley before 1854 predates the history of settler colonialism in 
Nebraska.  The United States was too weak to remove, conquer, or juridically eliminate the 
Native Americans who lived there.  As Michael Witgen writes, “Settler colonialism . . . seeks an 
end or completion of the colonial project via the elimination of the indigenous population and its 
replacement by a settler population.”11  Only after nearly thirty years of federal failures could 
such a process take place in the Platte Valley, through events beyond the full control of either 
federal or Pawnee leaders.  Settler colonialism is the end, not the beginning of the story. 
The transformation of a bordered land to borderland and of two independent powers to a 
settler colonial system explains how the Pawnee became close allies of the United States.  The 
alliance came too late to preserve Pawnee lands and independence, precisely the point of a settler 
colonialism that placed a new value on the Pawnee as a military power that could serve as an ally 
in U.S. conflicts.  Whether by intent or accident, the story of the Platte Valley explains how 
federal authorities incorporated a similarly martial people into the expanded federal state in the 
latter-half of the nineteenth century. 
                                               
11 Michael Witgen, “A Nation of Settlers: The Early American Republic and the Colonization of the Northwest 
Territory,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 76, no. 3, (July 2019): 391–398, quote on 393.  Settler colonialism as a 
theoretical explanatory system offers many possibilities for seeing the larger history of federal-Native American 
relations, but it also is limited in its ability to see some of the complexities of independent Native American power.  
Settler colonialism is very useful to explain the elimination of historical narratives as a tool of empire.  See Jean M. 
O’Brien, Firsting and Lasting: Writing Indians out of Existence in New England (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2010).  Getting to that stage, however, requires viewing power politics through a different lens, at 
least in the Platte Valley as two relatively equal regional powers – even if the United States struggled to project 
power – vied for dominance.  Patrick Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” Journal of 
Genocidal Research 8 No. 4 (December 2006): 387–409: Jeffrey Ostler and Nancy Shoemaker, “Settler Colonialism 
in Early American History: Introduction,” The William and Mary Quarterly 76, No. 3 (July 2019): 361-368; Nancy 
Shoemaker, “Settler Colonialism: Universal Theory or English Heritage?” The William and Mary Quarterly 76, no. 
3 (July 2019): 369-74; Susanah Shaw Romney, “Settler Colonial Prehistories in Seventeenth-Century North 
America,” The William and Mary Quarterly 76, no. 3 (July 2019): 375-82; Allan Greer, “Settler Colonialism and 
Empire in Early America,” The William and Mary Quarterly 76, no. 3 (July 2019): 383-90; Ashley Glassburn, 
“Settler Standpoints,” The William and Mary Quarterly 76, no. 3 (July 2019): 399-406; Tiya Miles, “Beyond a 
Boundary: Black Lives and the Settler-Native Divide,” The William and Mary Quarterly 76, no. 3 (2019): 417-26; 
Samuel Truett, “Settler Colonialism and the Borderlands of Early America,” The William and Mary Quarterly 76, 
no. 3 (July 2019): 435-42; Jeffrey Ostler, “Locating Settler Colonialism in Early American History,” The William 
and Mary Quarterly 76, no. 3 (July 2019): 443-50. 
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Rather than a brief hesitation on an inexorable march westward, the struggles to create 
Nebraska reveal the hollowness of federal pretensions to continental power at the moment the 
United States projected an image of hemispheric authority against European interference and 
made claims to the Pacific coast.  Histories of federal westward expansion reveal several 
moments when the United States discovered the limitations of its ability to control people, land, 
and project power.  Well-known are 1790s in the Old Northwest, the 1840s and 1850s along the 
southern borderlands, wars against the peoples of the northern Great Plains, as well as the 
geographic limitations of the arid West.  The struggle to define the space of the Platte Valley is 
another such moment.  The United States pushed its frontier, and the Pawnee pushed back. 
This dissertation discusses the history of Nebraska, Kansas, and Oklahoma, but it does 
not mean the narrative road leads to the Kansas-Nebraska Act and the Oklahoma land rush as 
either inevitable or central to the regional history examined herein.  Those events are peripheral 
results of the contest for control of the Platte Valley and different chapters of a regional political 
history of the United States, rather than a diplomatic history of two polities on the Great Plains.  
This dissertation focuses on the region as a site of dynamic intercultural contact and intercultural 
politics involving the Pawnee, the United States, and their neighbors.  That story, of the bilateral 
relationship of militarized diplomacy, is a self-contained one separate from the fundamentally 
Euro-American story of sectional conflict and white settlement within the United States.  That 
latter narrative of settler colonialism and sectional strife marks the beginning of a different 
regional history, one that appears only after a fundamental change in the political relationship 
between the Pawnee and the United States over military power on the Great Plains. 
Transforming the Platte Valley into Nebraska occurred at a moment in U.S. foreign 
relations and Indian policy that is largely absent from the historiographies of both.  Just as the 
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space was outside the federal territorial system, this period, in this place, is largely self-contained 
from the larger histories of the early republic or the antebellum era.  It follows the collapse of 
centuries-old European imperial systems in North America and predates the appearance of a 
powerful U.S. military-administrative state in the West following the Mexican-American War.  
Many of the defining issues of these periods exist at or outside the margins of the Pawnee-United 
States relationship.  Federal territorial expansion into the trans-Appalachian region, the 
expansion of slavery as a divisive national issue beginning with the Missouri Compromise, the 
Texas-Mexico-U.S.-Comanche conflict, and the Plains Indian wars informed, but did not 
determine the regional history.  Yet this space was central to large strategic and policy concerns 
over Indian Removal or the survival of the Pawnee as a nation.  Leaders on both sides scrambled 
to make sense of their place at this interstitial moment, in a space neither could fully control. 
Both polities operated within a mutually understood notion of militarized political power.  
Governance in the greater Platte Valley is then about the clash of similarly powerful military 
states and who could best deploy their martial power to define the relationships of people to the 
landscape.  This dissertation argues then, that North American state-building, at least in the 
Platte Valley, is a military history.  Martial power created the values of an American West where 
military utility rather than republican ideologies formed the normative story of political 
incorporation of space. 
Making sense of the Pawnee-U.S. relationship to each other and to the land they both 
sought to govern reveals the changing nature of sovereignty and the changing conceptions of 
space in the intertwined histories of the Great Plains, federal state-building, Indian policy, and 
westward expansion.  All of this occurred during a transformative period at the shift from the 
early republic to the antebellum era.  It was also a time of profound changes in Native American 
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life across the continent, with formalized Removal in the East, and the creation of Indian 
Territory in the West.  All of these changes occurred within a political framework of martial 
masculinity.  War and diplomacy were the purview of soldiers and warriors who shaped the 
space of the Platte and Missouri River Valleys between the Corps of Discovery under Lewis and 
Clark and the end of the Mexican-American War.  The landscape was simultaneously the Great 
American Desert, a rich home for the Pawnee, or merely a pass through first to the Rocky 
Mountain fur trade, then to the bounties of Oregon and California until 1854, when it was fully 
incorporated into the federal system as the Nebraska Territory.12  Regional struggles over the 
meaning of power and control in these spaces were foundational, not marginal to larger 
narratives or power and control. 
A case study of the Platte Valley in the second quarter of the nineteenth century suggests 
several larger trends for the history of North America.  First, it shows that peripheral areas are 
often the historical centers.  While the Platte Valley has largely been at the margins of traditional 
narratives of U.S. westward expansion, Indian Removal, and state-building, the Pawnee-U.S. 
relationship guided those histories.  Second, the period reveals the fundamental instability of the 
rise of the nation-state and nationalism in North America.  The United States, Pawnee, 
Comanche, and Sioux, were large, youthful, expansive polities that created instabilities across 
the continent as they grew.  State-building, in the context of both Native and Euro-American 
polities, was a destabilizing continental process rather than a move toward the stability of robust 
fiscal-military-administrative government.  Governments faced the limitations of their 
functionality.  As the polities grew, so did the existential anxieties about the meaning of 
sovereign control, the contours of national identity, and concern about the integration of material 
                                               
12 Kurt E. Kinbacher, “Imagining Place: Nebraska Territory, 1854-1867,” in Timothy R. Mahoney and Wendy J. 
Katz, eds., Regionalism and the Humanities (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), 251-73. 
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things be they people, places, or objects of value.  Territorial acquisition created more problems 
about what to do with spaces and peoples than the imposition of sovereignty solved.  Third, in 
trying to find its place on the continent, the United States lost its initial claims to an identity of 
republican inclusivity.  Being outside the federal territorial system until the 1850s, this period in 
the story of Nebraska prefigured the U.S. history of direct military conquest and imperial 
expansion seen in the latter-half of the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries across the 
continental interior and eventually overseas.  Expansion meant the development and deployment 
of illiberal brute force in the furtherance of racialized conceptions of nationhood, rather than 
republican ideology and political incorporation. 
To see these trends, this dissertation examines a broadly-defined region and the minute 
sites where conflict took place: forts, council houses, villages.  At these places, grand narratives 
of geopolitical power, authority, land use, and social organization gave meaning to and drew 
meaning from the larger landscape.  Forts, councils, and villages are generally assumed to be 
areas of control where the dominant power sets the narratives and enforces their norms in older 
historiographies and the popular imagination.  These places supposedly offered a clear line of 
demarcation, a fortified frontier that as Robert Athearn writes, “delineated two definite 
realms.”13  The fort thus becomes a cultural and historical simplifier by naturalizing an ideology 
of conquest and superiority.  It is a false dichotomy to suggest such clear delineation between 
federal or Native American space or a heroic outpost of imperial changes in the midst of savage 
wilderness that dominated nineteenth and twentieth century historical and popular 
                                               
13 Many works on forts as places follow a battle and campaign model, emphasizing defenses, architecture, the lives 
of the soldiers, and military campaigns the garrisons participated in.  Fur trading forts, the private outposts manned 
by various corporations such as Bent’s Fort near New Mexico or Fort Union high up the Missouri, are treated in a 
similar fashion in older histories.  Robert G. Athearn, Forts of the Upper Missouri (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall, 1967), vii-viii; David Lavender, Bent’s Fort (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1954). 
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imaginations.14  As scholars like James Ronda, Douglas Comer, and Daniel Ingram have so 
powerfully argued, these places were local frontiers undergoing constant negotiation and 
reconfiguration over the nature of power and authority 15 
If space is the final frontier, then we must reimagine what the concept of space means 
here as part of the collective past of North America and a larger notion of American history.  
Philosopher Edward Casey suggests that space is an overly broad thing—a universal unity that 
fails “to locate things or events in any senses other than that of pinpointing positions on a 
planiform geometric or cartographic grid.”  In contrast, place “situates, and it does so richly and 
diversely.  It locates things in regions whose most complex expression is neither geometric nor 
cartographic.”16  Such a notion allows for the more complex relationships, especially of non-
Western cultures to their locales in defining a sense of space and deriving or inscribing meaning 
onto that landscape.  The distinction allows for a return to contingency in histories of the Great 
Plains where no outcome was inevitable.17  As historian Dan Flores argues, the combination of 
“specific human cultures and specific landscapes” form a creative partnership to give meaning to 
                                               
14 Popular culture placed value on the fort as the site of civilization in works like James Fenimore Cooper’s Last of 
the Mohicans or 20th-century Western films like Fort Apache or lesser known B-movies like Fort Bowie. 
15 James P. Ronda, “Coboway’s Tale, A Story of Power and Places Along the Columbia,” in Richard White and 
John M. Findlay, eds., Power and Place in the North American West (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
1999), 3-20; Douglas C. Comer, Ritual Ground: Bent’s Old Fort, World Formation, and the Annexation of the 
Southwest (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 1-33; Daniel Ingram, Indians and British Outposts in 
Eighteenth-Century America (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2012), 3-26. 
16 Edward S. Casey, The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 
201.  In attempting to theorize space, French theorist Henri Lefebvre rejects a notion of space as “nothing more than 
the passive locus of social relations, the milieu in which their combination takes on body, or the aggregate of the 
procedures employed in their removal.”  He sees the longer continuum of production as one of biology.  Once a 
body starts to think about its own existence, it begins a creative process that produces space and eventually, if 
extrapolated, place.  Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell, 1991), 11, 169-228. 
17 Andrew L. Cayton and Fredrika J. Teute, eds., Contact Points: American Frontiers from the Mohawk Valley to the 
Mississippi, 1750-1830 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), embodies this contingency of 
backcountry frontiers as hyper-local with diverse and changeable meanings.  
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space that mutually reinforced environment and human imagination.18  Space is a physical thing 
for all; place is the constantly changing meaning created for it.  
Creating a place means ascribing a value.  Patricia Nelson Limerick argues that, “the 
events of Western history represent, not a simple process of territorial expansion, but an array of 
efforts to wrap the concept of property around unwieldy objects.”19  Making Nebraska then is a 
story of state-building and changes in government, not just of territorial expansion, but of 
remaking the value of places through transformation of meaning.  Old spaces were remade with 
new values. 
As Juliana Barr and Edward Countryman argue about maps and their ability to create 
narratives of power, a good map of the contested spaces of North America “would show a set of 
sometimes fluid, sometimes unbending fields of force.”20  Geographer Alan Pred argues that 
place, is a “historically contingent process that emphasizes institutional and individual practices 
as well as the structural features with which those practices are inter woven.”  This comes from 
an “emphasis on local practical life and its conceptualization of genre de vie as a creative 
adoption to natural environment  rather than dictate by imperial metropoles.”21  As Richard 
White and John Findlay note simply, “place is a spatial reality constructed by people.”22  
Imagining the West for Americans was a decades-long process of government and cultural 
                                               
18 Dan Flores, The Natural West: Environmental History in the Great Plains and the Rocky Mountains (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 2001), 94. 
19 Patricia Nelson Limerick, The Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken Past of the American West (New York: W. W. 
Norton, 1987), 71. 
20 Juliana Barr and Edward Countryman, eds., Contested Spaces of Early America (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2014), 2. 
21 Allan Pred, “Place as Historically Contingent Process: Structuration and the Time-Geography of Becoming 
Places,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 74, No. 2 (Jun., 1984): 280. 
22 Richard White and John M. Findlay, “Introduction,” in Power and Place in the North American West, Richard 
White and John M. Findlay, eds. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1999), 2. 
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production that created a federal state and remade the continent.23  The people who defined space 
of the Platte and Missouri river valleys gave it meaning through stories and actions and defended 
it through military and cultural power politics.  The geography of the Platte Valley—the 
relationships of people to the space and to each other within that space—frames the historical 
narrative. 
Power to define place is a political act that requires governance.  State power conceived 
broadly as a governing political entity with its ability to harness culture, resources, and people, 
particularly military power, made governance possible.  Native American polities did not 
conform to a normative Euro-American view of states, which makes many historians wary of 
labeling their government systems as states.24  Yet, the story of the Pawnee in the Platte Valley 
reveals a formalized governing system with clear divisions of power, leadership castes, military 
and foreign policies, the unity of spiritual and temporal power, and leaders’ control over their 
populations.  Moreover, the Pawnee controlled territory and organized their economy in 
relationship to their social and political needs.  They demonstrated every basic function of a 
political state.25   
                                               
23 Stephanie LeMenager argues that the process of imagining the West through multiple versions of Manifest 
Destiny as seen in nineteenth-century American literature was a way to compensate for American feelings of 
inferiority among the world powers.  A feeble state imagined itself as a great power.  Stephanie LeMenager, 
Manifest and Other Destinies: Territorial Fictions of the Nineteenth-Century United States (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 2004), 8-9. 
24 For the distinction see two competing notions of Comanche government between Pekka Hämäläinen, The 
Comanche Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008) and Brian Delay, War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian 
Raids and the U.S.-Mexican War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).  Both recognize the power of Native 
American polities to remake space according to their policy needs, with the former suggesting an organized 
Comanche imperial system. Delay writes in his 2015 review essay for Diplomatic History that “Native societies 
employed a host of social mechanisms to collectively define and pursue public goals; that is, they employed an array 
of political traditions in order to debate and to craft policy, and often executed policy with a degree of coordination 
and shared purpose that left surrounding states looking hapless and disorganized.” Brian Delay, “Indian Polities, 
Empire, and the History of American Foreign Relations,” Diplomatic History 39 no. 5 (2015): 937.  He shies away 
from calling this statecraft the product of a state.  If a society is organized like a state, deploys power and gathers 
resources like a state, holds territory like state, it should be recognized as a state, albeit with the caveat that the 
Pawnee system was less formalized or bureaucratic than its counterparts in Washington, D.C. or Mexico City. 
25 White, Roots of Dependency, 172-6, 190-2.  
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Power was the physical military force able to organize and monopolize violence and hold 
territory, but it was also about establishing and enforcing norms of identity and behavior as part 
of the narrative of authority.  Ideas of martial masculinity provided the framework for diplomatic 
exchanges.  Men argued about the nature and use of power, who had it, and why.  In a council 
with newly arrived federal officials in the fall of 1819, the powerful Kitkahahki Pawnee chief 
Petalesharoo pinpointed the grand stakes of power and cultural norms within a world of martial 
masculinity.  After offering some token and unenforceable words of obedience to federal power, 
the chief bitterly complained that “I am now like a squaw, and instead of carrying the mark of a 
man, I have that of a woman.  My right arm, and that half of my body is white man, and the other 
only Indian.”26  Men demonstrated they were men through their martial prowess and 
independence. 
This gendered understanding of power and authority became a key point of friction as 
federal officials sought to impose white American norms of gendered behavior to turn Pawnee 
men into farmers and curtail their martial independence as warriors.  Insecurities over status, 
over military prowess, over the obedience of subordinates, and generational change dominated 
the political struggles.  Pawnee warriors gained political status through military feats.  Their 
entire adult male identity came from their participation in war.27  Younger federal officials 
coming of age well after the Revolutionary generation and their children fretted about their 
fitness to govern and assert their own authority.  Gendered power created a framework for larger 
struggles over the meaning of place, authority, and the notion of the Platte as a site of contested 
                                               
26 Speech of Petalesharoo, October 19, 1819, James, Account of an Expedition from Pittsburgh to the Rocky 
Mountains, 1:400. 
27 White, Roots of Dependency, 173-7; van de Logt, War Party in Blue, 3-36. 
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military strength.  The frontier was a physical one on the landscape and one of cultural norms 
where competing armies and leaders fought a culture war over identity.28   
This dissertation looks at the different conceptions of power and struggles over its 
deployment in the Platte Valley.  It emerges from and engages with a larger scholarly effort that 
seeks to make sense of the intercultural contact zones of North America.  These zones take 
different forms, from urban centers, forts, trading sites, settlements, and elsewhere, but they fall 
into a larger category of frontiers.  Definitions of a frontier abound in historical scholarship.  Yet, 
it is difficult to pinpoint what can be simultaneously a physical entity and an abstract process, or 
switch from one to the other based on perspective.  The frontier as the leading edge of a 
phenomenon, the meeting ground or place of convergence is, as Jay Gitlin writes, “both a 
moving target and a space shaped by many perspectives.”29   
                                               
28 This is not unique to the Platte, but fits within a much larger story of Euro-American interest in civilizational 
projects to turn Native Americans into domesticated and easily controlled peoples through changes in gendered 
work, Christian conversions, etc.  Ironically, the more independent and warlike Native American nations were, the 
more they were respected as masculine, “real” Indians.  Elizabeth Vibert, Traders’ Tales: Narratives of Cultural 
Encounters on the Columbia Plateau, 1807-1846 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1997), 263-73.  On 
masculinity and gender in the early republic, anxious patriarchies, and the role of the military in American manhood 
see: R.W. Connell, Masculinities, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); Sylvia D. Hoffert, ed., A 
History of Gender in America: Essays, Documents, and Articles (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2003); 
Michael S. Kimmel, Manhood in America: A Cultural History, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); 
John Gilbert McCurdy, Citizen Bachelors: Manhood and the Creation of the United States (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2009); E. Anthony Rotundo, American Manhood: Transformations in Masculinity from the 
Revolution to the Modern Era (New York: Basic Books, 1993); Lorri Glover, Southern Sons: Becoming Men in the 
New Nation (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007); Shawn Johansen, Family Men: Middle-Class 
Fatherhood in Early Industrializing America (New York: Routledge, 2001); Kenneth A. Lockridge, On the Sources 
of Patriarchal Rage: The Commonplace Books of William Byrd and Thomas Jefferson and the Gendering of Power 
in the Eighteenth Century (New York: New York University Press, 1992); Clare A. Lyons, Sex Among the Rabble: 
An Intimate History of Gender and Power in the Age of Revolution, Philadelphia, 1730-1830 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2006); Honor Sachs, Home Rule: Households, Manhood, and National 
Expansion on the Eighteenth-Century Kentucky Frontier (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015); Craig 
Thompson Friend and Lorri Glover, eds., Southern Manhood: Perspectives on Masculinity in the Old South (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 2004); Marcus Cunliffe, Soldiers and Civilians: The Martial Spirit of America, 1775-
1865 (New York: Free Press, 1973); John Hope Franklin, The Militant South, 1800-1861 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1956); Ricardo Herrera, For Liberty and the Republic: the American Citizen as Solider, 1775-1861 
(New York: New York University Press, 2015); Ann M. Little, Abraham in Arms: War and Gender in Colonial New 
England (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007); Caroline Cox, A Proper Sense of Honor: Service 
and Sacrifice in George Washington’s Army (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004). 
29 Jay Gitlin, Barbara Berglund, Adam Arenson, eds., “Introduction,” Frontier Cities: Encounters at the Crossroads 
of Empire (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 4. 
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The last two decades reveal two distinct scholarly branches of a new frontier history 
dependent upon the geographical and methodological orientation of the scholar.  One branch 
generally follows Gregory Nobles’ admonition that a frontier “is a region in which no culture, 
group, or government can claim effective control or hegemony over others,” where “contact 
often involves conflict, a sometimes multisided struggle with an undetermined outcome.”30  The 
other branch follows a model akin to work by James F. Brooks and Kathleen DuVal in which 
encounters occurred within a space defined by one group to which the interlocutors adapted, 
albeit in the process altering the local situation.31  The former typically offers a more traditional 
Turnerian approach to cultural and political change as fluidity gives way to hegemony.32  The 
latter offers more possibilities to see the syncretism created by extended periods of contact and 
exchange.33  As Pekka Hämäläinen argues, “every homeland was also a borderland, a zone of 
contestation and intermixing.”34  This could be inside the walls of a fort, or a Pawnee earth 
lodge, or over hundreds of square miles of territory. 
In their influential article, “From Borderlands to Borders,” Jeremy Adelman and Stephen 
Aron critiqued “the persistence of cross-cultural mixing, social fluidity, and the creation of 
syncretic formations,” that “downplayed profound changes in favor of continuity.”35  Frontiers 
                                               
30 Gregory Nobles, American Frontier: Cultural Encounters and Continental Conquest (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1997), xii. 
31 James F. Brooks, Captives and Cousins: Slavery, Kinship, and Community in the Southwest Borderlands (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002); Kathleen DuVal, The Native Ground: Indians and Colonists in the 
Heart of the Continent (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006). 
32 Examples include: Alan Taylor, The Divided Ground: Indians, Settlers, and the Northern Borderland of the 
American Revolution (New York: Knopf, 2006); Leonard Sadosky, Revolutionary Negotiations: Indians, Empires, 
and Diplomats in the Founding of America (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2009); Kastor, William 
Clark’s World; Daniel Richter, Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2001). 
33 Examples include: Tanis C. Thorne, The Many Hands of My Relations: French and Indians on the Lower 
Missouri (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1996); Claudio Saunt, A New Order of Things: Property, Power, 
and the Transformation of the Creek Indians, 1733-1816 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
34 Pekka Hämäläinen, “The Shapes of Power: Indians, Europeans, and North American Worlds from the 
Seventeenth to the Nineteenth Century,” in Barr and Countryman, eds., Contested Spaces of Early America, 32. 
35 Adelman and Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders,” 815. 
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were “a meeting place of peoples in which geographic and cultural borders were not clearly 
defined,” while borderlands were “the contested boundaries between colonial domains,” in order 
to see multiple processes of European imperialism and indigenous responses.36  In their 
framework, the transitions from empires to independent states in North America redefined 
relationships of people by juridically separating societies and inscribing new notions of 
citizenship.37  This approach emphasized nation-building and state control over fixed boundaries 
based upon the economic transformations of capitalism in reformulating the stakes of identity 
and property, even if Adelman and Aron did ultimately acknowledge indigenous agency.38  For 
the Platte, however, state-building is not a transition from empires to independent states.  Rather, 
it is a contest between two already formed states with claims of territorial and cultural limits. 
In critiquing such a state-centric lens, Pekka Hämäläinen and Samuel Truett argue “the 
rise of American nations becomes an abrupt, violent, and incomplete deflection of a continental 
history that for centuries pulled in many directions.”39  They emphasize contingency and de-
center the state’s jurisdictional role by “combating directionality and closure” in narratives of the 
Americas.40  Yet the state-centric model of transformation offers the best possibility to 
understand the larger continental transformations underway.  Native American nations are 
presumed to be nation-states by expanding definitions of the state to account for an indigenous 
North American notion of government.  In the Platte Valley in particular this means de facto 
military control of space and martialing of resources to further military and foreign policy goals.  
                                               
36 Adelman and Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders,” 815-16. 
37 Adelman and Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders,” 817, 840-1. 
38 Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, “Of Lively Exchanges and Larger Perspectives,” The American Historical 
Review 104 (October 1999): 1235-1239, 1238-9;  For the response that tried to prioritize the non-Western notion of 
state politics see: Evan Haefeli, “A Note on the Use of North American Borderlands,”; Christopher Ebert-Schmidt-
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As federal military dominance replaced Pawnee authority, the change became a de jure legal 
control that fulfilled narratives of U.S. sovereignty. 
The political transformation of North American government then is one of story-telling 
about what counts as power, how it is used, and who wields it.  The stories about governance 
force the recalibration of diplomatic history in the Platte Valley and Great Plains more broadly.  
Moving from a legal fiction of federal control on a map to its reality occurred through laws, 
boundaries, jurisdictions, and ultimately a change in how people talked, wrote, and thought about 
place.  This dissertation seeks to meet the dual challenges posed by Brian Delay who urges 
historians of foreign relations to see Native Americans as actors in the history of foreign affairs.  
Seeing how “power worked on the ground,” allows for an understanding of the interplay of state-
level fights about de jure sovereignty and “the struggle between indigenous polities, settlers, and 
states for practical control over space.”  Doing so allows for “understanding of the complex 
relationships between de jure and de facto sovereignty as they evolved in particular North 
American contexts over time [that] would lay the groundwork for a new history of the 
continent’s dynamic international system.”41 
The emerging scholarly consensus about federal power east of the Mississippi in the early 
republic broadly aligns with Delay’s call to see state-building as a continental process involving 
the interplay between Euro and Native American governments.  Rather than anemic and limited, 
                                               
41 Delay, “Indian Polities,” 940.  This shortcoming is partly addressed by Leonard Sadosky, who unifies previously 
separated spheres of European and Indian diplomacy and their role in the making of the United States.  This 
comprehensive interpretation of North America places Indians as competitors for sovereign status within a larger 
political culture of diplomacy.  Sadosky illuminates the centrality of negotiations at the margins of state systems to 
the core polities from which the negotiators came, by tracing the evolving assumptions, methods, and practices of 
the conduct of politics.  While he argues that power, not principle eventually determined the American policy of 
Indian Removal, he does not explore how this power was constructed, the limitations of American power in the 
West, or how Indians appropriated Removal for their own strategic purposes. Sadosky, Revolutionary Negotiations, 
5-12; James P. Ronda, “We Have a Country”: Race, Geography, and the Invention of Indian Territory,” Journal of 
the Early Republic Vol. 19, No. 4, Special Issue on Racial Consciousness and Nation-Building in the Early Republic 
(Winter, 1999): 739-755. 
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the early federal government rapidly developed into a robust and expansive fiscal-military state 
capable of deploying power to its edges to create and defend hardening borders of national and 
racial identity.42   
Policymakers used federal fiscal-military power to extend the boundaries of a racially 
defined United States.  The Indian Removal Act of 1830 codified what was de facto practice.  
Successive Indian Intercourse Acts form the 1790s through the 1830s delineated formal 
boundaries of U.S. and Indian spaces and set parameters of contact.  Supreme Court decisions 
supplied the legal framework to justify the actions.  In Johnson v. M’Intosh (1823), the court 
reserved the power to extinguish sovereign Indian titles to the federal government.  Chief Justice 
John Marshall’s declaration that Indians were “domestic dependent nations” in Cherokee Nation 
v. Georgia (1831) formally distinguished the legal and cultural otherness of Native Americans as 
outside the federal polity, yet subject to it.  Furthermore, this decision was universally applicable 
as Marshall made this claim over all “tribes which reside within the acknowledged limits of the 
United States,” even ones beyond the effective control of federal power, but within the de jure 
territorial boundaries.  The decision simplified the process of subjugation and revealed an 
American consensus to reduce Indian power either on the battlefield or through treaties.  By 
1830, Removal was national policy.  East of the Mississippi it was all but accomplished by 1838 
with the exception of Florida.  By convincing Native Americans to constrain their imaginations 
                                               
42 Brian Balogh, A Government Out of Sight: The Mystery of National Authority in Nineteenth-Century America 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); William H. Bergmann, The American National State and the Early 
West (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Robert M. Owens, Mr. Jefferson’s Hammer: William Henry 
Harrison and the Origins of American Indian Policy (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2007).  These works 
most directly and recently challenge the notion of a feeble federal government in the early republic, especially in 
relations with Native Americans.  As political scientist Ira Katznelson argues, the United States used its nonliberal, 
coercive power in the military against outsiders, thus preserving the liberal political system of representation and 
consent for the privileged insiders.  In essence, the United States could claim to be a liberal political system while 
also being just another imperial conquering force.  Ira Katznelson, “Flexible Capacity: The Military and Early 
American Statebuilding,” in Shaped by War and trade: International Influences on American Political Development, 
Ira Katznelson and Martin Shefter, eds. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 82-110. 
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of the politically possible, federal authorities remade places into ones they actually controlled.43  
Native Americans did not accept this passively, but resistance generally failed.  The policy ended 
any pretenses of federal civilization efforts as a pathway to inclusion within the body politic, 
although these efforts continued through missionaries and federal funding of farming, 
educational, and other projects.  Rather, the policy established militarized racial exclusion as the 
preferred method of American territorial organization by the Jackson administration.44  This was 
a century-long process only partly underway by the 1830s. 
Removal was horrific, but it masked the realities of political power in the West.  In a 
statement that could be broadly applied to the Pawnee as well as their Comanche and Sioux 
neighbors, Lieutenant James Allen wrote of the Ojibwa near the Canadian border in 1832 that, 
they “feel inaccessible and secure from any power whatever, even that of the United States.”45  
                                               
43 Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); “ An 
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44 Francis Paul Prucha, Sword of the Republic: The United States Army on the Frontier, 1783-1846 (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1969), 249-68; Sadosky, Revolutionary Negotiations, 189-215; Delay, “Indian Polities,” 
936-7; Rebekah Myfanwy Kirstin Mergenthal, “Border Lines: The People of the Lower Missouri River Valley and 
the Expansion of the United States, 1803-1855” (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 2008), 1-14; Derek R. Everett, 
“Frontiers Within: State Boundaries and Borderlands in the American West” (Ph.D. diss., University of Arkansas, 
2008), 1-70; Stefan Heumann, “The Tutelary Empire: State and Nation-Building in the 19th Century United States” 
(Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 2009), 1-13, 69-275; Claudio Saunt, Unworthy Republic: The 
Dispossession of Native Americans and the Road to Indian Territory (New York: W.W. Norton, 2020). 
45 Journal of Lieutenant James Allen, July 17, 1832, in Schoolcraft’s Expedition to Lake Itasca: The Discovery of the 
Source of the Mississippi, ed. Philip P. Mason (Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1958), 259–60. 
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Federal sovereignty generally remained a legal fiction on the upper Mississippi and Missouri 
river systems. 
By framing this study as one of militarized culture, this dissertation also reconsiders the 
ways historians understand military institutions.  Turning the fiction of sovereignty into reality 
was the responsibility of the War Department, both through the U.S. Army and through the War 
Department’s authority over Indian affairs.  This dissertation follows the path of the new military 
history and uses the Army as a lens to see broader patterns of the political, institutional, and 
social development of the United States and American political culture.  Posing questions about 
the roles of soldiers as diplomats and cultural ambassadors, as well as the force’s internal social 
and class divisions, destabilizes notions of a monolithic American state presence in the West.  
This shift also permits the nuanced study of intercultural contact at multiple levels beyond formal 
diplomatic exchanges between elite military leaders.46  Histories of the United States Army as 
the primary agent of federal power tend to follow four broad categories: battle and campaign 
histories, organizational or institutional histories, development and exploration histories, and as 
agents of policy.  The focus on battles and strategies severely limits the types of questions it 
addresses and ignores intercultural contact beyond relatively infrequent wars against on the Great 
Plains prior to 1860, or makes them secondary to concerns about professionalization relative to 
                                               
46 Edward M. Coffman, The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784-1898 (Oxford: Oxford 
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2002); Daniel Scallet, “‘This Inglorious War’: The Second Seminole War, the Ad Hoc Origins of American 
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European armies.47  These works often minimize the effects of contact in shaping Native 
American societies and militaries or role in United States political development.48  Narrow views 
of soldiers as merely instruments of policy assume Native Americans to be the subjects of policy 
rather than coequals.49 
 Samuel Watson’s sweeping two volume study of the officer corps on the frontier from 
1810-1846 rightly situates United States military history as formative to the federal state and its 
relations with potential enemies and subjects along its borderlands.  It is an institutional history 
on a grand scale that more accurately reflects the complexities of military power.50  Building 
from this perspective requires understanding the Pawnee as the dominant regional political and 
military power that they were and as the main oppositional force to the U.S. Army in the region.  
This approach requires shifting focus from the Texas-Comanche-Mexico conflicts to the south 
                                               
47 See for example William R. Nestor, The Arikara War: The First Plains Indian War, 1823 (Missoula, MT: 
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50 Samuel J. Watson, Jackson’s Sword: The Army Officer Corps on the American Frontier, 1810-1821 (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 2012), 1-11; Samuel J. Watson, Peacekeepers and Conquerors: The Army Officer Corps 
on the American Frontier, 1821-1846 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2013), vii-xiii, 35-76. 
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and future Sioux-U.S. conflicts to the north to see the Platte as the first conflict zone on the Great 
Plains and one that emerged at a critical time in the development of federal power.51 
Blending the new military history with the new Indian history that emerged from the late-
1970s offers a more productive route to understand spatial and political transformations in the 
region.  The new Indian history rejects the limited conceptions of Native Americans as timeless, 
monolithic cultures and reintroduces the dynamism of their politics and the transformative 
possibilities of intercultural exchanges.52  As Pekka Hämäläinen writes, Native Americans have 
returned to history as “full-fledged protagonists,” who previously “lingered in the recesses of the 
American imagination as a kind of dark matter of history,” and as “a hazy frontier backdrop.”53  
Fluidity allowed for diverse political responses from accommodation and synthesis to resistance 
employed by different Native American groups, depending upon factors such as relative strength 
and geopolitical alliances.54  This new Indian history combines well with the new Western 
history’s interest in continuity and the lingering effects of political and cultural conquests.55  
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Texas Creation Myth. “Independent Indians and the U.S.-Mexican War,” American Historical Review, 112 
(February 2007): 36, 45; Pekka Hämäläinen suggests the Comanche had an imperial system capable of projecting 
power across long distances, transforming Spanish and Mexican peripheries into economic satellites of a Comanche 
state.   Hämäläinen, The Comanche Empire, 210; Blackhawk, Violence Over the Land, 6-10.  He argues that 
violence was a tripartite force that shifted daily life by reorganizing societies that in turn destroyed any 
conceptualization of timeless ethnographic or political Indian entities.  Violence furthermore links Native American 
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Recent work on the Mandan, Comanche, and Lakota Sioux provide a useful framework for 
reconceptualizing the basis of Indian governance projects.56 
For the Pawnee in particular and for the Platte Valley and surrounding area in general, 
there is no complete picture of how these claimants to governing authority interacted in these 
militarized diplomatic spaces.  Neither do historians have a clear understanding of how these 
encounters of soldiers, diplomats, chiefs, and others informed the constructions of political 
identities or institutional development.  Many studies of the Pawnee fit within a field of 
ethnohistorical inquiry, starting with early personal memoirs or ethnographic accounts from 
missionaries, explorers, and traders or their reminiscences, as well as turn of the twentieth 
century efforts by the anthropologists to capture the disappearing Wild West.57   
Richard White noted in 1981, that “the Pawnee have been relatively neglected by 
historians,” though the “lack of good history is somewhat compensated for by excellent 
ethnologies of the nation,” a fact he began to change by placing the Pawnee struggles of the 
nineteenth century into the context of environmental and social history.58  Taking up White’s 
challenge for a broader history of the Pawnee, masters theses by R. Paul Collister and Benjamin 
Kracht, and James Riding In’s 1991 dissertation on the development and destruction of Pawnee 
culture offer excellent studies of changing Pawnee society as they focus principally on 
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ethnohistorical approaches or outsider views of the people.59  This dissertation seeks to expand 
their framework to see the overlapping political and diplomatic struggles over space between the 
Pawnee, their neighbors, and the federal government that coincided with the social disruptions.  
Those earlier studies provide revealing views of Pawnee society internally.  This dissertation 
situates that culture externally, by locating the Pawnee in relation to a variety of regional powers. 
The Pawnee world fits between a historiography of Plains Indian wars and the conquest 
of peoples.  This dissertation examines them at a time when they were the regionally dominant 
military power and as such, the strongest claimants to political authority.  This development was 
partly the result of the Pawnee nation’s historical position as a militarized competitor to and 
eventual ally of the United States, rather than a direct military foe as the Lakota, Comanche, or 
other nations of the West that actively fought the federal government. 
The traditional news maxim of if it bleeds, it leads fits well for a historiography of Great 
Plains Native American interactions with the federal government in terms of historical interest.  
Since 1990, however, historians are becoming more interested in Pawnee relationships outside 
the traditional narratives of war and conquest to appreciate their power struggle with the United 
States as one of co-equals in the early-nineteenth century where missionaries, federal officials, 
and the U.S. Army still operated on Pawnee terms.60 
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 The following chapters trace a story of collision, contestation, and reassessment as two 
regional powers came together, argued about the control and meanings of spaces, and then 
reformulated their strategic policies and cultural understandings of their place in the Platte 
Valley.  Defining spaces and establishing boundaries is at the heart of state-building.  Who sets 
these definitions sets the narratives about control and political power over space.  The Platte was 
a meeting point where the hubris of imperial visions ran into the realities of local power politics.   
Chapter one examines the place: the Platte River Valley.  The Pawnee were at home in 
this space of rolling prairie hills and open spaces.  They set the terms of engagement and gave 
meaning to the space.  Their position between European empires, the Comanche, and the Lakota 
allowed them to build an expansionist military policy through the eighteenth century as 
middlemen in the horse-captive trade system.  The openness of the landscape created 
opportunities for people to imagine their identities and the possible uses of the land, but these 
dreams were limited by Pawnee dominance.  Europeans stumbled in with Spanish forays in the 
sixteenth-century, followed by the French in the late-seventeenth, guided more by fantasies of 
riches and trade routes than practical realities of the land and inhabitants.  At the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, a new political force in the federal government followed its own path of 
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expansion to project a vision of the West as an American place, ignorant of or unwilling to learn 
about the complexities of diplomacy, military power, and cultural norms. 
Chapter two examines the first point of extended contact between the Pawnee and the 
United States as well as neighbors like the Omaha and Otoe.  This chapter examines a hyper-
local place of Fort Atkinson and the Council Bluffs as a meeting point of cultures, diplomacy, 
and site of one of the largest garrisons of the United States Army.  Secretary of War John C. 
Calhoun’s plan to extend federal control to the edges of the Louisiana Purchase following the 
War of 1812 resulted in the development of Fort Atkinson into a self-sustaining garrison and 
what became a model American town.  It highlighted the industry, economy, and cultural norms 
seen as ideal for American colonization of the West: strict military discipline and control of its 
residents, ironically at odds with the larger democratization process at work during the shift from 
the early republic to an antebellum political culture in the rest of the country.  It was a fixed 
vision of power, and on the plains, a very limited one where federal control did not reach beyond 
the walls of the garrison.  Both the soldiers and neighboring Native Americans resisted such a 
model of control leading to reassessments over what federal expansion had to be in the West.  
Direct control did not work and threatened the very order the Army sought to build. 
Chapter 3 moves into a larger view of the region.  Fort Atkinson was abandoned in favor 
of Fort Leavenworth as the anticipated hub of a new Indian Territory that was closer to the 
American frontier.  The area just south of core Pawnee lands would house those peoples forcibly 
removed from the East as part of a larger vision of establishing the racialized legal boundaries of 
the federal state through Removal and clearly mapped territories.  What is now the state of 
Kansas and the southern portion of Nebraska would become a space of multi-ethnic forced 
migration.  The federal vision for the space remained focused on fixed power and a notion of 
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tightly controlled space centered on a fort and its militarized vision of politics.  Pawnee 
leadership, however, still defined this region as a plural set of spaces that they understood 
through careful strategic calculations.  In the face of resource competition from the arrival of the 
removed Delaware nation, increased Sioux attacks, and a smallpox epidemic, Pawnee leaders 
utilized their mobile military power to preserve their territory and strategic options.  Pawnee 
forces directed where the envisioned Indian Territory would be and on what terms.  They shaped 
the development of the future Nebraska, Kansas, and Oklahoma.  The 1833 U.S.-Pawnee treaty 
restructured the diplomatic relationship as strategic needs forced a closer relationship to the 
federal government to acquire military resources.  From the Pawnee perspective it positioned 
them as political equals over the same space even as they faced strategic challenges. 
Chapter 4 chronicles the shift in this relationship between 1833 and the end of 1835.  
After years of failures to expand beyond the narrow confines of forts and river valleys, federal 
authorities looked toward an expansive vision of military power.  Federal officials sought to 
remake the region between the Platte and Red rivers as the site for Native Americans forcibly 
removed from the East.  Developing the United States Dragoon regiment and deploying troops 
far into the Great Plains challenged the Pawnee dominance of space.  American missionaries 
arrived in the Pawnee world.  Pawnee leaders faced a strategic dilemma over the relationship to 
places they previously understood as theirs. 
By the late-1830s, this resulted in the circumstances of Chapter 5, when Pawnee 
leadership looked inward to reassess what was strategically possible and necessary for survival.  
Sioux attacks, the arrival of U.S. Dragoons, and internal divisions over the role of missionaries 
and government workers fractured Pawnee society.  What it meant to be Pawnee had to be 
modified to fit the geopolitical realities.  Pawnee leaders could no longer claim to be the masters 
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of their space.  What this meant cut to the heart of Pawnee identity.  Federal officials, 
emboldened by the success of the dragoons and the decline of Pawnee capabilities, embraced the 
notion of mobile military power.  Control was not about direct rule through forts, but about 
changing what the Pawnee saw as strategically possible.  The United States bypassed the Pawnee 
as irrelevant to larger strategic concerns after 1846.  It was both a conscious federal policy and 
an accidental result of bureaucratic chaos.  The result, the curtailment of Pawnee ability to shape 
regional politics, was precisely what federal officials wanted.  Pawnee leaders looked toward 
earlier federal models of fixed power in fortifications to protect a limited core space akin to Fort 
Atkinson.  The Pawnee inverted their relationship to the land and militarized power politics. 
 Within two generations, the Platte Valley switched from the domain of the Pawnee, to a 
contested ground, to a region constrained by federal power and authority if not yet directly 
controlled.  This was despite the best efforts and calculated strategies of Pawnee leaders.  By 
1857, the Pawnee accepted a small 15 by 30-mile reservation in Nebraska, while the United 
States was incorporating states on the Pacific coast and planning for transcontinental railways.  
This was not inevitable.  It was the result of choices made and not made and the occasional 
tragedy of circumstance.  Nor was this the end of the story.  The Pawnee did not disappear, nor 
did the United States become the unquestioned masters of the landscape.  This dissertation ends 
as the relationship between these two polities changed.  From a bilateral diplomatic contest 
between regional powers over the control of space, it became one where the domestic political 
stakes of national survival and identity took precedence as both faced existential crises. 
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Chapter One 
A Regional Collision 
 
 
The Pawnee and the United States began their complex diplomatic relationship at the turn 
of the nineteenth century.  They may have been strangers, but the relationship did not take form 
on a blank slate.  Rather, the political and military cultures of Pawnee-U.S. relations emerged as 
a product of both regional and continental developments.  
This chapter therefore examines two rising, expansive powers prior to their sustained 
contact and protracted struggles post-1818 within the Missouri and Platte valleys.  The space in 
which they met shaped their respective imaginations of the politically possible.  The Pawnee 
were the first to define their relationship to the plains and rivers and give them meaning within a 
Pawnee cosmological and temporal worldview.  They created the place.  This cultural 
underpinning of political space guided their politics as they became the Pawnee from the 
thirteenth to eighteenth centuries.  The Pawnee development and use of military power 
dominated the region.  They interacted with their immediate Native American neighbors, the 
Comanche and Sioux (who would become the most powerful indigenous nations of the mid-
nineteenth century), and increasingly after 1690, Europeans who stumbled into the Platte.   
Here, European imperial strength was minimal.  Spaniards and Frenchmen encountered 
this place and these people, providing early descriptions, but they were merely visitors to an 
unfamiliar land at the fringes of their respective empires.  The Great Plains and the Pawnee were 
known, yet ephemeral and mysterious just beyond the limits of Europeans.  It was Pawnee space, 
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regulated according to Pawnee norms, enforced by Pawnee power, within a diplomatic world of 
the Pawnee making. 
Federal entrée to the Plains after the Louisiana Purchase brought a new imperial force to 
the trans-Mississippi West, but one that stumbled in its early efforts to adjust to a new landscape, 
a powerful people, and its role on the continent in the face of European imperial collapse.  The 
United States claimed the space, but it had no ability to make those claims reality and little idea 
of what to do about it if they could.  Creating and projecting a federal vision of power that 
developed in the East was not easily transferrable to the landscape and people of the West. 
What governance looked like in the heart of the continent was contingent on the 
interactions of peoples in what was simultaneously a familiar and an alien landscape.  The 
particular land—its topography, its environmental conditions, its proximity to other spaces—
shaped power as an expression of brute strength military force and of cultural lifeways.  The 
Pawnee and the United States both prized expansion as a foundational norm of political 
behaviors.  Their march toward conflict over the nature and meaning of space at the heart of 
North America and respective histories of expansion, diplomacy, and military struggles at once 
created their notions of effective and possible politics and limited their ability to complete those 
goals.  While they never fought a war, their struggle to define the place was a constant 
negotiation over the nature of power in the Platte Valley.  Power was martial, gendered, and tied 
to geopolitical concerns, but always strongly rooted in the local conditions of the land and how 
people worked within its limitations and possibilities.  Their foundational beliefs guided the 
process of collision as they moved toward sustained, direct contact and competition after 1818. 
 
1.1  The Space 
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As Julie Maragon (Jean Simmons) tells James McKay (Gregory Peck) in the 1958 film 
The Big Country, “It is a big country.  And you shouldn’t be wandering out by yourself.  People 
have gotten lost out here you know.”1  For those new to the grass oceans and gently swelling 
hills, it was easy to feel adrift.  For those able to navigate them, however, the prairies were filled 
with possibilities to fix an order onto what others only saw as empty space.  Historian Elliot 
West called the region a place for experimentation where the landscape pushed people into 
“forever imagining new environments and trying to muscle them into being.”2  The region 
encompassed the tall-grass prairies, the mixed-grass plains, and the river valleys where the 
Pawnee spent half their year when not out hunting.  It was a dry region, but not quite the arid 
West.  It had enough rain for farmers to get by.  At their height the Pawnee had as much as 1,300 
acres under cultivation that in a good year produced as much as 30,000 bushels of corn.3  With a 
little manipulation, the landscape was very livable for those with imagination.   
This landscape made the deepest impression to many newcomers.  It was one of apparent 
sameness, a product of its long geological history of being scraped, reformed, scraped again as 
successive geological ages remade the space of the Platte watershed.  Repeated glacial periods 
cleared the land.  A great sea formed, deposited debris, dried, and turned to forest, and was 
scraped away again.  Meltwater flooded the region depositing finer sediments, the clay and sand 
so derided by Burton.  It was a slow process of streams carving valleys and gradually shaping a 
network through sandy soil and low hills.4 
                                               
1 The Big Country, dir. William Wyler, 2 hr. 46 min., MGM/United Artists, 1958, DVD. 
2 Elliot West, The Contested Plains: Indians, Goldseekers, and the Rush to Colorado (Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 1998), xxiv. 
3 White, Roots of Dependency, 157-63, 367-8 nos. 7-14. 
4 A.T. Andreas, History of the Start of Nebraska; Containing A Full Account of Its Growth from an Uninhabited 
Territory to a Wealthy and Important State; of Its Early Settlements; Its Rapid Increase in Population, and the 
Marvelous Development of its Great Natural Resources. Also an Extended Description of its Counties, Cities, 
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Like many of the Europeans before them, white travelers from the United States saw in 
this landscape a foreign place that was fundamentally different from the woodlands and river 
systems of the East.  Geographer Edwin James, who accompanied Major Stephen Long’s 
exploration party in 1819, described the region as “little less tiresome to the eye, and fatiguing to 
the spirit, than the dreary solitude of the ocean.”5  He channeled a cultural and political unease 
over the geography of a region in which federal officials, soldiers, American trappers, and 
traders operated for nearly a generation.  The prairies were vast, difficult, and too much like the 
open ocean.  Rivers were the roads, the safe places with resources, guideposts, and rest stops for 
travelers unsure of themselves in open spaces.  These were spaces to pass through, not places to 
settle.   
Baptist missionary and sometime government official Isaac McCoy spent years in the 
region.  Writing in 1835, McCoy echoed James.  The land has “a striking similarity between all 
parts of the Territory.  In its general character it is high and undulating, rather level than hilly.”  
But he saw possibilities and reported fertile soil, numerous rivers though “none of which are 
favorable to navigation,” salubrious climate, grass fit for cattle, coal, iron ore, and salt deposits 
ready for exploitation, and a prairie that could be transformed.6  It was boring because it was so 
open, so flat, so seemingly endless.  But it was a space for the imagination to create notions of 
place as a fixed, known, mapped, quantified, whole, part of the expanding United States.  Federal 
officials, army officers, traders, artists, and writers, though usually wary, saw possibilities.  
                                               
Towns, and Villages, their Advantages, Industries, Manufactures and Commerce; Biographical Sketches, Portraits 
of Prominent Men and Early Settlers; Views of Residences and Business Blocks, Cities and Towns (Chicago: The 
Western Historical Company, 1882), digitized, < http://www.kancoll.org/books/andreas_ne/geology/geology-
p6.html#physical>, accessed August 20, 2019. 
5 James, Account of an Expedition from Pittsburgh to the Rocky Mountains, 1:460. 
6 Isaac McCoy, Annual Register of Indian Affairs In the Western (or Indian) Territory, 1835-1838 (Springfield, MO: 
Particular Baptist Press, 1998), 3-4. 
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Those who actually lived in the region understood their relationship to the land.  A 
delegation of sixteen Pawnee, Omaha, Otoe, Missouri, and Kansa leaders travelled to 
Washington in 1822, three years after the establishment of Fort Atkinson and the Indian agency 
at Council Bluffs.  The tour was designed to impress these leaders with U.S. technical 
advancements prior to meeting with federal officials hoping to establish a supremacy over the 
nations.  The need to take these leaders away from their local power centers to try and impress 
them revealed the limitations of federal power within the Platte watershed, even after building 
Fort Atkinson.  Meeting with President James Monroe, Pawnee chief Sharitarish admitted to 
being impressed by American technology, but that was as it should be.  “The Great Spirit made 
us all . . . He placed us on this earth, and intended that we should live differently from each 
other,” he told Monroe, “I am like you, my Great Father, I love my country; I love my people; I 
love the manner in which we live, and I think myself and my warriors brave.”  His views 
reflected a deep comfort with the land, a place that was his source of political power and military 
strength.  It was a familiar space where he lived at relative ease across vast spaces whereas white 
Americans, he pointed out, liked their fixed settlements.  “We have every thing we want,” he told 
the president, “We have plenty of land, if you will keep your people off of it.”7   As Sharitarish 
argued, the two systems, two power centers, two ways of life were not incompatible, just suited 
to different spaces.  Pawnee and neighboring nations saw a home, easily known and understood.   
Different landscapes, different geopolitics, different sources of power and ways of life, 
and different people made the Platte watershed truly foreign space for any notion of federal 
expansion or previous Europeans merely passing through.  For those already living there, 
centuries of occupation imbued a deep meaning onto the space that rooted cultural norms of 
                                               
7 Sharitarish, “We Are Not Starving Yet,” in Our Hearts Fell to the Ground: Plains Indian Views of How the West 
was Lost, ed., Colin G. Calloway (Boston: Bedford Books, 1996), 58. 
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identity and power as part of the natural environment.  Despite grand dreams, Americans were 
unmoored on the plains.  The Pawnee were home. 
 
1.2  Pawnee Foundations 
 
Geography shaped the Pawnee.  Their deep ties to the Platte Valley provided a profound 
sense of spiritual connection to the landscape and specific locales that merged the cosmic and 
temporal worlds.  They had a centrally located position between the other emergent Native 
American peoples in the middle of North America: the Comanche, Sioux, Osage, and Cheyenne.  
Location spurred their need for military power and cultural identity as a preeminent military 
force on the Great Plains.  Their position afforded them close diplomatic ties and access to the 
larger trading networks of their neighbors while shielding them from the burden of close 
European empires.  The Pawnee were masters of their space. 
Exactly when the Pawnee arrived in the Platte Valley remains a source of disagreement, 
but it is clear that their presence extends back for many centuries.  The Pawnee nation currently 
claims a history as people of Nebraska going back 700 years.8  Archaeological and historical 
accounts suggest a more recent creation of the modern Pawnee people between the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, though their roots in the Platte watershed certainly run deep.  A major 
drought in the early-thirteenth century pushed a people known as the Upper Republicans from 
their small villages, soon covered with 10-20 inches of loess in a preview of the Dustbowl, 
eastward to the Missouri River.  By 1400, they returned to the Loup River as the climate 
                                               
8 “Pawnee History,” Pawnee Nation of Oklahoma, accessed September 19, 2019, 
https://www.pawneenation.org/page/home/pawnee-history.  This official government website lays out the stakes of 
national identity, suggesting a lineage that predates historical accounts, and the divergence of social science and 
national mythic identities. 
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improved.  Archaeological evidence suggests they were at least some of the Pawnee ancestors, 
possibly the Skidi who claimed kinship with their northern Arikara neighbors.9   
 
Image 6: The Pawnee and their neighbors circa 1800. Original Nebraska hydrography map courtesy of Daniel Feher, 
www.freeworldmaps.net. 
The three southern bands, Chaui, Kitkahahki, and Pitahawirata, may have different 
origins as a result of the Mississippian diasporas and collapse of the Arkansas Valley chiefdoms.  
The Cayas, Tula, and Quivera documented by Coronado collapsed in the wake of the first 
Spanish-brought epidemics of the early-sixteenth century.  These places were probably the 
ancestors of the Caddoan-speaking peoples of the greater Arkansas Valley, including the 
progenitors of the Pawnee.10  These places fractured from disease, environmental stress, war, and 
other factors into the societies first encountered by the French more than a century later.  The 
people fractured, reformed, and moved, many following old routes of bison hunting out into the 
                                               
9 White, Roots of Dependency, 147-9, 361-3. 
10 Duval, Native Ground, 22-28. 
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plains where they found more permanent settlement.11  The people arrived, then they began the 
process of becoming Pawnee. 
 Archaeological evidence suggests a proto-Pawnee movement into the Platte known as the 
Lower Loup Focus period between roughly 1500-1750.  By the mid-seventeenth century, village 
sites permeated the Platte tributaries primarily around Beaver Creek and Shell Creek, as well as 
the Loup River.  They covered large areas from 15 to 100 acres, usually on bluffs or hilltops, and 
at least occasionally, fortified by walls and ditches.  Remains of these fortified villages still 
appeared in the 1820s, suggesting both the pervasiveness and considerable size of the works that 
survived nearly two centuries.  By the mid-eighteenth century, the Kitkahahki and Pitahawirata 
bands split from the main Chaui band, possibly violently.  The former two then built villages on 
the Republican River and Smoky Hill and Blue Rivers respectively.  The emergence of a Pawnee 
confederacy between the Skidi and three other main bands suggests a more unified political and 
cultural identity by 1750.12  Their combined core territory was at its maximum, pointing to a 
powerful, expansionist people.  By about 1800, villages appeared about 40-60 miles west up the 
Platte.  Regardless of origins or early fractiousness between the different bands, by the time of 
extended European contact post-1720, it is possible to speak of a Pawnee confederacy with a 
generally unified notion of identity, politics, and cosmology, though with significant variations.  
Evidence of rather brutal warfare and a continuum of building practices across Pawnee bands 
                                               
11 Duval, Native Ground, 27, 58-62; White, Roots of Dependency, 148-9. 
12 The Skidi maintained a different dialect, often went on separate bison hunts, and held slightly different rituals than 
their relatives.  There is also evidence of wars between the Skidi and other Pawnee prior to 1750, suggesting the 
process of creating a Pawnee confederacy, let alone any form of unified nation was a difficult process.  White, Roots 
of Dependency, 148-9; Grinnell, Pawnee Hero Stories and Folk Tales, 223-7; James Murie, Pawnee Indian 
Societies, Pawnee Indian Societies, Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History, vol. 11, pt. 
7 (New York, 1914), 549; Dunbar, “Missionary Life Among the Pawnee,” Nebraska State Historical Society 
Collections, 16 (Lincoln, 1911): 276; Weltfish, Lost Universe, 4; Dorsey, Pawnee Mythology, 8-9; Hyde, Pawnee 
Indians, 178; Grange, Pawnee Pottery, 142-3; Waldo Wedel, The Direct-Historical Approach in Pawnee 
Archaeology, Smithsonian Miscellaneous Collections, 101, no. 3. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1941), 3. 
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that merged ritual with geography and architecture suggest a broadly applicable Pawnee 
political, cultural, and spatial identity by the mid to late-eighteenth century.  The differences 
were relatively modest compared to an overall sense of Pawnee identity against external foes.13 
Bounded by extensive hunting lands north to the Niobrara River, and as far south as the 
Cimarron, Pawnee core territory existed along the Platte River from the mouth of Skull Creek, 
north to present-day Hamilton County, Nebraska, and from the mouth of the Loup River to north 
of Cottonwood Creek.  Powerful Kiowa and Cheyenne neighbors with whom the Pawnee 
remained perpetually at war, checked Pawnee expansion to the south and west.  To the east, the 
Arikara, Omaha, Missouri, Otoe, and Kansa formed a semi-circular buffer between Sioux 
expansion, Osage migration, and Euro-American settlement.  Between 1800 and 1830, the 
Pawnee maintained a population of around 10,000 people of whom perhaps 2-3,000 were 
warriors, making them the preeminent power of the central Great Plains.14 
In the fall of 2019 the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York City displayed a 
Pawnee gun-stock form war club from about 1800 from the Charles and Valerie Diker 
Collection.  The highly polished and red-dyed wood shaped into the angular, stylized deer-leg 
offers both an effective weapon of war and a format to link the cosmos and temporal worlds of 
Pawnee power and identity.  It is richly adorned with a star chart including the Pleiades and a 
                                               
13 Roger T. Grange, “An Archaeological View of Pawnee Origins,” Nebraska History 60 (Summer 1979): 134-60; 
Roger T. Grange, Pawnee and Lower Loup Pottery, Nebraska State Publications in Archaeology, no. 3. Lincoln, 
1968, 17-34, 127-9; White, Roots of Dependency, 148-53; Gene Weltfish, The Lost Universe: Pawnee Life and 
Culture (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965) 6, 288-306; George Dorsey, Traditions of the Skidi Pawnee, 
Memoirs of the American Folklore Society, vol. 8 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1904), xiii-xiv; George Bird Grinnell, 
Pawnee Hero Stories and Folk-Tales (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961), 223-7; Murie, Pawnee Indian 
Societies, 549; George Dorsey, The Pawnee Mythology (Washington, DC: The Carnegie Institution, 1906), 8-9; 
George Hyde, The Pawnee Indians (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1974), 142-3; Wedel and Parks, 
“Pawnee Geography,” 146-7; Waldo Wedel, An Introduction to Pawnee Archaeology, Bureau of American 
Ethnology Bulletin 112 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1936): 25-42; William Duncan Strong, 
“An Introduction to Nebraska Archaeology,” Smithsonian Miscellaneous Collections 93, no. 10 (Washington, DC: 
July 20, 1935): 273-4; Douglas R. Parks, “Bands and Villages of the Arikara and Pawnee,” Nebraska History 60 
(1979): 214-239; James, Account of an Expedition from Pittsburgh to the Rocky Mountains,1:347-8, 478. 
14 White, Roots of Dependency, 150-6. 
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circle with lines suggesting storm clouds and lightning, a comet, or perhaps a representation of 
Venus that was so important in Pawnee mythologies of power and renewal.  The club directly 
linked its wielder and his conceptions of power and place within those systems.15 
Prior to white contact the Pawnee were already highly attuned astronomers, locating 
themselves within a larger cosmos.  Their detailed star charts surprised early ethnographers like 
Ralph Buckstaff who in 1927 concluded his analysis of one in the Field Museum collections that, 
“the Pawnee Indians must have had a knowledge of astronomy comparable to that of the early 
white men.”  He noted that the map contains a deep understanding of the cyclical mathematics of 
the cosmos, reflecting a number of constellations and the pathway for the transit of Venus 
through the Pleiades every eight years.16  Buckstaff’s racial assumptions about primitiveness 
aside, this is hardly surprising.   
Pawnee society closely linked the cosmic cycles and the temporal world, necessitating a 
close knowledge of the stars.  Skidi Pawnee and ethnographer James Murie recorded how 
knowledge of these movements were foundational to social organization and management of 
religious and political systems.  Venus and Mars (Evening and Morning Star, respectively) are 
linked as part of the creation of humans.  Pawnee religious rituals united the political and 
religious as one continuous harmony.  Various ceremonies including human sacrifice, linked 
                                               
15 Both the online catalogue record and the descriptive tag, as of September 2019, merely suggest the image is “a 
graceful image of a comet,” or “a circle and lightning-like lines representing spiritual energy,” respectively.  Given 
that the transit of Venus through the Pleiades happened in 1796 and 1804, the date of the club to circa 1800 would 
add further evidence to the notion of this being crafted at a time approaching the next cycle.  Item catalogue number 
L.2018.35.68, “War Club: Pawnee,” Metropolitan Museum of Art, accessed September 18, 2019, 
https://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/639782.  As of January 2020, the club has been removed from the 
museum website; Gaylord Torrence, “Star Power,” The Magazine Antiques, January/February 2019, 
(https://www.themagazineantiques.com/article/star-power/ (accessed January 23, 2020); Gaylord Torrence, Ned 
Blackhawk, Sylvia Yount, and Kamilah Foreman, Art of Native America: The Charles and Valerie Diker Collection 
(New York: The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 2018). 
16 Ralph N. Buckstaff, “Stars and Constellations of a Pawnee Sky Map,” American Anthropologist 29 (1927): 279-
85. 
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cosmic renewal, power bundles, the directional location of power, and how to physically 
represent the unity of the cosmos and people.  Power bundles of sacred objects bridged the 
worlds.17  Noted archaeo-astronomer and anthropologist Anthony Aveni simplifies this 
complexity by writing that for societies with a similar focus on renewal and the cycles of Venus, 
“they were always looking for better ways to meet the challenge of mediating the affairs of 
nature, society, and the gods.”18   
Looking back at the war club and assuming the tail of the object represents a cyclical 
transit of Venus through the Pleiades on the reverse, perhaps its path toward the four smaller 
lines with identical angles suggest a way of marking time.  If so, it may suggest that the owner 
was in his mid-30s or 40s having seen four, going on five cycles, making him an experienced 
warrior.  He would know his place in the cosmic order.  He may have participated in raids to 
secure the requisite sacrificial captives.19  The club is a singular representation of three main 
features of Pawnee identity.  It reproduces a sacred geographic knowledge of the land, the 
people, and the cosmos.  It links cultural and military power to the larger spiritual world.  
Finally, it is a physical reminder of expansion and regional power struggles for captives, horses, 
lands, and trade that made the Pawnee the premier military power of Platte Valley through the 
late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries. 
The Pawnee saw themselves as centrally located within a larger cosmos, deeply tied to 
the physical spaces they occupied as one level of a larger spiritual and temporal world.  This 
                                               
17 Murie, Pawnee Indian Societies, 549-561; George Hyde, The Pawnee Indians (Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1951, reprinted 1974), 137-9, 161.  The Missouri Gazette of St. Louis routinely printed stories of sacrifices 
and rescues of captives.  Fur trader and Indian agent Manuel Lisa gained acclaim for one such rescue of a Spanish 
boy taken captive for a sacrifice in June 1818, though the true credit was due to Pawnee chief Petalesharoo. 
18 Astronomer and anthropologist Anthony Aveni’s foundational work on ancient Mayan calendar systems 
highlights the links of celestial maps, especially of peoples with notions of cycles of death, rebirth, and continuity.  
Aveni’s work correlates well with similar Pawnee understandings of the cosmos. Anthony F. Aveni, Empires of 
Time: Calendars, Clocks, Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 203. 
19 Aveni, Empires of Time, 163-223.   
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knowledge gave power to the self-identity of a people calling themselves chatiks si chatiks or 
“Men of Men,” who emerged from the sacred union of the heavens and earth, precisely where 
they needed to be and as a people tied to sacred places.  They created the mechanisms of social, 
diplomatic, and military power to fully ascribe meaning to their space. 
 How the Pawnee inscribed meaning of place onto the vastness of the plains emerges from 
this deep sense of sacred space.  It is not that the Pawnee were unique in this belief of sacred 
geography among their neighbors, but that they had a highly specific concept of the 
cosmological links as the original people with a direct ancestral connection to the stars.  The 
Earth was created for the daughter of the Evening and Morning Stars, the Sun and Moon had a 
boy, together they created the people.20  As anthropologist Douglas Parks and archaeologist 
Waldo Wedel conclusively outlined, the Pawnee relationship to sacred places linked temporal 
power and spiritual power.  At least fourteen separate animal lodges (places that linked a watery 
underworld of animal spirits to places where they emerged) instructed humans, and acted as 
intercessors to the cosmos.  Such places were “rahurahwa:ruksti: 'u, “(being) holy ground,” and 
fixed as landmarks like springs and small hills that gave some definition to the terrain.21  These 
places bounded the Pawnee world.  The limited number of now identifiable places stretched from 
the Solomon River in present-day Kansas north throughout the Platte Valley.22 
 The Pawnee knew their space.  The appearance of Spanish horses in the Pawnee world 
transformed it.  Horses obtained from raids by other nations or the large-scale escapes following 
the 1680 Pueblo Revolt made the Pawnee an expansive Great Plains power.  It dramatically 
                                               
20 Murie, Pawnee Indian Societies, 553. 
21 Waldo R. Wedel and Douglas Parks, “Pawnee Geography Historical and Sacred,” Great Plains Quarterly 5 
(1985): 144. 
22 Wedel and Parks, “Pawnee Geography,” 147.  Their map of identifiable animal lodges and historic village sites is 
limited with only 5 of the 14 mentioned sacred sites conclusively identified, but does point to the expansive 
understanding of the Pawnee homeland. 
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extended their spatial reach.  In the process, it reshaped their culture.  By 1714, Frenchman 
Etienne de Bourgmont reported the Pawnee to be “alert, good horsemen,” suggesting at least a 
generation or two of experience.23  A century later, observers reported that a skilled Pawnee 
horseman could fire a bow in battle while hanging on the horse’s side and shooting from under 
the neck.24  By 1724, access to horses drove Pawnee foreign policy.  They concluded a peace 
with the Apache to secure access to New Mexican horses, while also raiding the Spanish 
directly.  Occasional raids on the Comanche ended by 1800 after the Pawnee negotiated a peace 
and alliance that secured more trade routes.  They traded horses with the Omaha, Arikara, Otoe, 
and Missouri, and lost them to Sioux, Cheyenne, and Kansa raiders.25 
Horses and early access to French goods meant that by as early as 1695, Pawnee forces 
raided into traditionally Apache lands to the south and west.26  Eleven years later, Spanish militia 
captain Juan de Ulibarrí reported the French trading guns to the Pawnee (possibly the Wichita 
who were sometimes labeled Pawnee Picts) and that the Cuartelejo Apache desired an alliance to 
attack their Pawnee enemies and allied French traders.27  Pawnee trading networks extended 
from the Utes in southwest Wyoming, the Comanche in Oklahoma, and the Mandan and Arikara 
on the Upper Missouri in the Dakotas and Montana, as much as 800 miles from Pawnee 
                                               
23 Bourgmont, ed. Giraud, “Exact Description of Louisiana,” 16. 
24 Reported by French trader Antoine Deshetres, and confirmed by other observers.  Washington Irving, A Tour on 
the Prairies, ed. John Francis McDermott (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956), 67. 
25 White, Roots of Dependency, 179, 373 n.4. 
26 “Louis Granillo to Diego de Vargas, Santa Fé, 29 September 1695,” in John L. Kessell, Rick Hendricks, and 
Meredith D. Dodge, eds. Blood of the Boulders: The Journals of Don Diego de Vargas, New Mexico, 1694-97 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1998), 652. 
27 Alfred Barnaby Thomas, ed. After Coronado: Spanish Exploration North of New Mexico, 1696-1727 (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1935), 68-70; Steinke, “Leading the Father,” 45. 
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territory.28  This military expansion made the Pawnee a key regional power that influenced 
geopolitics far beyond their immediate borders.   
Geography allowed considerable independence.  A dual diplomatic and military policy of 
expansion during this period integrated tightly controlled trade networks and rituals with the 
ability to project power far beyond core Pawnee lands.  A beneficial geographic position placed 
the Pawnee 12-25 days ride from Santa Fe and roughly 150 miles from the Missouri River.29  
The Spanish were too far to be a political concern.  The French, mostly confined to the eastern 
side of the Osage, were neighbors of neighbors, close enough to be useful trading partners and 
distant enough to avoid being troublesome.  Pawnee leaders could choose policies rather than 
being constantly reactive to imperial machinations. 
The Pawnee diplomatic world was of their own creation as they established the calumet 
pipe ceremony.  This ritual, widespread throughout the North American West, served as a means 
of safe conduct for travel and trade even temporarily among enemies.  Pawnee chiefs brought 
putative outsiders within a cultural and economic orbit.  By creating fictive kinships during a 
multi-day ceremony they forged diplomatic and trade ties with the Comanche, Omaha, Otoes, 
Poncas, and even their Sioux competitors.  Visitors “represented Fathers, while the ones they 
visited were designated their Children,” allowing for guests to be honored, but with reciprocal 
kinship obligations.  Outsiders were potential slaves or enemies.30  It was a highly prescribed 
ritual exchange benefitting Pawnee chiefs who increased their influence and exerted a degree of 
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unified policy that could strictly control goods entering Pawnee society, such as the liquor.31  
They positioned themselves as middlemen in the plains horse trade that shuffled animals from 
New and Old Mexico to people further east and north, and eventually the French and Americans. 
With the mechanisms for extended trade and diplomacy as well as a key location as 
middlemen, Pawnee leaders seemed to expand their power in the region.  With a collective horse 
herd of 6,000-9,000 head by the early-nineteenth century, Pawnee warriors had the means to 
expand their reach far into the plains, though of course not all were available for military use.  
The vagaries of seasonal feed and drought combined with the colder winters of the Platte Valley 
limited the herd size.32  They could project power, but not fully conquer space.  Yet this 
limitation seemingly fit within a larger policy directive to keep open lines of raiding and trade 
within an extractive economic and military system.  Horse and captive raids did not require a 
permanent presence on the land, just the ability to strike at will and retreat with the goods.  It had 
all the benefits of an extractive imperial system over tributary peoples without the hassle of 
direct administration.33 
To outsiders, the Pawnee often appeared as a more unified nation rather than four 
relatively independent bands.  This image was due in part to a policy of raiding Euro-Americans 
indiscriminately.  Everyone was a source of income for the Pawnee.  Cheyenne and Lakota 
Sioux attacks in the eighteenth century further consolidated power among a leadership caste 
concerned with military affairs.  Later observers like Edwin James noted that they “live in great 
                                               
31 Weltfish, The Lost Universe, 7, 19, 175; White, Roots of Dependency, 191; Alice C. Fletcher, The Hako: Song, 
Pipe, and Unity in a Pawnee Calumet Ceremony (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), 182, 256; Wishart, 
An Unspeakable Sadness, 31. 
32 White, Roots of Dependency, 179-181, Hämäläinen, Comanche Empire, 241; Kinbacher, “Indians and Empires,” 
216. 
33 Pawnee raids functioned as an extractive, hands-off imperialism akin to their sometime Comanche allies, though 
perhaps not as fully realized given their greater distance from New Mexico and northern Mexico.  Hämäläinen, The 
Comanche Empire, 14-15, 141-238; Delay, War of a Thousand Deserts, 114-38.  Delay is more subdued in claims of 
an imperial system at play, but the world both he and Hämäläinen describe functions in that way. 
 53 
harmony amongst themselves.”34  Social cohesion, consensus on foreign policy issues, and 
Pawnee military power meant a commanding regional dominance.  Defensively situated villages 
of prior centuries were abandoned in favor of fertile sites in river valleys with better access to 
fields and timber.35  Seasonal abandonments for hunting expeditions belied the relative 
permanence of village sites, as some were in continuous use for as long as 35 years.36  This 
extended residence and ability to range with whole populations over large hunting grounds for 
entire seasons indicated a strong ability to control and defend their agricultural and residential 
core.  Pawnee warriors projected power to their frontiers, directing foreign affairs on their own 
terms. 
 Martial culture among the Pawnee in part led to this appearance and formed a significant 
part of male Pawnee identity.37   Men trained from boyhood to be warriors.  “It was the proper 
destiny of men to go out on the warpath,” Pitahawirata Pawnee Effie Blaine recalled her father, 
chief Resaru pitku saying in the late-nineteenth century, as “it is far better to lie in the open and 
be eaten by birds.”38  Bravery was the most desired trait as it corresponded to status in temporal 
politics and the afterlife, and produced a fatalism about noble sacrifice for one’s people.39  A 
Pawnee man placed himself within a complex martial culture, at once in charge of his destiny to 
be a brave warrior, in the hands of cosmic fate about whether he would survive, and comfortable 
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with his sacrifice should he not.  Warfare was part of a ritual of sacrifice.  Trophies of war 
obtained on raids were part of a larger cosmic intertwining linked by power bundles.  If 
unsuccessful, a fallen Pawnee warrior was the sacrifice.  He was tough.  He could endure 
extremes of mental and physical toils, riding more than 100 miles in 24 hours.  He was well-
armed preferring a bow, at least in the early-nineteenth century, to a gun, along with a club, 
battle axe, shield, spear, and knife.40  He understood his identity in society, on the plains, and in 
the cosmos.  He was also not alone.  Estimates suggest the Pawnee could collectively field 2,000 
warriors in 1806, far more than their immediate neighbors like the Omaha.  This military 
strength made the Pawnee the great regional power of the central plains by 1800.41 
Historian Kurt Kinbacher and modern Omaha leader Howard Wolf argue that both the 
Omaha and Pawnee deviated from the “Indian way” by 1808.  This presents a false dichotomy of 
authentically Indian or Euro-American behaviors.   The focus on authentic behavior ignores what 
the Pawnee valued most at the time: a martial culture that linked the heavens and earth through 
dominance of their space.42 
The eighteenth century in the Platte Valley challenged Pawnee military power as they 
faced various threats from all four compass directions, moved to consolidate their position, and 
expand access to horses, captives, and guns.  Imperial machinations on the eastern side of the 
Mississippi throughout the eighteenth century upended a century of diplomatic and economic 
relationships with French imperial collapse in North America.  This process largely occurred 
outside the Pawnee world.  Their space was not the middle ground of the pays d’en haut. 
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The ubiquity of intertribal warfare highlights the machinations of regional power-politics.  
The Pawnee sought alliances, fought over trade and hunting rights, took and traded captives, and 
battled for their very existence in a complex web of alliances and enmities.  Larger powers, often 
with access to guns and horses, expanded at the expense of smaller or more isolated ones.43  
Pawnee policy appears to be one of expansion in the midst of this struggle.  They reached the 
height of their historical territorial claims suggesting they could not only sustain extended wars, 
but that both battle losses and enemy raids to take Pawnee captives did little to dent their overall 
military capabilities.44  What happened in their space was, by and large, decided by the Pawnee 
at the dawn of the nineteenth century. 
Outside of Pedro Villasur’s disastrous campaign in 1720, Pawnee territory faced no direct 
threat from European empires at least until the 1790s.  To the west, normal cycles of raids 
against the Arapaho and Cheyenne continued until at least the 1830s.45  Competition with the 
Apache in the late-seventeenth century to the west and southwards toward the greater Arkansas 
Valley limited expansion in that region and touched off a long-simmering war that lasted until 
the Comanche pushed out the Apache in the early-eighteenth century.  The ensuing border 
warfare lasted through the 1740s, with the Pawnee often getting the upper hand, while the 
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Comanche struggled to fight the Pawnee, Arapaho, and Osage, the latter now heavily armed with 
French guns.46   
Pawnee alliance-making with their distant Wichita relatives, especially the Taovayas, 
allowed them to parlay this position into one of diplomatic strength that the Comanche soon 
recognized.47  By 1750, a Comanche détente and alliance with the Taovayas brought a larger 
peace and alliance with at least the Skidi and Chaui Pawnee bands.  Combined, the three nations 
turned toward their mutual Osage enemy on the Pawnee’s southeastern flank and met with initial 
success by 1751.  Six years later, the Osage regrouped and pushed the Taovayas 200 miles 
west.48  Spanish officials noted a Pawnee-Comanche peace and trade alliance in 1795.  It was 
likely a renewal or continuation of previous arrangements that appeared to last through the 
1830s.49  Pawnee military power and diplomatic luck turned enemies into allies, further 
cementing their position as the dominant power between the Spanish-Comanche borderlands and 
the French-Osage alliance of the Missouri-Mississippi confluence. 
 It was to the north that the Pawnee faced their greatest challenge with the people known 
collectively as the Sioux, a broad term covering the seven allied groups whose western members 
were often referred to as Lakota.50  The Sioux were an unexpected imperial power on the 
margins of the plains.  Their rise from woodlands peoples without horses, guns, or metal in the 
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1650s, to being what historian Pekka Hämäläinen labels “the most powerful Indigenous nation in 
the Americas” by the mid-nineteenth century, is a story of reinvention and empire building.51   
By the 1710s, early clashes with Missouri Valley nations saw the beginning of the larger 
Sioux expansion into the plains.  By the 1750s, Lakota expansion created a crisis among the 
Omahas, Otoes, Poncas, and Iowas, all of whom fled the advance.  Raids on the Mandan 
established a Sicangus, Oglala, and Yanktonai power along the upper Missouri, and raids 
similarly reached Pawnee territory to the south.  As the United States declared its independence, 
the Sioux asserted themselves as the rising power and threat to the Pawnee, establishing the 
Missouri River between Pawnee and Sioux lands as a perpetual war zone for the next century.  
Like the Pawnee, Sioux struggles for horses, lands, and trade access dominated a broadly 
conceived foreign policy.  The rising powers competed for dominance.  By 1815, the Great 
Plains were broadly divided into a great power system of competing alliances and empires.  
Lakota raids occurred frequently enough that Edwin James reported the Pawnee routinely placed 
their horses under guard by 1819.  By 1830, the Lakota “tightened their grip on the Missouri 
artery,” as Hämäläinen argues.  They positioned themselves as controllers of river-based trade 
and ultimately the beneficiaries of a proliferation of American trading companies taking 
advantage of the deregulated chaos of the post-War of 1812 regional market.  This Lakota 
advance reached its height just as the Pawnee welcomed American newcomers into their orbit 
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with promises of trade goods, guns, and a possible ally or at least intermediary against the most 
pressing existential threat to Pawnee territory.52 
All of these realignments benefitted the Pawnee in the short-term.  The post-1776 dual 
upheavals of American independence and Sioux expansion opened more avenues for Pawnee 
trade.  As Richard White notes, the Pawnee “turned their resources, land, and labor into the 
market.”53  War is good business.  Wars between the Osage, Sac-Fox, Iowa, Missouri, and 
Kansa, who were all more directly involved with the imperial shifts of the late-eighteenth 
century meant the Pawnee filled gaps in trade networks and supplied horses to belligerents.  
They parlayed their position to trade simultaneously with the Spanish, British, French creole 
agents, and by the 1800s, Americans, as well as their own Comanche and Kiowa allies.  Lewis 
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and Clark reported “their trade is a valuable one . . . their population is increasing.”  They viewed 
the Pawnee as “friendly and hospitable to all white persons,” and could see potential allies and 
trading partners, without ever encountering the Pawnee themselves.54  Spanish officials 
desperately sought Pawnee allies and gave medals to any male of supposed importance.  Given 
the tumultuousness of the 1780s and 1790s—with continental smallpox epidemics, imperial 
realignments, and regional warfare—the fact that the Pawnee population increased suggests just 
how well-positioned they were.  Chaos benefited the Pawnee, as long as they remained just 
distant enough from it.55 
 On the cusp of sustained contact with the federal government and American traders, the 
Pawnee remained very much masters of their space.  Their military and economic position vis-à-
vis their immediate neighbors made them the dominant power.  Carefully cultivated alliances 
with the Comanche kept open vital routes for raiding and trade.  Their ongoing war with the 
Cheyenne was manageable.  While worrisome, the Lakota Sioux were not yet the existential 
threat as they would become by 1840.  Expansive and secure, the Pawnee could look to the 
nineteenth century with confidence in their power.  Americans were just another potential 
component of the Pawnee military and economic orbit. 
 
1.3  Europeans Stumble About 
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 This was a Pawnee world.  European empires had little power in the Platte.  They were 
connected to the region, but they did not matter as they did for the Algonquians of the pays d’en 
haut or the Comanche of the Mexican frontier.  Spanish and French empires were present, but 
ephemeral and largely beyond the Pawnee core as few of their people were ever in direct, 
sustained contact.  The British were almost non-existent in this mid-continental space.  All 
entered the Platte Valley on Pawnee terms. 
The Spanish and French presence can appear deceptively large in no small part because 
Spanish and French documents provide the first written accounts of the Pawnee and the 
landscape, but they struggled to adjust to the space and the geopolitical realities.  Spain and 
France were deeply connected to the Pawnee world as subjects of raids, trading partners, or 
neighbors of neighbors, but even with knowledge and connections they remained peripheral.  
Their experiences on the Great Plains between 1540 and 1800 fit two general modes: Spanish 
efforts to impose a military and political dominance, and French adaptations to local conditions.  
The former, guided by hubris, limited knowledge, and the near-absence of any demonstrable 
military power at the fringes of the Spanish empire, failed spectacularly.  Spain retreated toward 
a more permanent frontier line.  The latter, cognizant of its limits and more interested in 
connections than conquest, adapted itself to the ways of the plains while altering the region with 
more weapons and globally connected trade systems.  The landscape swallowed pretensions of 
European control or power as interlopers died or became part of the local cultures.  Europeans 
merely passed through. 
The landscape surprised those unfamiliar with it.  Francisco Váquez de Coronado’s 
disastrous foray into the plains in April 1541 filled his men with a sense of being lost at sea.  For 
hundreds of miles after leaving the New Mexican pueblos, they saw neither “a hill nor a hillock 
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which was three times as high as a man.  Several lakes were found at intervals . . . The country is 
like a bowl, so that when a man sits down, the horizon surrounds him all around at the distance 
of a musket shot . . . the rivers, which flow at the bottom of some ravines where the trees grow so 
thick that they were not noticed until one was right on the edge of them.  They are of dead earth,” 
recalled Pedro de Castaneda.56  Spaniards were scared by the unnerving qualities of the land, the 
herds of bison, the absence of information about their surroundings, and the people who clearly 
knew much more than they let on about how to operate in such a foreign place.  Men got lost, 
sometimes for days at a time, sometimes permanently.  They were, as historian Kathleen Duval 
so aptly writes, “adrift in these unknown and unreadable lands.”57  The failures of Coronado and 
the de Soto expeditions, the problems of settlement and revolt in New Mexico through the 1600s, 
and of powerful Native Americans meant that Spanish interest in the plains was limited.58  They 
were a hostile place best left alone. 
Not until the early-eighteenth century did the Franco-Spanish imperial rivalry spur 
renewed Spanish interest in the greater Platte Valley.  Rumors and scraps of information about 
the presence of French traders and soldiers along the Mississippi and Missouri rivers reached 
Santa Fe in the 1690s.  It was second or third hand information, though increased raids by Utes 
and Comanches supposedly with the aid and encouragement of the French confirmed deep 
suspicions about rival Europeans.   
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As early as 1700, French reports of the Pawnee suggested the Pawnee’s central 
importance and connections to the horse and captive trade originating from New Mexico.59  
Etienne Veniard de Bourgmont travelled up the Missouri River to the mouth of the Platte in 1714 
and noted that 10 villages of Pawnee lived about 80-85 miles upstream.60  Bourgmont was 
awestruck by “the most beautiful countries and the most beautiful pieces of land in the world. 
The prairies there are like seas and full of wild beasts . . . which are there in numbers that stagger 
the imagination.”61  French interests along the Missouri prompted an expedition to build Fort 
d’Orleans in 1724 near present-day Dewitt, Missouri as a diplomatic outpost.  Bourgmont used 
the location as a base from which to extend diplomatic ties to the Comanche, Pawnee, Otoe, and 
Osage.  It was in this context of French expansion that forty-five Spaniards and sixty Pueblo 
allies under Pedro Villasur left Santa Fe in 1720 for the Loup and Platte confluence to assert 
Spanish interests in the region.62   
The expedition was a tactical and strategic blunder from its inception.  Soldiers 
desperately needed for the defense of New Mexico against Ute and Comanche raids wandered 
into the midst of a war between the Pawnee and Apache without a clear understanding of local 
conditions.  Villasur had little information about where he was going and relied on a captive 
Pawnee named François Sistaca, whom promptly escaped to a Pawnee group the expedition met 
along the Platte.  The Pawnee were furious at the invasion by forces allied to their Apache 
enemies.  A surprise attack by the Pawnee killed 42 of Villasur’s men and sent the survivors 
racing toward safety in Santa Fe.  Governor Antonio Valverde y Cosío eagerly blamed a 
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supposed force of French soldiers for the defeat.  It was easier to blame other Europeans than 
acknowledge Native American power, Spanish limitations, or the combination of poor planning, 
poor intelligence, and hubris.  It was the last large-scale Spanish expedition into the region for 
almost a century as Spain struggled to defend New Mexico from increased Comanche, Ute, and 
occasional Pawnee raids.  Barely able to man their border presidios let alone expand, the Platte 
remained far outside the Spanish defensive perimeter.63 
By contrast, French interventions into the heart of Pawnee lands followed a similar 
pattern of adaptation and accommodation seen throughout much of the inland waterways of 
North America: occasional trade, intermarriage, local alliances, and systems of coexistence that 
acknowledged the local power of Native Americans.  In the trans-Mississippi West, the French 
were ever-present, but ephemeral figures.  They adapted to the locales rather than trying to bend 
the landscape and people to the whims of Paris, Quebec, or New Orleans.  Marquette (1673), 
LaSalle (1682), and Hennepin (1687) recorded Indian slaves described as Pani among 
Mississippi River peoples.  Whether they were actually Pawnee is debatable.  Pani-Maha, a 
blanket term for the hundreds if not thousands of Indian captives sold into French Illinois and 
Louisiana through the 1760s, suggests a deep connection to the Pawnee, yet a removal from 
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direct contact as Osage, Sioux, or Algonquian intermediaries provided the captives.  Reports of 
French goods reaching a people labeled “Panni” by Spanish writers appear by 1716.  By 1743, 
the French had a sense of the landscape along the whole of the Missouri at least to the Mandan as 
well contact with several of the Pawnee bands.  Throughout the first half of the eighteenth 
century, French officials viewed Louisiana, specifically the Missouri watershed, as one of 
boundless opportunities with fertile lands, river systems, and access to New Mexican silver that 
required further ascent of the Missouri.  Pawnee lands were an elusive, but tempting prize.64   
The French remained at the margins of the Pawnee world.  Frenchmen were neighbors of 
neighbors.  The post at the Osage-Missouri and later Missouri-Grand confluences remained the 
westernmost on the Missouri system, well below the Pawnee heartland.65  Positioned between 
the extreme edges of two European empires, Pawnee lands and the Platte Valley remained 
centrally important to continental imperial politics, but largely an unknown space.  As historian 
Paul Mapp writes of general European ignorance as late as the 1760s, large parts of the 
continental interior including Pawnee lands, “remained realms of rumor and imagination rather 
than of reliable information.”  Residents were often lumped into generalized categories that 
ignored complex realities, though geographic knowledge of the region improved by the 1780s.66 
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In reality, only a few Frenchmen were ever present among the Pawnee throughout much 
of the eighteenth century.  Even with the founding of St. Louis in 1764, French interactions, now 
limited to trade, intermarriage, and cultural exchanges, remained focused more on the lower 
Missouri.  Close relationships with the Osage and their geographic proximity to French 
settlements limited access to nations up river even as the Pawnee were deeply linked to the 
French trade system.67  Traders’ desires for more access to the Platte Valley, as well as the 
regional struggles between the Osage and their neighbors meant that by the late-1780s the region 
was engulfed in a larger conflict over access to the weapons, horse, and captive trade connected 
to St. Louis.68  
  French knowledge of the people and the geography far surpassed any information the 
Spanish possessed.  In large part this resulted from the complexities of French-Indian 
intermarriages and relationships among the extensive fur trade networks pioneered by the 
Chouteau family and others out of St. Louis throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  
Reports of Franco-Pawnee children appear in St. Louis baptismal records by 1773.69  Franco-
Indian families offered a tangible connection to the region, but were increasingly moved to the 
fringes of political power and cultural acceptance by their Euro-American cousins by the 
nineteenth century.70 
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Louisiana’s post-1763 transfer to Spain changed little as Madrid viewed Louisiana on the 
whole as a backwater.  Spain did not bother to send a governor until 1766, and no official 
military presence arrived in St. Louis until 1769.  British and American rivals on the borders of 
Louisiana forced Spain to expand its presence in the Missouri Valley.  The Missouri Company 
formed in 1792 with orders to seek a route to the Pacific and exert Spanish influence.  Pawnee 
raiders liberated most of the goods before traders even reached Pawnee territory and thwarted a 
similar effort four years later.  Spain continued to send emissaries toward the Pawnee through 
1810, but they could not make substantive claims to the region.  British trade increasingly 
threatened a tenuous Spanish presence.  Traders reached the Platte by 1796, but could not claim 
any serious influence.71 
The increased competition and violence associated with the horse-captive-weapons trade 
post-1790 was worrisome, but Spain generally let local merchant elites run their Indian policy 
through gift giving and trade regulations that favored established Euro-American families.  The 
merchants remained more closely aligned with the Osage, Missouri, Otoe, and Omaha than the 
Pawnee, who still occupied a more peripheral location vis-à-vis St. Louis.  It was a concession to 
reality.  Spanish focus was north and eastward toward the British and post-1783, Americans now 
just across the Mississippi.72 
Spain and France tried and failed to understand the Platte Valley.  Thwarted by their lack 
of direct knowledge, they projected their fears of a disorienting space filled with enemies or a 
fantasy of untold riches in captives, furs, and access to the Pacific and mines of New Mexico.  
Neither vision fully acknowledged the realities of the space or its people.  While Europeans 
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slowly improved their knowledge of the land, by 1800 it was still Pawnee land, ruled by Pawnee 
people and customs.  Any European pretensions to governance were simply that.  The Pawnee 
remained as they had been throughout at least the previous century.  They were a centrally 
located people on the margins of European machinations across North America, at once hidden 
by their geographic position, but deeply connected to the larger networks of trade and war across 
the Great Plains.   
 
1.4  Federal Entrée 
 
 Three interconnected histories prefigured the United States entry into the Platte prior to 
1818: Westward expansion, Indian policy, and European imperial collapse.  Federal experience 
in the trans-Mississippi West was limited.  Jefferson purchased Louisiana well before he or the 
government knew what to do with it, or had the capacity to govern it.  Federal officials needed 
the intervening fifteen years to gain control of the trans-Mississippi East before thinking about 
sustained expansion across the river.  Only in 1818 did the federal state finally possess the ability 
and geopolitical conditions necessary to envision the Missouri River system as national space. 
Prior to 1818, only a few small expeditions ventured into the larger Louisiana Purchase.  
Meriwether Lewis and William Clark were the most famous, but they never actually entered the 
Platte Valley.73  Part of the federal delay came from the need to extinguish independent Native 
American power by force or negotiation east of the Mississippi.  This also meant dealing with 
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the chaos of collapsing European empires that could aid independent Indians, threaten to reclaim 
old imperial lands, or wage war on the United States itself.  Creating the security conditions for 
expansion meant defining the boundaries of the federal state, both in terms of racial nationhood 
and its physical boundaries with the British to the north and Spanish empire and emergent 
Mexican state to the south. 
 From 1803 until 1815, federal entrée to the Missouri and Platte valleys was limited, 
occasional, and lacked any persuasive means of enforcing ownership or control.  On June 13, 
1804, the Corps of Discovery passed by two signs that perfectly encapsulated the turbulent world 
they were entering.  Near present day Kansas City, the Corps saw “the ancient village of the 
Missouris.  Of this village there remains no vestige, nor anything to recall this great and 
numerous nation…they were driven from their seat by the invasions of Sauks and other Indians 
from the Mississippi [Sioux].”  Opposite to the site, “there was an island and a French fort, but 
there is now no appearance of either, the successive inundations having probably washed them 
away.”74  One place revealed the destructiveness and disruption of the regional wars sparked by 
Sioux expansion, the other a metaphor of European imperial failure.  The power of the landscape 
literally erased the French.  Lewis and Clark did not understand the world through which they 
moved.  They were as James Ronda writes, “simply players in a complex game made more 
intricate by their very presence.”75 
The first task to expand federal power was to know the spaces and peoples.  Zebulon 
Montgomery Pike’s 1806 expedition was the first federal entrance to the Platte Valley to show 
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the flag, scout the southern border with Mexico, and announce that a new white father in 
Washington demanded obedience.  U.S-Pawnee diplomacy began as a military encounter.  Pike, 
an Army officer at the head of a military detachment, arrived to command the space and people 
into obedience.  What he found was an unsettling landscape ruled by militarily powerful people.  
He recorded that Pawnee territory was an “immense tract of meadow country.”76  Pike’s group 
relied on its Indian guides and felt lost once the party left the rivers.  After visiting the Pawnee, 
Pike followed the trails of the Spanish expedition sent to find him, and often “lost them entirely.  
This was a mortifying stroke, as we had reason to calculate, that they had good guides, and were 
on the best route for wood and water.”77  He did not even realize that at one point they wandered 
only three miles from the Arkansas River.78  Pike’s 1810 published narrative reported the region 
was, “barren soil, parched and dried up for eight months in the year, presents neither moisture 
nor nutrition sufficient, to nourish the timber.  These vast plains of the western hemisphere, may 
become in time equally celebrated as the sandy deserts of Africa.”79 
A number of Pawnee accompanied Pike’s party to monitor the interlopers, even though 
twenty infantrymen wandering about were of little danger.  A council on September 29, 1806 
reinforced this notion.  Pike reported that a large Spanish cavalry force impressed the Pawnee 
during their earlier visit and left a Spanish flag.  He insisted “it was impossible for the nation to 
have two fathers; that they must be either the children of the Spaniard or acknowledge their 
American father.”  An older chief exchanged the Spanish flag for an American, but Pike returned 
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it so that “as they had now shewn themselves dutiful children . . . I did not wish to embarrass 
them with the Spaniards,” should they return in force after delivering “an injunction that it 
should never be hoisted during our stay.”80  It must have been a farcical scene: twenty Americans 
dictating geopolitics to a nation of thousands.   
The Pawnee had just stopped the Spanish from exploring further into their country and 
warned that should Pike proceed further, they would stop him “by force of arms.”  Bluffing his 
way out, Pike threatened dire consequences of revenge from an army sent “to gather our bones 
and revenge our deaths . . . when our spirits would rejoice in hearing our exploits sung in the war 
songs of our chiefs.”81  Bluster worked.  Pike moved on after proving his readiness to die for his 
people, a characteristic the Pawnee could admire.  Considering it was a party of twenty who 
could easily be found by Spanish cavalry, there really was little risk to Pawnee geopolitics.  
Americans were a novelty to be tolerated. 
Understanding the treatment Pike and his men received by the Pawnee requires an 
understanding of the regional politics that predated the creation of the United States.  But 
understanding why Pike was there and what the federal leadership expected of him requires an 
understanding of a U.S. Indian policy that had been taking shape since the Declaration of 
Independence. 
Here was a key divergence between a narrative of thirty years of expanding federal power 
and the regional peculiarities of a landscape and people that gave federal officials pause.  Those 
on the frontlines had grave concerns about the viability of national expansion into an alien 
landscape.  Those making policy in Washington did not fully understand the regional dynamics.  
Explorers were bit players, small parties moving around country managed by others.  It was a 
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task too monumental for small, haphazard parties.  Knowing the West meant developing the 
Army into a force of both scientific exploration and American state and cultural power.  It was 
an exercise in nation-building that placed the emphasis on development at the edges of federal 
authority and it took time.82  No federal officials understood the Pawnee world. 
The adoption of the Northwest Ordnance and the Constitution created a territorial system 
under a national aegis that allowed the United States to project national power into contested 
lands.  This framework created a process for the full political incorporation of new territory.  
While nominally U.S. territory on a map, the Platte Valley remained outside this system of 
territorial governance and incorporation that had guided federal expansion since the 1780s.  This 
was a land beyond the bounds of regular federal governance. 
Federal officials did not fully realize the problems of distance and geography in 
administering the Missouri watershed.  The farthest Indian sub agencies—small diplomatic 
outposts often with no more than a low-ranking resident official and a translator—established in 
the 1810s and 1820s, were more than 1000 miles by water above St. Louis and isolated much of 
the year.  Sub Agent John Sanford, later of Dred Scott infamy, epitomized the untenable 
problems of his distant post complaining that he was “under the Superintendence of a man [in St. 
Louis] who has no more connection with me or my Indians then the governor of Vermont has.”83 
Federal authorities relied on coercive power, as territorial administration often meant 
preventing Indian wars and clearing illegal white settlements.  But that required an active and 
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sizeable military presence.  This duty fell to the U.S. Army, which acted as a federal police force 
and military buffer.  Indian wars created the federal government, at least the fiscal-military state 
capable of deploying power against non-white enemies on its margins.  This was neither a short 
nor simple process.  It was only after a series of disastrous military defeats in the early 1790s that 
the United States devoted the military and administrative resources necessary to begin to 
extinguish Native American power in the trans-Appalachian West in the mid-1790s.84   
Federal officials operated within a landscape of the familiar Eastern Woodlands and 
within military frameworks understood for generations.  Infantry, backed by networks of closely 
linked forts and settlements, fought wars of attrition against Native Americans.  Cavalry was 
aristocratic, expensive, and unnecessary.  Fortifications were both protective garrisons and 
administrative centers.  As such, they were sites of political tension between locals wary of 
coercive state power and federal officials tasked with enforcing regulations.  This model 
continued across the Mississippi after 1803.85  By the 1810s, federal power was a cudgel that 
deployed national strength against fractured Native American societies and positioned the United 
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States for continental expansion.  As historian Andrew Cayton writes, policies and laws were 
important, but more significant was “establishing the impression that the United States had the 
power to make them work.”86   
Federal policy makers can be forgiven for thinking that what worked in the East could be 
easily replicated.  After 1815, they looked westward with a reasonable expectation for continued 
success.  The territorial system largely settled questions over jurisdictions and the fears of a 
diffusion of authority over an expansive frontier.  Territories and peoples remained loyal to the 
national state through the trial of war.  Federal officials deployed military power through wars, 
built forts and infrastructure, and selectively used force against racial outsiders.  The last major 
threat of a pan-Indian confederacy disappeared, though regionally powerful groups remained.  
Federal officials entered the trans-Mississippi West with the undeserved arrogance of conquerors 
and guided by notions of racial and civilizational superiority. 
The independent United States struggled for political and racial self-definition as it tried 
to extinguish Native American power in the East by force or negotiation.  As historian Peter 
Silver writes of the great American paradox, “increased toleration for one group can nearly 
always be found tangled together with increased intolerance toward another.”  In this case a mid-
eighteenth century creation of whiteness as a political identity vis-à-vis Native Americans 
created a broadly democratic identity of white versus Indian interests and loyalties.  Race defined 
American nationalism and state-building processes.87  Federal officials used divide and conquer 
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diplomacy to exploit preexisting internal divisions within Native American societies to either 
force accommodation or flight westward.88   
Thomas Jefferson epitomized a confusion over national identity.  His conflation of race 
and nation struggled to reconcile if Native Americans “as natural republicans,” could or should 
be brought into the American political system once properly civilized and removed from the 
corrupting influence of foreign powers.   Writing to chiefs in the Old Northwest in 1808, 
Jefferson presented a generally applicable warning that “the tribe which shall begin an 
unprovoked war against us, we will extirpate from the earth.”89  If they rejected the charitable 
hand of American paternalism, the fault was theirs.  Join the American system or die.  A 
generational shift and hardening of racial boundaries promoted the latter.  By 1819, this policy 
manifested itself in the dual expulsion movements of the American Colonization Society and the 
establishment of a long-imagined Indian Territory somewhere west of the Mississippi.90   
Often grand designs ignored the physical and political realities.  Notions of racial and 
cultural superiority, expansive power, the dangers of unmanaged and unbounded peoples all fit 
into a seemingly open space ready to be shaped.  “Who can limit the extent to which the 
federative principle may operate effectively?” argued Thomas Jefferson, while defending the 
Louisiana Purchase in his second inaugural address. “Is it not better that the opposite bank of the 
Mississippi should be settled by our own brethren and children, than by strangers of another 
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family?” he asked, revealing the underlying nationalistic and racial elements of white American 
expansion.91  It was a grandiose dream by a man who often had to be brought back down to 
reality.  Lewis and Clark had not crossed Rockies, yet Jefferson was planning the full political 
incorporation of a new American West.  General James Wilkinson was more realistic about the 
strategic difficulties of governance.  He estimated that control required a minimum of 10,000 
troops, more than three and a half times the authorized size of the U.S. Army, for a proper show 
of force.92  Dreams versus realities remained the ever-present tension for federal officials in 
Washington and their agents in the field. 
Americans, like Europeans before them, could imagine nearly infinite possibilities for the 
landscape along grand scales, but with little understanding of the contextual dynamics of the 
space and people.  Jefferson briefly entertained a scheme to drain the Euro-American population 
from above the 31st parallel, move them to the Old Northwest, and turn the area into a version of 
Indian Territory.  The goal to separate racial nationalities and prevent wars was a logical idea.  It 
might prevent the insanity of confusing land claims that plagued Kentucky and Tennessee and 
the violence of contested frontiers, thus limiting the requisite expenditure of federal resources.  
Like many of his grandiose, impractical schemes, it had almost no actual support.93   
Federal authority nominally stretched to the Rockies as officials panicked over resurgent 
pan-Indian confederacies and struggled to control territories and people east of the Mississippi.  
The limited federal presence along the Platte was dictated by the limits of an overextended 
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national power prior to 1812.  Fort Osage, primarily a government-run trading factory on the 
Missouri, and Fort Madison at the confluence of the Des Moines and Mississippi, became the 
outer reaches of the federal presence in 1808.  They were far removed from Pawnee and Sioux 
lands.  French trader Pierre Chouteau urged the War Department to find “reliable and intelligent” 
men for agents among the Omaha, Otoe, Missouri, Kansa, and Pawnee in 1805 and 1806, but 
Indian agents were few and far between.  Federal officials did not conclude treaties with most of 
the regional nations until after 1816.  Primary contact remained with St. Louis-based 
merchants.94 
As federal leaders sought to extend the reach of Indian policy into the trans-Mississippi 
West in the 1810s, they selected an official who would become instrumental to U.S.-Pawnee 
relations for a generation.  In 1813, William Clark became territorial governor of Missouri, a 
position he held until statehood eight years later.  But Clark was already serving as the principle 
Indian agent for the territory west of the Mississippi, and it was in this role that he would become 
a principle figure in the U.S. and Pawnee diplomatic world. 
Given federal vulnerability during the War of 1812, it took years for Clark to enact a 
grand vision for federal-Native American relations west of the Mississippi.  Fears, both real and 
imaginary, of British-aligned tribes through the War of 1812 prioritized protecting vulnerable 
frontiers rather than expanding American influence.  Clark spent the war largely balancing a 
complex web of allies and competing interests.  The war in the Mississippi-Missouri confluence 
was in large part a contest between Native American groups, a fact Clark realized, if bemoaned. 
“Missouri tribes must either be engaged for us, or they will be opposed to us without doubt,” he 
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advised the War Department.  The Mississippi was now the site of “the most destructive Indian 
war.”95  Reporting on his efforts, Clark told Secretary of War William Crawford that “I adopted 
the only expedient in my power calculated to check the British influence and the extension of 
British warfare, which was to set some of the large tribes of the Missouri, nearest our southern 
frontiers, at war against the Tribes of the Mississippi.”96  Relations with the Omaha, Otoe, Iowa, 
and Sauk were at best tenuous with the latter nations more loyal to their British allies and 
Tecumseh’s movement.97   
To secure Omaha and Otoe friendship, trader Manuel Lisa of the Missouri Fur Company 
received an appointment as Indian sub agent near Council Bluffs in 1814.  Lisa was a regular 
presence in the region and maintained a trading post rather grandiosely called Fort Lisa, eleven 
miles up the Missouri from present-day Omaha.  It was a rude compound.  Set on the slope of a 
hill “near a small creek whose steep banks enclose[d] it nearly like a wall,” it offered little more 
than a convenient gathering place and warehouse close to the river according to Paul Wilhelm, 
the duke of Württemberg who visited in the 1820s.  Fort Lisa was hardly a formidable outpost, 
but rather a nearly hidden and inaccessible place, unobtrusive within the landscape.98  Lisa’s 
connections, however, did alter the geopolitics of the region.  According to Clark, “Lisa 
succeeded to my expectations and has produced valuable changes in the dispositions of [the 
Sioux, Omaha, and Pawnee].”99  His appointment solidified Council Bluffs as indispensable for 
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future expansion while the fur company incubated local expertise like future Superintendent of 
Indian Affairs Joshua Pilcher.100  
While federal officials barely escaped national defeat and embarrassment by the British 
in the East, they looked westward upon a generally victorious war effort and toward a grand 
realignment of Indian affairs on the upper Mississippi and Missouri rivers.  Clark and other 
federal officials conducted negotiations with 37 Native American groups between 1815 and1817 
to reset relations.101  The resultant treaties positioned the United States as the dominant power 
broker for the Mississippi.  The Missouri was a different matter.  Fewer groups came to St. Louis 
for talks.  Except for Manuel Lisa’s agency, no federal presence existed west of Fort Osage.102 
 Federal expansion required a physical presence to delineate boundaries and redefine 
space as American.  Clark pushed early and hard for more forts along the newly negotiated 
boundaries, arguing for the Arkansas River that “to prevent settlements extending up the 
Arkansaw (sic) as well as to detect illicit Trade, a military post is essential.”103  Major General 
Edmund Gaines agreed in principal, suggesting two of the three main purposes of the Army were 
to build forts and infrastructure.  Forts were teaching laboratories for troops, but as fixed 
positions they limited force readiness.  “Soldier[s] should explore the country bordering on the 
frontier and obtain from actual observation a knowledge of its topography,” he argued.  Troops 
could not learn everything “from books or within the walls of a Fort.”104  An expansive notion of 
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fort building combined with practical local knowledge were key to a national security predicated 
on distinct boundaries between white Americans and the frontiers.    
Following the War of 1812, federal officials could look toward this expansive view of 
continental power because of the larger chaos of the Atlantic world as European empires 
collapsed under internal pressures and the crises of the Napoleonic Wars.  Napoleon’s failed 
effort to rebuild the French empire in Haiti and Louisiana resulted in the fire sale of the latter to 
the United States.  Relations with Britain, though at times tense, entered a period of relative calm 
and increased trade.  The crisis points of Anglo-American relations shifted from the Great Lakes 
and support for Native American resistance to claims over Oregon.105  The United States had the 
geopolitical space to expand. 
Relations with Spain were a different matter.  The crumbling empire faced revolutions 
across Latin America and a borderland in North America it could not defend.  A volatile 
situation, exacerbated by renegade white Americans, independent Native Americans, and 
popular support for Latin American revolutions threatened federal control and ability to direct a 
national policy.  Foreign relations, the Madison and Monroe administrations discovered, required 
expanded federal control of Americans as well as their borders.  Negotiations for U.S. 
acquisition of Florida began in 1818, spurred by the region’s part in supporting independent 
Creek and Seminole power in the Southeast.  The negotiations eventually included a settlement 
of the southern boundary of the United States, clarifying the ambiguities of the Louisiana 
Purchase with the Transcontinental Treaty of 1819.  By the spring of 1819, federal officials 
could look to stable if permeable borders on the north and south, erasure of European claims to 
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the space in between—minus the Pacific coast—and a belief, however wrong, that any remaining 
Native American powers were now a solely federal problem.106 
As Secretary of State John Quincy Adams quipped about federal ambitions in North 
American to British ambassador Stratford Canning in 1821, “keep what is yours, leave the rest of 
the continent to us.”107  The question was what to do with it.  A group of active expansionists 
pushed federal policy toward a vision of continental dominance, among them John Quincy 
Adams, Henry Clay, Thomas Hart Benton, Andrew Jackson, and especially John C. Calhoun 
who as secretary of war took responsibility to make the vision a reality. 
By 1817, Congressional desire for a distinct western Indian Territory and stronger border 
controls increased sharply.  The Committee on Public Lands worried that “the present irregular 
form of the frontier, deeply indented by tracts of Indian territory, presents an extended boundary 
on which intercourse is maintained between the citizen and the savage, the effect of which on the 
moral habits of both is not unworthy of regard.”  Without a clearly delineated physical, racial, 
and national boundary “the civilized man cannot be improved, and by which there is ground to 
believe the savage is depraved.”108   
Many Army officers shared this sentiment, particularly Gaines, under whose command 
frontier military policy took definitive shape.  His was a vision of benevolent paternalism 
focused on humanitarian goals of government sponsored civilizing efforts where subordinate 
Indians recognized federal supremacy coupled with the ability to compel obedience.  As early as 
1815, he saw frontier Indians as easy to conquer and, “should the neighboring Indians renew 
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their system of massacre on our exposed settlements a prompt exhibition of our force and a little 
timely chastisement of these Barbarians will insure a cheap lasting peace.”109  It was hubris from 
a commander who did not know the Platte Valley.   
The Monroe administration agreed with Gaines.  Efforts by Secretary of War John C. 
Calhoun spearheaded the process of removal and the creation of a distinct boundary line that 
could be policed, patrolled, and regulated.  Taking advantage of a report on Indian trade to the 
House of Representatives, Calhoun pushed strongly for systematic regional management and 
strict regulation.  Without an active federal presence to protect American and Indian interests, he 
argued, “a state of disorder and violence would universally prevail.”110  Disorder could be guised 
as actual attacks, economic chaos, or the muddling of racial and national identities.  Moreover, 
fear of foreign influences, principally British fur traders who had operated in the Platte region 
since the 1790s, might again incite hostilities among people Calhoun considered “the most 
warlike and powerful” who were becoming the “near neighbors” of western settlements.  Such 
independence posed a direct strategic threat to American security.111 
Calhoun began a wave of experimentation to reform Indian policy and army organization.  
He saw the Missouri Valley as integral to his broad expansionist and reform agenda, where 
Council Bluffs would be “permanently occupied in considerable force,” to link posts along the 
river.112  Calhoun sought advice from his commanders who suggested a diplomatic framework to 
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treat the less advanced in a tutelary manner that Gaines recognized as the prerogative of strong, 
civilized neighbors.  “The savage must be taught and compelled to do that which is right, and to 
abstain from that which is wrong,” he argued, “The poisonous cup of barbarism cannot be taken 
from the lips of the savage by the mild voice of reason alone; the strong mandate of justice must 
be resorted to, and enforced,” leaving little doubt of the need for a boots-on-the-ground presence 
along the border.  Such a view reinforced the understanding that beyond the boundary lines 
Native American nations were still distinct, powerful entities.  Echoing Jefferson’s 1808 and 
1809 messages, Gaines argued that if Native Americans resisted, “we should annihilate them.”113 
The result was a dramatic expansion of the federal presence in the West.  By 1818, 
federal officials started thinking in vast imaginaries of spatial domination from Fort Smith on the 
Arkansas, to Council Bluffs on the Missouri, and to the Falls of St. Anthony near present-day 
Minneapolis and the future Fort Snelling.  Major Stephen H. Long’s 1819-20 expedition through 
the Great Plains to the Rocky Mountains formed the corollary portion of this strategy: map, 
explore, document, and know the places and peoples to be brought into the American orbit.114  
Long’s description of “a great sandy desert,” that was hot, parched, and “wholly unfit for 
cultivation, and of course uninhabitable by a people depending upon agriculture for their 
subsistence,” reinforced the Great Plains as unfit terra incognita.115  But this did not stop federal 
policy makers from thinking about the uses of space, even if it was unfit for white settlement. 
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 Rather than a specific place, the United States looked to grand transformations.  Federal 
knowledge and authority would remake the physical space on a scale previously inconceivable.  
As they would learn at Council Bluffs in 1819, however, federal officials and the U.S. Army in 
particular were prepared neither physically nor conceptually for the kind of power necessary to 
impose an American cultural or political norm over putatively subject peoples and places.  This 
unpreparedness was a recurring theme through the 1820s and 1830s as federal officials tried to 
imagine a new use for the trans-Mississippi West as the place to resettle Native Americans 
removed from the East.116 
  
1.5  Realignment 
 
By 1818, two vastly different regional powers appeared ready to dramatically realign the 
geopolitics of the Platte Valley.  The Pawnee recognized the emergent power on their frontier 
had to be incorporated into Pawnee diplomacy.  The United States looked to reorganize Indian 
affairs and Western diplomacy on a grand scale by blustering in to dictate a new order based on 
federal supremacy with a massive military presence.  Neither group fully accounted for the 
power of the other. 
Delegations of all four Pawnee bands traveled to St. Louis in 1818 to negotiate treaties of 
friendship with the United States, represented by William Clark and French trading magnate 
Auguste Chouteau.  It was supposed to be a reset for new relationships in preparation for the 
federal advance up the Missouri.  Pawnee leaders nominally pledged to be under federal 
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protection, acknowledge no other foreign power, and turn over any individuals who violated the 
peace to federal authorities.  They were easy pledges to make to officials hundreds of miles 
downstream with no physical presence in Pawnee territory or ability to enforce the new rules.117 
Federal military expansion sought to model direct and hierarchical control of subordinate 
places and people.  It was a manifestation of society at odds with a cultural emphasis on 
democratic individualism apparent by the 1810s.118  Those men who journeyed up the Missouri 
found a contested place where geography, pre-existing Native American ideals of masculine 
authority, and the contradictions of state claims to authority over increasingly democratic and 
unruly men thwarted the hopes for orderly federal regional consolidation.119  Secure in their 
leadership roles as mediators of the temporal and spiritual worlds, and their geopolitical position 
as the dominant power on the Platte, Pawnee leaders saw little behavior worth emulating. 
The appearance of federal forces did little to immediately change Pawnee conceptions of 
place and power.  Edwin James recorded a mixed reception at the Pawnee villages when he 
arrived in late-April 1820 with the Long Expedition and Clark’s nephew, newly appointed Indian 
Agent Benjamin O’Fallon.  Sharitarish of the Chaui and other Pawnee leaders offered a warm 
welcome and hospitality.  Tarrarecawaho, however, remained initially aloof with a “dignity of 
his appearance; but his extreme hauteur became manifest . . . by not offering his hand, or even 
deigning to look at us.”120  Tarrarecawaho previously met Clark in St. Louis and walked a careful 
diplomatic line.  He acknowledged federal power over the flow of military supplies by 
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recognizing that O’Fallon was a chief, at least in terms of the agent’s ability to control trade 
goods.  “I have no personal fear,” he told his assembled younger warriors, but would invite the 
American chief to council, “and if any of you wish to speak to him then, you have my consent.  
Do as I do; I am not ashamed of what I have done; follow my example.”121  In the context of 
Pawnee power this was a clever diplomatic position.  It reinforced Tarrarecawaho’s authority as 
he conducted the proceedings from a secure position while simple words placated the Americans. 
Telling stories conveyed an even stronger message about Pawnee self-conceptions.  A 
few days later while meeting with the Métis [recorded as Metiff] Pawnee chief, James reported a 
mourning ceremony for the losses of a war party the previous winter that included the chief’s 
half-brother, a distiguinshed full-blood Pawnee warrior.  A party of 93 Pawnee, on foot to raid 
horses and armed with only 12 guns was surrounded and attacked by a large force of Cheyenne, 
Arapaho, and Kiowa.  A brutal, day-long battle of hand to hand combat ensued with the Pawnee 
leader falling mortally wounded.  Even so, the leader urged on his men to “fight whilst you can 
move a limb, and when your arrows are expended take to your knives.”  At their most desparate 
moment he ordered the survivors to break out on a fighting retreat.  One leader was so ashamed 
at surviving he ran back to the enemy to die fighting.  Forty survivors initially escaped, but 
several wounded men requested to be killed or left to die.  One man, “after soliciting death from 
his brother repeatedly in vain . . . finally plunged his knife in his heart.”122 
It was a dramatic story filled with not so subtle messages for Americans.  Pawnee leaders 
simultaneously extolled the military bravery and capabilities of their warriors and signaled the 
lengths to which their men would go if necessary to fight for their people.  Even in defeat, 
Pawnee warriors were the masters of their fate.  Death before dishonor; death before becoming a 
                                               
121 James, Account of an Expedition from Pittsburgh to the Rocky Mountains, 1:352-3. 
122 James, Account of an Expedition from Pittsburgh to the Rocky Mountains, 1:363-4. 
 86 
burden that endangered their compatriots.  It was a thinly concealed warning.  Pawnee self-
conceptions of their bravery, martial skill, and ability to control their space and people were 
secure.  Change, if it came, would come on their terms.  James did not dwell on this message or 
its import.  Perhaps he was comforted by the federal military power deployed along the Missouri. 
That power appeared in force in 1819.  Colonel Henry Atkinson led 1,000 men from St. 
Louis toward the Yellowstone River in July as part of Calhoun’s ambitious attempt to bring the 
region into federal control.  Atkinson’s force partially escorted the Long Expedition, and the 
entire party reconvened in October as supply problems, incompetent contractors, and bad 
transportation stranded the troops at the Council Bluffs where temporary winter quarters evolved 
into the more permanent Fort Atkinson.123  The contest over control and meaning at this space, at 
one time the largest U.S. Army garrison, symbolized the larger problem of military expansion 
and federal visions for power in the Platte Valley and the West writ large.  Federal officials 
rushed to remake the space in their own image undaunted by the landscape or the complexities of 
regional politics.  Like the Europeans before, they understood little, imagined a lot, and learned 
through hard experience about the particulars of trying to remake space into a Euro-American 
place.  The United States expanded its frontier, and here among the Pawnee, the frontier pushed 
back. 
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Chapter Two 
Defining Spaces: Fort Atkinson at the Council Bluffs 
 
 
Pawnee diplomacy, politics, and the life of the Platte Valley began to change in 1819 as 
the United States arrived in earnest.  Secretary of War John C. Calhoun planned to extend federal 
authority to the Upper Missouri River by sending thousands of troops far beyond American 
settlements.  This chapter chronicles the years immediately after the United States tried to stake 
its claim to the region by constructing and manning Fort Atkinson at Council Bluffs.  Through 
this project of military construction and military occupation, the United States sought to build 
itself into the landscape and insert its vision of power into the regional diplomatic and military 
dynamics. 
Federal officials succeeded in establishing a diplomatic presence, but failed in their 
efforts to make U.S. sovereignty over the region a reality.  One fort manned by infantry fixed 
power in a small locale.  It could not remake the dynamics of an expansive region.  While the 
United States was unable to achieve its goals,  Pawnee leaders did succeed in bringing the United 
States into their diplomatic world.  They preserved their sovereignty and ability to conduct 
independent military and foreign policy outside the limited range of Fort Atkinson’s guns. 
Forts are by their nature physical symbols of state power upon the landscape.  They are 
fixed, secure, foreboding projections of coercive authority that claim a monopoly of violence 
controlled through strict hierarchy and discipline.  Fort Atkinson was supposed to fit this model.  
The military complex with its associated Indian Agency was an experiment in military 
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government predicated on a system of martial patriarchy and supported by coerced obedience.1  
This was federal authority showcased as raw coercive power. 
Council Bluffs was a space in-between centers of power.  At the eastern edge of Pawnee 
territory, it was similarly a military outpost where Pawnee leaders could engage in diplomacy, 
assess federal power, and meet rivals at a neutral location.  Native American military power 
offered competing claims of sovereignty and models of governance grounded on customary 
behavior.  Chiefs’ status originated in self-control, martial leadership, and command over the 
behavior of their young men.  Federal officers thought small and tried to maintain order within 
the fort’s confines.  Secure in their positions, Pawnee and other Native American leaders looked 
beyond Council Bluffs to diplomatic and economic networks from Mexico to Canada. 
Fort Atkinson was designed to impose a coercive order on Native American people 
outside of the American nation.  Fort Atkinson was both a military installation and a small 
agricultural settlement.  It was an atypical frontier city in that its government, social order, and 
cultural self-conceptions were guided by its martial role and population, often diametrically 
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opposed to U.S. and local Native American political cultures.2  Life at Fort Atkinson was 
bounded by law, but outside the norms of expected U.S. legal and political culture.  Here, 
expansion was about imposing control through the broad categories of labor and economics, 
crime and punishment, and military power around Council Bluffs.  Military justice theoretically 
governed the space, but rebellious members of the Army, civilian officials and workers, traders 
and travelers, and local Native Americans belied notions of authoritarian control.  The mission to 
expand control failed, spectacularly.   
Federal authorities could not control their own people or model norms of behavior that 
appealed to local Native American powers.  Nor could they project power to alter the complex 
geopolitics of the Platte and Missouri river systems.  Internal conflicts over hierarchy, authority, 
governance, and the meaning of independent manhood itself belied the supposed regularity and 
discipline of a professional military force arrayed against Native American military power.  A 
nominally secure federal space was in reality a dynamic frontier.  How federal officials and 
Native American leaders worked within common norms of martial masculinity to assert their 
authority, govern their people, and punish transgressors informed the larger debate about power 
and control of the Platte and Missouri valleys.  Federal officials did not understand the 
geopolitical world of mobile power wielded by Native American nations confident in their 
cultural norms.  In trying to make the Council Bluffs into a model of a coercive state, federal 
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officials merely alienated their own citizens and local Native Americans evaluating whether this 
new model of behavior was worth emulating. 
The power of a fort to overawe visitors, white and Indian alike, with the physical 
presence of the government and the apparent success of civilization over a savage wilderness lies 
at the heart of a persistent American myth of forts on the frontier.3  Americans conquered a 
complex wilderness space by turning it into a place with specific, ordered functions and 
appearances.  Forts naturalized narratives of power, or tried to project that image to those who 
entered the gates.4 
Such a naturalized image is precisely what some visitors saw.  On an oppressively hot 
June day in 1823 a party of American fur traders and European travelers made the short trip from 
Cabanné’s trading post along the Missouri River up to Fort Atkinson.  The intense heat and the 
dense underbrush along the difficult trail slowed the progress to a crawl as the party took more 
than an hour to make the two miles to the open prairie around the outpost.  Duke Paul Wilhelm 
of Württemberg who organized the trip as part of his North American excursions, exclaimed that 
from almost every direction from the picturesque bluffs, “the tasteful, whitewashed buildings of 
the fort could be seen at a considerable distance, and for me it was a genuine pleasure to see the 
dwellings of civilized men, yes a small town again after months of separation in the 
wilderness.”5  For the duke, it appeared as a natural formation, a bastion of white civilization 
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conquering the savage wilderness, bringing the ax, the plough, and the government of Euro-
Americans.  The attached Indian agency with its council house and resident agent further marked 
the place as a site of federal authority, with its own gravitational pull bringing diverse peoples 
into the political orbit of the United States.  What the duke saw was simple to explain: federal 
officials created a model town that was picturesque, powerful, and organized along simple lines 
of hierarchical power.  Little did he know this was merely an illusion of control.   
What the duke did not understand was that the façade of federal power at Fort Atkinson 
hid anxious men, unsure of their authority and identity, in a daily battle over how to run the 
United States’ western-most outpost.  It was an isolated American island in a sea of grass.  Fort 
Atkinson’s residents were legally squatters whose presence depended on the benevolence of their 
Native American hosts.6  The post was claustrophobic, surrounded by potential enemies, 
hundreds of miles from resupply or reinforcement, and manned by infantry limited in their 
ability to project power beyond the fort’s cannons. 
This chapter argues that the struggles to define the fort as a place matched a larger 
struggle over the basis of masculinity and its relationship to political authority.  By trying to 
control the individual male at the frontier, federal leaders nationalized bodies to establish the 
borders of race, culture, and nation out of an international space.7  Honor, courage, self-
sufficiency, mastery over oneself and one’s subordinates, technical prowess, and the ability to 
avoid physical harm while retaining the ability to inflict it marked the successful man.  Pawnee 
                                               
6 The treaty securing the military reservation at Council Bluffs was never actually ratified by the Senate. “Treaty 
with the Mahas made at Council Bluff,” ASP:IA, 2:226. 
7 Walter Johnson, River of Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2013), 3-4.  Johnson’s examination of the cotton kingdom holds similar analytical power for the 
initial military settlement of the Missouri Valley.  The Army reproduced a Jeffersonian ideal of independent 
outposts with a clear gendered and racialized hierarchy akin to Southern plantations and the household political 
economy and social order.  It was the mechanism for turning vast land holdings into federal places and situating 
direct copies of white American households—albeit ones on a massive scale—into a foreign and international 
landscape. 
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chief Tarrarecawaho emphasized this in an 1819 council with federal officials.  “The Master of 
Life placed me on this land, and what should I fear? Nothing,” he proclaimed to Indian Agent 
Benjamin O’Fallon, “You are a chief, and I am a chief.”8  Military patriarchy as a governing 
concept could be mutually understood by federal and Native American leaders.  Here was 
equality among the leadership class.  If Tarrarecawaho was as powerful as the agent appointed 
over him, the boundaries of race, nation, and political authority remained unsettled. 
The federal presence disrupted Pawnee diplomatic and political worlds, and to a lesser 
extent Sioux, Omaha, Otoe, Missouri, and Kansa political worlds.  Disruption, however, did not 
mean erasure or total change of policies.  Pawnee leaders reassessed their positions vis-à-vis the 
federal interlopers who were largely confined to Council Bluffs.  Fixed power and limited 
control at Fort Atkinson did little to alter the Pawnee’s ability to conduct their own affairs. 
Four interrelated themes—the transformation of space, the creation of a martial culture, 
the regulation and rebellion of bodies through sexuality, labor, and criminality, and the 
diplomatic consequences of federal claims—carry through the period.  The chapter examines 
each in turn to see why this creation of a federal space failed in its goals to transform regional 
geopolitics. 
 
2.1  Making a Federal Place 
 
In July 1804 just north of present-day Omaha, the Corps of Discovery found graceful 
forests interspersed with dense brush and open prairies, testifying to the versatility of the 
landscape and health of the soil.  The sweeping vistas and overall beauty of the place were not 
                                               
8 Speech of Tarrarecawaho, October 19, 1819, James, Account of an Expedition from Pittsburgh to the Rocky 
Mountains, 1:395. 
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lost on the usually taciturn William Clark.  As he recorded in his journal, Clark and Meriwether 
Lewis “walked in the Prarie on the top of the Bluff and observed the most butifull prospects 
imagionable.”9  Clark’s idiosyncratic spelling managed to capture the essential feel of the locale.  
A tranquil scene of timber and bottomland was an ideal landscape waiting for exploitation and 
conquest by settlement.  The strategic value of the place was more immediately apparent to the 
pragmatic officer.  Clark noted that the commanding views of river valley were perfectly suited 
for a trading or military post.  The bluffs’ physical dominance of the valley made them an 
attractive meeting and trading site for the independent Native American powers.10 
For the moment, however, Clark and his compatriots could do little beyond plan for the 
future.  Forty men briefly passing through the region were hardly the agents of permanent U.S. 
colonization.  “After Delivering a Speech informing thos Children of ours of the Change which 
had taken place,” he and Lewis delivered “the wishes of our government to Cultivate friendship 
& good understanding, the method of . . . good advice & Some Directions, we made . . . Some 
presents of Meadels.”  Imagining federal control was an act of wishful thinking.  A few gifts, 
some grandiose speeches about federal territorial claims and power, renaming the local 
geography, and a quick departure were hardly the signs of authority and control.  In response, the 
Otoe chiefs at the council “each . . . delivered a Speech acknowledging their approbation to what 
they had heard and promised to prosue the good advice and Caustion, they were happy with ther 
new fathers who gave good ad[vice].”11  These were easy speeches to make to newcomers who 
could be useful allies against the Sioux and other enemies, but not direct threats themselves. 
                                               
9 William Clark, Journal, July 30, 1804, University of Nebraska Press / University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries-
Electronic Text Center, The Journals of the Lewis and Clark Expedition, http://lewisandclarkjournals.unl.edu. 
(Accessed July 17, 2014). 
10 Clark, Journal, August 3, 1804, Journals of the Lewis and Clark Expedition.  Clark recorded that as “those people 
[the Pawnee and Sioux] are now at war with each other,” he wrote, “an establishment here would bring about peace 
and be the means of Keeping of it.” 
11 Clark, Journal, August 3, 1804, Journals of the Lewis and Clark Expedition. 
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Council Bluffs occupied a potentially dangerous middle point in a violent regional 
political economy of endemic raiding and warfare sparked largely by the Sioux expansion in the 
late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries.12  Lying 70 miles south of the principal Omaha 
village, two days ride from the Otoe near the mouth of the Platte, and four days from the 
Pawnee, Council Bluffs was strategically situated, but immensely vulnerable with potentially 
thousands of neighboring warriors.13  It linked the imagined American border as the closest point 
on the Missouri to Fort Snelling near present-day St. Paul, and halfway between St. Louis and 
the Mandan Villages.  Council Bluffs was 25 days hard ride to the Santa Fe pass at the head of 
the Arkansas River.  The proximity of Spanish New Mexico troubled federal officials trying to 
establish American sovereignty in an international space.14 
To carry out Calhoun’s vision of territorial expansion up the Missouri, elements of the 5th 
and 6th Infantry began massing near St. Louis in 1818.  An advance party wintered at 
Cantonment Martin on Cow Island, near present-day Iatan, Missouri, more than 300 miles from 
St. Louis.  The main force, waiting on contractors to supply steamboats and rations, did not begin 
moving until July to rendezvous with the advance party.  In addition to reinforcing the federal 
presence at Council Bluffs, they were also supposed to escort a federal surveying expedition led 
by Major Stephen H. Long.  Long’s primary task was to survey the Missouri River up to the 
mouth of the Yellowstone River, but the expedition wintered at Council Bluffs in 1819-1820.    
Failures of the steamboats, rancid rations, and other delays meant that the reconvened 
force did not leave Cow Island until September 5, not reaching the Platte until September 26.  
Three days later they met Long’s party, which had already established winter quarters near 
                                               
12 White, “Winning of the West,” 319-47; Hämäläinen, Lakota America, 50-163, 184-91. 
13 James, Account of an Expedition from Pittsburgh to the Rocky Mountains, 1:152-3; Paul Wilhelm, Travels in 
North America, 377-8, 387-88. 
14 Calhoun to House Committee on Military Affairs, December 28, 1819, New York Spectator, January 18, 1820. 
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Manuel Lisa’s trading post and sub agency at Council Bluffs.  With little prospect for further 
travel, the force established nearby Cantonment Missouri.  Disease, exposure, concerns about 
cost overruns, and the strategic necessity of establishing a presence at Council Bluffs meant that 
temporary quarters evolved into Fort Atkinson during the spring of 1820.15   
This camp instantly established the single largest white settlement for hundreds of miles 
in any direction.  Unlike temporary fur traders or government explorers, these men were intent 
on establishing permanent residency.  Yet, American fortifications signaled an inherent 
weakness in culture and politics that needed protection.  Pawnee villages and defenses were 
more dispersed and less fortified.  The contrast highlighted the perceived superiority of Pawnee 
mobile military power.  Pawnee forces could move at ease through their country.  American 
soldiers were trapped in a world of their own making. 
At its founding as Cantonment Missouri, the post was the largest garrison in the United 
States with 1,120 men in 1819, and remained one of the largest and western-most military posts 
until its closure in 1827.16  Turning Council Bluffs into a federal place meant carving it out of the 
                                               
15 Surgeon John Gale kept a detailed diary of his time with the advance party at Cantonment Martin and the dangers 
of the exposed position.  Infrequent and inadequate supplies made the situation precarious and forced the troops to 
rely on hunting and foraging that caused at least one death from accidental gunshot.  River travel also posed 
problems in which several soldiers and at least one woman and child died.  Gale complained of the “lethargy of the 
Government, and the unwarranted and unnecessary delays . . . of the contractor,” in 1818, which could equally apply 
to the problems of 1819.  John Gale, The Missouri Expedition, 1818-1820: The Journal of Surgeon John Gale with 
Related Documents, ed. Roger Nichols (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969), 3-77, quote on 5.  In 1818, 
James Johnson of Kentucky received a contract to supply the Yellowstone Expedition.  He had extensive contracting 
experience from the War of 1812, and received $193,407.23 to supply five western forts.  Johnson’s brother Richard 
was a proponent of Calhoun’s expansion plans and one of the most powerful Congressmen in the nation before 
becoming a Senator and Vice President.  As one historian noted, “The Johnsons were accused of holding the purse 
strings of the nation for more than twenty years, and that scarcely a federal dollar passed through Kentucky that had 
not been first their property.”  James A. Padgett, “The Life and Letters of James Johnson of Kentucky,” Register of 
Kentucky State Historical Society 35, no. 113 (1937): 301-38.  The cost overruns and overall failures sparked a 
congressional investigation that made national headlines as reports and documents were reprinted in newspaper 
beyond Washington.  New York Spectator, January 18, 1820. 
16 In 1818, the 7,421-man army was scattered in 64 posts, only 23 of which had garrisons of more than 100 men. 
Coffman, The Old Army, 162. Edgar Bruce Wesley, “Life at a Frontier Post: Fort Atkinson, 1823-1826,” Journal of 
the American Military Institute 3 no. 4 (1939), 202.  Henry Atkinson, Willoughby Morgan, Talbot Chambers, 
William S. Foster, Henry Leavenworth, Daniel Ketchum and Abram Woolley all commanded the fort at different 
points.  The garrison went from a high of 1,120 in 1819 to a low of 423, rising again to 490 when the post was 
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shared intercultural space, placing a property value on it, and Americanizing its daily 
governance.  In practical terms this meant curbing violence into state sanctioned or controlled 
avenues and limiting the ability of non-whites to employ violence as a means of politics, exercise 
perceived deviant or archaic political economies, or forge autonomous diplomatic alliances.17  
Building this space required securing the locale, constructing the physical manifestations of state 
power, and projecting that power onto the local geopolitical scene.  For infantry isolated on the 
edge of the prairie, this was a monumental task. 
Calhoun’s plans for the Missouri Valley meant that Council Bluffs would be 
“permanently occupied in considerable force,” both as a secure point between posts higher 
upriver and to control the local people.18  Colonel Henry Atkinson agreed once he reached the 
Bluffs and assessed its strategic position first hand.  “It will be necessary to leave a garrison of 
four or five hundred men at the Council Bluffs; this point holds in check a greater body of 
Indians than any other on the river & covers our frontier from insult or depredation,” he argued.  
The remote position required a 300-acre garrison farm and numerous other facilities to make it 
relatively self-sufficient.19  Making Fort Atkinson such a permanent fixture suggests that 
Calhoun and his generals saw the Missouri River as a true dividing line at least for the 
foreseeable future between the United States and any future Indian Territory. 
                                               
abandoned. Virgil Ney, Fort on the Prairie: Fort Atkinson, on the Council Bluff, 1819-1827 (Washington, D.C.: 
Command Publications, 1978), 3-10. 
17 Sadosky, Revolutionary Negotiations, 6-7, 200; Lemanager, Manifest and Other Destinies, 16; Limerick, Legacy 
of Conquest, 3. 
18 Calhoun to Andrew Jackson, March 6, 1819, Calhoun Papers, 3:633-4. 
19 Atkinson to Jackson, November 25, 1819, Calhoun Papers, 4:529; Atkinson to Calhoun, January 2, 1820, 
Calhoun Papers, 4:540.  In effect, Atkinson’s plan for stationing troops at the Bluffs and further up at the Great 
Bend and Mandan Villages amounted to garrisoning about 1200 men along the Missouri River, equivalent to 10% of 
the entire U.S. Army prior to the 1821 reductions, and nearly 1/6 afterwards.  It was an overly ambitious plan and 
rightly rejected to accommodate reductions in military spending and troop levels. 
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By planting 
the flag and building 
defensive works, the 
Army anchored itself 
to the land.  Shortly 





Gad Humphreys and 
Thomas Biddle, and 
Captains Thomas Hamilton and Wyly Martin as a survey board to locate a suitable position for 
the fort.  After a brief examination, the flotilla moved upriver to a cottonwood grove three miles 
above Council Bluffs to unload and prepare winter quarters.20   
 Surgeon John Gale remained cautiously optimistic about the enterprise as he observed his 
new surroundings.  The abundance of natural produce, especially grapes and hazel nuts, as well 
as small game and fowl pointed to the site being a productive and potentially rich area.  But 
dangers lurked in the shadows.  Prairie fires burned around the encampment for five days.  
Stragglers from the flotilla dragged in and offered testimony about the hazards of travel in an 
unfamiliar country.  A detachment under Lieutenant Gantt arrived on October 13 after a week 
lost in the wilderness.  Lieutenant Keeler arrived three days later after his keelboat caught a snag 
                                               
20 Gale, The Missouri Expedition, 76. 
Image 8: Army officer Andrew Talcott's plan of Fort Atkinson, circa 1819. The fort 
was laid out in a simple square with almost no defensive outer works for siege warfare, 
and would typify western forts that only needed to be secured against small arms.  




and sank with cannons and ordnance cargo.  Lieutenant Mix appeared on the 18th after being lost 
for five days without food.  They were lucky.  Those unfortunate enough to be injured away 
from camp faced gruesome prospects.  One soldier went missing after a fight on October 19 only 
to be found the next morning “partially consumed by wolves about 90 yards from camp.”21 
The men set about hewing logs and quarrying stone at a feverish pace to complete the 
works before winter.  It was grueling fatigue duty on a massive scale.  Almost a month into 
construction Atkinson reported to the War Department that: 
 
The Barrack[s] are laid out, as well for defence, as for accommodation. They form a 
square, each curtain presenting a front of 520 feet, made of heavy logs & the wall about 
sixteen feet high & the whole of the roofs sloping to the interior. In the center of each 
projection there is a projection of twenty feet, its width twenty with a heavy ten foot gate 
in the front. These projections will be pierced with three embrasures for cannon, two 
raking the curtain each way form the centre & the other through the gate to the front. The 
upper part of the projection will have a second floor & still project over the tower part to 
afford loops to fire down through. It will be raised to barbet[te] height & will answer for 
cannon & musketry. The Barrack rooms, the exterior of which form the curtains, are 20 
feet by 20 & will be pierced with loop holes for small arms. When completed, no force 
will be able to carry the work without the aid of cannon.22 
 
The building followed the typical pattern of frontier forts: built quickly and efficiently, often of 
simple hewn logs, and cheap enough to be easily rebuilt or abandoned as the strategic conditions 
warranted.23  Federal troops convinced themselves that they had established a powerful presence.  
Quartermaster General Thomas Jesup justified the expense of the expedition by suggesting Fort 
Atkinson could “hold in check five powerful and warlike nations of Indians,” as a new regional 
hub for economic and political exchanges.24 
                                               
21 Gale, Missouri Expedition, 76-78. 
22 Atkinson to Calhoun, October 19, 1819, Calhoun Papers, 4:380-1. 
23 Army engineers faced two building challenges: erecting effective but cheap and easily abandoned forts along a 
moving frontier line and permanent, imposing earth and masonry fortress to defend against European fleets along 
the coastline.  Rarely did the interior fortifications reach similar levels of permanence in either construction 
materials or length of service as coastal fortifications. 
24 Thomas Jesup to Calhoun, December 28, 1819, New York Spectator, January 18, 1820. 
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But the federal presence was more nebulous.  Atkinson and O’Fallon negotiated a cession 
from the Omaha for a ten-square mile military reserve.  The Senate refused to ratify the treaty.  
Calhoun did not foresee a problem.  His calculus that Omaha ignorance of federal treaty-making 
processes and “the liberality of the government in fulfilling the treaty on its part, will induce the 
Indians to observe it on their part so far as to permit the peaceable occupation of the country by 
the troops of the U States, as long as it may be deemed necessary by the Govt.”25  Council Bluffs 
was a space between two legal worlds that was neither fully Omaha, nor legally American. 
At some level Fort Atkinson’s defenses were overkill.  No Native Americans possessed 
the cannons necessary to breach the walls, nor did the preeminent cavalry forces in North 
America have the strategic desire for or tactical training in siege warfare.  Why so much effort 
and labor went into building these fortifications reveals two intertwined aspects of the federal 
presence at Council Bluffs.  The troops were tactically vulnerable, a fact the strength of the fort 
was meant to mask.  The walls were equally, if not more, about regulating the internal politics of 
the post than projecting power to outsiders.  Moreover, they remained only partially complete 
through the winter of 1819-20.26 
The large structure visible for miles around would make a greater statement of state 
power than the isolated and tactically outmatched troops at Council Bluffs.  By bringing Native 
Americans to Council Bluffs for diplomatic negotiations and trade, the fort nullified some of the 
mobility advantages those nations possessed.  They had to seek out the Americans.  They were 
generally outnumbered as the whole band rarely traveled to Council Bluffs.  Perhaps most 
importantly, they conducted business in an environment specifically crafted to overawe visitors 
with the architecture of state power. 
                                               
25 Calhoun to Atkinson, April 6, 1821, Calhoun Papers, 6:20. 
26 Atkinson to Calhoun, January 2, 1820, Calhoun Papers, 4:538: Gale, Missouri Expedition, 80. 
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Despite the apparent power of the fort, outside of cannon-range and the fort walls 
infantry was at a profound disadvantage on the horse-dominated plains.  Reliance on fixed 
positions created a fundamental impotence in projecting power beyond the narrow confines of 
fortifications and the river.  Infantry at the edge of the Great Plains was militarily impractical.  
Without a regular cavalry force, the troops had little hope of imposing their will beyond the 
confines of the military reservation.  A reliance on water transport also meant that soldiers were 
confined spatially to the river bottoms.  A short transport season between low water, ice, or 
extreme flooding prevented large transport vessels or steamships from navigating the Missouri.   
Local conditions remained dangerous both from natural and Native American threats.  
There was a constant fear of theft, particularly of horses.  Conditions remained so tenuous by 
1823 that Colonel Henry Leavenworth considered it “prudent that individuals or parties who go 
any considerable distance from the Garrison should carry their arms and be prepared to defend 
themselves” from Indian war parties in the vicinity.27  That no attack ever occurred did not 
mitigate the fact that the post remained under a constant threat that subjected the inhabitants to 
an uneasy relationship with their dangerous surroundings.28 
The new works at Council Bluffs tapped into a long regional tradition of military 
fortifications.  The disruptions wrought by drought, migrations, and warfare in the sixteenth 
                                               
27 Order Book, Fort Atkinson, May 11, 1823, quoted in Ney, Fort on the Prairie, 97. 
28 The only significant military operation at the fort was the 1823 Arikara War.  A group of fur traders further up the 
Missouri in present-day South Dakota was attacked and robbed by the Arikara.  In response, Colonel Henry 
Leavenworth organized an expedition of 230 soldiers and 50 trappers, accompanied by 750-800 Sioux warriors 
supplied through the efforts of Indian Agent Benjamin O’Fallon.  The August campaign was a mixed success.  Some 
reprisals and burnings were carried out, but little actual damage or killing occurred.  The debates and recriminations 
about the policies and actions soured relations between Leavenworth and O’Fallon that nearly resulted in a duel 
between the two highest ranking Americans in the region, and involved their superiors in a lengthy and vicious 
correspondence for a considerable time afterwards.  It is significant to note that this conflict took place far from the 
fort and revealed the general impotence of federal military force away from its stronghold.  For a thorough account 
of the Arikara War see William R. Nestor, The Arikara War: The First Plains Indian War, 1823 (Missoula, MT: 
Mountain Press, 2001); J. Wendel Cox, “A World Together, A World Apart: The United States and the Arikara, 
1803-1851” (Ph.D. diss., University of Minnesota, 1998). 
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through eighteenth centuries meant the people who became Pawnee situated villages for defense, 
often on hills or bluffs.  Skidi villages near Beaver Creek still showed evidence of this period as 
late as the 1820s when the Long Expedition passed through.  One site, known locally as Pawnee 
Medicine, was an earthwork 200-feet long, 130 wide, and 30 deep, carved into the brow of the 
bluffs.  Edwin James, a botanist who accompanied the Long expedition, noted that “an entire 
nation may have here defied the efforts of an allied army of an extensive coalition.”29  These 
were older sites and did not fully reflect the current Pawnee military mindset regarding 
fortifications. 
Pawnee war parties retained the practice of fortifying their camps with small breastworks 
of logs and bison carcasses, but these were limited and temporary.  As James related about one 
such camp along the Platte, a returning Skidi party used decorated bison skulls as a form of flag, 
relating how many warriors occupied the place, their intentions to return home, and their success 
in taking scalps.30  These symbols announced a masculine prowess and power: the warriors were 
brave and accomplished, having killed four enemies, and they were unafraid of retribution by 
anyone in pursuit.  Painted skulls, poles with human hair, and the camp itself show a Pawnee 
military system fully immersed in the use of fortifications as metaphors of power and as a 
language of diplomacy, but they did not rely on them for defense. 
This sentiment was central to Pawnee understandings of diplomacy.  “I am not afraid to 
see you,” Chaui chief Tarrarecawaho proclaimed to O’Fallon in 1819, “we are fond of pipes, we 
like to travel to our neighboring nations, and smoke with them.”31  The Pawnee had little to fear 
in their own lands.  Rather than being invaded and dictated to, they sent emissaries, made peace 
                                               
29 James, Account of an Expedition from Pittsburgh to the Rocky Mountains, 1:347-8. 
30 White, Roots of Dependency, 149; Wedel, An Introduction to Pawnee Archaeology, 25-42; James, Account of an 
Expedition from Pittsburgh to the Rocky Mountains, 1:478. 
31 James, Account of an Expedition from Pittsburgh to the Rocky Mountains, 1:395. 
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and alliances, and negotiated with neighbors as equals and from positions of strength.  In short, 
the Pawnee built environment near Council Bluffs reflected a world built around military power 
that was outward looking rather than inwardly defensive.  Military and diplomatic power came 
from encounters on the Pawnee frontiers, not from the strength of defensive works. 
 Defensive walls could not stop disease or replace adequate supplies and military 
planning.  Most of the soldiers were physically exhausted after months of arduous travel and 
feverish construction.  The winter closure of the river meant supplies quickly ran low.  By 
January 10, 1820, Surgeon John Gale reported widespread scurvy among the garrison.  A diet 
consisting of “putrescent salted meat, damaged flour, a deficiency of vegetable matter and 
groceries” as well as the variable weather and the unhealthy location of the barracks contributed 
to a growing health crisis.32  By March 10, conditions were dire.  Gale reported that of 788 men 
on the rolls on January 1, 1820, 160 died from disease and an additional 360 were still on the 
sick list.33  “Entering the hospital is considered by them [the soldiers] as a certain passport to the 
grave,” reported Edwin James from his slightly better-appointed winter quarters with the Long 
Expedition.34  Those strong enough to make the trip were sent downriver to a temporary hospital 
at Fort Osage.  Of those 100 men, 30 died en route to St. Louis.35  With medical supplies 
exhausted and rations still limited and unhealthy, little could be done except wait for spring 
weather and the 600 tons of supplies requested by Atkinson for relief of the garrison.36 
                                               
32 Gale, Missouri Expedition, 81; Gale to board of officers, February 25, 1820, in Missouri Expedition, 122. 
33 Gale, Missouri Expedition, 83. Wild vegetables began appearing on April 1, 1820.  Supplies from below arrived 
with the breakup of the winter ice.  The 160 did not count the 11 who died in December from other diseases.  
Atkinson to Calhoun, March 10, 1820, Calhoun Papers, 4:709.  This is compared to only 10 other recorded scurvy 
fatalities between 1819 and 1838 in the entire U.S. Army.  Coffman, The Old Army, 186. 
34 James, Account of an Expedition from Pittsburgh to the Rocky Mountains, 1:195. 
35 Gale, Missouri Expedition, 83; Atkinson to Calhoun, April 28, 1820, Calhoun Papers, 5:80.  Gale reported that 
medical supplies were exhausted by March 20. 
36 Atkinson to Calhoun, April 7, 1820, Calhoun Papers, 5:13. 
 103 
 Conditions deteriorated so much that post commander Willoughby Morgan undertook 
extensive efforts to conceal the garrison’s vulnerable condition from Native American visitors.  
So many sick men remained in camp that they could not be easily hidden.  Pawnee leaders knew 
about the losses and sensed federal weakness.37  Officers sent out warnings against visiting the 
garrison, as Edwin James noted, because “we did not wish them to observe the extent of the 
malady, with which the camp was afflicted.”  When Ongpatonga (Big Elk), Washcomonea, and 
Big Eyes of the Omaha visited the Engineer Cantonment on March 8, 1820, only the sternest 
warnings could deter the chiefs from visiting the fort.  Ongpatonga, himself a smallpox survivor, 
exhibited no fear of disease nor of the harsh weather as “ his life was at the disposal of the great 
Wahconda only, and he could not die before his time.”38  With many of remaining men sent out 
into the woods looking for wild game, the post was a skeletal version of itself.39   
If American commanders could not safeguard their own men at their own post, their 
claims to a larger regional governing authority were mere hollow proclamations.  The supposed 
strength of federal state architecture was of little use in promoting the health and welfare of the 
garrison.  Gale indicted the site of the fort itself as a contributing factor.  “Serious objections 
may be made, to our local situation,” he reported to the officer board investigating the outbreak, 
as it was “flat, low, moist and clayey and in the neighborhood of a Stagnant pond.  Dry, Sandy 
Elevated places are most conducive to health.”40 
Colonel Atkinson returned from St. Louis to take personal command of the outpost’s 
reorganization.  By May 27, he proudly reported that the worst of the disease scare was over as 
                                               
37 James, Account of an Expedition from Pittsburgh to the Rocky Mountains, 1:350. 
38 James, Account of an Expedition from Pittsburgh to the Rocky Mountains, 1:194. 
39 Gale, April 1, 1820, Missouri Expedition, 83-4. 
40 Gale to Board of Officers, February 25, 1820, Missouri Expedition, 122. 
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no more men died.  To prevent a recurrence of scurvy he planned for 300 acres of corn and 
extensive gardens to combat dietary deficiencies. 
Despite Atkinson’s grand designs for the fort, the officers who selected the location failed 
to account for the annual flooding of the Missouri.  Floodwaters breached the riverbanks and 
rendered the bottom land uninhabitable shortly after Atkinson arrived.  Nearly 70 acres of crops 
were ruined and any plans for further movement during the summer of 1820 were immediately 
discarded as the troops set about hauling the salvaged remains up the bluffs.  Atkinson reported 
that at present “taking down and putting up again our present work, tending & gathering our 
crop, cutting & saving Hay, erecting a grist mill, opening a road to Chariton, marking a route to 
St. Peters, exploring the country between this & the Mississippi, & driving up cattle & Hogs to 
stock the post, will require all, or most of our time.”41  At the very least, such a disastrous result 
from the carefully laid plans epitomized the tenuousness of the federal presence and inexperience 
and ineffectiveness of the officer corps in creating an imposing built environment to project 
authority.  Such a colossal waste of time and resources from carelessness and hubris if not 
outright neglect of duty and incompetence went unpunished. 
Rebuilding atop the bluffs provided a more secure location.  The fort quickly grew to 
include a number of outbuildings and industrial operations such as a gristmill, barn, three-story 
warehouse for whiskey, salted meat, and grain, another building for agricultural equipment, and 
a distillery.  Soldiers built a dairy by 1825.  The efforts turned the military space into a nearly 
self-sufficient outpost more akin to a small town.42  Major General Gaines inspected the fort in 
September 1822, noting positively the apparent equal facility in cultivation and military 
                                               
41 Atkinson to Calhoun, June 19, 1820, Calhoun Papers, 5:193-4. 
42 Ney, Fort on the Prairie, 140. 
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proficiency.43  This praise was not universal.  Inspector General George Croghan’s 1826 tour 
issued alarms that instead of being a military establishment, Fort Atkinson had “barn yards that 
would not disgrace a Pennsylvania farmer, herds of cattle that would do credit to a Potomac 
grazier.”  Instead of martial honor, the agricultural system threatened masculine prowess as it 
“would sink the proud soldier into the menial and reduce him who may have gallantly led in the 
front of our enemies into a base overseer of a troop of awkward ploughmen.”44  Croghan’s 
critique had merit.  During planting and harvesting season drills and parades were dispensed with 
to concentrate on agriculture, further questioning exactly what role enlisted men held.45  This 
hero of the War of 1812 had little patience for anything but military proficiency and found the 
general lack of training at frontier posts in general truly alarming.  “Ask an officer . . . what his 
place is in the event of alarms, and his answer will be, I don’t know . . . we never have alarms,” 
Croghan reported, “Order a shell to be thrown, and the time for firing three or more will be taken 
up in finding one small enough to enter the muzzle of the howitzer.”46 
The agricultural and industrial works were part of a larger statement about American 
technical progress meant to showcase federal power.  The farming operations transformed the 
space around the fort.  Technology could transform notions of power by demonstrating federal 
officials possessed a superior civilization and the specialized knowledge needed to control 
potentially dangerous equipment like artillery and steam boilers.  Technology was also a 
practical and symbolic tool of empire that held the possibility of domesticating nature.  Steam 
could erase distances.  Howitzers and air guns could overwhelm people by cowing them into 
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submission or physically eradicating them.  Modern agriculture would make the wilds fertile and 
settled.  Yet, these technologies had potential to undo the imperial project should they fail or, 
nearly as bad, fail to make an impression on the intended targets. 
The appearance of steam power on the Missouri was supposed to shrink both time and 
space and connect the distant fringes of American empire.  Erratic water flows, shifting and 
frequent sand bars, and indeterminate channels were problems enough for keelboats on a river 
Missouri Senator Thomas Hart Benton once described as “too thick to swim in and too thin to 
walk on,” making travel at best a dangerous and exhausting undertaking.47  Steam answered the 
purposes of shrinking space.  At Council Bluffs it teetered between being a grandiose symbol of 
empire and a descent into mere novelty.  Although the contractor James Johnson’s steamboats 
were miserable failures in 1818 and 1819, Major Stephen Long’s Western Engineer managed to 
dock at Council Bluffs, proving the theoretical viability of the technology on the river. 
Based at the Engineer Cantonment, the Western Engineer became a tourist attraction for 
visiting Native Americans.  James reported that on November 15, 1819, a visiting Sioux 
delegation “hesitated to enter the boat, fearing, as they said, that it was, or that it contained, some 
great medicine of the Big-knives that might injure them” and that “they appeared much delighted 
with the boat; its size seemed to surprise them,” once they were encouraged to come aboard.48   
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Captain Wyly Martin whose two years of disastrous experiences moving boats on the 
river elicited a prediction that “any steam boat on this river of 80 tons or upwards will never 
reach the Yellow Stone, nor do I think she will ever return from whence she came.”  He 
preferred sails, oars, and rope.49  Despite these warnings, Calhoun refused to abandon the idea of 
steam power as transformative solution to federal territorial overstretch.  One or two functioning 
steamboats, Calhoun wrote Atkinson, “would give much more interest and éclat,” to a 
contemplated troop movement further up the Missouri and “probably impress the Indians and the 
British with our means of supporting and holding intercourse with the remote posts.”50  Such 
assumptions about the political importance of technology had merit. 
Shock was precisely the reaction federal officials sought.  As tools of imperial dominion, 
technological marvels like the magnets, air guns, and howitzers firing case shot upset the 
physical and cosmological balance of power.  James recorded that the effect of case shot “was 
new and unexpected, and [the Sioux] covered their mouths with their hands, to express their 
astonishment.”51  Atkinson similarly claimed that Pawnee and Omaha chiefs were “impressed 
with our strength” after viewing ordnance demonstrations in 1819.52  Technological novelty 
could make up for the limited ability of infantry to project power. 
Psychological experiments involving the regimental band, however, demonstrated limited 
power of new technologies to impress.  Musicians lined a path to the council meeting on October 
19, 1819 with the Pawnee.  When Tarrarecawaho arrived, the band “struck up, suddenly and 
loudly, a martial air.”  Observing the proceedings, James admitted that “We wished to observe 
the effect which instruments, that he had never seen or heard before, would produce on this 
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distinguished man, and therefore eyed him closely, and were not disappointed to observe that he 
did not deign to look upon them, or to manifest, by any motion whatever, that he was sensible of 
their presence.”53  For James, Tarrarecawaho was a test subject worthy of scientific study similar 
to the natural world around him.  To fail in this test of self-control would have threatened 
Tarrarecawaho’s claims to power and infantilized him as an immature individual bereft of 
political authority. 
What was apparently lost upon James and many officers at the post was that initial shock 
at new technology did not translate into permanently altered perceptions about federal power.  
Pawnee, Sioux, and other local nations who visited Council Bluffs were well acquainted with 
whites through trade and visits to St. Louis.  They gauged how the federal presence altered the 
political and spiritual balance of the region.  If federal power was limited in its ability to reach 
beyond the military reserve, it did not matter.  After examining the steamboat, one Sioux warrior 
commented to James the he “hardly thought the Big-knives had any medicine to hurt them,” 
revealing the limitations of novelty to permanently impress.54 
For Sioux and Pawnee visitors the challenge posed by American technology was how to 
incorporate these novel objects and their power into a pre-existing cosmology of power.  Pawnee 
medicine bundles containing sacred objects helped regulate the natural order.  By appropriating 
the power of an object, the bundle connected the Pawnee with tirawahut, the heavenly unifier of 
all earthly power.  This power was available through the intercession of chiefs and priests, often 
one and the same, whose ability to understand and manipulate power bundles for earthly 
purposes gave them the spiritual authority to rule.55  If American technology upset the previous 
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order, then such items had to be understood, and if possible, incorporated into the Pawnee world 
to gain their power and nullify any threats to the masculine identities of the chiefly priests as 
fathers of their children.   
Fort Atkinson similarly tried to remake the economic space with soldiers acting as a 
police force to regulate and control the influx of traders and adventurers pouring into the 
Missouri Valley.  Strict licensing accompanied by restrictions of trade goods and the posting of 
bonds by traders placed some measure of regulation on trade.  Once beyond Fort Atkinson and 
Council Bluffs, little could be done to enforce regulations or inspect cargoes.  By 1825, the 
amount of capital invested in Indian trade going up the Missouri was $78,114, by 1826 it jumped 
to nearly a quarter million dollars for the entire St. Louis Superintendency, with Pratte and 
Company accounting for $53,000 up the Missouri alone.56  O’Fallon and his fellow Indian agents 
tried to bring the Missouri River nations within a federal economic orbit by controlling access to 
goods.  This kind of economic regulation only worked if those under interdiction were 
inseparably tied to American goods.  Full control remained elusive throughout the 1820s.  
Pawnee participation in the fur trade was minimal in the 1820s, partly a condition of the 
difficulty of the Platte as a trading route, and partly from a cultural pride in self-sufficiency and 
autonomy.  As a Pawnee priest explained why the duke of Württemberg was generally welcomed 
during his tour in 1824, “You have not come into our country to trade with us nor to throw down 
all sorts of useless trash or poisoned drink . . . for our best property, nor to enrich yourself by our 
poverty.”57  Strict internal controls over the liquor trade also contributed to Pawnee resistance to 
white economic dependence.  The chiefs prevented the social problems increasingly plaguing 
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their neighbors.  Trade occurred with the sanction of chiefs, under their direct control, and only 
with their approbation.58 
Army officers built a new space physically and technologically, but in the process, often 
forgot their primary duty as soldiers or were blinded by their assumptions of superiority to the 
regional power dynamics.  They built an impressive island that could easily be bypassed by 
nations reliant on mobile power.  Making Fort Atkinson’s garrison largely self-sufficient 
required extraordinary amounts of labor.  Every acre farmed, every head of cattle tended to 
meant time away from drills.  It meant soldiers were less like military men and more like highly 
regimented farmers and laborers, subject to strict discipline and limited freedoms. 
 
2.2  Martial Culture 
 
Social categories across the United States were on display at Fort Atkinson.  The fort 
brought American bachelors, families, and men of varying social classes into close proximity 
with their Native American counterparts and those straddling multiple worlds like mixed-race 
traders.  Most residents were soldiers or had been at one point in their lives.  At Council Bluffs, 
this military identity became the lens through which men across these cultures viewed their 
status.  Rituals that recounted heroics, the behavior of men in command, and personal 
comportment outlined the framework of martial, masculine authority. 
Developing a local, martial, and mutually intelligible masculine political culture unsettled 
the boundaries of race, nationality, and class at a time when federal officials desperately tried to 
establish clearly delineated borders.59  Creating the simplicity necessary for federal control 
                                               
58 White, Roots of Dependency, 190-2. 
59 Ronda, “We Have a Country,” 739-55. 
 111 
depended on subordinating the land to the plough and the military engineer, enlisted men to 
officers, Indians to federal agents, and the individual to the state.  Control required eliminating 
complexity by fixing identities relative to status.  In a region where the idealized male was a 
fiercely independent warrior such subordination proved difficult to achieve. 
Efforts to control the norms of masculinity reveal the patriarchal assumptions about 
civilization, government, and the gendered meaning of authority.  Despite the large numbers of 
women and children present at the fort, it was a male-dominated world, a masculine outpost and 
industrial center built and maintained by disciplined men.  Many, though not all soldiers and 
officers were bachelors.  They represented the possibilities of unfettered men able to create their 
own identities and lives.  They were also a population of potentially unrestrained, violent, or 
predatory men outside the social and civil fabric of society.  At Council Bluffs, the development 
of a martial masculinity as the ideal of manhood made it problematic to control individuals who 
viewed independence as the basis of their identity.60  
This was no less so for the nation.  While the freewheeling bachelor might be a useful 
agent of empire as a fur trader, soldier, or settler, his gains had to be brought within a governing 
structure to tie masculine power to state purposes.  Defining borders, claiming dominion, and 
exercising sovereign authority over populations epitomized the nation state.  Only by controlling 
the economics, politics, and autonomous diplomacy of the Native American populations in its 
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new territories could the United States claim to have arrived at full independence.  Control 
turned international spaces into domesticated places with definitive rules, regulations, and 
hierarchies.  The Indian Agency further acted as an economic and political draw bringing the 
outside world into the theoretically separate world of the military reservation.  Such interactions 
created tensions between residents and newcomers that brought different people face-to-face and 
juxtaposed rival visions of political and social order in a militarized cultural venue. 
Encounters at Fort Atkinson reinforced the martial underpinnings of command authority.  
Individual bravery was a commonly respected trait that both informed Native American notions 
of political authority and offered white observers a common measure for judgment of character.  
Many of the field officers were combat veterans of the War of 1812.  Junior officers looked to 
military expeditions as a path to advancement in an otherwise mostly static queue for promotion.  
Omaha, and neighboring nations, similarly valued individual bravery as pathways toward 
political recognition.  “High distinction is due to the gallant soul, that advances upon the field of 
battle, and captures an enemy, or who first strikes, or even touches the body of a fallen enemy,” 
during a battle recorded James, as it denoted “extraordinary proof of courage.”  The romanticized 
notions of heroism he highlighted could be universally admirable political qualities of 
fearlessness and grit in the face death.61   
Martial masculinity translated into political power.  Kansa chief Caegawatanninga held 
“nothing like monarchical authority,” as he “maintain[ed] his distinction only by his bravery and 
good conduct.”62  Iowa chief Wangewaha typified these commonalities.  His efforts to unite the 
Iowa, Missouri, and Otoe offer a testament to his political skill and charismatic leadership.  Yet 
it was his ability to cross cultural lines that most attracted James to a man “said to have more 
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intimate knowledge of the manners of the whites than any other Indian of the Missouri.”  As a 
veteran of 50 battles and commander of seven, Wangewaha viewed inter-tribal warfare as the 
primary path to honor and status.  Conversely, he viewed federal efforts to curb Indian warfare as 
a threat to his identity as a warrior and man.  Upon being insulted by a former army captain, 
Wangewaha claimed the status of a white gentleman by demanding satisfaction in a duel 
according to white customs.63  Honor culture deemed dueling to be an activity reserved for social 
equals.  Tapping into this exclusive domain of elite white males provided the avenue for 
Wangewaha to assert his status as a political leader while showcasing his bravery in defense of 
honor.  It also threatened to undermine racial barriers of identity. 
Ritual performances affirmed the power and status of the individual while engaging in a 
conversation with the audience.  Otoe and Iowa leaders arriving for a council at the Bluffs on 
October 3, 1819 performed a ritual dance for O’Fallon that symbolically honored brave or 
distinguished persons.64  For the twenty-six-year-old recently appointed government agent, the 
affirmation of authority confirmed his identity as a politically powerful individual and part of the 
gentlemen’s club of leadership.  The ritual simultaneously claimed Native American authority to 
recognize political leaders within the very heart of one of the largest federal garrisons. 
A regular feature at councils was the “striking the post” performance.  The substance of 
the dance offered a stylized recounting of warriors on a raid and the exultation of personal 
bravery in the midst of danger.  The ritual linked masculine bravery to diplomacy and politics in 
a form that predated the federal presence in the region.  More important than the dance were the 
intervening spaces in which “a warrior would step forward and strike a flagstaff they had erected 
with a stick, whip, or other weapon, and recount his martial deeds.”  Individual warriors and 
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chiefs offered their credentials to claim authority and status.  “Whatever is then said may be 
relied upon as rigid truth,” recorded James, “being delivered in the presence of many a jealous 
warrior and witness, who could easily detect and would immediately disgrace the striker for 
exaggeration or falsehood.”65  Here was intercultural diplomacy based upon a mutually 
intelligible martial honor culture.  The emphasis on individual feats offered potential challenges 
to the self-conception of American soldiers as brave individuals.  The message, however, was 
apparently lost on the intended audience.  Atkinson dismissed Indian warfare as little beyond 
horse stealing and the loss of a few lives.66 
Military leaders sought to embody a settled respectability of manners, comportment, and 
action as commissioned gentlemen.  Commanders faced challenges of maintaining authority 
without abrogating self-assured restraint.  O’Fallon considered the Army to be a serious threat to 
civilian government, writing to his uncle William Clark that, “An Indian Agent is too dependent 
on the immediate commandant of the military post at which he is located. . . Military men are too 
frequently arbitrary, especially when in command . . . They think that everything should be 
subservient to them.”  O’Fallon revealed underlying fears about subservience as a threat to his 
own and broadly American civilian, masculine independence.  These rifts undermined federal 
ability to project a united policy front.67 
The leadership capabilities and limitations of Fort Atkinson’s different commanders, as 
well as O’Fallon as the highest ranking civilian at the fort, highlight the divergent notions of 
what an American leader could be.  Leaders modeled behavior and a vision of authority.  Failure 
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to show the traits of an effective, yet benevolent leadership undermined the authority to 
command or be perceived as worthy diplomatic partners. 
To be effective, officers had to be in firm command.  Lieutenant Colonel Talbot 
Chambers garnered a reputation for uncontrolled subordinates during his leadership of the 
advance party on the Missouri in 1818-19.  Moving a detachment up the Missouri in 1818 to 
prepare for the main force, Captain Wyly Martin flogged a civilian boatman when the latter lost 
supplies in the river.  Calhoun was infuriated that Chambers allowed such an action to occur 
under his command.  The fifty lashes represented “a most violent outrage” upon a civilian 
considering that “so distant and important a Command requires the greatest degree of firmness 
and prudence,” he wrote Chambers.  Inability to control subordinates dishonored the officer, the 
Army, and the administration.  Illegal punishments undermined claims of martial authority and 
revealed the perpetrator as unnecessarily violent.68 
As a capable leader and diplomat, Henry Atkinson most typified chiefly behavior: brave, 
stoic, in command of his subordinates, and in effect the ideal martial man.  Atkinson was 
atypical among the officers and Indian department officials at the post in his military 
competence, administrative abilities, and diplomatic skill.  But his tenure at Fort Atkinson was 
limited.  Atkinson spent most of his time in St. Louis as a regional commander after 1820, 
though he returned in 1825 to lead an expedition to make treaties with 12 Native American 
groups further upriver.  Atkinson’s partner in those negotiations, Benjamin O’Fallon, revealed 
both a personal insecurity in his position and at times a histrionic antipathy toward any Native 
Americans who offended the honor of the United States.  Only in his mid-20s, O’Fallon 
struggled to distinguish himself as an independent authority figure.  His agency extended 900 
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miles west from Council Bluffs, but his position was as tenuous as his claims to controlling the 
lands and people were grandiose.69 
Lieutenant Colonel Henry Leavenworth relieved Atkinson as post commander in 1821.  
He struggled to balance military and civilian authority in the region while adapting to the 
geographic distinctiveness and irregularity of plains warfare.  In May 1823, the Arikara attacked 
fur traders several hundred miles above the fort.  Leavenworth led the retaliatory strike, but the 
limited campaign highlighted the weakness of infantry and general inability to project federal 
power on the Great Plains.  He boasted of imagined victories and left the Indian department out 
of critical negotiations.  O’Fallon derided Leavenworth as among “the most indulgent officers of 
this fortification, how widely I differ with him as to the supposed effect produced by the 
cannonading and his unfortunate negotiations.”  Recriminations between Leavenworth and 
O’Fallon over the campaign soured their relationship and nearly resulted in a duel between the 
region’s two highest ranking Americans.70 
Major Willoughby Morgan was a competent and humanitarian officer who handled the 
scurvy crisis during the winter of 1819-20 with care for the health and morale of the post.  
Morgan’s personal sentiments reflected a measured approach to keep punishments “within the 
narrowest limits possible,” consistent with military order.  This restraint showed his self-
confidence and security in command.71 
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Lieutenant Colonel Abram Woolley commanded Fort Atkinson twice between 1825 and 
1827.  He embodied the martial martinet.  Woolley’s previous assignment at Fort Smith in the 
Arkansas Territory earned him a reputation as a detested leader who belittled subordinates with 
extra duties and punishments to reassure his authority.  Woolley marked his tenure at Fort 
Atkinson with a series of courts martial against subordinates for often imagined offenses.  
Woolley’s personal fear of retaliation became so great that by April 1826 he increased guards 
around the fort, especially for his own quarters.72  These problems epitomized concerns about 
military authority and its potential for arbitrariness outside of civilian oversight. 
These officers had to behave as diplomats toward their Native American counterparts 
who visited the fort.  Pawnee status as leaders depended upon similar expectations and 
exhibitions of chiefly conduct that would have been familiar to U.S Army officers.  An ideal 
chief had no need to proclaim his authority, it was understood.  Tarrarecawaho had “the 
appearance and character of an intrepid man,” both “artful and politic,” suggesting his leadership 
savviness.73  Historian Preston Holder synthesized this chiefly bearing, albeit with tropes of the 
stoic, noble savage, describing them as: 
 
Men to whom violence was a stranger; they were quiet and secure in their knowledge of 
their power.  Their voices were never raised in anger or threatened violence.  The image 
was one of large knowledge, infinite quiet patience, and thorough understanding.  There 
was no outward show of authority; such was not needed . . . These secure, calm, well-
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In April 1820, a delegation consisting of Benjamin O’Fallon, sub agent John Dougherty, Edwin 
James, four officers, and twenty-seven soldiers visited the Chaui village.  Prior to the council the 
group “performed a half circuit around the village, and entered it with the sound of the bugle, 
drum, and fife, with which the commonalty and children seemed highly delighted.”75  This 
performance revealed the distinction in what federal officials deemed to be legitimate reactions 
to the novelty of the situation.  A distinguished chief was mature, deliberate, and in emotional 
control.  Those without legitimate claims to leadership, commoners and children, were unable to 
master their emotional response to the display of novel forms of technology and entertainment. 
 Omaha conceptions of martial masculinity similarly valued stoic fortitude in the face of 
hardships.  “They appear to esteem themselves more brave, more generous and hospitable to 
strangers than white people,” recorded James after visiting with several of the leaders.  They 
“regard the white people, as very deficient in one of these cardinal virtues [hospitality].”76  
Pawnee leaders shared this assessment of white deficiency in the traits of a strong male.  
O’Fallon recalled a conversation with Pawnee leaders who told him “that a white man was like a 
dog—he would come into an Indian lodge for a skin as a dog for a bone, and if struck on the 
head would run out and around howling, and as soon as the hurt is over, return for the same skin 
as a dog for the same bone.”  This was a military problem.  Pawnee leaders, nor other Native 
Americans, would not fear deficient and defenseless men, O’Fallon worried.  He urged Atkinson 
to strengthen the military presence in the region to challenge the notion.  American traders and 
trappers had to be protected or “the Indian country should be shut against our citizens—They 
should not be suffered, under existing circumstances, injured by the pecuniary embarrassment of 
our country, and prospect of gain, to ascend high up this river, to loose their lives or prostrate in 
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the estimation of Indians, the American character.”  Nothing less than national honor and white 
racial pride was at stake.  For O’Fallon, these were inseparable issues.77 
 Martial culture provided a broadly understood framework through which leaders saw 
themselves and their counterparts.  These understandings informed debates about gendered 
norms of behavior among individuals and the larger relationship of those individual bodies to 
their societies.  How to regulate those bodies within such a framework was not easy. 
 
2.3  Regulating Bodies: Sex, Race, and Labor 
 
Fort Atkinson was a microcosm of the larger social fabric of the United States.  But it 
operated under an exaggerated context.  People from varying social classes and backgrounds 
labored under a strict code of military justice.  Class was more strictly denoted here than within 
the democratizing United States.  Officers, officially gentlemen by commission, and their wives 
held privileges according to rank.  Bachelor enlisted men and those few with families operated in 
a different, subordinate social world.  Their labor and bodies were not totally their own.  Fluidity 
of racial identities and gender norms among the neighboring societies of this isolated post 
threatened to upend federal claims about what constituted normative behavior.  Building and 
maintaining Fort Atkinson required a large, well-controlled workforce that could fulfill 
Calhoun’s plans to make the post nearly self-sufficient.  Theoretically the Army provided this.  
In reality, individuals bristled at being controlled. 
A physically tenuous hold on the ground matched the disciplinary instability within the 
walls.  Regulating individual bodies, labor, and punishing transgressors was key to making an 
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American place in a nominally wild space.  Forced labor, strict hierarchy, and little to no 
remuneration for those working hardest, restricted the notion of independent masculinity to those 
select few able to give orders.  Distance from American society gave officers license to behave 
as authoritarian leaders in conflict with the new ideal of American manhood.  By 1819, white 
men increasingly defined themselves in terms of service, to themselves, their families, and their 
country as independent actors making free choices about their own governance and economic 
roles.  No longer static and rooted in property, proof of manhood required continuous service as 
an active citizen.78 
Many officials at Fort Atkinson drew on ideas of order and stability learned on family 
plantations.  Atkinson, a North Carolinian from a 6,100-acre plantation, was the biggest 
proponent of Calhoun’s military agriculture program.  He even wrote of the garrison’s labor as if 
he personally did all the work, much like a plantation owner claiming his slaves’ labor as his 
own.  Indian Agent Benjamin O’Fallon embodied the conflict of slaveholders between the need 
for rigid order and cherished beliefs in individual autonomy.  Yet he saw coercive state power as 
necessary when it came to enforcing racial boundaries.  O’Fallon feared that unchecked whites 
became servants to their base passions and such behavior destroyed the republican foundations 
of national character.79 
Concerns with subservience revealed a more widespread belief in proper behavior as the 
roots of political independence.  On New Year’s Eve 1819, several Canadians employed by the 
Missouri Fur Company appeared at the Engineer Cantonment to sing and dance for some food 
and liquor.  Edwin James recorded his disgust at white men “adorned with paint after the Indian 
manner, clothed with bison robes,” with “bells attached to different parts of their dress.  So 
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completely were they disguised, that three of their employers . . . had much difficulty in 
recognizing them.”80  On this frontier, such behavior threatened a precarious racial hierarchy.  
Whiteness formed a broad racial, economic, and cultural identity that needed guarding.  Begging 
for food and liquor denoted the loss of independence akin the idealized role whites wished 
Indians to perform.  Whites, even Canadians, performing as Indians stepped too far into the 
subversive to be acceptable as an American norm. 
Exotic and taboo behaviors delineated stark cultural boundaries between Euro and Native 
American norms of masculinity.  James quoted expedition members’ shock that “sodomy is a 
crime not uncommonly committed,” among the Kansa, “the subjects of it are publicly known, 
and do not appear to be despised, or to excite disgust.”  To fulfill a vow, one mystic “submitted 
himself to it . . . which obliged him to change his dress for that of a squaw, to do their work, and 
to permit his hair to grow.”  Aside from shock value, such behavior labeled Native American 
notions of gender fluidity as dangerous, criminal, and abhorrent.  Sexuality provided clear 
distinctions.  James recorded many encounters with “respectable Indians who thought pimping 
no disgrace.”  Wangewaha, an Iowa chief and U.S. ally, visited the Engineer Cantonment with 
his three wives in December 1819.  Wangewaha’s polygamy appealed to masculine fantasies of 
unlimited sexual satisfaction, but an unsettling one as one wife “appeared to be about nine or ten 
years of age, and whom we mistook for his daughter, until he undeceived us.”  Such suggestive 
phrasing by James presents a disturbing portrait of Indian male lasciviousness.  The skilled 
warrior and diplomat remained a dangerous hypersexual exotic.81 
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Sexuality was political, especially as federal officials sought to build stricter racial 
borders.  Fears about the immaturity of young men and their political and social instability were 
rampant in the early republic and remained as a holdover of colonial norms about 
bachelorhood.82  Interracial sexual relationships among European men and Native American 
women offered entrée into Indian kinship networks for trade, served as an important source of 
labor, and helped create a creole population that built cross-cultural bridges.83  For military men 
who did not seek kinship networks for business purposes, sex resulted from basic human needs 
and actual love.  Reports of officers having multiple wives, perhaps a local, temporary “wife” as 
their legal brides were far from the frontier, were common.  At Fort Snelling, a post founded in 
1819 near present-day St. Paul, Minnesota, Lieutenant James McClure fell in love with and 
married a Sioux woman.  McClure’s love apparently went beyond simple lust as he fought a duel 
with another officer to defend her honor.84  Fort Atkinson’s surgeon John Gale fathered a child 
with Nicomi of the Iowa.85  Such relationships threatened officers’ standing as white gentlemen 
as middle-class sexual respectability took on larger cultural cachet in the 1820s.86 
Controlling the parameters of acceptable sexual relationships denoted the ability of the 
state to regulate bodies and exert power.  O’Fallon echoed traditional worries about the 
degenerating effects of Indian Country upon unworthy characters.  In arguing for a stronger 
military presence to stymie this descent, O’Fallon opined that:  
 
Owing to the want of protection, the forbearance, and mistaken policy of our government 
they fall into the power of miserable Indians, and being obliged to submit, become 
accustomed to submitting – they soon loose [sic] their national pride, and all spirit of 
resentment, and becoming slaves to their own interest, make every thing subservient to it. 
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There are some tho few high minded, brave and honourable men, whom can intercourse 
with the Indians, whom no circumstances can change.87 
 
 
This racialized notion of nationhood reveals a gendered conception of power.  Unrestrained 
profit-seeking destroyed the masculine character of individuals.  Instead of controlling their 
passions they became slaves to gain.   
Fluidity further undermined racial boundaries.  Principal Omaha chief Ongpatonga 
viewed himself as part of a trans-racial ruling elite.  “Such was his attachment to us, that he 
believed that he should, at a future day, be a white man himself,” wrote James.88  While James 
no doubt focused on the idea of white cultural superiority, Ongpatonga’s desire was a 
commentary on gendered power where his own chiefly status depended upon rituals of gifting 
and access to the large quantities of trade goods that belonged to whites.  Whiteness formed not a 
racial identity, but an economic and cultural one.  As such, a “negro belonging to the [Missouri] 
Fur Company” was described by a delegation of visiting Native Americans as “the black 
whiteman.”89 
John Dougherty provided the standard white American view of Native American women 
as sexually exotic temptresses.  He related a conversation with Omaha chief Sans Oreille about 
male control of female sexuality. “I am not so silly as to believe that a woman would reject a 
timely offer [when her husband is away hunting],” stated Sans Oreille, “Even this squaw of 
mine, who sits by my side, would, I have no doubt, kindly accede to the opportune solicitations 
of a young, handsome, and brave suitor.”  According to Dougherty, “his squaw laughed heartily, 
but did not affect to repel the imputation.”  James added that, “Many husbands will take no 
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cognizance whatever of the breach of conjugal fidelity on the part of the wife; and the offer of 
their wives for company during the night . . . was no cause of surprise to us during our stay at 
their villages.” 90  From the Native American perspective, sex played an important role in forging 
political and economic kinship networks.  From the white American perspective, this lack of 
exclusivity threatened patriarchy.  Native American men unmanned themselves by allowing 
broad access to their sexual partners.  White American norms and the establishment of restricted 
space around Fort Atkinson set women apart as objects of protected exclusivity. 
If Fort Atkinson was to be a model American community, those in command had to 
protect their immediate families.  White masculine sexuality adopted a veneer of respectability as 
the presence of families made the fort a site of supposed domestic tranquility and reproduced a 
semblance of familiar gendered order.  Protecting the nascent and vulnerable domestic sphere 
from physical and social disintegration occupied considerable time.    
Labor or leisure offered a stark dividing line among women.  Fort Atkinson modeled the 
idealized American home for those of the upper class.  Enlisted men and their wives resembled 
the growing urban working class where labor threatened conceptions of femininity and 
domesticity.  Officers’ wives enjoyed leisurely pursuits: dances, banquets, dramatic productions, 
the garrison library, and socializing among the officers and similarly ranked civilians.91    Such 
events reinforced the class differences compared to women lower on the social scale. 
Army regulations sanctioned the presence of as many as four women laborers per 
company.  They were often the wives of enlisted men or widows who worked as laundresses for 
up to 17 men each.  They were subject to military justice and regulations in return for a modicum 
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of economic security of 50 cents per month for every NCO or enlisted man’s laundry and 75 
cents per officer, as well as a whiskey ration.92  Considering the backbreaking work involved this 
was a pittance, but it meant some extra income for frontier military families trying to navigate 
the high costs of distant service.  Their work allowed upper class women a stronger claim on 
femininity as non-wage laborers in the delineation of a domestic sphere.93 
Creating an ideal domestic space of upper class, leisured women intertwined the issues of 
class, labor, and race.  Laboring American women more closely resembled their Native 
American counterparts.  Edwin James made constant references to the tropes of lazy Indian men 
by expressing shock at the apparent exploitation of female labor within their societies.  An 
Omaha man made his Sioux wife carry his furs and trade goods “whilst he carried only a keg of 
whiskey slung over his shoulders, and his gun and hunting apparatus.”94  While James was 
cutting wood, an Omaha man approached and desired a piece to make a bowl.  James handed 
him an axe, but the Omaha man indicated that it would make his hand sore, and gave it to one of 
his female companions who “handled the axe very dexterously.”  This incident upset James’s 
notion of gendered behavior as he suggested to the woman that several young men should be 
enlisted to assist her.  “She laughed significantly,” James stated, “as if she would say – you are 
ironical.”95  James intended the anecdotes to indict Native American men, but they reveal his 
own unreflective assumptions about gender, labor, and class.  He scarcely mentioned working 
white women. 
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Children at the post added to concerns about security and the development of the 
domestic sphere.  By January 1822, enough children lived at the fort to warrant establishing a 
post school.  Run by Sergeant Thomas Mumford, a 22-year old former distiller from 
Connecticut, the education was limited, but better than nothing.  Despite their military roots, the 
post children seemed to be lacking in any kind of discipline or conduct conducive to a healthy 
garrison.  Commanders had to compel attendance.96  As late as 1826, Lt. Colonel Abram 
Woolley, the post commander, had to remind parents in a regimental order that “The few 
children in the quarters must be taught habits of cleanliness by their parents and not be permitted 
to do what they please, when they please.”97  One can imagine Woolley’s frustration at the 
undisciplined behavior and its reflection upon his authority as a commander, especially 
considering his penchant for being a martial martinet and fastidious about the details of his 
command.  As a group needing constant protection and instruction, the children were a hindrance 
to the efficiency of the post from a military perspective. 
Good order required efficiency across all operations, especially as the post needed to 
supply much of its own sustenance.  Military agriculture reflected a model of American society 
in line with Southern plantations and based on similar principals of coerced labor.98  Officers 
boasted of their success turning a prairie into one of the most important and prosperous 
communities west of the Mississippi with a highly organized, hierarchical labor system.  The 
first harvest in 1820 yielded 10,000 bushels of corn, 3,000 of potatoes and turnips, and had 25 
                                               
96 Johnson, “The Sixth’s Elysian Fields,” 22; Descriptive Roll of the Sixth Infantry 1817-1827, 1823, p. 13, cited in 
Ney, Fort on the Prairie, 83-7.  At 15 cents per day, plus 50 cents per officer’s student per month and an extra ration 
of whiskey, Mumford was hardly overpaid for his work, but he was probably barely qualified.  After six months, 
Major Daniel Ketchum sought leave to remove his family to Franklin, Missouri to better educate his children.  By 
1825, Mumford was sick of the job.  Even the ability to purchase 2 gallons of whiskey per month did not induce him 
to retain the post.  Private Bonnell Berry, who had been a teacher prior to his enlistment in 1824, assumed the duties 
until the post was abandoned. 
97 Woolley, Orders 99, April 30, 1826, Sixth Infantry Regimental Order Book. 
98 Ney, Fort on the Prairie, 55; Atkinson to Calhoun, June 19, 1820, Calhoun Papers, 5:194. 
 127 
acres of vegetables.99  It was an impressive return considering that flooding inundated some 
fields and forced the evacuation and rebuilding of the post on higher ground during the summer.  
The success of individual officers testified to their mastery of men and nature.  The St. Louis 
County Agricultural Society even inducted Atkinson as an honorary member in 1823.100  One 
presumes that he did not actually lift a hoe or yoke an ox to earn such recognition.  Such efforts 
represented a total transformation of the physical space with a domestic core surrounded by 
hundreds of acres of croplands and industry.  Council Bluffs blended the political economy of a 
plantation with the size and appearance of a small town. 
For the men laboring in the fields, however, farming brought little glory and added 
fatigue.  Rather than being independent masters and yeoman farmers, they became forced 
laborers within a strict military hierarchy.  Work was dull, albeit potentially hazardous.  Hidden 
dangers required constant alertness.  Harvest time was an all-hands operation with all non-
employed soldiers mustered for duty with their weapons and under strict orders to return to the 
post at retreat.  Guards were stationed in the fields overnight to prevent the fort’s neighbors from 
stealing the produce from right under the garrison’s windows.101 
Fragmentary evidence of soldiers’ reactions to this regime exists in the court martial 
records.  Resistance to the coercive system of labor control, while rare, demonstrated class-
consciousness among enlisted men confronted with a very different picture of army life than one 
of martial glory.  During the critical planting season, refusals to work set the entire farming 
project in jeopardy.  In April 1826, Private Samuel Richmond refused an officer’s order to take a 
hoe to the blacksmith for repairs, while Private Evans refused to work in the company garden.  A 
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month later Private Gwist earned a trip to the guardhouse for refusing to work.102  Three cases 
within a month at the critical planting time suggests that there was a larger discontent with the 
isolation of the post and the labor required to keep it functioning. 
Calhoun’s military agriculture served as a cultural weapon.  He asked the Osage along 
the Arkansas River to accept missionaries that would help, “to prepare your food like the white 
people, to shew your young men how to make axes, hoes and ploughs, and the way to use them 
in tilling your lands and raising crops for the support of yourselves and families.”  Calhoun 
wanted to “introduce among you, generally, the arts of civilized life,” and outlined a particular 
model that was racially coded as superior, modern, and above all civilized for its static nature in 
the ideal image of an agrarian republic. 103   
Fort Atkinson offered an archetypal model of American gender norms: hierarchical, 
patriarchal authority based loosely around the concept of the independent man at the head of a 
nuclear family.  Inherent in this plan was the assumption of control over subordinate bodies.  
Individuals, however, jealously guarded their freedoms and rebelled when they were threatened. 
 
2.4  Crime and Punishment 
 
Fort Atkinson was not immune to crime.  Unlike the civilian world, however, military 
justice provided for fewer rights and individual freedoms.  Rebellion in any form threatened 
security and the daily functioning of the fort.  The isolation of the post further concentrated 
power amongst the upper echelons.  Disciplined military hierarchy conflicted with the ability of 
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enlisted men and junior officers to assert their masculine independence.  Courts martial show 
how individualistic masculinity ran into confrontation with state and elite desires for rational 
order, and at what point those desires became too pernicious for men in a free society.104  These 
problems were hardly unique to Fort Atkinson, but they acquired a special significance in a place 
where military culture was emerging as the principal language of intercultural contact. 
Brigadier General Winfield Scott’s 1821 “Systems of Martial Law” encouraged 
European-style dominance of enlisted men to acclimate them to subordination and “a passive 
obedience.”  Enforcing this control became increasingly difficult for the officer corps.  Civilian 
qualms about corporal punishment limited legal methods of discipline, including a de jure ban of 
flogging throughout the 1820s.  Violators faced court martial, loss of rank, or dismissal.  Life at 
Fort Atkinson revealed that Scott’s theory of military administration conflicted with how 
American men viewed their prerogatives as individuals, even within the hierarchical army.105 
Military structures reinforced class divisions.  Unlike the enlisted men they commanded, 
officers enjoyed considerable leeway to conduct private business and act as fully independent 
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men.  Leavenworth partnered with sutler James Kennerly in a farming venture.  They used Jim 
and Reddy, two of Kennerly’s slaves, to raise corn to sell to the garrison.  This was the ideal 
arrangement of exploitative hierarchy with elite control and limited autonomy for subordinates 
who followed orders without reaping the rewards.  It was symbolic of Fort Atkinson on the 
whole: plantation management reinforced by military authority.106 
James Kennerly was deeply entwined with the O’Fallon brothers.  Kennerly was related 
by marriage to Indian Agent Benjamin, and successor to sutler John.  His position occupied an 
intermediary space in the post hierarchy as both an independent merchant and an officer.  He 
officially ranked as a cadet without command and was subject to officers of the Council of 
Administration who fixed prices and profits.  Like Benjamin O’Fallon, he viewed military 
control over civilian operations as particularly antithetical to American cultural norms.  Such 
strict controls were “unfair and unjust,” as officers knew little about the risks.  The conflict 
between discipline and entrepreneurship threatened his economic rights as a free American.  
With manhood increasingly linked to marketplace success, Kennerly remained continuously 
anxious about his status.107 
Entrepreneurial soldiers threated military discipline.  At five dollars a month, privates 
labored hard for little reward compared to fur company employees who received on average 
three times more as a base salary.  They held no rights to work independently.  Officers regulated 
their purchases and limited their credit at the sutler to one half-month’s pay.  This was at odds 
with the increased cultural belief in free enterprise within broader American society.108  Private 
Frederick Anson showed remarkable business ability in creating an illicit trade in whiskey and 
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provisions with liquor at one dollar per pint and butter at 25 cents per pound.  His business grew 
large enough to employ Private Bonnell Berry as an assistant.  Anson was convicted at an 1825 
court martial and suffered a partial loss of pay and one presumes the confiscation of his stash.  
As a frontier precursor to Milo Minderbinder of Catch-22, Anson embodied the entrepreneurial 
ideal while subverting military order.109 
Alcohol fueled chaos.  Enlisted men received a daily whiskey ration until 1830.  Fort 
Atkinson’s commissary held 9,000 gallons for the troops.  With limited social outlets, troops had 
little else to relieve grueling fatigue duties and the stress of isolation.  Henry Leavenworth 
recorded dozens of charges for drunkenness after one payday.  One ten-month period witnessed 
nearly 40 courts martial with almost as many descriptions of intoxication.  After leaving the 
guardhouse for a prior alcohol conviction, Musician Richard Burk “did become so completely 
intoxicated as to loose not only the power of utterance but the power of Recollection,” testifying 
to his lack of masculine self-control.  Chronic problems reinforced fears of chaotic subordinates 
and the necessity for strict policing.110 
Officers and chiefs were held to higher standards.  Restrained leaders gained a cross-
racial respectability with expectations of mutual gentlemanly conduct.  Those who lost their self-
control also lost their status and authority to command.  Bored junior officers hosted raucous 
parties fueled by easy, privileged access to sutler alcohol.  Several possibly drunk officers 
detonated gunpowder in the northwest bastion “for fun,” reported Kennerly, causing a garrison-
wide alarm in May 1824.  James Gray faced charges of “being so much intoxicated as to be 
incapable of performing his duties appertaining to his station as a captain,” while commanding a 
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detachment.  Continued offenses forced commander Abram Woolley to limit officers’ access to 
liquor, effectively demoting them to enlisted men incapable of exercising self-control.111 
Drunks gave the majority of the troops a bad reputation.  Within the United States the 
problem was limited to administrative headaches.  At this western-most fort, however, drunken 
disorder undermined federal authority and belied official efforts to portray an all-powerful state.  
Commanders could not prevent illicit liquor among their own men, let alone its introduction into 
Indian Country.  Each nation had a different relationship to alcohol, but the Pawnee remained 
particularly unaffected by liquor.  Strict control of trade by the chiefs limited alcohol-fueled 
political and social problems through the 1820s, in stark contrast to their federal neighbors.112 
Underlying the problem was the fort’s location.  Isolation and grueling fatigue duties 
spurred rebelliousness, with occasionally fatal results.  Private John Shepard was hanged for 
mutiny and murder on April 1, 1821, in the only execution at Fort Atkinson.  The entire garrison 
including sick men on excused duty witnessed the display of state power to literally unmake the 
physical person.  Since 1790, federal criminal law provided for dissection of convicted 
murderers as a form of supra-capital punishment to further humiliate the convict and reinforce 
the message of state power.  The court followed precedent and ordered Shepard’s body dissected 
by the post surgeon.  Even for a violent time and place, it was a cruel sentence that denied a 
traditional burial, contrary to cultural norms.113 
The lesson failed to take hold.  Easy recourse to violence in daily life showed the state’s 
inability to craft an orderly society through exemplary punishment.  A sample of incidents 
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include the case of a corporal beaten to death while working at the limekiln, a musician who tried 
to stab his sergeant, and a private who threatened his company commander with a pistol.  
Enlisted men held few avenues to retain mastery over their bodies, which fueled violent 
responses from those with little to lose.  Consider Private Moses Elkins.  He refused an order to 
arrest another soldier, and was himself arrested.  As others tried to detain him, Elkins grabbed his 
musket, fixed the bayonet, and declared “that he would kill every man of the party before he 
would be taken or conveyed to the Guard house,” before breaking free and deserting.  For Elkins, 
the threat of punishment or death at the hands of Indian bounty hunters sent after him was less 
important than his autonomy of action.  A court martial sentenced him to hard labor on the 
fortifications at the mouth of the Mississippi.  For the remainder of his enlistment he was to wear 
“a ball and chain,” and “an Iron Collar weighing 8lbs having 2 prongs each 3 foot in length.”114 
Nor were senior NCOs above such violent responses.  Sergeant Lathrop stabbed his wife 
and Assistant Surgeon William Nicoll seven times, suggesting the discovery of an illicit 
rendezvous.  Lathrop’s response is hardly surprising given the circumstances.  Being cuckolded 
by a superior officer destroyed Lathrop’s position as a familial patriarch at home and leader in 
the ranks.  Enlisted men were paradoxically the representatives of a democratizing American 
society, yet highly constrained in their ability to act as such while surrounded by examples of 
elite warrior men who jealously guarded their freedom of action.  Indian men were freer 
individuals than white Americans.115 
Officers overstepping the legal bounds of punishment created constant tension over the 
meaning of power and authority.  Free, white Americans were not supposed to be subject to 
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cruelties reserved for slaves.  Beginning during the Jefferson administration, civilian political 
pressure directed punishments away from floggings and mutilations that permanently scarred 
white bodies.  Yet flogging often occurred at the company and battalion level.  These were 
unsanctioned punishments.  Administration officials routinely court-martialed complicit officers.  
Reports of whippings and ear cropping outraged Calhoun and Monroe as embarrassing 
extrajudicial attacks on the bodily integrity of American citizens.  Incidents in 1818 and 1819 
sparked investigations, while another caused Abram Woolley to be cashiered from the Army in 
1828.  Beyond a desire to avoid Congressional inquiries, such hypersensitivity to punishment by 
two slave owners underscores that the physical integrity of a white man’s body was the ultimate 
marker of masculine independence.116 
Calhoun was infuriated that an officer in Missouri flogged a civilian boatman and 
demanded Colonel Talbot Chambers answer for his officer’s abuse of authority.  “The great 
responsibility attached to so distant and important a Command requires the greatest degree of 
firmness and prudence,” he reminded Chambers, “without these qualities the great object of 
affording additional security to our frontiers and extending our fur trade, will be entirely defeated 
to the dishonor of the Officers charged with it, and the Executive by whom it was planned.”117  
Furthermore, they negated the Army’s legitimacy and effectiveness as a governing force over 
white Americans or Indians.  Reliance on military justice and the absence of civilian courts 
meant that commandants regularly acted as the complainant, witness, prosecutor, and 
commanding officer in a court martial, a fact sutler James Kennerly found “rather odd.”118  
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Power originating from brutality created illegitimate authority.  Fort Atkinson’s isolation meant 
fewer checks against authoritarianism and brutal governance. 
Racial distinctions often delineated acceptable behavior.  O’Fallon displayed unusual 
cruelty during a council with Otoe and Omaha representatives.  A metis man among the Indians 
boasted of participating in the massacre of American prisoners at Chicago in 1812 and tried to 
organize an attack on O’Fallon during the council.  Being informed of this plot by a chief, 
O’Fallon “promptly cut off the fellow’s ears, gave him 100 lashes, threw his arms in the river, 
and set him loose.”119  That a brutal and summary punishment did not ignite a crisis suggests at 
least tacit approval by chiefs who balked at aiding one who threatened the diplomatic customs of 
a council.  By identifying as an Indian, the man surrendered any protections his partial white 
status afforded against such treatment.  When some Kitkahahki Pawnee whipped two whites in 
1819, the ensuing diplomatic crisis required a council meeting, restitution, and obeisance to 
federal authority under the threat of military retaliation.120 
White criminals jeopardized their racial status and privileges of citizenship.  Desertion 
was a chronic problem generally with 6,952 cases from 1823-1830.  The average strength of the 
force during the period was only 5,100.  Troops stationed near population centers saw easy 
opportunities to flee toward better pay and less discipline.  At Fort Atkinson, American towns 
were a hard journey through several potentially hostile Indian nations.  The army road to 
Chariton, Missouri was 330 miles and St. Louis by water was nearly 500.  Those men driven to 
desertion made powerful statements about their beliefs in bodily ownership.121 
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Deserters showed considerable desperation and bravery.  Fleeing soldiers faced summary 
punishment, mutilation, or death from comrades or Indian bounty hunters.  Colonel Talbot 
Chambers had the ignominious distinction of being subjected to one of the first courts martial at 
Fort Atkinson after he cropped the ears of two deserters in 1819.  His subsequent arrest was on 
the personal order of President Monroe.  The light sentence, a one-month suspension from duty, 
outraged Calhoun as inadequate for “such illegal and odious punishment.”122  Henry 
Leavenworth’s standing orders from 1823 reinforced the dangers for a deserter, stating that “it 
will be well to take him alive, but better to shoot him than to let him escape . . . if he should not 
stand when hailed, or should attempt to make resistance, the Country will expect the pursuers to 
do their duty.”123  Summarily shooting deserters in peacetime emphasized notions of military 
justice at extreme odds with the due process rights of any American.  Seven men deserted in 
August 1824 and O’Fallon enlisted neighboring Indians to hunt them down.  By encouraging 
Native American bounty hunters the government made a political statement that flight equated to 
abandonment of racial identity.  Sentencing further unmanned deserters as outcasts of white 
nationhood.  Convicts routinely served at hard labor on Mississippi River fortifications while 
wearing pronged iron collars commonly reserved for escaped slaves.  One of the only significant 
differences between convicted soldiers and the slaves laboring around them in the Louisiana sun 
was that the soldiers were freed upon the survival and completion of their sentences.124 
Viewed from a law and order standpoint, Fort Atkinson was a chaotic mess and the 
precise opposite of a disciplined military establishment.  By contrast Pawnee villages displayed 
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“excellent order” and “decorous behavior of the young people,” according to Paul Wilhelm.  The 
duke’s impression of an “extremely proud people . . . and should they become hostile, 
exceedingly dangerous,” said much about the chiefs’ control of their followers and ability to act 
with a unity that federal officers struggled to emulate.125 
Policing the daily life of the fort and its surroundings took on added political 
significance.  Diplomatic encounters over crime and the terms of punishment constituted the 
most contested issues around the military reserve.  Control of punishment and defining 
criminality offered the clearest indicator of sovereignty and the ability to govern.  Control of 
bodies delineated the boundaries of group identity in the Missouri Valley.  O’Fallon outlined 
these stakes at a meeting at Council Bluffs to address Pawnee thefts from the Long Expedition.  
He warned Pawnee chiefs that, “When you find yourselves unable to punish those dogs among 
you, think that you hear the sound of those bugles from the hills near your village.”126  The 
message was unambiguous: order would be maintained, if necessary by the sword.  Enforcing 
those regulations proved to be one of the greatest challenges at Fort Atkinson. 
Retaining bodily sovereignty reserved political authority within Native American 
societies.  Omaha chief Ongpatonga understood this well.  Avoiding dependency was of 
paramount concern.  At an 1819 council, he revealed the fears inherent within the confusion of 
multiple legal systems vying for legitimacy.  He asked newly arrived agent O’Fallon, “We have 
heard of your tying up and whipping individuals of several nations, as you ascended this river.  
What is the offence which will subject us to this punishment? I wish to know, that I may inform 
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my people, that they may be on their guard.”  Ongpatonga understood Fort Atkinson remade or 
at least questioned the paradigms of criminal behavior and sovereign authority in the region.127 
Indian sub agent John Dougherty doubted the Pawnee chiefs’ ability to control young 
men who required martial glory for political status.  Pawnee leaders were savvier than Dougherty 
allowed.  In claiming an inability to control their warriors’ occasional raids or theft, chiefs pitted 
domestic and foreign relations imperatives against each other.  By playing as dependent, weak 
children, chiefs appealed to malleable power metaphors to acquire federal recognition of their 
authority while offering only token acts of restitution and punishment.128 
The power to denote crimes and punishments represented the most basic level of political 
authority.  Without internal group control, claims to sovereignty were ephemeral rhetoric and as 
easily dissipated as council fire smoke.  While O’Fallon probably understood the following 
exchange as proof of obeisance to federal authority, Pawnee chief Petalesharoo crafted routes to 
maintain sovereign authority by simply avoiding situations that might threaten his leadership.  
Petalesharoo offered to whip his own people as punishment for theft in an act of political 
accommodation.  “I am now an American,” he stated at a council meeting, “and you shall hear 
that it is true.  If you hear of my being whipped when I return to my village, consider yourself the 
cause of it, for I will whip those dogs that insulted you as you desire me.  You love your 
children; I love mine.”  Petalesharoo told O’Fallon exactly what the agent wanted to hear, yet 
maintained his own legal and paternal authority to punish offenders.  Potential retribution was 
preferable to the loss of sovereignty if federal officials sought out and punished the offenders 
instead.  But even token appearances of submission cut at the heart of Pawnee masculine 
authority as Petalesharoo bitterly complained that “I am now like a squaw . . . instead of carrying 
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the mark of a man, I have that of a woman . . . My right arm, and that half of my body is white 
man, and the other only Indian.”  Occasionally punishing a young warrior for acting like a 
warrior and participating in the raid-based plains economy was the diplomatic price of 
autonomy, even at the cost of Pawnee leaders’ self-conceptions of gendered power and racial 
identity.129 
Tarrarecawaho, however, was unafraid of O’Fallon.  He spoke with the air of a man 
totally secure in his position, telling the agent that “I am not a child,” and that he considered “all 
those people around me,” including the whites as his children.130  Federal efforts to impart a new 
system of law and order first had to change Pawnee notions of their own power and sovereignty. 
The officials running Fort Atkinson and the Indian Agency squabbled like children, pursued 
petty disputes, exercised arbitrary and at times cruel punishments, and failed to act as a cohesive 
unit implanting national policy.  Here, the differences in political culture between Pawnee and 
American society were in stark relief. 
 
2.5  Pawnee Skepticism 
 
Pawnee leaders viewed the Americans with a mix of scorn, skepticism, and novelty.  
Their geopolitical world did not change in demonstrable ways.  They retained mobile power at a 
distance from Fort Atkinson and a secure core homeland.  The United States could do little to 
intervene in their affairs to the west or south, far beyond the reach of federal military power. 
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Pawnee leaders understood their position as the regionally preeminent military power.  
The possibility of good federal-Pawnee relations unnerved their neighbors.  Ongpatonga of the 
Omaha warned of serious blowback to prevent arms from reaching the Pawnee.  He tried to scare 
federal officials, cautioning that any weapons given “would be stained with white man’s blood, 
before they reached the Pawnee village.”131  Extended raids to Mexico and wars to the west 
demonstrated Pawnee ability to project force over large distances.  An attack in the late-1810s 
brought Pawnee cavalry into the heart of the Kansa village.  An assault against an easily fortified 
and defended place showcased Pawnee confidence in their capabilities.132   
It was difficult for the United States to create a new regional diplomatic landscape in the 
face of both Pawnee power and the problems within Fort Atkinson.  If they could not be 
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conquerors of the type Secretary of War Calhoun hoped, perhaps they could be brokers.  
O’Fallon and his successor, John Dougherty worked to make federal agents the arbitrators of 
inter-Indian disputes.  They also had to create the agency next to the fort as the primary spot for 
conducting negotiations by making it the site for annuity and gift distribution, trade, and the 
repair of tools and guns.  In effect they had to create a new space of neutral, measured, and 
patriarchal authority in a chaotic environment.  Efforts to settle regional disputes promoted this 
claim of being neutral arbiters. 
On the way to Council Bluffs in September 1819, O’Fallon and Dougherty mediated a 
peace between the Otoe and Kansa nations.  It was a fragile peace and constantly in danger of 
failure, but affirmed O’Fallon’s status as mediator.  Dougherty similarly acted as a go between 
for the Iowa, Otoe, and Missouri.133  These were modest successes.  While they reoriented the 
political landscape and positioned the Indian agents as new fathers within the context of 
diplomacy for these nations, these were easier cases.  The people involved were far less 
politically and militarily powerful than their Pawnee or Sioux neighbors.  
Pawnee raids into Mexico intensified during this period, posing a political challenge for 
officials at the agency and threatening U.S.-Mexican relations.  A stream of letters from New 
Mexican governors Joseph Anthony Vizcarra and his successor Bartolome Baca began arriving 
in 1823.  They pressed both O’Fallon and Missouri governor Alexander McNair to interdict the 
raids emanating from American territory.  As “the said tribe is within the boundaries of the 
United States and consequently belongs to them,” wrote Vizcarra, “I have therefore to request 
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that you will have the goodness to cause a serious remonstrance to be made to them that the said 
hostilities may cease.  Should they however maintain their perfidious hostilities I shall be 
compelled to declare war against them.”134  Mexican assumptions of federal responsibility over 
Pawnee conduct and the threat of a retaliatory invasion placed an urgency on establishing federal 
diplomatic control.   
Twenty years after making his first reference to the Pawnee in his journals on the Lewis 
and Clark Expedition, William Clark was still concerned about the Pawnee.  Since 1807, he had 
served as a federal Indian agent.  It was an office he held before becoming governor of the 
Missouri Territory, and one he continued to hold for the rest of his life.  In 1824, Clark was 
apprehensive that much could be done to curtail the raiding, informing Calhoun that “it will be 
with much difficulty that those Indians will be restrained from persuing a warfare which have 
been lucrative without much loss on their part.”135  It was an honest assessment of the limitations 
of federal authority. 
 O’Fallon, however, was more eager to prove himself in his role as a diplomat responsible 
for theoretically subordinate people.  Mexico proposed sending negotiators to Council Bluffs for 
a peace council mediated by O’Fallon, which he eagerly accepted.  Clark worried that O’Fallon 
exceeded his authority and undermined federal policy of maintaining the exclusive negotiating 
authority over resident Native Americans.136  At the fringes of federal control O’Fallon assumed 
far more authority than he was probably entitled to, but it did not stop him. 
A delegation of 14 Mexicans and 12 Christian Indians arrived at Council Bluffs for a 
peace conference in August 1824.  After a three-day council with the Pawnee in September, the 
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delegation returned to New Mexico with a peace deal, but within a framework that reasserted 
federal authority to mediate disputes and control over negotiations with the Pawnee.  O’Fallon’s 
message to Governor Baca offered thinly veiled insults about Mexican power and “the pecuniary 
embarrassment and unsettled state of the government of your unhappy country.”  O’Fallon 
excused the governor for his meddling.  Asserting federal authority, he reminded Baca that the 
Pawnee and others “residing in our territory are dependent on and subject to this government, 
therefore it would be considered unfriendly and improper . . . to give or sell to them any uniform 
clothing other than that of the United States, or medals, flags arm Bands or other ornaments of 
dress bearing the figures, devices or emblems of any other nation.”137  Such pronouncements 
offered a sharp rebuke to Mexican efforts to muddle the international boundary by engaging in 
direct diplomacy with one of their foremost military foes.  But pretensions of federal control 
were illusory. 
O’Fallon’s self-assuredness about federal diplomatic strength and ability to coerce the 
Pawnee signified the reorientation of Council Bluffs and Fort Atkinson as the regional 
diplomatic hub.  This did not fully represent reality.  Pawnee raids continued unabated against 
their neighbors, Mexico, and the Santa Fe Trail.  Without any force capable of patrolling the 
plains to the west, federal officials could do little to quell the regional wars.138 
The Pawnee did not care about federal claims to regional control.  Infantry confined to 
the river valley was ineffective.  Within the military reserve at Council Bluffs, federal authority 
was certainly stronger, but it could not dictate policy to independent people.  The Pawnee, Sioux, 
                                               
137 O’Fallon to Bartolome Baca, September 9, 1824, Benjamin O’Fallon Letterbook. 
138 Clark to Barbour, July 12, 1826, LROIA: StLS, Roll 747; Clark to Thomas McKenney, February 25, 1828, 
LROIA: StLS, Roll, 748; John Dougherty to Clark, November 4, 1828, LROIA: StLS, Roll 748. 
 144 
and others knew federal power was limited and fixed.  O’Fallon eventually recognized this 
futility and argued for mounted rangers to project power into the central plains.139 
As a model of American government and society, Fort Atkinson failed to create the 
control envisioned by federal military planners.  Too much leeway remained for assertions of 
independent political authority among Native Americans and white soldiers.  Although 
Americans attempted to fit their own version of martial masculinity and patriarchal authority 
over the region their efforts remained incomplete.  Federal officials failed to emulate the 
standards of leadership required to supplant Pawnee chiefs.  Fort Atkinson was too exposed 
without providing the projected benefits.  It was abandoned on June 6, 1827.140   
Federal agents failed to make U.S. sovereignty a regional reality.  They entered the 
Pawnee diplomatic world as weak challengers to Pawnee power.  Diplomacy rather than direct 
models of control marked the next phase of federal Indian policy in the Platte Valley.  The next 
round of federal expansion would be closer to the U.S. frontier and focused on building a new 
space for forcibly removed Native Americans from the East.  The Pawnee brought the United 
States into their world, set the terms of engagement, and retained their sovereignty to pursue 
independent policies.  The Pawnee remained masters of the Platte. 
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Chapter Three 
The Pawnee Neighborhood 
 
 
On May 8, 1827, Colonel Henry Leavenworth reported to the War Department about 
selecting the location for a new fort on the western bank of the Missouri.  It was “a high, dry, and 
rolling country” about twenty miles from the mouth of the Little Platte close to the start of the 
Santa Fe Road, and exceedingly healthy, away from the fetid and flood-prone river bottom.1   
Philip St. George Cooke, a young second lieutenant stationed at the new Fort Leavenworth, was 
similarly impressed by the landscape and the tinge of romance in its natural beauty.  After five 
months of escort duty along the Santa Fe Road he described the area around the new post in 
rapturous delight: 
 
Every line of every surface is curved with symmetry and beauty.  On the one hand is to be seen 
the mighty river . . . stretching away till mellowed to aerial blue; on the other, rolling prairies, 
dotted with groves, and bounded on the west by a bold grassy ridge . . . [beyond, a] view of the 
prairie lost in a dim and vague outline. How feeble are words! How inadequate to give a general 
idea, much more to paint this rare scenery, where grandeur is softened by beauty.2 
 
 
Cooke was enthralled by the scenery, perhaps more because it meant secure quarters away from 
the dangers of the prairies.  The vagueness Cooke described hid a complexity of Native 
American relations, multiple ongoing wars, and the sense that federal officials still very much 
struggled to understand their place in this vast space.  Fort Leavenworth was a safe, bounded 
place with distinct markers separating it from the dimly understood prairie in the distance.  It was 
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more a park than a fortress, and easily distinguished from its surroundings.  Yet this view was 
largely imaginary. 
Unlike Fort Atkinson, Fort Leavenworth was the precursor necessary for Removal, the 
coordinated federal policy in the 1830s that called for the relocation of all Native Americans east 
of the Mississippi to a designated Indian Territory in the West.  Fort Leavenworth was the 
perfect spot for a second attempt to assert federal military power along the Missouri River after 
the failure of Fort Atkinson.  Here the United States could pivot to the southwest and the 
growing trade with New Mexico and the increasingly important interactions with the Comanche 
and Kiowa.3  It was a healthy place, closer to white settlements springing up along the western 
edge of Missouri.  Fort Leavenworth would be the administration center for the Shawnee, 
Delaware, Kickapoo, Piankashaw, and Peoria, native peoples who William Clark was in the 
midst of removing from Missouri and Illinois.  Combined with resident agents the new post 
“would give greater confidence to the Indians, in the permanency of the New Settlements, and 
will most probably facilitate the union of the tribes,” Clark reasoned.4   
Between 1827 and 1833, federal officials envisioned the region around the Kansas and 
Platte rivers as the necessary space for a sweeping Removal program that would functionally 
clear the East of Native Americans and place them as a buffer of civilized tribes along the U.S. 
frontier between more hostile neighbors.  The area would be close enough to act as a second 
buffer between the Osage being pushed west and their traditional Pawnee, Omaha, and Otoe 
enemies.  It was the spot to control migrations and the transfer of populations, an anchor for 
newly arrived peoples, a political hub, and the base from which military power could ultimately 
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enforce the protection clause embedded in the Removal legislation.  Here, federal officials 
assumed they could create a neighborhood of civilized tribes subject to federal oversight and 
missionary reformers.   
In addition to Fort Leavenworth, developing this region required securing a regional 
peace among the local nations.  In particular this meant blunting Pawnee military power both 
against their long-term neighbors and the increasing numbers of new arrivals.  This remained 
elusive at best.  For the Pawnee, this period was the most challenging they had faced to that 
point.  Their military power was stretched thin.  Pawnee fighters covered ongoing conflicts to the 
north and west, and new conflicts with the appearance of removed nations like the Delaware who 
encroached on Pawnee territory to the south.  Careful strategic calculations, however, meant the 
Pawnee often directed the course of Removal policy in the region and where Indian Territory 
ultimately took shape.  Yet careful strategy could not prevent smallpox from upending Pawnee 
geopolitics and forcing a strategic recalibration by 1833. 
This chapter argues that Nebraska, Kansas, and Oklahoma took shape in the nineteenth 
century because of the bilateral relationship between the Pawnee and the United States.  Federal 
conceptions of power as fixable hampered U.S. efforts to reimagine the space and create an 
Indian Territory in the West as part of an emerging Removal policy in the late-1820s and early-
1830s.  While Removal settled U.S. Indian affairs in the East through forced migration, it 
unsettled the West.  Federal officials could not force their vision of settled, controlled Native 
American groups onto the space around Fort Leavenworth.  Removal was in part decided by 
Pawnee military power.  Through strategic calculations and force deployment, Pawnee leaders 
and warriors directed the creation of Indian Territory to the future Oklahoma, instead of Kansas 
and Nebraska.  Federal officials had to adapt to the Pawnee understanding of military power as 
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mobile and far-ranging.  This process challenged Pawnee military dominance as they adapted to 
the new strategic reality of a robust federal presence in the region and need for a new 
relationship in the face of political threats and a smallpox epidemic.  The resultant treaty in 1833 
shaped U.S. expansion into the West and Pawnee responses for decades.  The Pawnee sought an 
alliance of equals while the U.S. sought dominance over the Platte and its inhabitants. 
 
3.1  Envisioning a Neighborhood 
 
From his office in St. Louis, Superintendent of Indian Affairs William Clark imagined 
Fort Leavenworth as the anchor of a new Indian Territory formed to the west and south of the 
post.  Here, thousands of Eastern Native Americans could be relocated as Removal became the 
formal policy of the Jackson administration.  This perspective ignored the fact that the world just 
beyond the vision of its garrison was turbulent, undergoing massive population shifts and 
economic readjustments.  In the late-1820s, the years immediately before the Jackson 
administration promulgated the Removal Policy, Clark had observed a region that defied federal 
control.  Native Americans were already moving there as a result of the federal government’s 
existing practices of coerced migration, with all of the challenges that ensued.  Meanwhile, the 
Pawnee remained the ongoing power brokers, and they actively prevented the federal 
government from extending governing authority between the Platte and the Arkansas rivers. 
Sioux expansion from the northeast pushed the Omaha, Arikara, Iowa, and Ponca closer 
to the Missouri River and American support.  The Delaware, Shawnee, and Kickapoo (who were 
undergoing forced relocation by the federal government) squeezed the Kansa and Pawnee from 
the south and encroached on hunting grounds south of the Platte.  In addition to long-standing 
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conflicts with the Cheyenne and Sioux, the Pawnee were fighting a war of extermination with the 
Kansa, who were already hard-pressed by disease and the social collapse precipitated by the 
disappearing fur trade and pervasive alcoholism.  The different bands and sub groups of the 
Sioux and Pawnee conducted autonomous foreign relations, further complicating the labyrinthine 
relationships of regional alliances and enmities between Native American groups.5   
This was the neighborhood surrounding Fort Leavenworth.  Pawnee military actions 
south of the Platte made the region a terrible place to settle removed Native Americans.  Forming 
a new Indian Territory in the midst of prime hunting grounds was not within the Pawnee 
imagination.  Through the late-1820s and into the early 1830s, the Pawnee pushed back against 
federal plans and those of the often destitute and desperate removed peoples trying to settle 
themselves after their forced relocation.  Relocating nations hesitated to move into a potential 
war zone near the Platte Valley. 
Yet, for a new outpost “there is no other place that will answer the purposes required 
within the prescribed distance of the Little Platte,” argued Leavenworth about his chosen 
location.  Moreover, “there will no doubt soon be many tribes of Indians to visit this new post, 
and if not inconsistent with the views of the Government, I should be happy to have Mr. 
Dougherty [Indian Agent at Council Bluffs] ordered to this new post.”6  Here was the basis for a 
new sense of place for the region, as the administrative hub of Indian Country, for both the 
native inhabitants and those Indians forced west. 
Building the fort changed little in the natural landscape that so captivated St. George 
Cooke.  Rather than create a model American town like Fort Atkinson, Fort Leavenworth was 
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merely a garrison, depot, and administrative hub to keep a regional peace.  The post “was in 
reality but a straggling cantonment,” two years after construction began with quarters described 
only as “miserable huts and sheds.”7  It remained severely undermanned.  Even with the burden 
of escorting Santa Fe caravans, barely 200 officers and men garrisoned the post in 1829.8  The 
rude walls and buildings matched a limited sense of state power that was largely static and 
difficult to project beyond the slow march of infantry over the plains.  It had little influence on 
nations that relied on mobility for their military power. 
For the independent Pawnee and Sioux, mobility was central to their political world and 
an economy based on hunting, raiding, and the trade in horses and captives.9  It depended on 
precisely the mobility the United States sought to curb.  Yet both federal officials and Native 
American leaders spoke in similar terms about their strategic goals, framed by rhetoric of 
neighbors and neighborhood. 
In creating a gathering spot, Fort Leavenworth was supposed to remake the space around 
it into a neighborhood where local ties existed through the common focal point of the fort.  Here 
was the federal ideal of Indian Country as a series of contained and clearly bounded lands 
governed from a central location.  “There are but two ways to keep Indians at peace one by force 
of arms,” argued veteran Indian Agent John Dougherty about American policy for the region, 
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Mexico.  Pawnee raiding against the Cheyenne also fulfilled important religious obligations by taking captives for 
human sacrifice during the Morning Star ritual.  Pawnee raids against New Mexico in the 1820s prompted a US-
brokered peace conference at Fort Atkinson in 1824.  Vizcarra to McNair, September 8, 1823, in Clark to Calhoun, 
February 11, 1824, LROIA: StLS, Roll 747; Hyde, Pawnee Indians, 137-9, 161; Calloway, “The Inter-Tribal 
Balance of Power,” 27; Delay, War of A Thousand Deserts, 88-90, 117-118. 
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“the other by convincing them of their own interest in being at peace with their neighbors, which 
has to be done by . . . presents.”10  Key to this mixed policy of force and persuasion was the 
necessity of getting Native Americans to see themselves as neighbors, first to each other, and 
then to the United States. 
This was not a foreign concept to Native American policy makers.  Repeated discussions 
and treaty negotiations between nations utilized the language of neighbors and neighborhood to 
outline a spatial and political world.  Kansa chief Now-Pe-Warai wished to live close to the fort 
and as “I consider myself as an American and my wife as an American woman.  I want to take 
every thing like white people (meaning house furniture) to receive white people.”11  Speaking at 
a treaty council at Fort Leavenworth the following year, the aging Omaha chief Ongpatonga 
announced to Dougherty that “now that I have seen how those live in your neighborhood 
(meaning Shawnees) I have determined to establish myself and if possible cultivate the soil and 
collect all kinds of domestic animals around me,” and be “situated like the southern Indians 
[those removed to the vicinity of Fort Leavenworth].”12  When Pawnee chiefs complained to 
Dougherty about the preferential treatment and annuities given to the Otoe and Omaha for land 
transfers, and none for their own transfer to the Delaware, they complained about their 
neighbors.13  This was an unlikely word choice, though perhaps it reflects a translator’s 
influence, considering the bitter and long-standing enmities.  Wars did not appear to be 
neighborly interactions. 
The rhetoric of the neighborhood encompassed so many different relationships: 
individuals and groups to their sense of place, the boundaries of identity and physical space, and 
                                               
10 Dougherty to Clark, June 28, 1827 LROIA: UMA, Roll 883. 
11 Now-Pe-Warai to Clark, May 17, 1827, LROIA: StLS, Roll 748. 
12 Ongpatonga to Dougherty, June 24, 1828, LROIA: UMA, Roll 883. 
13 Dougherty to Clark, October 29, 1831, LROIA: UMA, Roll 883. 
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even the space itself into a place.14  Fort Leavenworth, like Atkinson before it, was supposed to 
transform space into a place of power through the physicality of state architecture, but it was a 
minor physical presence over the oceans of grasslands and distances of up to a thousand miles 
between agencies with one or two officials.   
The abstraction of place, ascribing a meaning to the space and the inhabitants, was far 
more important.  Neighborhoods brought a sense of place to different and vast geographic 
terrains.  As the historian of slavery Anthony Kaye writes, neighborhoods were “pervasive but 
not uniform,” and encompassed “a geography of kinship” by ordering social relationships and a 
sense of place.  Neighborhoods embraced pluralism and difference by providing the structure to 
understand relationships to people and places.  They were political places that framed 
international spaces.  Their creation and recreation were ways to “recalibrate the balance of 
power.”15   This model explains the complexities of political relationships and diplomatic 
relations between local Native American nations of disparate power and new arrivals from the 
East in the late-1820s and 1830s.  A common understanding of neighborhood and neighborly 
behaviors framed diplomacy, negotiations, and a sense of fairness or correct action to protect 
territory or judge the efficacy of alliances.  The sense of who constituted a neighbor, through 
geographic proximity or behavior, gave meaning to the landscape and order to the disruption 
                                               
14 Place should be understood as a spatial reality constructed by people.  It brings together the physical space with a 
created understanding of meaning, defined boundaries, and the abstraction of meaning imposed onto a natural space.  
Place, argues geographer Allan Pred, “always involves an appropriation and transformation of space and nature that 
is inseparable from the reproduction and transformation of society in time and space.” Pred, “Place as Historically 
Contingent Process,” 279; White and Findlay, eds., Power and Place in the North American West, x. 
15 Anthony Kaye, Joining Places: Slave Neighborhoods in the Old South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2007), 1-7, 12.  Kaye’s argument moves studies of slavery beyond the tired questions of resistance to the 
“terrains of struggle” by emphasizing the importance of place and locality.  Indian Country was similarly not a 
monolithic place, but a dynamic place constantly being remade by the inhabitants.  Seeing the complexity of 
political relationships similarly gets us beyond the older questions about resistance or lack thereof to federal 
expansion by highlighting the regional differences, squabbles, and the conflicting interests of dozens of political 
groups each with a unique set of foreign and domestic policy priorities framed by the sense of local place and 
neighborhood belonging. 
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wrought by disease, migration, and warfare.  A sense of neighborhood placed old inhabitants and 
new arrivals within a comprehensible political framework.  
Pawnee visions of their neighborhood placed themselves as the central power.  Between 
1819 and 1827, federal officials upset the old order of things around Pawnee territory.  The entry 
of federal agents into the diplomatic world of the Missouri Valley merely complicated the multi-
faceted relationships between the regional Native American powers, it did not replace Pawnee 
dominance.  Treaties of friendship between the United States and Pawnee in 1818 and 1825 tried 
to place federal sovereignty over regional affairs.  Pawnee acknowledgements that they lived 
within the borders of the United States were pro forma.  The treaties did little to alter existing 
conditions of Pawnee independence or power.16  Federal retreat to Fort Leavenworth in 1827 and 
the intermittent occupation of the Indian Agency at Council Bluffs effectively opened the area 
southeast of Pawnee territory for raids on the Otoe and Kansa.17  In 1826, the primary threat to 
Pawnee territory and power was the Sioux expansion southward.  The Sioux absorbed smaller 
                                               
16 The 1818 treaties negotiated by Missouri’s territorial Governor and Superintendent of Indian Affairs William 
Clark and St. Louis fur magnate Auguste Chouteau with the Grand, “Pitavirate Noisy,” Republic, and “Marhar” 
bands of Pawnee were notable, aside from the utter failure to record Pawnee names properly, for their limited scope.  
Identical boiler-plate language proclaimed the Pawnee to be under federal sovereignty – an easy item to agree to on 
paper and impossible to enforce without an actual agent or military presence in Pawnee territory – and the reciprocal 
desires to maintain peace through extradition protocols and a willingness to mark the treaty as a reset for any past 
violence committed by either side.  They represented a pro forma approach to Indian treaties with nations beyond 
the reach of federal power.  ASP:IA, 2:171-172.  The 1825 treaty was part of the effort to secure Indian relations 
along the entirety of the Missouri.  Before leaving Fort Atkinson with several hundred men, Brigadier General 
Atkinson and Indian Agent Benjamin O’Fallon negotiated a comprehensive Pawnee treaty that lumped all the bands 
together.  The initial reiteration of Pawnee submission to the United States was reinforced by a statement that the 
Pawnee recognized they lived within the boundaries of the United States as a protectorate tribe.  Traders authorized 
by the United States, under Pawnee protection, would conduct all trade and unauthorized people trading or entering 
Indian country would be apprehended by the Pawnee and delivered to federal officials.  No trade in guns or 
ammunition to Indians not in amity with the United States would occur.  Criminals would be delivered to officials 
and safe passage was secured for the caravans to New Mexico.  None of this was observed in practice.  Federal 
officials claimed sovereignty on paper, but the Pawnee were still masters of the region who controlled access to it 
and could, if they wanted, threaten American security and commerce. ASP:IA, 2:603-604. 
17 John Dougherty made the unauthorized move to Leavenworth in 1827, effectively abandoning Council Bluffs.  
After five years of making every excuse about the beneficial location, necessity of military support, and outright 
refusal to move, he finally purchased a former trading post of the Missouri Fur Company at Bellevue (about 20 
miles south of the old post at Council Bluffs) and moved the agency back up the Missouri. 
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nations on the edge of the Pawnee, like the Ponca, into their political world.  Uneasy relations 
with the Omaha and Otoe further damaged the buffer between this aggressive expansion and the 
Pawnee.18  Constriction of the Pawnee neighborhood and the arrival of new threats at their 
doorsteps forced the chiefs to solve a foreign policy crisis of potentially existential proportions. 
By the fall of 1826, two different conceptions of neighborhood were being formed in the 
minds of federal bureaucrats and Pawnee chiefs: Americans wanted a regional community center 
anchored by a fort, the Pawnee wanted to maintain the regional balance of power between 
increasingly hostile neighbors. 
Indian Removal in the period between 1827 and 1835 is typically told from the 
perspective of the Eastern nations relocated to the West, either by choice or force.  It is a story of 
the terrible triumph of federal power over Native American independence and sovereignty.19  
Except for the Seminoles of Florida, Indian power east of the Mississippi ceased to exist.20  
Indian Territory in present-day Oklahoma appeared as a formally organized region to receive 
those people who survived the unforgivable and avoidable tragedy of the Trail of Tears.  Federal 
authorities, not Native Americans, determined the outcome of events and drove the migrations of 
people westward.  While the federal government might determine what happened in the East, it 
was the local people in the West, notably the Pawnee, who shaped the outcomes of federal policy 
                                               
18 White, “The Winning of the West,” 330-331; Dougherty to Elbert Herring, August 20, 1835, LROIA: UMA, Roll 
883.  White argues convincingly that the western Sioux were a colonial power with a policy of expansion for 
resource extraction in buffalo and agricultural products.  By outsourcing farming to conquered tribes, the Sioux 
maintained their cultural identity as that of hunters and warriors while maintaining a strategic reserve of produce 
grown by buffer tribes positioned between them and their more powerful enemies, the Pawnee. 
19 Satz, American Indian Policy; Saunt, Unworthy Republic.  Most famously the reduction of Indian tribes to the 
status of “domestic dependent” nations and wards of the United States in John Marshall’s infamous Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia decision of 1831 presents the period as one of legal and political triumph to complete the military 
victories of the 1790s and 1810s over independent Indian powers and confederacies. 
20 Scallet, “‘This Inglorious War’”; John W. Hall, Uncommon Defense: Indian Allies in the Black Hawk War 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009).  Americans brought approximately 7,000 regulars, militia, and Native 
American allies into the field against a band of roughly 1,000 outgunned and undersupplied men, women, and 
children.  Despite the alarm and fear, this was hardly an existential crisis for the American frontier given the 
disparity. 
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and the development of Indian Territory. 
The conception of an empty wilderness was central to federal policy makers’ 
understandings of the land and its potential value as a dumping ground for Native Americans 
removed from the East.  It was a transformable landscape ready to be remade according to 
American policy dictates with clearly demarcated boundaries and federal oversight.21  William 
Clark should have known better after his decades of experience, but even he fell into the trap of 
thinking that the West was easily transformable.  The problem was not just removing nations 
from the East, but where to put them once uprooted.  The problem limited previous removal 
efforts.  Clark’s March 1826 report to Secretary of War James Barbour outlined the basic 
architecture of the western components of Removal.  Clark argued that “the country west of 
Missouri and Arkansas and west of the Mississippi river north of Missouri is the one destined to 
receive [the forced migrants] . . . this country will be well adapted to their residence.  It is well 
watered . . . abounds with grass . . . has many salt springs . . . contains much prairie land, which 
will make the opening of farms easy, and afford a temporary supply of game.”22  It was the 
perfect landscape to create civilized and settled Indian nations.  Indian Territory would be in the 
central plains, between the Kansas and Platte river valleys.  In modern terms, the federal 
government designated what is now the state of Kansas as the new home for Native Americans 
from throughout the East.  Peoples who had never encountered each other before would suddenly 
find themselves becoming neighbors. 
For those Native Americans already occupying the region, Clark reported their condition 
“is the most pitiable that can be imagined,” with pervasive famine from which “many die for 
want of food, and during which the living child is often buried with the dead mother, because no 
                                               
21 Ronda, “‘We Have A Country,” 742-3. 
22 Clark to Barbour, March 1, 1826, LROIA: StLS, Roll 747. 
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can spare it as much food as would sustain it through its helpless infancy.  This description 
applies to Sioux, Osages, and many others, but I mention those because they are powerful tribes 
and live near our borders.”23  Considering the Sioux as destitute and starving severely 
downplayed their collective power either ignorantly or by design to promote the removal plan.  
Clark based the plan on the faulty premise that resident Native Americans would acquiesce to 
thousands of strangers competing for their resources. 
Dougherty agreed with Clark’s assessments about the bleak conditions in Indian Country.  
The bordering tribes “are constantly at war with each other,” he reported to superiors in 
Washington in 1827, so much so that “starvation is at this time one of the leading causes of their 
disputes, the game has left them . . . and many of them starve half their time.”24  Certainly the 
smaller nations like the Kansa suffered greatly.  Increased indebtedness to traders with their 
stores of smuggled whiskey and the loss of social and political control fit Dougherty’s 
description of dependence and his own perceptions about the importance of his agency in 
remedying the pitiful humanitarian crisis.  Without such federally organized intervention, “the 
natural consequence is that hungry worm is constantly gnawing on them, and keeps them 
prowling over the country like so many hungry wolves seeking out and devouring everything 
eatable that comes in their way.”25 
Such bleak assessments fit within a larger understanding among many federal officials 
that Removal would be beneficial to Native Americans across the continent.  Removal itself was 
nothing new: Clark merely extended the policy tradition of creating a racial and national 
                                               
23 Clark to Barbour, March 1, 1826, LROIA: StLS, Roll 747. 
24 Dougherty to McKenney, September 4, 1827, LROIA: UMA, Roll 883. 
25 Dougherty to McKenney, September 4, 1827, LROIA: UMA, Roll 883. 
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separation that many whites and some Native Americans saw as necessary for Indian survival.26  
Federal administrators hoped to fix what Dougherty observed as the “unsettled state of their 
boundary lines,” that federal officials saw as fundamental to nearly all the intertribal conflicts.27  
Surveyed, fixed, and policed spaces would stop wars.  Static tribes would be more receptive to 
civilizing reformers, undertaking agricultural pursuits in the place of hunting, and limit the 
collateral damage against white traders and settlers from intertribal warfare.  The 1830 Indian 
Removal Act merely enshrined this long-held view.  It assumed federal control over the entirety 
of the land acquired through the Louisiana Purchase, including the authority and power to make 
borders, enforce exchanges, and ultimately protect against “all interruption and disturbance” 
from other Indians or white intruders.  By granting title to the lands and establishing property 
boundaries, the United States created the legal basis for direct oversight, turned the wild space 
into a settled place, diminished Indian ability to act independently by reducing their landholding 
to permanent tenant status through the provision that all lands would revert to the United States 
should the tribe abandon the lands or become extinct.28  “A speedy removal,” argued President 
Andrew Jackson in his annual message to Congress, “will place a civilized and dense population 
                                               
26 Every administration had envisioned some form of removal and separation of white and Native American 
populations.  The Monroe administration drafted the first comprehensive program for removal.  This effort stalled in 
the John Quincy Adams administration, though Adams reluctantly agreed that removal would be necessary to tamp 
down jurisdictional conflicts between states and the federal government over Native Americans.  Jackson rightly 
receives the blame and infamy for much of the horrors of a full-throated Removal policy, but he and his 
subordinates were operating within longstanding policy guidelines.  Ronda, “We Have A Country,” 742-5; Satz, 
American Indian Policy, 1-8. 
27 Dougherty to Eaton, October 27, 1829, LROIA: UMA, Roll 883. 
28 “An Act to provide for an exchange of lands with the Indians residing in any of the states or territories, and for 
their removal west of the river Mississippi.” United States Statutes at Large, 21st Cong., Session 1, Chapter 148. 
This followed the judicial theory laid out by Chief Justice John Marshall in Johnson v. McIntosh in 1823, Indians 
were “the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it 
according to their own discretion,” the European discovery of America “gave exclusive title to those who made it,” 
which “necessarily diminished” Indian ability “to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased.” 
See Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823). 
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in large tracts of country now occupied by a few savage hunters.”29  It would clarify jurisdictions 
and settle issues of federalism thus reaffirming national power over national space. 
 
3.2  Creating Neighbors 
 
 Federal efforts to create a regional neighborhood required getting local nations to 
acquiesce to the plan.  Those nations under stress looked forward to a new fort and direct 
relationships with the United States.  Those with considerably more power, like the Pawnee, 
remained apprehensive and continued their military policies of raiding and resource extraction.  
Throughout the late-1820s and early-1830s, Clark and Dougherty focused on trying to make a 
general peace to establish the necessary preconditions to consolidate nations in the immediate 
vicinity of Fort Leavenworth. 
 Kansa chief Now-Pe-Warai (White Plume) visited Clark in St. Louis at the same time 
Leavenworth made his survey for the new fort.  His people were being hard-pressed by the 
Pawnee.  Rival claimants to political power threatened his rule and the succession of his son 
Chin-ga-ca-he-ga.  Disease, encroaching whites, wars with other nations, and economic collapse 
threatened the Kansa with annihilation.  Now-Pe-Warai urged Clark to expedite construction of 
the new fort as a solution to his strategic insecurity.  “My Father, I understand you are making a 
fort near my village.  I am glad of it.  I hope you will lend me your hand to correct my men when 
they do wrong,” he told Clark.  Now-Pe-Warai sought a political guarantor to assist him in 
asserting control over a world in the midst of political upheaval and imminent social collapse.  
“My people are bad people, they ought to be corrected,” he exclaimed.  They ought to “have 
                                               
29 Andrew Jackson, “President’s Message”, in Register of Debates, 21st, Cong. 2nd Session, Appendix to Gales and 
Seaton’s Register, ix (1830). 
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their ears cropped and their backs striped.  I hope you will give me a paper for the commanding 
officer to assist me in correcting my people – as you have made me a chief I want to use my 
authority among them.  I do not want to be a chief behind the bush.”30  Even if Now-Pe-Warai 
merely told Clark what the superintendent wanted to hear, the underlying issues of the Kansa 
crisis suggest Now-Pe-Warai needed a direct federal presence to better order his neighborhood 
and retain power. 
Leaders like Now-Pe-Warai were eager to ally themselves with the United States.  They 
preferred a possibly malevolent, but neutral power to guarantee security against more powerful 
neighbors like the Pawnee.  Federal authorities could further tamp down internal squabbles over 
leadership by recognizing existing political leaders like Now-Pe-Warai, who could then claim 
the economic benefits of official recognition like housing, goods, and even slaves as the chief 
requested.  Federal officials backed away from an extended commitment up the Missouri, 
creating space between places of Pawnee and federal control.  People like the Kansa pulled the 
government closer, relying on it to create a hybrid federal-Native American place.  Kansa leaders 
changed the scale of the relationship with Americans and the United States to an intimate, 
dependent one.  Here, leaders in positions like that of Now-Pe-Warai sought to shrink distance as 
a key to political survival.  This also fit into federal plans for consolidation and control of space 
in the immediate vicinity of Fort Leavenworth. 
Consolidation was key.  Just as Now-Pe-Warai tried to consolidate his own governing 
authority through close interpersonal relations with Clark, the Superintendent sought to a more 
cohesive strategy to centralize administration.  “Many leading chiefs,” Clark wrote of the 
emigrating Indians, “are zealous in this work, and labouring hard to collect their dispersed and 
                                               
30 Now-Pe-Warai to Clark, May 17, 1827, LROIA: StLS, Roll 748. 
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broken tribes at their new and permanent homes.”31  Collecting scattered peoples simplified 
administration of a remade Indian Territory, allowing each polity to develop a hierarchy of 
leadership anointed by resident agents and a singular tribal identity centered on a fixed location, 
all while being more easily controllable than multiple factions.  Fixed boundaries with local 
agents would imbue the new residents with a sense of place and collective identity.  Rather than 
divide and conquer, this was a strategy of unification. 
At work was a fundamental misunderstanding of power in this region as fixable, rather 
than as flexible and mobile.  Federal military strategy looked to fix locations with a centralized 
power of state architecture in buildings, officials, troops, culture, law, and ultimately backed by 
force.  It was a strategy of posts that showed officials learned little from the experience of Fort 
Atkinson.  Fixed positions, however, did not work within the geographic context of the Great 
Plains.  Lieutenant Philip Cooke highlighted the stark differences while on escort duty with a 
detachment of the Sixth Infantry guarding the Santa Fe caravan in 1829: 
 
It was a humiliating condition to be surrounded by these rascally Indians, who, by means of their 
horses, could tantalize us with hopes of battle, and elude our efforts; who could annoy us by 
preventing all individual excursions for hunting, &c., and who could insult us with impunity. 
Much did we regret that we were not mounted too.32 
 
The regionally dominant military powers, particularly the Pawnee, but also the Sioux to the north 
and Comanche to the south, relied on cavalry.  Their power lay in mobile warrior societies 
outside American forts.   
Forts could not project power beyond a limited range.  The infantry garrisoning Fort 
Leavenworth were just as ineffective on the plains as their predecessors at Fort Atkinson.  The 
                                               
31 Clark to Barbour, March 11, 1826, LROIA: StLS, Roll 748. 
32 Cooke, Scenes and Adventures, 54. 
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U.S. Mounted Rangers, a paramilitary force outside the regular army and designed primarily for 
escort duty of the Santa Fe trade did not receive Congressional authorization until 1832.33  
Between 1827 and 1833 the United States had little military ability to enforce the process of 
spatial transformation or create stable relations with Native American nations on its western 
border.  Despite federal assertions to the contrary, the Pawnee remained the arbiters of the land, 
controlling access and setting the terms of engagement. 
Veteran Indian agent and keen observer John Dougherty considered the Pawnee the most 
powerful of the tribes bordering U.S. territory, capable of simultaneous military campaigns 
against the Osage, Kansa, and Cheyenne.  The Kitkahahki were “carrying on an exterminating 
war,” against the Kansa, even with the latter living mere miles from the month-old Fort 
Leavenworth.  The arrival of forcibly relocated Native Americans created increasingly 
complicated relationships between the new arrivals and the original inhabitants.  Arrivals 
sparked new feuds.  Older disputes reignited or intensified.  Without settling these disputes, 
Dougherty warned Clark, “all that section of the country which you so wisely recommended, and 
still contemplate having set apart for the location and seat of Government for all the remnants of 
Indian tribes East of this will, in my opinion, soon become a perfect field of blood and pillage.”34 
Implementing Removal policy and creating a federally envisioned neighborhood fell 
largely to Clark.  Coordinating emigrations, establishing boundaries, and most importantly 
securing the cooperation of local nations hostile to newcomers appeared to be nearly 
insurmountable problems.  Complicating the situation were the intractable regional animosities 
along the Missouri.  “The Sioux and Pawnees of the Missouri are unfriendly to each other and 
some of each nation have been killed by their War Parties,” Clark wrote to the War Department.  
                                               
33 Leo E. Oliva, Soldiers on the Santa Fe Trail (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967), 31-7. 
34 Dougherty to Clark, June 28, 1827, LROIA: UMA, Roll 883. 
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“Those distant and roving bands of Indians are continually at war with each other, and I am 
inclined to believe, that we have not the power at this time, to prevent it,” he worried.  Fearing 
little could be done, he reported being “apprehensive of much difficulty in bringing about peace 
and friendship between the Osages and the combination of Delaware, Kickapoo, Cherokee, and 
others, as the unfriendly feelings which have long existed and the recent acts of violence, have 
increased them to a deadly hatred and eagerness for revenge.”35  From Clark’s perspective, 
Indian Country was a diplomatic quagmire of unremitting hostility and a giant multi-ethnic 
warzone.  With less than $68,000 to run the entirety of his superintendency for the fiscal year 
from September 1826 to September 1827, including support for often destitute relocated Native 
Americans, Clark found himself continually hard-pressed to manage daily affairs, let alone 
establish an ambitious peace plan to remake the Missouri Valley.  By January 1828, the 
superintendency was running nearly $20,000 over budget in unfulfilled expenses from treaty 
implementation and removal costs.36 
Garrison commanders in the region were even less optimistic about the prospects of 
effecting a general peace in Indian Country.  High up the Mississippi at the Falls of St. Anthony, 
Colonel Josiah Snelling reported back to Brigadier General Henry Atkinson and Clark in St. 
Louis that not even the presence of an American garrison could keep the peace.  A Sioux party 
even opened fire on their Chippewa hosts within sight of Fort Snelling.  Chippewa leaders 
captured the two Sioux murderers and promptly executed them under terms of a peace treaty 
signed by both parties at Prairie du Chien less than two years before.  Even with this framework 
to settle disputes, Sioux leaders promised revenge for the execution.  “The transaction is an 
                                               
35 Clark to Barbour, May 8, 1826, LROIA: StLS, Roll 747. 
36 Clark to Barbour, “Estimate of Yearly Expenses,” September 1, 1826, LROIA: StLS, Roll 747; Clark to Barbour, 
January 1, 1828, LROIA: StLS, Roll 748. 
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excellent commentary of the efficacy of Indian Treaties, held at an immense expense and broken 
as soon as they are made,” lamented Snelling, whose years of experience in the midst of inter-
tribal warfare made him a calloused observer.  He concluded that the whole idea of creating a 
federally-enforced peace in Indian Country, and making treaties in particular, may “tell well in 
the newspapers, but are worse than useless to the Government.”37 
Such sentiments remained all too valid for federal relations with the Pawnee.  Continued 
outrages (to use contemporary terminology) against Santa Fe caravans and the road 
commissioners sent to mark the official trail in 1826 belied the language of the 1818 and 1825 
treaties that theoretically established federal territorial sovereignty over the region.  Santa Fe 
road commissioner Benjamin Reeves suffered through repeated raids and complained to the War 
Department that unanswered Pawnee attacks set a dangerous precedent about the lack of federal 
power.  Indian Department head Thomas McKenney concurred and ordered Clark to fix the 
situation.  In “thus daring the power of the United States,” wrote McKenney, they need to “be 
held accountable and made to suffer for such outrages, if they do not immediately desist the 
practice of them, and cause demand to be made of the property taken, and to take such steps in 
regard to the irruptive disposition of this Tribe, as may be best calculated to produce a change in 
their practice of committing such acts for the future.”38  Without restitution and punishment to 
hold the Pawnee accountable, federal power counted for nothing.  In reality there was no federal 
power west of Fort Leavenworth. 
 Clark remained pessimistic about changing Pawnee behavior.  Replying directly to 
Secretary of War Barbour he argued that little could be done as “Those Pawnees who inhabit the 
Country on the River Platte and those on the Red River [the Wichita, known as Pawnee Picts] 
                                               
37 Josiah Snelling to Atkinson, May 30 and 31, 1827, LROIA: StLS, Roll 748. 
38 McKenney to Clark, May 30, 1826, in Clark to Barbour, July 12, 1826, LROIA: StLS, Roll 747. 
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have been in the habit of killing and robbing the Spaniards, both before and since the change of 
Govt of Louisiana and occasionally robbing the traders between new Mexico and their 
Settlements, as also the Kansas, Osages, and others.”  Each reported incident was recorded and 
official demands made of the Pawnee with “spirited remonstrances” by local agents.  “The 
Pawnees of Missouri, Osages, and Kansas have been frequently threatened,” Clark reported, 
“and it is believed their depredations have been less frequent,” but he remained unconvinced of 
any permanent changes.  The best recourse, he suggested, was to buy off the Pawnee.  Treaties 
that exchanged “a discretionary annuity of guns, powder, and lead with an expressed 
understanding, that all trade will be suspended with them, for violations of the stipulations, the 
most salutary effect, may be produced in those as well as other Tribes, who are dependent upon 
the articles furnished to them by Traders for their support.”39  Federal power was so weak, the 
best plan was to pay protection money.  Pawnee independence and Clark’s limited enforcement 
capability meant that federal officials relied on the kind of treaty-making diplomacy that kept 
producing ineffectual results.  The contemplated bribes for good behavior merely fed Pawnee 
power by supplying them with weapons more appropriate for continued warfare.40 
Adding to this state of affairs were the unclear jurisdictions of federal Indian officials.  
John Dougherty succeeded Benjamin O’Fallon after the latter’s resignation due to poor health in 
March 1827.  Dougherty promptly moved the Upper Missouri Agency, responsible for the 
Pawnee, Omaha, and Otoe, away from Council Bluffs.  The sub agents for the Sioux and 
Mandan, and any other nations higher up the Missouri, while technically within Dougherty’s 
agency, reported directly to Clark in St. Louis, along with those for the Kansa, Delaware, and 
                                               
39 Clark to Barbour, July 12, 1826, LROIA: StLS, Roll 747. 
40 Bows and arrows remained the weapon of choice for hunting purposes.  Guns were more difficult to reload and 
aim while on horseback, and an arrow wound was more effective at eventually bringing down a bison than a bullet 
wound.  White, Roots of Dependency, 187, 376 f.n.25. 
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others gathered around Fort Leavenworth.   As late as 1830, unclear lines of communication 
further complicated a jurisdictional mess already clouded by personal antipathies.  The 
bureaucratic maneuvering even prompted Dougherty to write directly to the War Department 
claiming that Clark “evinced a disposition to curtail and take from, the rights and powers 
appertaining to that station [Upper Missouri Indian Agent],” and asking for “the authority 
properly belonging to my station.”41 
Within this context of bureaucratic wrangling, Dougherty and Clark had to work toward 
implementing the changes in Pawnee behavior.  The growing political pressure of Santa Fe 
traders and the increased demands for speedy Indian removal emanating from Washington 
spurred action.  Dougherty’s budget estimates for fiscal year 1828 reflected the growing 
importance of the Upper Missouri Agency as it encompassed a spending increase to $11,250 for 
gifts, staff including translators and blacksmiths, annuities, and other responsibilities to in effect 
buy peaceful relations.  To focus on stabilizing Indian relations around the Platte-Missouri 
confluence, he advocated a partial pullback from higher up the Missouri.  The sub agents there 
were too isolated and dependent on fur traders for supplies.  Dougherty recommended using 
$1000 destined for the sub agents’ housing be reallocated to bribe the Pawnee into making peace 
with their Otoe, Omaha, Osage, and Kansa neighbors.42  It suggested a significant federal retreat 
from the upper Missouri if fully implemented.  Clark approved of the peace plan.  It fit within his 
grand strategy to settle affairs around Council Bluffs and Fort Leavenworth.  Planning began for 
                                               
41 Dougherty to Clark, October 16, 1829, Clark to Eaton, no date (probably October 1829), Clark to Eaton, 
November 15, 1829, all in LROIA: UMA, Roll 883.  In the comments for Dougherty’s budget estimates for 1828, 
Clark wrote the War Department that other than budgeting issues and supplies, matters best handled by Clark in St. 
Louis to reduce costs, the sub agents were to report to Dougherty.  Dougherty and sub agents Richard Bean and John 
Sanford clashed professionally and personally.  Secretary of War John Eaton finally settled the matter in 
Dougherty’s favor, but the back and forth remained one more distraction in an already overworked department. 
42 Dougherty to Clark, “Estimate for Missouri Agency,” September 1, 1827, LROIA: UMA, Roll 883. 
 166 
several treaty councils to be convened in the summer of 1828 to settle land disputes between the 
Sioux, Omaha, Kansa, Otoe, Pawnee, Shawnee, Iowa, Sac and Fox.43 
This small shift in funds was not enough to adequately cover the larger strategic needs of 
the Agency.  Between 1827 and 1831, the percentage of funds within the St. Louis 
Superintendency allocated for the main agency around Council Bluffs, Bellevue, and Fort 
Leavenworth fell from 51.5% to 38.8%.  Money increasingly went toward the Sioux and Mandan 
sub agencies.  Clark estimated the needs of the whole Superintendency more than doubled in the 
same period, from $89,000 in 1827 to $200,800 in 1830.  The amount fell to $144,100 in 1831 as 
the administration strove for fiscal economy and the demands of Removal drained resources and 
attention from stabilizing the region north of Fort Leavenworth.44  Clark did not have the 
resources to buy peace. 
  
3.3  The Pawnee Homeland 
 
Through the 1820s, the Pawnee built the preconditions of economic and military power 
necessary to counter federal efforts to remake the diplomatic world of the Platte Valley.  Pawnee 
actions from the mid- to late-1820s reaffirmed their capabilities, though they faced increasingly 
difficult challenges.  For the Pawnee the political status quo at the start of 1828 was not ideal, but 
appeared manageable given their recent history. 
Mobility gave Pawnee warriors a strategic edge over their neighbors, especially the 
horse-poor Sioux.  Herds of around 8,000 horses gave the Pawnee flexibility to project power 
                                               
43 Clark to Barbour, January 1, 1828, LROIA: StLS, Roll 748; Clark to Dougherty, October 12, 1827, LROIA: 
UMA, Roll 883. 
44 Collister, “An Early Stage in Decline,” 116. 
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through long-range raiding and trading, as well as a rapid response capability to any incursions 
of peripheral hunting grounds or core territory.45  The core territory produced sufficient food to 
maintain a population of around 10,000 people.  The herds allowed for extensive hunting ranges 
to the west.46  These economic preconditions preserved the Pawnee as the dominant regional 
power at the close of the decade.  They allowed Pawnee leaders to manage their regional 
geopolitics with some degree of flexibility. 
Chiefs routinely complained about their young men as uncontrollable and eager to wage 
war, raid, and not listen to federal demands.  But these remained convenient rhetorical tactics to 
deflect federal pressure while preserving Pawnee political culture and pathways to power for the 
next generation.  Without combat experience or success on raids, a Pawnee man remained 
politically immature, a boy among men in the village without the proof of bravery necessary for 
political power.47  By decade’s close, the warriors and younger leaders who were labeled 
troublesome in 1819 and 1820 reached political maturity and assumed newly opened leadership 
positions.  A generational shift in leadership began after the limited Pawnee-U.S. treaty of 
friendship signed in 1825.  Older leaders who made the first connections with the United States 
were dead or dying: Sharitarish II of the Chaui was replaced by his younger brother Iskatape 
(Wicked Chief), Knife Chief, and Petalesharoo of the Skidi were last recorded in the 1825 
treaty.48   
The younger leaders participated in the great raids into Mexico and wars against the 
Arapaho, and Kiowa in the early 1820s.  After a century of conflict, the Chaui and Kitkahahki 
                                               
45 White, Roots of Dependency, 200. 
46 Collister, “An Early State in Decline,” 65-9. 
47 Murie, Pawnee Indian Societies, 557; Weltfish, Lost Universe, 24; Holder, Hoe and Horse, 51; Dorsey and Murie, 
Skidi Society, 113. 
48 Hyde, The Pawnee Indians, 179. 
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bands concluded a peace with the Arapaho in 1822 that gave the Pawnee freedom to range west 
against their Cheyenne enemies.  Cheyenne captives provided sacrifices for the Morning Star 
religious ritual central to Pawnee cosmology.  Renewed peace and alliance with the Comanche 
allowed for continued raiding south to Mexico.49  Great and Little Osage moves into the northern 
Oklahoma Pawnee hunting grounds in the 1810s remained a constant source of annoyance, but 
not enough to prevent a general peace between the groups in 1822.50  The Pawnee secured their 
southern borders and hunting grounds with at least neutral, if not friendly neighbors by mid-
decade.  This diplomacy allowed for a strategic pivot toward threats from the east and northeast. 
Pressure on the Pawnee core territory mounted throughout the 1820s.  With less buffer 
space on the eastern and northern borders, the Ponca, Arikara, Omaha, Otoe, and Kansa 
neighbors were a more direct threat.  Meanwhile, the Oglala and Brulé Sioux pushed into the 
buffalo hunting grounds of the Platte drainage.  This expansion largely confined itself to the 
loosely defined neutral grounds between rival Native American powers.  These lands were 
generally too dangerous for anyone but war parties, which made them excellent hunting grounds 
and conduits of relatively safe passage for war and trading parties that wanted to bypass 
population centers.51  American pressure in the form of overhunting fueled by the fur trade and 
removal of tribes from the state of Missouri, squeezed the Kansa and Otoe along the Missouri 
River closer toward Pawnee land and into greater competition for resources. 
                                               
49 Even with the traders’ penchant for misidentifying Comanche, Kiowa, and Arapaho raiders as Pawnee, it is clear 
the Pawnee raids to Mexico and along the Santa Fe Trail continued with few impediments.  Traders to Santa Fe 
reported that 2,000 Chaui and Kitkahahki warriors were on their way to meet their new friends the Comanche in 
June 1822, and presumably continued into Mexico.  Pawnee raids into New Mexico prompted urgent pleas from 
Mexican authorities for federal officials to curtail the raids and effect a peace treaty.  Hyde, The Pawnee Indians, 
177-8; Vizcarra to McNair, September 8, 1823, in Clark to Calhoun, February 11, 1824, LROIA: StLS, Roll 747. 
50 Hyde, The Pawnee Indians, 178. 
51 White, “The Winning of the West,” 332-4; Nester, The Arikara War. 
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The Pawnee homeland remained remarkably secure economically and socially despite the 
growing dangers at the margins.  American explorers and agents dismissed Pawnee agriculture in 
part to emphasize the need for federal civilization efforts.  Twenty years earlier, Zebulon Pike 
had observed that they only raised enough corn “to afford a little thickening to their soup.”  But 
this claim ran counter to the reality that the “most industrious” Pawnee women “raise[d] an 
abundance of corn.”52  Conservative estimates from the late-1830s suggested over 400 acres in 
cultivation with annual yields of about 10,000 bushels of corn.  Agricultural output, in 
conjunction with the all-important buffalo hunts, provided enough to sustain a population of 
around 10,000.53  
 Economic autonomy further secured political cohesion.  American trade with the Pawnee 
was limited in scope and value.  Domination of trade by the chiefs limited the influence of 
alcohol through the 1820s with its attendant social problems, cycle of indebtedness to traders, 
and environmental collapse from overhunting.54 
 In total, the Pawnee were economically and politically secure at the close of 1827.  Their 
leadership was composed of younger, battle-tested men.  Their military resources allowed them 
to project power up to a thousand miles from their homeland, and when united in a general 
confederacy, they fielded over 2,000 expert cavalrymen.  The Pawnee were regional masters 
with a secure southern border and enough strength to match incursions from the east and north.  
 How the Pawnee used this power in the region was, from the perspective of Lucien 
Fontenelle who ran the American Fur Company outpost at Bellevue near present-day Omaha, 
nothing but “a continual stream of abuses.”  In 1829, Fontenelle constructed a retrospective 
                                               
52 Pike, Journals, 2:35; Samuel Allis, “Journal,” PML, 157. 
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history of the previous decade that told the story of Pawnee power as one of Pawnee abuses.  At 
Dougherty’s request, Fontenelle catalogued a series of robberies, murders, captive taking, raiding 
parties, and general insults from his own experiences going back to 1819.  Such outrages resulted 
from Pawnee hubris, and according to Fontenelle: 
 
It is my considered opinion that the Pawnis knowing themselves to be a powerfull tribe, have for 
a long time past been under the firm belief, that no American force that could be sent against 
them could in the least, injure or molest them.  They have often said publickly and in my 
presence, that no combined force could frighten them.  All these threats are verified by their 
continuing hostility against American citizens travelling on the road leading to Santa Fee as well 
as on those who enter the Upper Missouri. 
 
Fontenelle made no distinction between acts of economic or political violence, as all these 
outrages were insulting to the American flag and sovereignty, as well as treaty violations.  No 
acts of kindness could bring them into submission, only force.  In Fontenelle’s telling, a Pawnee 
war party attacked Stephen Long’s expedition in 1819.  “They entered the camp, pulled down an 
American flag which was then flying at the major’s tent, trampled it and cut it to pieces,” to 
remind the interlopers who controlled the territory through which they travelled.  Even after 
more consistent relations were established an officer of the 6th Regiment at Fort Atkinson 
pursuing deserters was “shamefully treated” and temporarily kept in confinement in 1824.  
Travelers along the Santa Fe Trail, supposedly protected by federal agreements with the Pawnee, 
were more often than not subjected to detentions and demands for payment.55 
Pawnee leaders held little regard for American military power.  Fontenelle recalled that in 
1824, “I heard myself the Pawnis observe that they would be happy to meet them [Americans] in 
a fight to show them that the Americans could be used up like buffaloes in a chase.”56  They had 
                                               
55 Lucien Fontenelle to Dougherty, February 26, 1829, LROIA: UMA, Roll 883. 
56 Fontenelle to Dougherty, February 26, 1829, LROIA: UMA, Roll 883. 
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a point.  The Pawnee could literally ride circles around American infantry and outnumbered 
garrisons at Fort Atkinson and Fort Leavenworth by anywhere between four and six to one. 
What Fontenelle did not understand was the rationale behind these incidents as tools of 
Pawnee foreign policy and revenue extraction within an intertwined political and religious 
cosmology.  For Pawnee leaders, the Santa Fe Trail operated as a source of revenue and military 
supplies.  Each trader who entered Pawnee country was liable to what amounted to a licensing 
fee of gifts in tobacco, goods, horses, or in more extreme cases all of a trader’s merchandize and 
even his life.  As horses, guns, and ammunition were the most common articles taken it is clear 
that Pawnee raiders viewed Americans as a vital source of weaponry.  One raiding party leader 
declared, “that it was nothing to rob white men, they were such cowards and dogs.”57  Americans 
were not worthy men, capable of bearing arms and acting the part of warriors.  
Appropriating the cultural and physical power of interloping whites fit within a Pawnee 
cosmology of assimilating power objects.  A village leader flogged a resident American as 
punishment for several Pawnee dying of disease in 1825.  From the Pawnee perspective, this was 
part of a larger regulatory system that asserted chiefly control over supernatural forces and 
physical objects.  Taxing trade and regulating travel across Pawnee lands represented the foreign 
policy extension of a cosmological imperative to maintain spiritual order of all things, forces, 
and people.58 
Central to this cosmology was the Morning Star sacrificial ritual that revitalized the earth 
and maintained the balance of supernatural forces that protected the Pawnee and provided 
fertility through human sacrifice.59  Federal officials tried desperately to eradicate the practice 
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from the 1810s through the 1830s.  On April 3, 1827, Dougherty received word from traders that 
the Pawnee intended to sacrifice a captive Cheyenne woman.  Dougherty, his Sub Agent Captain 
George Kennerly, three other officers and a small detachment of troops immediately tried to 
secure her release.  Upon their arrival at the Skidi village, Dougherty demanded the captive.  
“After some long deliberations from the part of the Indians and some presents were made to 
them by the Agent, they agreed that the prisoner should be sent in . . . by some of their own 
people and delivered to the whites,” according to the report by Lucien Fontenelle.  What ensued, 
however, was a horrifying scene of bloodletting.  As the captive was being exchanged, “some 8 
or 10 Pawnis prepared for the act, rushed on them, killed the woman and cut the body into pieces 
in presence of the party.”  No Americans were injured, “but the act itself, taken in proper light 
and as the Indians themselves would take it, was in my opinion and not less in theirs a great 
insult to the American government.”60  It was a visually appalling scene.  That it occurred after 
federal agents supposedly reached a diplomatic resolution offered a stunning reminder of the 
limited ability to alter foundational Pawnee culture. 
The general impotence of federal officials to enforce treaty provisions or obtain the 
surrender of accused criminals only reinforced Pawnee perceptions of their own power.  News of 
war parties in the fall of 1828 made U.S. officials nervous about a possible rupture in relations 
and increased raiding.  The best Dougherty could do, however, was order Sub Agent R. P. 
                                               
was in opposition to the Evening Star (Venus, female, dark) and by the former’s sexual conquest of the latter, the 
first woman was born on Earth.  The sacrifice was to return the first woman to the sky power of the Morning Star to 
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60 Fontenelle to R. P. Beauchamp, March 12, 1829, LROIA: UMA, Roll 883. 
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Beauchamp to “read to the nation the treaty (a copy of which is furnished you) concluded at 
Council Bluffs on the 30th Sept. 1825 and inform them that the Government is fully apprised of 
their frequent violation of that instrument.”  Dougherty cautioned him that, “should you ascertain 
. . . that there would be too much hazard in visiting the villages you will employ such men and 
interpreters who are the habits of intercourse with them,” or failing “to procure such suitable 
white men to send to the villages, you will employ the most competent Indians of the Otoes or 
Omahaws for that purpose.”61  If the agents responsible for the Pawnee dared not travel to 
Pawnee lands there was little hope of enforcing treaty provisions or changing Pawnee behavior. 
 Clark was not surprised by the state of affairs.  After 100 horses and mules were stolen 
along the Santa Fe Trail, he lamented that the Pawnee “have conducted themselves badly since 
the troops left the Council Bluffs.  The Ricaras [Arikara], are restless and presumptuous.  Our 
neighboring tribes conduct themselves as usual.”62  The violence deeply troubled him, but Clark 
still held hopes for a regional peace.  A proposed council with the Pawnee, Kansa, Osage, Otoe, 
and Iowa at Council Bluffs in May 1828 offered a last-ditch effort to settle the inter-tribal 
conflicts and limit Pawnee power prior to the arrival of a large group of Native Americans being 
removed west. 
 
3.4  Removal and the Pawnee Creation of Indian Territory 
 
Pressure to relocated Eastern nations grew as the decade ended.  Increasing numbers of 
U.S.-sponsored delegations arrived to view potential resettlement areas around Fort 
Leavenworth.  Pressure from U.S. officials only exacerbated the situation.  The region was still a 
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conflict zone dominated by the Pawnee.  Whatever Clark’s intentions to form a neighborhood, 
Pawnee policy and military power determined where Indian Territory would become reality. 
Clark grew increasingly worried about the prospects for successful Removal, even as he 
was dogged by Washington’s incessant drive for economy.  Clark had a limited budget to 
support those being forced into the West.  He paid out $7,373.74 beyond the allotted funds in 
1827 to support those who arrived at the Mississippi River in near starving condition.  Clark’s 
conservative estimate for 1828 Removal costs required $28,334, or about 20% of his entire 
budget, not counting peace negotiations, annuities, or other expenses.63  Superintendent of Indian 
Affairs Thomas McKenney warned that the Department’s contingency funds could no longer 
bear the increased demands for the cost of emigration and that Congress remained unwilling to 
make to requisite appropriations.64  Washington’s ignorance of the costs of Removal in human 
and monetary terms exacerbated the difficulties Clark already faced in resettling thousands of 
Native Americans.  Despite witnessing the suffering of forced migrations, Clark believed 
removal on the whole benefited Native Americans and continued implementing the policy. 
Clark and McKenney’s correspondence served as a reminder that Removal did not begin 
with Jackson’s annual message, let alone the Removal Act of 1830.  The federal government had 
already designated the fringes of Pawnee territory as a dumping ground for Native Americans 
located on both sides of the Mississippi River. 
Aside from concerns about the growing inhumanity of the situation, such cheapness on 
the part of the government threatened frontier security.  “My situation will be rendered more 
unpleasant when I have numbers of Indians depending upon me (as is always the case) for food 
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and other assistance; without my having the means of affording them any,” Clark warned.  
“Numerous complaints may be expected,” that would create “encreased difficulties . . . between 
the Indians and white people.”  The consequences of an inhumane approach based on 
Washington’s penny-pinching undermined federal authority and credibility.  He asked 
McKenney about how to answer to those who left their homes based on federal promises of 
support only to be told, “no assistance can be afforded you; you must go to the country assigned 
you west of the Missouri, and do the best you can.”  What would those people feel “on receiving 
such language from the Agent of a Government which they may have considered just and 
humane,” asked Clark.65  Without assistance, these people could not act as a civilized buffer of 
Indian Territory alongside the American frontier.  Poverty and desperation would create a 
neighborhood of theft, raiding, and violence perpetrated against white Americans, and would 
leave the removed nations vulnerable to attacks by their powerful neighbors.  If the United States 
fulfilled obligations as the guarantor of security for the removed people, it would be embroiled in 
inter-Indian conflicts and damage claims from settlers and traders. 
By April 1828, Clark was negotiating with the Kickapoo and Delaware of Missouri about 
exchanging lands within the state for new ones in the vicinity of Fort Leavenworth.  The 
Shawnees of Ohio were already on the move toward the Kansas River.66  This was the ideal 
fruition of Clark’s strategy: civilized, centralized nations living in settled communities close to 
military and federal government control.  They would also be outside state boundaries as a buffer 
between the U.S. frontier settlements and potentially more hostile neighbors. 
The continued violence in the region between the Pawnee and their neighbors, however, 
halted the Delaware relocation already in progress.  Chief William Anderson expressed great 
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reluctance about moving to the middle of a potential six-way war between the Osage, Otoe, 
Omaha, Iowa, Kansa, and Pawnee.  After viewing the lands Clark offered along the Kansas 
River, the Delaware delegation instead requested a ten-square mile plot on the eastern side of the 
Missouri line running south of the mouth of the Kansas River.  Residing within Missouri 
afforded more protection from hostile neighbors.67 
 Peace among the regional powers first had to be obtained prior to settling new arrivals.  
Dougherty and Clark recommended a departmental shift toward the Pawnee as the regional key 
to stability, an act to be accomplished through increased gifts, if not outright bribes for good 
behavior.68  By May 1828, Clark’s anticipated regional peace conference was taking shape at the 
Council Bluffs Agency near the recently abandoned Fort Atkinson.  Representatives from all the 
warring groups arrived except the Osage, whose agent failed to invite them.  After several weeks 
of negotiations Dougherty reported a breakthrough agreement between the Pawnee, Omaha, 
Otoe, Kansa, Iowa, Sac, and Shawnee.  The Ponca attended, but did not sign in the absence of 
their chief.  The council left Dougherty optimistic about frontier Indian relations as he “never 
saw more if as much good feeling and friendship exhibited as was by all the contracting parties . 
. . Peace as you know is very uncertain between all nations and particularly Indians, but I must 
be allowed to say it is my firm belief that the one this day concluded will be of some 
considerable duration.”  Most importantly for the future plans, Dougherty reported to Clark back 
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in St. Louis that “All the Indians in council seemed to be much pleased with the Shawnees,” and 
that the “Shawnees also appear to be well pleased with their neighbors generally.”69 
The leaders present evinced a dramatic change of mind regarding federal involvement in 
settling the region.  Ongpatonga of the Omaha expressed a newfound willingness to settle and 
civilize according to American customs.  He blamed traders for encouraging a nomadic lifestyle, 
but that “now that I have seen how those live in your neighborhood (meaning Shawnees) I have 
determined to establish myself and if possible cultivate the soil and collect all kinds of domestic 
animals around me . . . and I have now determined to exert myself and by and with his assistance 
am in hopes we will one day live in abundance.”70  With such sentiments among the leaders, 
Dougherty and Clark could afford to be hopeful about the resettlement plans for the Delaware, 
Choctaw, and Chickasaw underway for 1829 and 1830. 
 Negotiations between the eight signatory nations effectively secured a regional peace 
from the area north and west of Fort Leavenworth, through Pawnee territory in at least the 
eastern half of Nebraska, and well into Iowa.  It theoretically secured the entire northern flank of 
a new Indian Territory from hostilities toward new arrivals.   
With a regional peace concluded, Clark turned toward the regulation of Indian Country to 
assert American sovereignty through policing.  Clark lamented the historic lack of federal power 
to police Indian Country.71  He argued that asserting effective control therefore required “a 
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general system of regulations similar to those which govern the administration of the several 
branches of the military service.”72  Negotiate a peace.  Enforce it, and federal sovereignty more 
broadly, through military power. 
 Such an argument for the militarization of Indian Country harkened back to the failed 
strategy of 1819-1827 at Fort Atkinson.  Yet the combination of a regional peace with a new fort 
and the neighborhood strategy of the consolidated, removed nations offered hope for the creation 
of Indian Territory under a strict federal administrative system.  More direct military 
administration would give agents increased power to enforce federal policy without resort to the 
cajoling and bribery that brought such limited success. 
Developing Fort Leavenworth as an administrative hub remained key to this policy.  The 
Kansa, Iowa, and Shawnee living near the fort visited frequently, which constantly drained the 
budget for presents.  Dougherty estimated that 8,684 warriors and 43,420 total Native Americans 
lived within his agency.  With only $5000 for presents, or roughly 11.5 cents per person, “the 
amount of presents from the government for the Indians of Missouri goes but a little way towards 
giving them a support . . . or leave a favourable impression.”  Nor could he rely on the 
architecture of state power to impress Indians.  He complained to Clark and the War Department 
in October 1828 that “I have been for the last 12 months living in a cabin 18 feet [long] . . . and 6 
½ feet high thrown up in a hurry by the troops and that too of the roughest kind of logs, 
clapboard and puncheons.”73  Such a hut hardly showed the state power needed for the direct 
control Clark envisioned. 
                                               
sovereignty that caused resentments from both Indians and local whites for being either too ineffective or 
overzealous in the application of the laws.  Satz, American Indian Policy, 46-7, 132-145. 
72 Clark to Peter B. Porter, August 27, 1828, LROIA: StLS, Roll 748. 
73 Dougherty, Remarks in Yearly Estimate for 1829, in Clark to Porter, October 10, 1828, LROIA: StLS, Roll 748.  
Combined with annuities, an estimated $30,000 necessary to support relocating Native Americans, and requisitions 
for more buildings and operating expenses, Clark submitted a $210,352 budget request for fiscal year 1829, double 
 179 
 Impressing visitors assumed new importance in the fall of 1828 as Ottawa, Pottawatomie, 
Creek, Chickasaw, and Choctaw delegations arrived at Fort Leavenworth to scout for new 
territories.  Clark had a short window to sell the scouts on the land that fall before winter, the 
spring floods, summer heat, and oppressive flies negated any favorable impressions.74  Initial 
plans to locate tribes along the Kansas River met with some skepticism.  Despite finding the land 
“generally a high rolling country exhibiting a healthy appearance, stone, and almost universally 
limestone sufficiently abundant for use,” Isaac McCoy, who accompanied one delegation, noted 
that the creeks failed in the dry season and “wood is too scarce, especially beyond the distance of 
60 miles west of this state and ten miles south of Kanzas river.”  The last point deeply troubled 
Ottawa and Pottawatomie representatives.75  Like federal officials, these Eastern people had 
difficulty seeing the potential of prairies as healthy or useable land. 
 The landscape soon became the least of Clark’s problems.  While McCoy reported 
friendly encounters with the Osage, Kansa, Shawnee, and Pawnee the situation deteriorated 
rapidly as November approached.  An express from Dougherty at Fort Leavenworth warned that 
Pawnee conduct was becoming “more and more outrageous.”  Direct insults to federal 
sovereignty like “flagellating and otherwise cruelly treating several of our licensed traders,” as 
well as “murdering and pillaging the Santa Fe Merchants on the United States road to New 
Mexico,” violated the 1825 treaty and mocked federal claims to protection of the Santa Fe 
Trail.76  More alarming, Chaui and Skidi warriors showed signs of preparation for all-out war 
with the United States.77   
                                               
the previous amount expended within the Superintendency.  The amount reflected the growing importance of the 
region and the costs of creating an Indian Territory under more direct federal control. 
74 Clark to McKenney, August 21, 1828, LROIA: StLS, Roll 748.  
75 McCoy to Clark, October 7, 1828, LROIA: StLS, Roll 748. 
76 Dougherty to Clark, November 4, 1828, LROIA: StLS, Roll 748. 
77 George Hyde discounts this event as one of mistaken identity or mistaken intent.  Either the Pawnee in question 
were actually confused for Comanche, Kiowa, or a strange band, or Dougherty got bad information about the intent 
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A clerk of the American Fur Company at the Pawnee villages reported that the Chaui and 
Skidi left their villages en masse on October 20.  Their 1,500 mounted warriors outnumbered any 
American force west of the Mississippi, had a two-week head start, and could out maneuver any 
river-based American infantry sent to respond.  They rode for the Santa Fe Trail, according to 
witnesses, “publicly declaring their determination to rob and murder every white man who 
should have the misfortune to fall into their power . . . One of their distinguished War Chiefs 
proclaimed, on leaving his village, that the Santa Fe road should henceforth become a home to 
himself and band; for the purpose of plunder.”  Clark’s achievements for 1828 appeared to be for 
naught.  For Dougherty, this movement resulted from an indulgent policy of forbearance.   “The 
frontier settlements from Red River to this place presents a wide and open field for their 
depredations,” he further warned, “and I am sorry to say that I fear they will avail themselves of 
every opportunity to take the lives and property of all they may meet.”   Even warnings about 
federal power and retribution from the resident traders held little sway.  The Pawnee “still hold 
great confidence in their own strength believing themselves to be more numerous warlike and 
brave than any other nation on earth,” and “say they would rejoice to see [Americans] arrayed 
against them – that they were able to run them down like Buffaloe in the Prairie.”  Here was the 
nightmare scenario for the Indian Department: a hostile force able to outfight any immediate 
military detachment and willing to challenge American sovereignty, trade, and frontier settlers.78 
  The worst fears of an Indian war subsided as the Pawnee refrained from movements 
against the U.S. frontier, but the damage to Clark’s vision for Indian Territory was considerable.  
                                               
of this expedition, and Hyde dismisses its importance.  Hyde, The Pawnee Indians, 179.  This interpretation does not 
fit with the recorded evidence.  Dougherty’s warning came from a Mr. A. Papin, chief clerk of the American Fur 
Company in the Pawnee villages.  It is unlikely that such a person intimately familiar with the Nebraska Pawnee 
would make such a mistake.  Even if the warnings were hyperbolic and it was a raiding party destined for Mexico or 
to meet with Comanche allies, the effect of the Pawnee movement had significant ramifications for federal officials 
who viewed it as a serious war warning. 
78 Dougherty to Clark, November 4, 1828, LROIA: StLS, Roll 748. 
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While escorting the Choctaw and Chickasaw delegation near the Kansas River, Sub Agent 
George Kennerly received a warning from Dougherty who advised them to be on guard “or you 
may loose your horses – and perhaps your scalps.  Let no ponies approach your camp, under any 
circumstances.”79  This was a dire warning. 
The news placed Kennerly in a difficult position as the leader of the delegation.  The 
government expected him to sell the region and the favorability of removing there to the 
Choctaw and Chickasaw.  Kennerly was also deeply aware “that the eyes of the nation is fixed 
on me,” to conclude the business safely.  He was at a loss for the correct course of action.  If he 
reported the message to his party, Kennerly “was confident they would have returned without 
examining any of the country west . . . Those people are naturally timid, and I have had great 
difficulty in persuading them to pass through even the Osage Country.”  In consultations with his 
colleagues,  Kennerly decided to confine their route close to the state lines of Missouri and 
Arkansas.  “After examining the country between the Osages and Kansas,” he reported, “I will 
pursue a course down the Neosho by the way of the Osage Villages and Agency to the Fort 
Gibson, after which we will examine as much of the country on the Canadian Fork and I think 
we can do in safety.”80  This was a dramatic change in plans from those Clark envisioned. 
The Pawnee effectively closed off the entire region around the Platte and Kansas to 
immigrating Indians.  Unlike the smaller nations easily relocated in the vicinity of Leavenworth, 
the federal government determined it needed far more space for the larger groups moving from 
Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi.  By steering the party south and west, the Pawnee effectively 
                                               
79 Dougherty to George Kennerly, “Express Received November 8, 1828,” in Kennerly to Clark, November 9, 1828, 
LROIA: StLS, Roll 748. 
80 Kennerly to Clark, November 9, 1828, LROIA: StLS, Roll 748. 
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determined that the lands that became Indian Territory would not be where Clark envisioned near 
Fort Leavenworth, but in the future state of Oklahoma. 
 It is difficult to pinpoint the exact purpose of the Pawnee movement that fall.  Veteran 
traders and officials familiar with the cycles of Pawnee movements would not have mistaken a 
hunting expedition.  If the statements about Pawnee intentions were accurate and not a 
hyperbolic reaction to years of smaller Pawnee acts of hostility, then it is possible that Pawnee 
leaders intended to scare off potential immigrants through a demonstration of their military 
capabilities.  At this moment the Pawnee were at the height of their power with younger 
militaristic leaders, a strong economic and social base at home, and a commanding sense of 
military and diplomatic superiority at the margins of their territory.  Why not project that power? 
 Pawnee threats to close down the proposed relocation areas remained persistent through 
1830.  Surveying for the Delaware lands south of the Platte in August, Baptist missionary turned 
federal Indian official Isaac McCoy complained of the Army’s unwillingness to provide him a 
sufficient escort as “[General Henry]Atkinson, and every one else in this country knew that not a 
year for several years had passed, in which those Pawnees did not kill, and rob, and otherwise 
abuse, more or fewer of the citizens of the U. States who happened to fall into their hands.”81  
McCoy so feared Pawnee attack that he could not understand the reluctance to properly arm and 
escort his party, complaining in his journal of “Clark's neglect of duty, and Atkinson's foolish & 
wicked orders, and [Major William – who initially refused the escort] Davenport's 
childishness.”82  McCoy was right to worry.  His party was trying to operate amidst a war zone. 
                                               
81 Isaac McCoy, “Journal of Isaac McCoy for the Exploring Expedition of 1830,” edited by Lela Barnes, Kansas 
Historical Quarterly 5, no. 4 (November 1936): 348. 
82 McCoy, “Journal of Isaac McCoy for the Exploring Expedition,” 349. 
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 Though hard pressed by the new arrivals and the expanding Sioux, at the close the 1820s 
the Pawnee were shaping the course of Removal policy.  This ability relied on two foundations. 
One, that the Pawnee could maintain the ability to project power.  Two, that the core strength of 
their home territory and population could sustain the losses of protracted wars while reacting to 
new crises along their borders and at home.  This was increasingly difficult by 1830 as military 
demands only increased. 
 
3.5  Pawnee Strategic Recalibrations 
 
Strains on Pawnee military power and increasingly fraught foreign affairs pushed the 
nation toward a recalibration of its relations with the federal government.  This was not a 
capitulation by any means.  Efforts to secure better access to weapons, avenues for diplomacy, 
and perhaps an alliance against the Sioux were about strengthening Pawnee independence.  A 
smallpox outbreak forced the Pawnee hand and made the reset all the more urgent. 
By the summer of 1829, warfare was again the norm within the territory surrounding the 
Pawnee.  Violence among the Sioux and the Sac and Fox on the Upper Mississippi was matched 
by renewed war between the Pawnee and the Osage, Kansa, and Delaware with occasional 
deaths on all sides.  Despite this unsettled state of affairs, Clark faced drastic budget cuts and 
unfunded mandates from the newly established Jackson administration.83  Without funds to buy 
peace or exert military control the United States had few viable alternatives except encouraging 
                                               
83 The Jackson administration began its tenure with a fundamental ignorance about the costs of western Indian 
affairs.  Secretary of War John Eaton’s push for economy of spending in the superintendency “to the lowest possible 
amount, consistently with the Treaty obligations of the Government” left Clark without sufficient funds to run his 
department and forced him to issue drafts for the remainder, hoping for later Congressional appropriations and 
reimbursement.  Eaton to Clark, March 10, 1829, LROIA: StLS, Roll 749.; Clark to Eaton, April 8, 1829, LROIA: 
StLS, Roll 749. 
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the continuation of inter-tribal war and hope that the exhausted victors would be too weak to 
resist federal policy.  “A combination between the Shawnees, Delawares, Osages, and Kansas is 
in contemplation for the purpose of attacking the Pania and forcing them to terms,” reported 
Clark to his superiors, “and I am inclined to believe it would not be good policy to stop them in 
the present state of our relations with these Tribes.”84  Clark wanted to let the Indians kill each 
other.  It was a dramatic reversal of policy given the effort expended for regional peace.  But it 
fit within Clark’s overall goal of settling Native American disputes once and for all and merely 
repeated his strategy from the War of 1812.  It was a cold and brutal calculation. 
The strategy apparently worked.  Nations south of the Platte encroached even more into 
Pawnee territory.  Pawnee forces fought several battles to protect their hunting parties and 
defend against raiders.  A visit by Dougherty to the Skidi and Pitahawirata villages on October 
13, 1829 revealed that most of the warriors were absent on campaigns.  After demanding their 
compliance with treaty obligations, Dougherty reported that “They all professed a friendly 
feeling for the whites, denied having committed any mischief themselves, threw the blame on 
their inconsiderate young men; and declared their inability to prevent a recurrence of such deeds; 
but promised to exert themselves to do so.”  It was a familiar trope that shifted blame from the 
leadership to the impetuous young warriors.  The chiefs also requested a resident agent “in order 
to advise their young men frequently; which they thought, would have the effect to prevent them 
from injuring our traders.” It was a request Dougherty understood to be motivated more by a 
desire for gifts, but it signaled a new course in Pawnee policy.  A similar interest in acquiring a 
blacksmith, primarily to mend guns, and a government-employed farmer marked a new era of 
Pawnee strategic thinking.85 
                                               
84 Clark to Eaton, August 18, 1829, LROIA: StLS, Roll 749. 
85 Dougherty to Clark, October 26, 1829, LROIA: UMA, Roll 883. 
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Why this reversal and eagerness to bring federal officials and workers into the heart of 
Pawnee territory?  The Pawnee needed help both militarily and economically.  Wars stretched 
their military power thin by the end of 1829 and several military setbacks may have forced the 
change in strategy.  Osage warriors reported victories as the year ended, including one battle on 
the upper Arkansas River in which they surprised a camp of Pawnee and killed 80-90 men, 
women, and children, stole as many horses, and took at least 5 captives.  The Osage boasted 
“they had shed more Pawnee blood than in any fight since they had known the tribe.”86  Such an 
attack showed Pawnee inability to protect what they considered core territory. 
The request for a resident agent, blacksmith, and farmer represented a strategic 
reassessment rather than an admission of defeat on the part of the Pawnee.  To federal officials, 
this was a step toward the cultural imperialism of civilizing a savage tribe.  But if viewed as part 
of the Pawnee political cosmology surrounding power bundles and chiefly authority, such a 
request may have had the opposite effect and enhanced the power of Pawnee chiefs.  By adapting 
outsider knowledge within Pawnee society, the chiefs were taking what they wanted for their 
own purposes.87  Sacred objects and the knowledge to manipulate them constituted “earthly 
reservoirs of a power which enabled [chiefs] to be the fathers and protectors of their children, the 
people.”88  Through direct access to the federal political and material world, Pawnee chiefs could 
bring different forces into a knowable and exploitable system.  By making this request Pawnee 
leaders signaled their willingness to adapt to preserve their current social and political system at 
a time of military stress.  Both federal and Pawnee interpretations could be true at the same time. 
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87 White, Roots of Dependency, 172-3. 
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 Yet for all the Pawnee ambitions, Dougherty saw the requests as an opportunity to 
contain Pawnee power.  He lamented the ineffectiveness of previous government reform 
programs after a decade of work in the region as “they continue in the same aboriginal condition 
in which our government found them – of the mechanical arts; they know nothing – of 
agriculture nothing more, than they have possessed . . . as to ‘education’ there is not a single 
Indian man, woman, or child . . . from the head of the Missouri to the mouth of the Kanzas river, 
that knows one letter from another.”89  The requests also signaled an opportunity to rebuild the 
regional peace efforts.  A planned council at Prairie du Chien [Fort Crawford] on the Mississippi 
for the summer of 1830 tapped into the war-weariness of the region.  Clark counted on the 
council to effect “a lasting peace between contending tribes of the Mississippi and Missouri, 
there will be something definite acted upon in relation to their hunting lands on the Missouri, and 
to the line and boundaries of the different nations.”90 
 Fixing boundary lines took on new urgency.  Delaware and Kickapoo leaders anxiously 
awaited final settlements of land claims and payments in order to undertake their move out of 
Missouri.91  Yet the superintendency remained underfunded thanks to Congressional parsimony.  
Supplies of medals, flags, and other trappings of chiefly status prevented Clark from developing 
effective relationships with Native American leaders.  “As to funds,” Clark complained to the 
War Department, “I must do the best I can upon my own credit, as Congress has neglected to 
make the appropriations which are necessary and which are daily required.”92  The neighborhood 
                                               
89 Dougherty to McKenney, January 30, 1830, LROIA: UMA, Roll 883. 
90 Clark to Dougherty, April 25, 1830, LROIA: StLS, Roll 749.  The Sioux and Menominee war against the Sac and 
Fox along the Upper Mississippi was one more military distraction from Clark’s efforts at Removal.  The conflict 
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conducted additional councils with the Weas, Peorias, and Crooked Creek Shawnees, all of whom were eager to 
move provided they received government compensation and assistance, as the prior settlement of the Delaware. 
George Vashon to Clark, October 29, 1829, LROIA: StLS, Roll 749. 
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itself was in no condition for new arrivals.  The Kansa were in the midst of a civil war and only 
the quick actions of their agent prevented an all-out battle at the agency itself.93  The Pawnee-
Osage war continued unabated around the Kansas and Arkansas rivers.  To the west, Pawnee and 
Cheyenne forces continued to exchange blows.94 
 January 1831 arrived with little visible progress by either federal officials who sought to 
stabilize the neighborhood around Fort Leavenworth or by the regional powers who sought to 
settle their differences.  A despondent Clark sought instructions, complaining of the lack of 
funds, confusing jurisdictional lines, multiple unfulfilled treaty obligations, and the fear of losing 
American influence to the British on the Upper Missouri.95  For its part, the War Department 
continued the economy drive initiated in 1829 by shuttering sub agencies and laying off staff.   
Clark and Dougherty used the moment to reframe the strategic necessity of a robust, 
militarized Indian policy of containment over independent nations like the Pawnee.  Lack of 
force plagued all the prior efforts to organize an Indian Territory in the neighborhood of Fort 
Leavenworth.96  Referring to the Pawnee and other nations of the Upper Missouri, Dougherty 
                                               
93 Marston Clark to William Clark, July 28, 1830, LROIA: StLS, Roll 749.  Marston Clark reported that the rival 
factions were under competing interests from the traders, whom he viewed as a pernicious influence.  Annuity 
disbursements brought the rivals together, which precipitated an armed standoff as both sides arrayed for battle.  
Only Marston Clark’s swift action of literally placing himself between the battle lines and warning of the dire 
consequences of federal military retribution should he be killed staved off the fight. 
94 Hyde, The Pawnee Indians, 179-180. 
95 Clark to Eaton, January 17 and 22, 1831, LROIA: StLS, Roll 749.  Clark remained ever watchful of British 
intentions on the Upper Missouri fearful of the loss of American control and territory as well as the dangers to 
traders.  So little federal authority existed beyond Council Bluffs that murders of traders went unpunished.  Clark 
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Roll 883.  Dougherty advocated a far more radical approach with the general abandonment of the Upper Missouri 
and the reduction of four sub agents from the Upper Missouri agency.  The tribes closest to the frontier line were 
smaller, more assimilated to white norms, and easily controlled by the military.  Those far up the river were too 
independent and hostile to listen to an agent without a strong military force.  Eliminating those sub agents, of course, 
made Dougherty’s position all the more important.  Clark was far less draconian, advocating fewer reductions and 
more shifting of resources and personnel from older, less important positions to new locations further west, 
following the movement of removed tribes.  Sub Agent John Sanford strongly urged against any reduction on the 
Upper Missouri, writing in his budget estimate that his position was in the midst of eight distinct Indian nations, 
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advised Secretary of War Eaton that “from their known and predatory characters, these tribes 
would but little regard any treaty you might make with them, unless restrained by a military 
force in their neighborhood without which, I am of opinion it would be useless, if not 
impracticable to make treaties with any of these tribes.”  Federal strategy required a shift in focus 
from the Upper Missouri to the Santa Fe Trail.  There, a new fort at the head of the Arkansas 
could extend federal influence to the southwest, check hostile tribes, protect the trade route, and 
partly guard against Comanche and Kiowa raids.97  
 Central to Dougherty’s strategic outlook was a reliance on the Chaui to act as an entrée 
for agents and military representatives along the Arkansas, using their summer hunt to open 
communications with the Comanche, Kiowa, and Arapaho.  The documentary record provides no 
indication of whether the Chaui themselves or Pawnee as a whole approved of these measures, 
but Dougherty’s confidence suggests that relations with at least the Chaui were improving at the 
start of 1831.  This may have been part of the Pawnee strategic shift, in addition to their requests 
for a resident agent, blacksmiths, and farmers. 
 For the Pawnee, 1831 held the promise of better regional relations after beating back 
Cheyenne incursions.  With the Sioux occupied by their war with the Sac and Fox, and still kept 
partially at bay by the Pawnee’s eastern neighbors, only occasional Sioux hunting parties 
threatened the Platte Valley.98  The Pawnee maintained a precarious balance of power here.  
With requests for blacksmiths, farmers, and better relations with the United States as yet 
unfulfilled, Pawnee leaders defended the status quo.  Any major disruption would throw off the 
                                               
with many subdivisions, and “That they are the most hostile and most remote of the Indians with whom our citizens 
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balance and bring the dual disaster of a political existential crisis and cultural disorder suggesting 
the chiefs lacked control of the spiritual world. 
 By the end of summer all hopes for an improved situation disappeared as smallpox took 
hold in Pawnee territory.  A Pawnee party recently returned from the Santa Fe Trail brought the 
virus with them after contracting it from the traders.  Missionary Isaac McCoy reported from the 
region that the epidemic was a deliberate case of germ warfare, insisting that the traders packed 
smallpox with them to lace trade goods and gifts for any “troublesome” Indians.99  Regardless of 
the accuracy of McCoy’s report, the net result remained the same: nearly apocalyptic devastation 
with perhaps 4,000 dead by the end of the year.100   
Dougherty visited the Pawnee in October and found them in a deplorable condition.  He 
struggled to find words for the misery he saw.  “I am fully persuaded that one half the whole 
number of souls of each village have and will be carried off . . . not one under 33 years of age, 
escape the monstrous disease,” he reported.  Smallpox last appeared around 1800, leaving a large 
segment of the population without immunity from previous exposure.  The Pawnee were dying 
so fast and in such large numbers “that they had ceased to bury their dead.”  He saw bodies in 
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every direction, “laying about in the rivers, gorges, on the sand banks, in the hog weeds around 
the villages, and in their old corn cashes, others again were dragged off by the hungry dogs in the 
prairie where they were torn to pieces by the more hungry wolves.”  Dougherty suggested the 
Pawnee were in collective shock.  The “misery was so great, and so general that they seem to be 
unconscious of it,” he wrote, and the survivors “look upon the dead and dying as they would on 
so many dead horses.”101 
Many of the chiefs who signed the 1825 treaty disappeared from the historical record at 
this time, possibly felled by the disease.  With their leadership decimated, the Pawnee faced an 
existential crisis of the highest order.  Thousands were dead.  Military power was in shambles.  
Decades of experience in political, military, and spiritual leadership was erased.  It was clear 
evidence that the chiefs could not manipulate spiritual power to protect the people.102 
 Smallpox effectively did what federal military and economic power could not.  It 
reorganized the regional power dynamic.  Following a vaccination program in the fall of 1832, 
Dougherty noted that “The Pawnee treated us with marked attention, and I took advantage of 
their good feeling toward the Government to prepare their minds in advance for meeting the U.S. 
Commissioners, and I have no hesitation in believing that the difficulty concerning hunting 
grounds, between them the Delawares can be easily adjusted.”103  Chaui leaders exhibited a 
dramatic change in policy as they sought closer relations to the United States on par with those 
of their Otoe and Omaha neighbors.  The latter two received an annuity for allowing immigrating 
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Indians the use of some of their hunting lands.  It was an arrangement the Pawnee wanted to join.  
As they told Dougherty in 1831, since “he had surveyed off a portion of Pawnee Land and given 
it to his Delaware children . . . which they hoped he would take pity on his Pawnee children also, 
and do for them as he was doing for his Oto and Omohaw Children.”104  The desire was urgent.  
For the Pawnee it was a strategic recalibration in the face of changed military realities.  They 
could not defend everything, but they could use the annuity to rebuild their power, acquire more 
weaponry, and skilled tradesmen like blacksmiths to make tools and repair guns that were 
desperately needed to fend off the encroaching Sioux and Cheyenne.  Sioux attacks threatened 
the Pawnee core itself.  An attack on the Pawnee villages themselves in 1832 killed 100.105  
Disease and military crisis forced a dramatic reassessment. 
 As Pawnee power crumbled, the United States devised a new strategy to project military 
power into the region.  Lewis Cass, newly confirmed as secretary of War in 1832, brought a 
fresh perspective to the department given his experience with Indian affairs as a territorial 
governor and treaty negotiator with Clark.  He initiated of a review of federal policy and 
strategic focus that coincided with the epidemic.106  Clark warned that if left unchecked, dangers 
posed to the Santa Fe trade by the Pawnee, Comanche, and Kiowa, the latter two having “no idea 
whatever” of American power, remained the biggest hurdle to establishing federal control over 
the region.  “Unless some effectual mode should be speedily adopted, to inform them on this 
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subject,” wrote Clark, “the injury to hundreds of our citizens will be severely felt.”  Clark 
worried that federal impotence would embolden border nations “who witness the unchecked 
hostility of their roving neighbors, and who can scarcely refrain from an open expression of their 
contempt for a Government which could permit a few Bands of half starved naked savages to 
prey upon so many of its citizens – to strip them of everything they possess, and even to shed 
their blood with impunity.”107   
Settling the neighborhood required the rapid militarization of enforcement and an ability 
to project power onto the prairie.  Clark recommended the formation of a mounted volunteer 
corps as the only effectual method to enforce federal policy.  “Being mounted, and operating 
chiefly in a prairie country, it would be in the power of select detachments from this corps to 
move to the points requiring their presence with the utmost celerity imaginable,” Clark advised. 
Such a force had the added benefit of “preserving peace among the various Tribes collected, and 
collecting on our borders, and who are already beginning to require an interposition of the strong 
arm of the Government to quell their feuds.”108  After years of fruitless peace negotiations, Clark 
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their quarters.”  Joshua Pilcher to Cass, December 1, 1831, LROIA: StLS, Roll 749. 
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finally concluded that mobile military force directly engaged in the region was the only effective 
means of creating the settled, civilized neighborhood he envisioned for Indian Territory. 
  As this plan developed, tensions in the region continued to rise.  Skirmishes between the 
Pawnee and Omaha over the winter of 1831-32 produced a hasty peace conference organized by 
Dougherty the following October.  Neither side desired a protracted war as both were hard-
pressed by invaders.  Dougherty reported that he had “never seen the Pawnees so much inclined 
to be at peace with their neighbours nor have I ever known them apparently so friendly disposed 
towards the whites.”  Pawnee complaints about white trappers and traders along the Santa Fe 
Trail driving away the bison and beaver suggest significant stress on western Pawnee hunting 
grounds, so much so that they demanded federal compensation for their losses.  After an 
exchange of gifts, horses, and lengthy discussions, Dougherty happily reported the settlement of 
differences and that “I never left them to all appearances so well satisfied.”109  Settled affairs 
with the Omaha granted the Pawnee a free hand to strike at a more pressing threat from the 
Delaware to their immediate south. 
While many like veteran trader and sub agent Joshua Pilcher considered them to still be 
“the most numerous, the most turbulent and the most savage nation upon our borders,” the 
Pawnee ability to direct the course of regional development waned.110  Their regional dominance 
was on the verge of collapse in the wake of the epidemic.  A strip of land reserved for the 
Delaware adjacent to Fort Leavenworth, 10 miles wide and extending back from the Missouri for 
150 miles, just north of the Kansas River and Kansa tribal territory, cut directly into Pawnee 
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hunting grounds.  Despite an initial and cordial diplomatic understanding between the Delaware 
and Pawnee over use of the corridor for transit, by October 1831, Delaware hunters regularly 
ventured into the region between the Kansas and the Platte.  These incursions initiated a series of 
violent reactions.111   From the north, Ponca forces attacked the Pitahawirata near their village 
while returning from their summer hunt in August and killed three.112 
 Geography and poor planning were partly at fault.  In the absence of natural markers or a 
clear survey line it was next to impossible to know the exact boundaries of territory.  The 
corridor cut through the heart of Pawnee hunting ground south of the Platte and the major travel 
route to other lands near the Arkansas.  Such a narrow corridor also suggested the place was less 
a hunting ground and more of a thoroughfare to lands farther west for Delaware use.  “If the 
government should purchase the particular slip named, and make no additional arrangement with 
the Pawnees,” Dougherty argued from Fort Leavenworth, “the evil intended to be remedied will 
in a great degree still exist.”113  Events quickly proved him correct.   
In early 1832, the Chaui killed a Delaware hunting party it found on Pawnee land.  
Delaware chief Souwanock responded by sending a war party to the Chaui village on the Platte, 
and although it was empty, the band having already left for their hunt, burned the village and 
destroyed every lodge.  After rebuilding, the Pawnee formed an alliance with the Otoe, whose 
lands at the mouth of Platte were most under threat from the new arrivals.  The Osage joined the 
Delaware, and by May 1833 tensions escalated to the point where a regional pan-Indian war 
involving the Pawnee, Otoe, Osage, Delaware, Shawnee, Kansa, Iowa, Kickapoo, and Sac and 
Fox of Iowa appeared likely.114   
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Even more disturbing for the Pawnee a Teton Sioux raiding party attacked the Skidi 
village in late September, killed 19 men, stole 20 horses, and lost only two dead.  Out-gunned by 
the well-armed Tetons and with only seven firearms in the entire village, the Skidi turned their 
earthen lodges into makeshift forts to wait out the attack.115  The year proved disastrous for the 
Pawnee: two villages attacked, two powerful enemies on their doorsteps, at will violations of 
their hunting ground, a regional war set to break out at any moment, and only a small diplomatic 
victory with the Omaha to their credit. 
With the Army concentrated in Illinois and Wisconsin chasing Black Hawk and his 
people, primary responsibility for the Missouri frontier during these violent years fell to the 
Indian department.  Clark and his superiors used this moment of Pawnee crisis as an opportunity 
to settle the regional issues and finalize the long-anticipated Removal plans.  Dougherty 
observed the validity of historical Pawnee claims to all the land south of the Platte.  He 
recommended extinguishing all claim to the entirety of the territory as “this would give us an 
additional tract of considerable extent, on which, should it be thought expedient and proper, to 
locate emigrating Indians,” as well as reserving the region for a common hunting ground to be 
used “by permission of the government.”116  Clark concurred.  The plan fulfilled his desire for a 
federally managed, bounded neighborhood.  Furthermore, it brought the Pawnee within the 
annuity system that tied the other regional nations to federal administrators.117  A dedicated 
annuity gave federal agents leverage to guarantee good behavior from the Pawnee.   
For their part, the Pawnee needed the revenue to rebuild their military defenses and 
appeared willing to trade land for time and additional resources.  The disasters of 1831 and 1832 
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fostered an increased sense of Pawnee identity and political unity.  Dougherty recommended 
viewing all four bands as equally interested in the land.  As they “never failed to make common 
cause, in all cases of war, or in any other matter, interesting either of the tribes,” he wrote.  
Having only “separated into four villages, for the purpose of convenience and comfort, in 
consequence . . . they still retain their national attachment for each other . . . They speak the same 
language, have intermarried with each other, and in all cases, when an individual of one tribe is 
at the village of either of the others, he considers himself at home.”118  An increased internal 
unity matched an increase of foreign alliances.  Continued Sioux raids against the Arikara further 
up the Missouri in the 1820s and 1830s forced the latter to abandon their villages and move close 
to the Skidi Pawnee for security.119  Consolidation and retrenchment governed Pawnee strategy 
as they pursued treaty negotiations with the newly arrived American commission sent to settle 
boundary and other disputes.  Building a unified, but smaller neighborhood united by cultural 
and political kinship reduced the necessity of fighting foreign wars over extended territory and 
the constant drain of men lost on those expeditions. 
 The commission sent to resolve the Pawnee, Otoe, Omaha, and Delaware disputes 
worked through the summer and fall of 1833, logging hundreds of miles of hard riding across the 
plains shuttling between villages from Council Bluffs to Fort Gibson.  Commissioners easily 
secured promises from the Otoe and Omaha to relocate their villages and adopt the sedentary 
agricultural life.  Without game or other options, the chiefs were “brought to this certain 
alternative – to till the ground or starve,” reported commissioner Henry Ellsworth on October 4, 
1833 from the Otoe village on the Platte.120  Pressed on all sides by new arrivals, their movement 
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increasingly circumscribed to lands unfit for hunting and agriculture, and without a viable 
alternative, Omaha leaders surrendered to federal wishes and ceded control of their foreign 
affairs to federal agents.  If “we have any difficulty with neighboring tribes,” declared 
Ongpatonga and his fellow chiefs, they would “refer the matter in dispute to some arbiter whom 
you shall appoint to settle the same.  This we are willing to do.  We have done.”121  With two 
nations thus brought into the federal orbit, attention turned to the Pawnee. 
 Five days later at the Chaui village the commissioners concluded the most comprehensive 
treaty to date with the Pawnee confederacy.  Despite the setbacks of the 1831 and 1832, Pawnee 
chiefs extracted a number of concessions from the commission.  Pawnee leaders ceded all claims 
to the land south of 
the Platte, which 
would become a 
neutral hunting 
ground.  In return the 
Pawnee were to 
receive $4,600 in 
goods annually for 
twelve years, $2,000 a year for agricultural equipment for at least five years, $1,000 a year for 
ten years for schools, two blacksmiths and strikers for ten years at government expense, four 
farmers to teach agriculture for five years along with $1,000 in stock animals, four corn mills, 
and a signing bonus of $1,600 for a total cost of roughly $110,000.  Remaining at home to 
protect any American farmers or smiths further entitled each Pawnee village to a military aid 
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package of a 25-gun arsenal and ammunition for use in the event of attack by Sioux or other 
invaders.122  Even considering full payment would not occur for a decade, this sum represents 
approximately the entire annual operating budget of the St. Louis Superintendency and a major 
investment in building the neighborhood of settled tribes federal authorities envisioned.   
By securing this aid Pawnee negotiators accomplished their most pressing strategic goal 
since 1829 of bringing federal technical and material power into the Pawnee world.  Here was 
the basis to rebuild the Pawnee core territory by diversifying the economy through predictable 
annuities, providing a more secure food supply, acquiring expertise in necessary trades, and 
securing a much-needed arsenal.  Pawnee hunters even retained access to the ceded land all 
while outsourcing the costs of security to the United States.  While article nine called for an end 
to raids on the Santa Fe traders, the revenue from annuities theoretically compensated for the 
loss.  On the surface it appeared to be a near-total victory for the Pawnee leadership. 
 Article ten, however, offered a very different interpretation.  Unless the Pawnee located 
themselves “in convenient agricultural districts, and remain in these districts the whole year,” to 
protect any government employees, the United States had no obligation to provide schools, 
blacksmiths, farmers, or mills.  Furthermore, any disputes with whites or neighboring nations 
came under an arbitration provision in which a federal official appointed by the president had 
ultimate authority to resolve the conflict.123  In effect this provision theoretically limited Pawnee 
movement and foreign affairs in the same way as the agreement with Omaha.  Determining 
whether the Pawnee met the specific conditions and by what metrics remained unclear.  This 
oversight by Pawnee leaders led to disastrous consequences through the next decade. 
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 The treaty was a decision point for federal-Pawnee relations.  It offered the kind of 
alliance the Pawnee needed to maintain their independent power.  It also prefigured what Pawnee 
scholar James Riding In rightly labels a cultural genocide that started in 1833 and continued 
through the treaties of 1857 and removal to Indian Territory, as the Pawnee “did not . . . consent 
to the eradication of their traditional ways of living or agree to be colonized.”124  With an 
alternate federal vision for the relationship, the 1833 treaty could have been a very different 
turning point in line with Pawnee strategic goals of an alliance. 
 After nearly eight years of planning, negotiations, and failures, Clark finally had the 
secure neighborhood he envisioned for the region.  Whether or not the Pawnee fulfilled the treaty 
remained to be seen.  On March 2, 1833 Congress created the dragoon regiment, a move that 
finally answered the repeated calls for an effective federal cavalry presence on the plains.125  By 
December 1833, the United States appeared to be in control of the Missouri valley as high as the 
Mandan villages and as far west as the present Colorado-Nebraska border.  The Pawnee 
interpreted the treaty very differently.  It offered a strategic reset rather than a capitulation to 
federal desires.  Securing the immediate southern and eastern borders and rebuilding the core 
opened the possibility for continued war and raiding to the west.  Who set the boundaries and 
terms of the neighborhood remained very much unsettled at the dawn of 1834. 
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After the 1833 Pawnee-U.S. treaty, a new understanding of spatial relationships emerged 
in the Platte and larger West.  Federal officials imagined an expanded role in shaping the West 
by projecting military power beyond any previous limits, inserting themselves as the arbiters of 
diplomacy and war between Native American nations, and defining the space as federally 
controlled.  Pawnee leaders looked toward maintaining an increasingly tenuous autonomy of 
foreign policy and war powers.  Sioux advances from the north and federal efforts to create a 
Western or Indian Territory to the south squeezed Pawnee territory.  In each case, the control of 
space guided policy goals.   
Beginning in earnest in 1829 and culminating in the treaty of 1833, Pawnee leaders had 
moved toward a more strategic alliance with the United States to access military equipment and 
economic aid.  Yet they retained significant independence over their foreign and domestic policy 
through the 1830s.  Pawnee power depended on understanding spatial relationships and 
boundaries as impressionistic: usefully nebulous enough for wide interpretation, but within an 
overarching and recognizable form.  This was the Pawnee core and hinterlands of 1829, strongly 
defined at its social and political core around the villages of the Loup and Platte Rivers, but fluid 
and fungible at the margins.  
Pawnee actions gave meaning to the space of the central Great Plains and turned it into 
Pawnee places.  Here the Pawnee defined their space through their movements and policies.  




approximately 25,000 square miles, or 16,000,000 acres, around the Platte and Elkhorn.1  This 
was the Pawnee core from which they could extend their power west and south, and to a lesser 
extent against the Sioux to the north.  Such large holdings allowed for an expansive view of 
foreign policy opportunities.  Protecting the core was the highest priority for Pawnee leaders.  
Incursions from the south and north, even if manageable, revealed the need for a shift in policy. 
Ellsworth’s report served as a useful benchmark of Pawnee-U.S. relations in the late-
1820s and early-1830s.  Meanwhile, Ellsworth’s report combined with an 1845 letter from 
Superintendent of Indian Affairs Thomas Harvey provides a point of reference that reveals the 
specific and significant changes that occurred in the decade. 
Writing in July 1845, Harvey reported that the Pawnee villages were increasingly beset 
by Sioux invaders.  Their village was fortified, their horses guarded day and night from theft, 
their women “have to be guarded while working their corns and digging roots and with all their 
vigilance they frequently fall victims to the scalping knife in sight of their village.”  They were 
an appropriate charity case and “a most inviting field for the philanthropist, they are . . . 
exceedingly mild and easily instructed by whites . . . They are poor and often suffer for 
subsistence; they see the advantage of civilization and are anxious to adopt the habits of the 
whites.”2  This was a dramatic, if hyperbolic statement about a nation consistently ranked by 
Harvey’s predecessors as the most powerful and potentially dangerous in the West.  Yet there 
was some truth in it. 
By 1845, Pawnee spatial understandings had shifted from the expansive vision of the 
1820s to a starkly limited outlook.  Harvey’s report highlighted the constricted nature of Pawnee 
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space as dictated more by outsiders than Pawnee self-constructions.  Simultaneously the report 
spoke to the expansive vision taking shape within the federal bureaucracy.  For federal officials, 
the heretofore limited entry into Pawnee society and non-existent military presence on the plains 
represented a sort of political and spatial void.   
This chapter examines the inversion of Pawnee and federal strategic thinking that 
emerged following the 1833 treaty.  The treaty alone did not cause these changes, but it was a 
harbinger of things to come.  The period between the Pawnee-U.S. treaty of 1833 and the end of 
1835 marks the beginning of the strategic inversion.  The chapter traces a spatial reorganization 
of political possibilities and necessary cultural adaptations.  In this period, federal officials tried 
to establish a new Western or Indian Territory through a regional pan-Indian peace negotiation.  
American missionaries began work among the Pawnee.  The Army expanded its presence in the 
West with the creation and deployment of the U.S. Dragoons.  These events redefined the 
Pawnee diplomatic and military world, and constricted Pawnee ability to operate outside of 
federal influence or oversight.   
This was not an immediate shift, nor a complete one.  Even the sudden appearance of the 
dragoons to the west of the Pawnee core was limited in its long-term effects as the regiment had 
few patrols westward through the 1830s.  The Pawnee reputation for military power and 
independence, carried over from the 1820s, did much to solidify their increasingly tenuous 
political position in the mid-1830s.  Without maintaining the underlying factors of military 
strength and freedom of movement that created the reputation, however, the Pawnee could not 
operate as the unchecked regional power they had been. 
The trajectory of Pawnee policy in the years preceding the 1833 treaty was to mitigate the 




along the Platte allowed Pawnee leaders to refocus attention on the greater menace of Sioux 
invasions while keeping U.S.-backed emigrant Indians from further encroachment.  Agents noted 
constant hostile movements south that they feared would upset American trade interests.3  A war 
with the Delaware (who had recently arrived as part of Removal) and intensifying Sioux hostility 
throughout the early-1830s drove much of the Pawnee realignment.  These military conflicts, 
combined with disease, forced the Pawnee into a new calculation of their position.  By late-1833, 
they had to settle their southern borders.4 
For Pawnee leadership, securing regional peace with their southern neighbors was 
priority two after securing better federal relations.  Securing the Pawnee neighborhood as part of 
the larger federal Removal effort formed a crucial part of Commissioner Ellsworth’s work, and a 
goal that held broad support among the regional nations.  Speaking generally, Ellsworth reported 
that although many tribes exhibited hostilities, “there is a general desire for peace, and I trust we 
shall ere long, establish a general peace among all the tribes on this side of the Rocky 
Mountains.”   The situation remained volatile.  The Pawnee refused to come to any meetings 
near Osage, Cherokee, or Delaware territory.5  The goal was not as foolhardy as it may have 
appeared.  The Removed nations desired a territorial government, one that depended on a general 
peace.  The Pawnee used their reputation and still considerable military power to navigate the 
new reality of their southern border and negotiate the terms of what peace and an Indian 
Territory might look like.  But Pawnee freedom of action faced increasing constrictions through 
the 1830s as they adjusted to the new regional state of affairs. 
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4.1  The Pawnee Reputation 
 
 Among white visitors to the Great Plains, the Pawnee reputation for unchecked power 
and independence framed the understandings of the space and the power dynamics of the region.  
The reality and the reputation began diverging in the mid-1830s.  Yet the literary representation 
of the Pawnee solidified their place within the American cultural imagination as the preeminent 
military power of the Platte and a people uncontrolled by federal authority. 
John Treat Irving, nephew and traveling companion of novelist Washington, 
accompanied Indian Commissioner Henry Ellsworth during his trip to the Pawnee in 1833. 
Irving observed of the Pawnee he encountered, “upon the prairies . . . he is in his element.  An air 
of wild freedom breathes around him.  His head droops not . . . not a single feature yields in 
submission to his fellow man.  He is unrestrained in body; unfettered in spirit; and as wayward as 
the breeze, which sweeps over the grass of his own hills.”6  Such rhapsodic imagery highlighted 
the roots of Pawnee power: the unchecked freedom of movement over land they knew to be 
unquestionably theirs without fear of competition.  National independence was rooted within the 
individual’s understanding of place and space.  Irving pointed to the martial masculinity 
idealized across the racial divides of white and Native American societies as the true delineations 
of power.  Those personal characteristics formed the foundation of national and racial 
independence.  As masters of themselves, Native Americans mastered their space.  But it was a 
reciprocal relationship in which the space shaped the character of the residents. 
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To Irving, the Indian was free, but it was a wild freedom, unfettered by civilization’s 
restraints and in line with his environment.  Visiting the region within a year of Irving, the 
British traveler Charles Augustus Murray remarked that the Pawnee were “children of the 
desert,” with the implications of nomadic Bedouin warriors concerned with primitive masculine 
characteristics of war and horse stealing who lacked the virtues of civilization, like honesty.  
When a few Pawnee horsemen accoutered for war encountered Murray’s party, their demurred 
denials about their activities as disapproved by the United States met with skepticism from 
Murray who knew better.  “In this vast wilderness the threat is empty,” in terms of punishment or 
American enforcement, he wrote, making such unsanctioned theft the casually winked at norm.7   
Even Murray’s Indian packhorses resisted attempts at confinement.  Upon arriving at Fort 
Leavenworth, “no power” could induce the horses to approach the “white walls . . . and when at 
last we led them as far as the gate . . . we were unable to make them pass through it; they snorted, 
they reared, and would have defeated our attempts, whether at persuasion or coercion,” had a 
soldier not forced the horses through.8  The undertone throughout was clear: the Indian character 
existed across the human and animal divide, united by a total resistance to authority and the need 
for military force to control.  Such force, however, was limited to the confines of a fort and 
centralized power.  Soldiers could tame wild horses, but on the open prairie federal authority 
could be winked at and dismissed as fantasy. 
Such was the condition of the wilderness, spawning savage people and animals who 
enjoyed the unchecked freedom to ignore norms of civilization.  To white observers, the Pawnee 
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were masters of their space because they behaved as a savage and wild people commensurate 
with their untamed environment.   
Even with the policy setbacks and attacks of 1829-33, the Pawnee still exhibited the spirit 
of unbridled control of their spaces, but not as exuberantly as these literary observers gave them 
credit.  Sioux movements increasingly concerned Pawnee leaders.  The regional pan-Indian war 
sparked by Delaware and Pawnee territorial disputes of 1831 and 1832 questioned the ability of 
the latter to protect their core villages.  Delaware chief Souwahnock openly boasted of his July 
1833 raid that burned the Chaui Pawnee village while in peace councils at Fort Leavenworth that 
November.9  What these white observers did not fully appreciate was the extent of the changes 
beginning to appear within the Pawnee strategic framework, starting with the need to secure their 
southern border. 
 
4.2  Forging A Regional Peace 
 
The Pawnee saw Removal as a challenge to their regional power and adapted policies to 
meet the developments in the late-1820s.  But they did not fully appreciate the extent to which 
federal policies and American cultural understandings were changing the region between the 
Platte and the Red River to the south.  Understanding the transition of strategic thinking in the 
1830s requires understanding the longer context of changes at work to the south of the Pawnee as 
Removal developed in the late-1820s and took formal shape by the mid-1830s.  From 1829 to the 
fall of 1833, federal policymakers and American visitors could not decide whether the Pawnee 
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were still the regional power they had been or were, by October 1833, easily controllable.  The 
American strategy of Removal and western territorial development included the tactic of limiting 
Indian sovereignty under the guise of autonomy.  The creation of a Western or Indian Territory, 
halting in the 1820s, took on new significance with tens of thousands of forced migrants heading 
west in the 1830s.  Federal plans only worked if the United States could create a relatively 
peaceful space, as promised by treaty obligations for the new arrivals, and tamp down the 
regional wars making administration difficult if not impossible. 
Jackson administration policy to promote Removal emphasized self-rule and limited 
federal interference.  In reality, it reflected the larger goals of subsuming tribes within an 
expansive view of federal power.  Jackson himself believed that Native Americans lacked the 
education and intelligence for self-rule, and said so in the first draft of his 1829 annual message 
to Congress.10  While he removed the passage from the final version, it was an idea shared by 
Secretary of War John Eaton, who considered the removed tribes as “fostered children.”  He also 
seemed to believe the independent nations west of the Mississippi were also simple wards of the 
state in need of federal protection and governance.  “As moral influences can be of little benefit 
to minds not cultivated,” he argued, it was therefore necessary to “arrange to the best advantage 
the physical force of the country.”11  He did not understand the region. 
William Clark’s vision for a neighborhood of tribes anchored by Fort Leavenworth was 
only part of the larger federal plan to remake Indian Country into a governable territory and 
organized place within the scope of the 1830 Removal Act.  Eaton’s successor at the War 
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Department, Lewis Cass, pursued a multi-pronged effort to reorganize the territory and subsume 
independent Native Americans from the Mexican border to Canada within a more manageable 
scheme.  This meant consolidated nations and clear lines of authority for an effective and 
permanent remaking of the space.  Part of this effort was the Stokes-Schermerhorn-Ellsworth 
commission that spent much of 1833 traveling through the region between the Red and Platte 
rivers to assess the situation, negotiate treaties, and begin forging the regional peace necessary to 
implement Removal fully. 
The continuing strategic and political problem for the United States was how to balance 
jurisdictional authority with the idea of Indian autonomy and improvement.  American space had 
to be federally governed in order to protect citizens, secure boundaries, and fulfill treaty 
obligations to tribes in the process of or contemplating Removal.  Previous legislation 
emphasized federal control over the lands across the frontier line, but administrative experience 
meant that Indian Country was beyond the power of the federal state to regulate fully.12  
Problems of enforcement from the lack of staff and legal questions over jurisdiction plagued 
efforts to establish sovereign authority.  It was a problem the territorial judiciary refused to 
address.13  Governance was spotty at best and non-existent or unenforceable at worst without 
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delineated authority and judicial sovereignty clarified by territorial government structures.  
Secretary of War James Barbour, working in conjunction with the House Committee on Indian 
Affairs, sought a spatial reorganization of an American territory in the West under the 
jurisdiction and governance of the United States, not any Indian nations, but did not get 
Congressional approval for his overhaul.14  By 1830, the West remained largely within the early 
republic paradigm where independent Native American power remained in nominally federal 
space. 
Consolidation and centralization of Native American government was key to better 
control.  As Clark looked toward the Fort Leavenworth region as a potential consolidation point, 
others, including veteran missionary turned federal official Isaac McCoy looked toward the lands 
immediately south of the Kansas River for similar efforts.  Through the early-1830s Clark 
remained pragmatic about the limited prospects for significant changes, at least around Fort 
Leavenworth.15  McCoy, in part looking for continued work from the War Department, outlined 
the hyperbolically optimistic prospects of a new Western Territory where consolidated emigrant 
tribes would exist within a mutual defense and common government framework.  He predicted 
that the shift would bring an era of peace and prosperity for a new part of the United States.  
Schools, industry, and religion would “promote happiness in this world,” and “prepare them for 
the next.”  A remade West, with a new territory for and ruled in part by Native Americans was 
the ideal end result of decades of policy, and if followed, would usher in a millenarian epoch of 
prosperity, at least in McCoy’s view.16   
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 Other missionary boards, including the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign 
Missions who eventually established a mission among the Pawnee, echoed the millennialism of 
Removal and territorial expansion, eyeing converts as potential new citizens, once properly 
reformed.17  Once on the ground in the West among both whites and Indians, Commissioner 
Ellsworth discovered “a strong desire for a Territorial Government . . . which if satisfactory to 
the govt will I am confident do much to advance the future welfare of the Indians.”18 
This was to be a restrained process that was orderly, humane, and controlled tightly by 
federal authorities.  Even Indian hater Andrew Jackson appealed to sympathy for uncivilized 
people whose “emigration should be voluntary, for it would be as cruel as unjust to compel the 
aborigines to abandon the graves of their fathers.”19  Jacksonian Indian policy writ large 
represented a paradigm shift in federal strategic thinking.  Racial antipathy and Removal did not 
originate here, rather it was the scale of thinking that underwent significant changes.  For the first 
time in almost a generation since the failed Yellowstone Expedition, federal policy makers felt 
emboldened to remake Indian Country into an American protectorate.  Broad confidence from 
Washington bureaucrats, missionaries, and larger cultural shifts about the possibilities and 
necessity of expansion remade American political culture.  The shift was from one nervous about 
unchecked expansion and warry of the costs to one that increasingly saw expansion as politically 
and morally necessary.   
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Writing a new introduction from Paris in 1832 for his novel The Prairie, James Fenimore 
Cooper presented his readers with an enduring characterization of the Great Plains.  Cooper 
argued that “They resemble the steppes of Tartary more than any other known portion of the 
world,” as it was “a vast country, incapable of sustaining a dense population, in the absence of 
the two great necessaries [wood and water] . . . Rivers abound it is true; but this region is nearly 
destitute of brooks and the smaller water courses, which tend so much to comfort and fertility.”20  
Cooper presented American conquest of the region as a fait accompli, that “made us masters of a 
belt of fertile country . . . and placed the countless tribes of savages, who lay on our borders, 
entirely within our controul.”   Despite “a barrier of desert to the extension of our population,” it 
was “an empty empire,” ready for Americans.21  Expansion was not to be an unchecked free-for-
all, but one conducted with thorough planning, large-scale vision for regional transformation, 
and requiring the coordination and acquiescence of more than two dozen nations.22 
Such writing revealed a profound ignorance of the place and people born of distance from 
Cooper’s subject and unfounded notions of racial superiority.  Sub Agent John Sanford decried 
the lack of federal power beyond Council Bluffs where British traders and Indian wars made his 
job useless.  The Indians “are, (as usual) at war with each other – and will always continue so,” 
he wrote Clark, and “I once was pipe bearer amongst them and patched up a peace frequently (as 
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others do some times and are doing).  But the clouds of smoke had scarcely time to disappear, 
before a war party was out expecting to find their enemies off guard,” negating the entire effort.23   
His post near the mouth of the Yellowstone made him the westernmost official of the 
Indian Department.  There he recognized the hubris of a government completely out of touch 
with conditions and unaware of its powerlessness on the fringes of empire.  Sitting in the midst 
of eight different nations with an estimated 75,000 people, “not in the Navy Yard at Washington, 
where there are public magazines and guards to protect property . . . I am in the plains, and the 
Government has not as yet paid for a skin lodge to cover me (its worthy representative) or its 
goods.”  He was at the mercy of the elements, the Indians, and the traders without any real 
power.  Furthermore, he complained, “my generous government thinks $400!!! for an Interpreter 
too expensive and must be lopped off,” even as a sinecure for the Corps of Discovery veteran 
Toussaint Charbonneau who proved indispensable as Sanford’s aid.24 
Through 1833, William Clark and John Dougherty worked within this framework of 
limited local power and increasingly grand plans emanating from Washington as they tried to 
establish the regional stability required for emigrants and a new Western Territory.  Their efforts 
largely failed as federal power was dispersed across the plains in the face of stronger regional 
polities.  Commissioner Ellsworth finally secured step one by negotiating a treaty with the 
Pawnee in October 1833.   
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Step two, concurrent with the Pawnee-U.S. treaty and extending afterwards into the fall 
of 1833, was for a grand spatial transformation.  This began with securing a regional peace to the 
south between the Platte and Red rivers.  Disagreement over the scope of this transformation 
remained a constant problem within the Indian Department.  While Clark, Ellsworth, and Cass 
looked to a grand reconfiguration, others like Montfort Stokes, a close political ally of Cass, 
former North Carolina governor, and putative head of the commission, dismissed Pawnee 
diplomacy as a waste of time.  He suggested conflicts in the Platte Valley were beyond the scope 
of the commission to prepare for emigrating Eastern nations and not worth the commission’s 
effort.  Recalling his time in the Senate ratifying the 1818 treaty of friendship, he believed “there 
is no complaint of their conduct towards the citizens of the United States,” and that the Pawnee 
“are not the formidable Rovers of the Great Prairie.”  Ellsworth’s trip was therefore “of little 
importance towards forwarding the views and advancing the interest of the government.”25  
Stokes apparently enjoyed willful ignorance. 
Stokes and Ellsworth clashed over a number of issues both personal and professional.  
The former spent considerable energy undermining the report of the commission, accusing his 
colleagues of financial malfeasance, and seeking personal enrichment through their 
recommendations.26  Yet these differences did not prevent them from working toward the shared 
goal of spatial reorganization, albeit often along different paths as Ellsworth travelled north to 
pursue Pawnee regional peace while Stokes remained at Fort Gibson.  Arriving at Fort 
Leavenworth in August 1833, Ellsworth reported that the fort was healthy and well-appointed, 
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but that the recent Delaware raid on the Chaui Pawnee “will exacerbate the talks very much.”  
But he retained hope that “we shall stop the numerous war parties.”27  Express reports of cholera 
further up river near the Council Bluffs Agency, coupled with an outbreak at the fort three weeks 
later did not dispel Ellsworth’s optimism, though he feared for the health of Native Americans 
given the dearth of medicine available.  Disease and dissention only reinforced the perception of 
immediacy necessary for regional stability.28 
Federal officials went into the fall of 1833 with some hubris about their ability to affect 
changes.  Cass charged the commissioners with a broad mandate in his instructions: to settle any 
disputes among emigrating Native Americans, clarify boundaries, and clear the way for new 
waves of Indian refugees by securing peace with the potentially hostile border nations.  Peace 
was the primary concern as the federal government pledged to protect the new arrivals.29  Such 
thinking suggested that the United States had already won the great contest for control and now it 
just needed to settle the details.  John Irving put it more lyrically in summation of the two-month 
expedition to the Pawnee:  
 
We had lived in the land of the savage; we had seen, in his real character, the man of nature.  We 
had seen him in his moments of joy and pain; in his moments of pride and humility; in his 
paroxysms of excitement, when urged on by his impetuous nature . . .The illusions thrown around 
him by the exaggerated reports of travelers, and the fictions of poets, had been removed; and we 
beheld him as he really was – an untutored, generous, yet savage man.  He had lost much of the 
romance with which imagination had clothed him . . . still with all his imperfections we had 
learned to admire his chivalrous nature.30 
 
Such a summation epitomized the old trope of the noble savage.  Perhaps it is unfair to expect 
more cogent analysis from an author who spent so little time with his subjects and who was 
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weighted down by his own prejudices.  Irving’s prose does reveal an important facet of 
American thinking about the Pawnee.  Unlike almost every other previous traveler and official, 
Irving claimed the Pawnee were now easily mastered and understood.  They were not the lurking 
menace outside of federal control.  The Pawnee were just another type of the same Indian 
familiar to any American who read some James Fennimore Cooper.  The Pawnee and their lands 
could be demystified and brought within an American cultural system.   
Born from convictions of racial superiority and the successful realization of racial 
supremacy in the East, Irving’s ideas did not represent reality.  The Pawnee still held 
considerable power to ignore any plans to turn them into a client state.  Pawnee willingness to 
enter the treaty negotiations and broader peace talks called for by Ellsworth at Fort Leavenworth 
in November 1833 came from a degree of strategic desperation about the conflicts on their 
southern borders.  “The Delawares said they had complained in vain to the government, and 
would take revenge against the Pawnees; who by the way were defending their own land,” 
reported Ellsworth.  He learned from Kansa Agent Marston Clark that “the constant interruption 
of war parties going through his tribe against the Pawnees,” pushed the agent to exasperation and 
potential resignation.31  The Pawnee were on alert to the point that a false alarm about a Sioux 
raid sent the whole Chaui village into an uproar and panic.32   
Even with these conditions the Pawnee themselves were divided as to strategy.  Leaders 
faced the delicate task of maintaining the appearance of unchecked military power while also 
trying to secure the southern boundaries through peace councils with their federal and Native 
American adversaries.  To succeed in the regional power struggle with the Sioux, the Pawnee 
had to compete and win on the micro level of the councils with displays of masculine authority, 
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reinforcement of the Pawnee conceptions of personal power, and reminders of the possibility of 
unchecked military force beyond the reach of federal intervention.  Sharitarish, principle chief of 
the Chaui, and a large faction of warriors engaged in heated debate over the path forward for 
treaty negotiations.  Only the interventions of Wild Horse appeared to calm the proceedings and 
welcome Ellsworth’s negotiation party.33  The proposed general peace conference thus took on 
greater importance to settle the internal Pawnee political divide. 
Fulfilling Cass’s mandates to organize the territory for new arrivals required the 
settlement of the Indian war raging through the Fort Leavenworth area.  As of November 19, 
1833, Ellsworth reported that the garrison held two Omaha prisoners, while eight Iowa and three 
Otoe had lately escaped, and one Iowa remained at large, all of whom were held for murdering 
other Native Americans during the preceding months.  “It is clear that the criminals deserve (in a 
moral point of view) some punishment,” wrote Ellsworth, “and it is important for the dignity and 
influence of the government that those who have escaped should be retaken.”  Per the treaty of 
Prairie du Chien, these criminals would be turned over to the United States for punishment, thus 
inserting federal authority over Indian affairs and removing a cause for wars of revenge.  Yet this 
created a jurisdictional nightmare for federal officials and threatened to upend any progress on 
peace.  Ellsworth recommended releasing the Omaha to preserve the hopes of peace at the 
expense of justice and a demonstration of federal authority.34 
Such was the climate around Fort Leavenworth in the critical month of November.  
Ellsworth toured the Pawnee villages to arrange a general conference.  Pawnee reluctance to 
cede their power to federal officials was emphasized at each chief’s lodge the federal negotiators 
visited.  At the Chaui, the official meeting of the chiefs and federal agents was cloaked in the 
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rituals of military power.  Upon entering the lodge, Sharitarish was enveloped in a white wolf 
skin painted in hieroglyphics of his military exploits and victories, only to remove it and present 
the robe to Ellsworth as a dramatic reinforcement of the chief’s status and accomplishments.35  
Pawnee leaders repeated the ritual at each village, reinforcing the point that the Americans were 
tolerated as guests by choice, at the pleasure of their more powerful hosts. 
Ellsworth convinced each band to send four delegates to the general peace conference.  
The Pawnee delegation evinced little desire to put aside their military ambitions.  While the 
Pawnee travelled with the commissioner, a group of unknown Indians emerged from cover.  
Believing them to be their long-time Kansa enemies and spoiling for a fight, Wild Horse led a 
frantic charge at the party “every feeling . . . now absorbed in the deep, burning thirst for blood.”  
Only the last-minute recognition of the hunting party as Otoe, at peace with the Pawnee, 
prevented a massacre of the smaller band.36  Such a display by Pawnee leaders and warriors 
while traveling with federal officials on a peace mission revealed a significant hubris regarding 
their power.  The impetuousness of Wild Horse and his men could very well have destroyed any 
peace effort for a strategically unimportant target of opportunity.  This was Pawnee land and 
would be defended as such.  A successful attack would symbolize to the Americans and their 
Otoe escorts, more than anything else, that the Pawnee retained the ultimate military power over 
their lands, and thus granting them the rights and privileges to make the space their own.  Across 
the cultural divide of Pawnee and federal diplomacy, the gamesmanship of the military display 
provided clear messages that military power was political authority. 
Either undeterred by such gestures, or ignorant of their meaning, Ellsworth labored to 
exert the government’s influence to further blunt the military power of the Pawnee following 
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their lands cessions of October.  Fourteen warring tribes gathered at Fort Leavenworth for the 
larger regional peace council at the beginning of November 1833.  Ellsworth was optimistic.  In 
reality the Indian Department was in turmoil.  A late-summer cholera epidemic on the heels of 
the smallpox epidemic wiped out almost the entirety of the Council Bluffs Agency staff 
including the sub agent and two interpreters, placing an even greater burden on the commission 
staff who struggled to understand the regional politics without the local experts.37 
The diplomatic complications of so many hostile groups in close proximity provided a 
tactical minefield for officials running between the separated camps.  The council almost fell 
apart before it began from Delaware hostility toward the whole proceeding.  Ellsworth rebuffed a 
demand for a $1000 payment by the Pawnee for each Delaware scalp taken as a non-starter given 
the recent Pawnee land cession.  Delaware grievances over perceived slights by the local nations 
who refused to acknowledge the former as “the grandfather of all the tribes around here,” a claim 
based on their origins in the East and early contact with whites, was negotiable.38  The Delaware 
claimed the Pawnee as their figurative descendants, and as such the Pawnee were being 
disobedient and unfilial to their elders.  Americans and Pawnees met the claim with equal parts 
confusion and derision.  With only 150 warriors, the Delaware claimed a power position totally 
disproportionate to their size and regional importance.  Pawnee negotiators viewed the Delaware 
position with contempt and disavowed descent from “Delaware dogs.”   Proceeding with the 
council required Ellsworth to create some diplomatic fictions that preserved both honor and 
acknowledgement of reality.  He implored the Pawnee chiefs to humor the Delaware for the 
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duration of the council while privately acknowledging the United States shared their beliefs of 
the absurdity of the claims.39 
Both the Delaware and Pawnee claimed a relationship to power based on their tenure on 
different lands.  Delaware claims to a fictive kinship and progenitor status were superficially 
ridiculous, but from a more metaphorical standpoint, the Lenni Lenape considered themselves 
literally “the original people” and constituted a broad cultural group, transformed by time and 
space into an amalgamation that could speak for all Indians.  Their power came from travelling 
and gathering scattered people under the broad cloak of the Delaware.  Chief William Anderson 
outlined the idea to Clark in the 1820s when the former suggested that he considered the regional 
powers of the Platte to be his grandchildren and lamented that they were perpetually at war.  
Speaking in the broadest terms of pan-Indian leadership, he feared for his scattered people and 
requested help to consolidate the different nations.  Because they had done so much to further 
federal policy, and would continue to do so in helping coalesce scattered Native American 
groups in the West, the Delaware required special status that included acknowledgment from 
their petulant grandchildren.40 
For the Pawnee, such talk, even in metaphors, was nonsense.  Despite the recent 
Delaware victory, the Pawnee outnumbered the smaller tribe almost ten to one in military 
strength.  Their power came from spatial dominance rooted in the sense of permanence on the 
land.  Pawnee origin mythology looked to the west and to the north, centered on what they 
considered divinely-granted Pawnee land.41  Identity as hunters and warriors, the rituals and 
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training carried on by each village and each warrior, emerged from this spatially oriented 
mythology.  Games of skill played before others, where men launched a spear through a rolling 
four-inch ring, was both good training and symbolic of the ability to hunt and fight anywhere 
across the plains, to hit a fixed point, and continue the cultural heritage of Pawnee as masters of 
their space.42  To look beyond their own rituals, their own heritage, their own space for origins or 
allegiance was fantastical.  The mutual antipathy of the Pawnee and Delaware remained rooted 
in their conceptions of self in their space. 
With a fictional family tree settled, the more difficult task of securing the regional peace 
commenced.  As with the displays of masculine leadership at the Pawnee villages, the delegates 
comported themselves as embodiments of martial power and within white observer tropes of 
savage versus civilized Indians.  Wild Horse, who earlier captured Irving’s attention, embodied 
that principle of stoic immunity to physical discomfort as he appeared on a cold autumn day 
barely clothed.  He spoke in measured lines of simple truth, as he said, “I cannot lie, for I am a 
Pawnee chief.”  He was the archetype of the wild, noble warrior.  Those with longer histories of 
white interaction were feminized and clothed like whites in Irving’s record.  They appeared as 
objects of mockery who merely parroted behavior.43  These were familiar literary tropes. 
Even accounting for Irving’s reliance on the tired tropes of Indian nobility, the 
assessment of Pawnee leaders as epitomes of raw martial masculinity underscored the 
importance of comportment in the confined space of the council circle.  Seated opposite bitter 
enemies, ones who boasted of their exploits and exhibited white habits of jeering their 
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opponents, Pawnee stoicism, marked only by smiles of “scorn at the frivolous deportment of 
their enemies,” garnered admiration.44  Pawnee leaders earned respect for their restraint. 
More difficult than the Delaware-Pawnee reconciliation was that between the Pawnee 
and their seemingly eternal enemies the Kansa.  The day following the Delaware council, long-
time Kansa chief Now-Pe-Warai rose to needle the Pawnee into a violent outburst and curry 
favor with his American benefactors.45  Representing the Pawnee as a “mean and miserly race – 
perfidious and revengeful,” he did his best to provoke, but to no avail.  Calming his subordinates 
and thrice stifling his own anger, Pitahawirata chief Skalahlaysharo (The Only Chief), performed 
an admirable feat of diplomatic judo, dodging the attack and flipping the power dynamic with a 
deft recital of Kansa outrages and behavior that reclaimed the Pawnee moral high ground.46  
These preliminaries were necessary for the larger negotiations among the fourteen groups invited 
to Fort Leavenworth. 
General negotiations began in the second week of November between representatives of 
the Delaware, Shawnee, Kickapoo, Potawatomie, Ottawa, Peoria and Kaskaskia, Weas, Otoes, 
Omaha, Kansa, Iowa, Sauk, Piankashaw, Osage, and all four Pawnee bands.    The signatories 
agreed to “mutually covenant with each other, and bind ourselves . . . maintain peace, to respect 
the rights of persons, and property, and to do all in their power to perpetuate the friendship.”47    
In some respects, the treaty erased regional history as it wiped out past transgressions to 
break the cycle of retributive justice killings.  Acts of personal violence became acts of 
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criminality with offenders subject to arrest and prosecution by federal authorities, not casus belli 
for new wars.  The realignment imposed a white American conception of property rights as 
paramount to maintaining security.  “No private revenge shall be sought, and all damages 
sustained by either tribe in any party is hereby cancelled, settled, and forgiven,” it read.  
Furthermore, “any individual shall have the right to prefer claim against any other individual of 
another tribe, for horses lost or stolen, or any other property wrongfully taken, or detained; to the 
adjustment of the umpire [federally designated official] hereafter mentioned.”48  For chiefs, such 
a scheme held some appeal in that they would not be held responsible for the behavior of their 
young warriors, who now assumed personal responsibility for raids.   
Federal officials merely acted as brokers fulfilling their duty to protect emigrants and 
settle differences per Removal policy and prior treaties.  The distinction remained important as 
this was not a federal dictation, but a mutually negotiated and accepted treaty by independent 
polities.  They still held control of their foreign policies, even if they were nudged by the United 
States.  By agreeing that the “flag of the United States shall be our protection, and token of 
friendship, whenever and wherever we meet,” federal authority became the guarantor of 
diplomatic norms and further solidified the United States as the emergent regional power.49 
The degree to which Ellsworth, the seven Indian agents, and other officials present 
sought to remake Indian Country norms of behavior was significant.  The scope of the agreement 
suggested that federal legal norms—personal rather than collective rights and responsibilities and 
the paramount protection of personal property—dominated the new diplomatic frameworks of 
the regional political economy.  It cancelled old tribal damage claims, replacing national rights 
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with individual rights.  It atomized regional powers and deprived them of their national standing 
as claimants.  The United States became the symbolic and actual guarantor of the treaty.50  
Removal policies could now proceed with a regional peace.  The ambitious regional legal 
transformation attempted to make intractable and impossibly large problems manageable as 
micro issues easily adjusted without treaties, conferences, and the expense of controlling nations.  
Federal sovereignty remained at the heart of the agreement.  With the legally establish doctrine 
of federal sovereignty over the regional powers, government officials could claim, at least to 
their own satisfaction, that the United States extended authority over previously independent 
tribes and established a framework for territorial management. 
Articles four and seven established a new paradigm of regional governance.  Article four 
called for an annual assembly of representatives for the tribes.  The provision did what the 
United States had for decades desperately tried to avoid: pan-Indian political connections.  
Article seven went further by providing the framework for an expansion of the regional body to 
include later signatories: the Osage, newly removed Cherokee, Creek, Choctaw, Chickasaw, and 
Seminoles living north of Red River.51  As part of the larger effort to create a Western Territory, 
this body was a racially modified version of prior territorial expansion.  The 1834 bill from the 
House of Representatives to create the territory proposed a governing council for the associated 
Native Americans, albeit one subject to veto and dissolution of the body by the territorial 
governor.  A judicial system composed of chiefs would settle law.  An Indian delegate to 
Congress would represent a region defined along strict borderlines between white and Native 
America.  Bringing together diverse and unruly people under the umbrella of federal control was 
step one toward Jackson’s publicly stated plan for including this new, wild space within federal 
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governance.  It seemingly answered Jefferson’s question about inclusion of Native Americans in 
the federal system.  Per the racialist sentiments of the administration, of course, this meant first 
civilizing the savage inhabitants through imposing peace, controlling crime, policing bodies, and 
fully extending federal sovereignty over the space.52   
While the proposed government council would police the body politic, local tribes were 
to police their own people.  Enforcing stricter racial barriers included limiting white-Native 
American sexual encounters.53  In a private council with the Delaware and Shawnee, Ellsworth 
admonished the chiefs about the “chastity of your women.  Among white men a harlot is 
despised.  She is often diseased and never respected.  There are some of your women in the habit 
of frequently sleeping with white men, and by these men have children.  Let me tell you if you 
become a happy nation, you must restrain your women from intercourse with bad men.”  While 
the chiefs agreed, they lamented that whites were too rich to resist and that “we have no laws and 
our great father does not put into execution those he makes himself.”54  Governing Indian bodies 
required more direct control both at the local and regional levels. 
Ellsworth urged Commissioner of Indian Affairs Elbert Herring to pressure Congress to 
support the agreement as a necessary step toward Indian civilization.55  Within the broader 
historical context of American fears about pan-Indian confederacies this was a big request.  
Federal help to organize a local governing body and defray the costs of gathering representatives 
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was a dramatic departure from previous policy of limiting Native American alliance building and 
actively dividing nations against themselves.56 
Ellsworth’s efforts were underappreciated by his superiors.  When correspondence finally 
caught up with him in December, he learned that government parsimony was again threatening 
to overturn the hard work of officials in the field.  For want of funds, instructions from 
Washington were “to delay in accomplishing with all possible dispatch, the objects named in the 
first instructions – Among the most important of these were the difficulties between the northern 
tribes; the Delawares Pawnees and others.”  Without his work, Ellsworth argued, no chance to 
resolve the regional war was available until the following July.  Only a general peace could 
begin the process of civilization reforms among the nations north of the Platte.57 
Ellsworth’s efforts allowed a Pawnee delegation to travel safely to Fort Gibson for 
meetings with the Osage, Cherokee, Creek, and Choctaw precedent to peace negotiations.  The 
efforts also revealed a fundamental ignorance of the diplomatic relationships of the region.  
Stokes decried the trip as useless, but Ellsworth corrected the record as “the Pawnees of the 
Platte are at war indiscriminately, with all south of the Kanzas river.”  Southern nations 
“considered the Pawnee Picts [Wichita] and the Pawnees of the Platte to be the same people, 
connected by language and by blood.  How important to show them the difference between the 
American and Mexican Indians.  Among 10,000 Pawnees of the Platte, only one could be found 
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who understands the language of the Picts!”58  Fifty Pawnee and Otoe representatives met 
another 100 Osage as well as Cherokee leaders who all appeared eager to settle differences.59   
Such eagerness revealed the difficulties faced by those north and south of the Platte.  
Pawnee efforts to secure their southern boundaries to refocus on the Sioux and Cheyenne meant 
they could ill-afford to alienate the newly arrived people.  Repeated concerns about the 
Comanche and Wichita, the latter too often mistaken for the northern relations, revealed deep 
concerns about the safety of any proposed Western Territory.  In an earlier council with the 
Osage, the commissioners reassured leaders nervous about repeated Comanche and Wichita raids 
should the Osage resettle as the Creek and Cherokee.  “Your Great Father will erect forts soon, 
and put soldiers in them, out on the Arkansas, Canadian and Red Rivers, west of your 
settlements,” the commissioners promised.  In addition to making peace, “you may therefore be 
assured your Great Father will protect you in your farms, and no one shall hurt you, for your 
Great Father has a great many soldiers who can, in a short time, kill all the wild Indians that hurt 
his red children here.”60  It was a wildly presumptuous claim given the limited forces available, 
but revelatory of federal thinking about spatial control based on direct military dominance.  The 
claims echoed Congressional ignorance of the frontier in suggesting the Comanche were 
dissipating as a threat and could be easily handled.61 
 
4.3  Territorial Reorganization and the Arrival of Missionaries and Dragoons 
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Federal concerns about the fragility of any peace with the Pawnee or their neighbors, and 
the limited ability to enforce policy at its territorial margins pushed the War Department toward 
a more active presence on the Great Plains.  Stabilizing the new Indian Territory and projecting 
power through the creation of the Mounted Rangers, a temporary and ineffective solution, and 
eventually the United States Dragoon Regiment, changed the regional strategic situation.  The 
United States had the capability to enter what the Pawnee heretofore considered their exclusive 
space in force. 
Pawnee leaders scrambled to adapt to the new reality.  The War Department remained 
concerned about the Pawnee reputation for unchecked hostility along the Santa Fe Road.  
Rumored hostile movements reported by traders fueled the fears.  Dougherty, commenting about 
the ignorance of Washington officials, reassured Clark that he “never found them so friendly 
disposed as during the last year.”  Moreover, he usually attributed Pawnee hostile actions along 
the Santa Fe Road to misidentification by scared whites who “are generally unacquainted with 
the various and mischievous tribes who roam over the country between our western borders and 
Santa Fee therefore their inability to distinguish one tribe from another.”62   
He may have been right.  Pawnee policy suggested that their primary concern was to 
bring federal officials into a closer strategic partnership.  They “have never evinced so good and 
friendly feelings towards both the whites and their Red neighbors,” Dougherty claimed, and 
“express a strong desire to have their Farmers, Teachers, and Blacksmiths located at their towns 
next spring.”  The Pawnee further promised to leave behind a sufficient security force to protect 
the government employees.  Pawnee intentions as reported to federal officials revealed a more 
circumspect view of their spatial limits to refocus on their core.  Dougherty opined that they 
                                               




were “truly desirous of being instructed in the domestic arts,” though he remained unable to see 
the rationale as part of the larger strategic shift.  Notwithstanding government obligations and 
desires, however, Dougherty recommended against the immediate fulfilment of treaty provisions 
as a waste until the Pawnee demonstrated their actual desires to remain at home.  If the Sioux 
and Pawnee were brought to peace terms, as they implored Dougherty to arrange, treaty 
obligations could be fulfilled easily.63 
This was a big if.  Sioux aggressions turned the formerly formidable Arikara into 
refugees who desperately sought alliance and protection with their Pawnee neighbors.  The 
Pawnee in turn threaded a fine diplomatic needle of gaining necessary allies to the north while 
not upsetting Americans with memories of Arikara hostility.  For Dougherty, such a relation 
suggested the Arikara could “be more easily controlled, when located at the Pawnees.”  For the 
Pawnee, the Arikara offered significant numbers of veteran fighters to add to the growing anti-
Sioux coalition around the Platte.  This latter consideration did give Dougherty pause.  “The 
Pawnees are a very numerous and powerful tribe, (particularly if the Rees should be attached to 
them),” he wrote to Clark, “all the other tribes together of my agency are small, and of much less 
importance.”  A military presence and shift in agency business to Fort Leavenworth was 
necessary to impress them with federal power.  Given that “Our intercourse with them is 
increasing so rapidly,” at the fort Dougherty “would have it in his power to keep the Dept. and 
the commanding military officer on the frontiers better informed of everything going on among 
the Indians.”64  Dougherty’s repeated requests to move the agency from Bellevue to Fort 
Leavenworth followed his understanding of the need for an increasingly militarized conduct of 
Indian affairs and interest in direct control.  Clark denied the requests. 
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In their 1834 annuity council, Pawnee leaders reported their readiness to comply with the 
treaty.  Big Axe pointed toward the wealth and power disparities as the primary reasons for the 
pivot to the United States.  “We know the whites are wise and rich – we know that their ways are 
better than our ways; therefore, we want to learn of them,” he told Dougherty, not from a 
willingness to abandon Pawnee ways, but to learn the secrets of white power.  “I love the white 
man; the white man cannot cry in the prairie but, I will be there to assist him,” he continued, “I 
want to know something of the great religion which you have among you; and if any of those 
people who come to teach us about the Great Spirit, and how to write, will come to my lodge, I 
will see that they shall be neither cold nor hungry.”65  Such words sounded nice, even if they 
were merely calculated to placate federal officials to produce the alliance Big Axe sought. 
Pawnee eagerness to welcome government workers and missionaries revealed the shift in 
strategic focus already occurring by the close of 1834.  Accepting the missionaries John Dunbar 
and Samuel Allis from the interdenominational American Board of Commissioners for Foreign 
Missions did not represent a fundamental rejection of Pawnee culture.  It fit within the Pawnee 
cosmology of incorporating new ideas and sources of spiritual and temporal power.  As Dunbar 
related upon his arrival at the Pawnee villages, several chiefs were eager for their sons to read to 
better serve as political go-betweens with the white world and incorporate new forms of power.66 
Federal policymakers felt none of the constraints or pressures limiting the Pawnee chiefs.  
Washington officialdom entered 1834 on a wave of critical successes in transforming the West.  
Cass’s long-term project to remake federal Indian policy appeared successful with the exception 
of curbing Sioux aggression.  His commissioners forwarded recommendations for territorial 
government that respected local Indian autonomy in domestic legal affairs, tribal sovereignty 
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within specific boundaries, and allowed for direct yet unobtrusive federal control in all other 
areas, with an American governor situated at Fort Leavenworth to exert military control.67   
Cass forwarded the recommendations to Congress as part of his plan for a systemic 
overhaul of Indian affairs he had initiated as secretary of War.  His was merely the latest reform 
effort.  His predecessors, especially Calhoun and to an extent Eaton, also tinkered with the 
system resulting in a bureaucratic mess by the 1830s.  Horace Everett’s House Committee on 
Indian Affairs suggested that “so manifestly defective and inadequate is our present system, that 
an immediate revision seems to be imperiously demanded.”  The department itself was “of 
doubtful origin and authority.  Its administration is expensive, inefficient, and irresponsible,” and 
that the “committee have sought, in vain, for any lawful authority for the appointment of a 
majority of the agents and subagents of Indian Affairs now in office.”68 
In addition to the normal desires for economy and streamlined authority, the report 
showed the shift in federal strategic thinking.  Previously, the report argued, “conciliation was 
sought; but the time is now passed when the fear of Indian hostility should be a leading feature of 
our Indian intercourse.”  After decades of wars coupled with fears about pan-Indian 
confederacies and foreign influence, the United States was finally asserting its control.  The 
federal relationship to Native Americans “is now that of the strong to the weak, and demands at 
our hands a more liberal policy, as well directed to promote their welfare as our political 
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interests.”69  Adopting this mindset of federal supremacy, even with the limited recent successes 
of the commissioners, meant that federal policy and bureaucracy reforms could be dictated from 
positions of strength and control.  It was the hubris of victors who viewed lines on a map as 
definitive markers.  Policy makers removed from the Platte remained ignorant of the spatial and 
diplomatic realities that nullified claims to finality.  The report and map showed a disconnect 
between federal officials who assumed the Pawnee to be controllable and the reality on the 
ground that the Pawnee still held considerable independent power. 
                                               





Image 11 is a map by George Washington Hood, a leading cartographer in the Army’s 
department of topographical engineers.  Hood’s map delineated the new tribal boundaries and 
proposed Western Territory.  This map was a cartographic sleight of hand, demonstrating a 
wishful understanding of Indian Country and its boundaries.  Suggesting that the Pawnee core 
Image 11: “Map of the Western Territory,” prepared by Lt. Washington Hood in Horace Everett, “Regulating the Indian 
Department, To Accompany Bills H.R. Nos. 488, 489, 490,” 23rd Congress, 1st Session, Report 474 (Washington, DC: Gales 




ended along clear lines to the west and north was pure fiction.70  Pawnee leaders at no point 
ceded any land or claims toward the west.  Their policy shifts to the United States in fact were 
designed to free their military power to continue raiding west against the Cheyenne.  It was a 
useful tool for Congressional action and federal claims, but held little basis in the reality of the 
Platte Valley.  To an extent, factual reality did not matter.  Federal policymakers felt comfortable 
that such boundaries could be implemented, at least over time. 
The House committee proposed three bills to completely reorganize federal Indian 
policy: a revised trade and intercourse act, an authorization of the Indian Office within the War 
Department, and the proposed Western Territory.  This was merely the latest effort at reform 
following previous overhaul attempts by Calhoun and each of his successors.  The report and 
bills received general support from the administration and broader Jacksonian party.  Writing 
about the sweeping reform efforts, the National Intelligencer argued that “the report seems, with 
a view to secure a real reform, to have avoided all topics of a culpatory character, or [ones] that 
could be used to excite party considerations.”71  The first two bills were non-partisan 
administrative reform measures and passed in June 1834.72 
Fears from both Jacksonian and anti-Jackson factions combined to stall the plan for a 
Western Territory.  From his perch in the House of Representatives, former President John 
Quincy Adams thought creating and admitting a territory of Indians was unconstitutional and 
dangerous for Eastern states’ power.  Other opponents feared such a territory increased executive 
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and military power over territorial governance.  Virginian William S. Archer revealed the deep 
antipathies to racial mixing underlying Removal and warned that opening admission to Native 
Americans might be a precursor to extending similar rights to African Americans.  This 
congressional wrangling undercut the plan for an Indian-governed territory negotiated by the 
commissioners in favor of a more draconian approach of direct federal control.  The land south 
of the Platte would be governed by a federal policy of strict economic and racial segregation 
under the Trade and Intercourse Act and enforced by military power.  Local government was 
limited.  Adjudication of disputes would be within the federal courts of Missouri and Arkansas 
where Indians remained at a disadvantage.  As historian Ronald Satz wrote of the legislation, it 
“placed Indian emigrants at the mercy of the white man’s conception of justice.”  This was a 
dictatorial system of direct rule rather than the tutelary model of republican governance 
Ellsworth negotiated.73 
Washington’s focus on the Western Territory importantly took federal attention away 
from the Pawnee and the Upper Missouri.  Ellsworth, Schermerhorn, and Stokes reported their 
findings from the previous two years of travel and negotiations in February 1834.  The 
commissioners “hoped the numerous Sioux and other still more northern tribes or bands will ere 
long embrace the opportunity afforded by the terms of pacification, for their admission to the 
same,” but provided no evidence this was even contemplated by the Sioux.  The report suggested 
wishful thinking alone would be sufficient to settle the conflicts north of the Platte.74  The 
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commissioners and Congress assumed the Pawnee would remain at home to protect the 
government employees, thereby giving up their hunts and war expeditions per the 1833 treaty.75   
The commissioners argued that peace could be maintained through a massive expansion 
of forts in two concentric rings, “on the borders of the Indian country and the state of Missouri 
and Arkansas Territory.  The other in the interior, on the western line of the agricultural district, 
extending from Red river to the Upper Missouri.”  Placing a garrison on the Platte, above the 
Chaui village, and at least one on the Upper Missouri in Sioux country was “indispensably 
necessary for the peace and protection of the Indian country, that this tribe should cease to make 
war and commit depredations on their neighbors . . .  [in] their extensive country.”  Echoing 
decades-long calls for a mobile strike force, the commission pushed for a strategy of active 
intervention deep into Indian Country by the dragoons.  Strongpoints anchoring an extensive 
annual or bi-annual patrol route by an impressive corps whose “active and martial appearance” 
was the military force best suited to the peculiarities of the regions.76   
It was a curious mix of wishful thinking and direct military control unlike anything 
previously attempted in the West, even the experiment of Fort Atkinson.  Yet little came of the 
report’s call for direct military involvement.  The appearance of the U.S. Dragoons in December 
1833 proved a sea-change in strategic power on the Plains and at least partly justified the 
arrogance of policy makers.  Authorized in March 1833, and deployed by December, the 
dragoons slowly replaced the mounted rangers who had struggled to protect themselves from the 
Comanche and Wichita, let alone project federal power.77  Colonel Henry Dodge’s arrival at Fort 
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Gibson in the midst of the Pawnee conference with the southern Indians produced an immediate 
effect on Pawnee strategic thinking.  “The arrival of the dragoons was at a lucky moment just as 
the Pawnees and Otoes reached the garrison,” reported commission secretary Edward Ellsworth, 
as “the wild Indians expressed much curiosity to see what they have called the ‘horse soldiers.’”  
Parading his men before the assembled Cherokee, Creek, Pawnee, Otoe, Osage, and Seneca, 
Dodge was finally able to show federal power on par with the expert horsemen of the Pawnee.78  
But this was an illusion.  The dragoons were mostly for show and barely organized as a unit.  
Cavalry was expensive, patrols cost money, and forts in the far West for support would be even 
costlier, which made the report’s recommendations impractical at least in the near-term. 
Congressional reluctance to fund western military and Indian policy in general usually 
meant that a robust expansion of the Army’s role in the West was a non-starter.  Recent 
experiences of Santa Fe caravans, continual pushes from officials about the need for mounted 
men, and the panic of the Blackhawk War pushed Congress toward reconsidering the need for 
expanded military presence in the West, including cavalry.79  As a former western governor, 
Cass knew the importance of forts: 
 
The stockaded works erected in Indian country, are important to overawe the Indians, and to 
retrain their perpetual disposition to war.  Under any circumstances, in peace or war, they must be 
retained and supported.  They command the great avenues of communication into the country; 
they cover the whole frontier; they protect our citizens in the various employment required by 
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their duties, public and private, and they produce a moral effect upon the Indians, which is visible 
and permanent.80 
 
He also understood the growing importance of mobility as they key to an expansive federal 
strategy.  Creating the U.S. cavalry force, however, was more difficult in reality. 
The dragoons’ initial appearance in December 1833 did little besides announce their 
arrival.  The first real dragoon campaign to visit the Comanche, Wichita, and Kiowa 250 miles to 
the west of Fort Gibson in the summer of 1834 was a disaster.  Of 500 men, only 200 reached the 
destination fit for duty, the rest falling out from sickness and exhaustion, with as many as 100 
succumbing to their illnesses.  Accompanying the regiment, artist George Catlin labeled the 
whole affair “this most disastrous campaign.”81  Despite the embarrassing first campaign, Cass 
remained undeterred in his evolution toward mobile military force.  One company escorted the 
Santa Fe caravan while the remainder showed the flag along the southwest border.  Washington 
finally had the capabilities to project power onto the Great Plains, albeit with very mixed results 
in the initial forays.  The mobility of the cavalry, the security afforded by treaties with the border 
nations, and the confidence in Removal policy writ large suggested federal comfort with 
extending unfettered American dominion to the Rocky Mountains, or so policy makers assumed.   
 A similar exuberance about U.S. political and cultural power undergirded the American 
Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions and their efforts to establish more western 
outposts.  The interdenominational board drew most of its support from Presbyterians, 
Congregationalists, and the Dutch Reformed churches.  It funded 33 different mission stations, 
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claimed 900 Indian converts, and 1000 students enrolled in its schools.  Originally sent to scout 
locations west of the Rockies in the spring of 1834, Samuel Allis, John Dunbar, and Samuel 
Parker were dissuaded by Dougherty who advised them to work with the Pawnee who were 
eager for assistance.82  Initially more ethnographers than missionaries, the group was dismayed 
by Pawnee callousness about death, suffering, and medicine.  Dunbar exclaimed to his journal 
that “the sight of my eyes affected my heart.  I felt solemn.  But this is only the beginning of my 
witnessing heathenism in real life.”  Such moral superiority was to be expected, as were 
commentaries about male idleness, women treated as “mere slaves,” and the grudging respect for 
Indians who went out of their way to make life comfortable for their guests.83  Rather than 
immediately dictating new ways of life to the Pawnee, the missionaries sought to learn the 
language and customs, and establish themselves as model American Christians, farmers, and 
teachers as ambassadors of soft power.  Conversions would take place once the cultural fields 
were prepared and the Pawnee recognized what Dunbar and Allis already considered to be their 
own innate superiority. 
 Pawnee responses to the missionaries ranged from indifference to welcoming.  
Performative claims to cultural and physical space showed what language barriers could not: 
Pawnee dominance and confidence in their internal structures as a people that had “less 
intercourse with the whites, than almost any tribe on this side of the mountains.”84  Dunbar’s 
journal recorded numerous instances where Pawnee actions showed their confidence in 
behavioral norms including treatment of guests.  As they had with cultural interlopers like the 
Paul Wilhelm and John Irving, Pawnee leaders brought Dunbar into their centers of power, the 
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rituals surrounding the sacred bundles at the heart of chiefly cosmic authority.  Describing a feast 
of thanksgiving to Terawah [Tirawahut], whom Dunbar assumed to be a Christian-like God of 
the Pawnee, he witnessed the opening of a sacred bundle, the rituals of the feast, the speeches 
which he did not understand, and was given an equal share of the sacrifice.85  Assuming his 
status as that of a regular guest, Dunbar did not appreciate the diplomatic significance of the 
scene.  He was invited into the heart of Pawnee religious and political circles to demonstrate that 
they needed little of his theology.  He was there as a useful guest.  Whereas previous efforts to 
impress visitors had their intended effects, Dunbar was either unable or unwilling given his 
missionary zeal and aversion to heathenism, to accept the Pawnee claims over their sacred 
political spaces. 
 Treaties and missionaries did not diminish the Pawnee conceptions of their regional 
control.  Dunbar suggested in March 1835, that Pawnee men were “abominably lazy” as “they 
say their proper business is killing buffalo and war,” and “since the recent treaty with the United 
States, they have been obliged to give up the last mentioned business,” and now lounge away 
their time.86  Yet such optimism about Pawnee docility belied the centrality of war to their 
cosmology.  Witnessing a village-wide festival two weeks later, Dunbar noted the importance of 
Cheyenne scalps within the ceremonies, scalps that remained prominently displayed as trophies 
and marks of Pawnee dominance.87  The realignment simply shifted the focus of Pawnee military 
power westward. 
 
4.4  Dragoons Move West 
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The disasters of the 1834 dragoon campaign did not deter Army leaders from renewing 
the push westward in 1835.  Now able to showcase federal power, the War Department used the 
dragoons to insert a vision of sovereignty where few U.S. officials had previously ventured.  
Mobile power offered a way to contain Pawnee westward movements; begin bringing the 
Cheyenne and Arapahoe into the federal orbit; and patrol the nebulous border with Mexico. 
In 1835, one dragoon company patrolled the Osage boundary from Fort Gibson.  Three 
more scouted the Des Moines River.  Three others based at Fort Leavenworth received orders in 
March to ride for the Rockies on a diplomatic mission and show of force.88  They left Fort 
Leavenworth on May 29.  Colonel Henry Dodge commanded about 120 men with a small wagon 
and mule train, two swivel guns, and a herd of cattle to supply the march.  Agent Dougherty and 
former captain turned Indian trader John Gantt who had served at Fort Atkinson, accompanied 
the detachment.  Their march, with stops at the Otoe, Omaha, Pawnee, Arikara, Cheyenne, and 
other nations covered 1,600 miles.  It partially replicated the exploration route of Major Stephen 
                                               
88 There are three accounts of this expedition, the official report prepared by Lt. G. P. Kingsbury as the official 
diarist and submitted by Colonel Henry Dodge.  The second was a journal kept by Sergeant Hugh Evans, orderly 
sergeant of Company G.  Evans’s journal ends abruptly in August 1835, despite making the return to Fort 
Leavenworth in October.  The third was a journal kept by Captain Lemuel Ford, commanding company G and a 
holdover officer from the Mounted Rangers.  Henry Dodge, “Journal of the march of a detachment of dragoons, 
under the command of Colonel Dodge, during the summer of 1835,” ASP:MA, 6:130-46; Hugh Evans, “Hugh 
Evans’ Journal of Colonel Henry Dodge’s Expedition to the Rocky Mountains in 1835,” Fred S. Perrine, ed. 
Mississippi Valley Historical Review 14, no. 2 (Sept. 1927): 192-214; Lemuel Ford, “Captain Ford’s Journal of an 
Expedition to the Rocky Mountains,” Louis Pelzer, ed. Mississippi Valley Historical Review 12, no. 4 (Mar. 1926): 
550-579.  Prucha, Sword of the Republic, 373-5.  Prucha suggests the importance of what he terms “the most 
extensive military campaign yet undertaken in the West”—discounting the Yellowstone Expedition—and its success 
in showing the flag among nations not accustomed to dealing with the United States, but does not examine what the 
campaign meant for Native American foreign affairs.  Recent scholarship does not place nearly as much importance 
on this expedition.  Wooster dismisses it in a two-sentence blurb outlining the route taken and nations met, but 
assigns no significance.  Wooster, American Military Frontiers, 81.  Watson does not mention the 1835 expedition 
directly, implying the dragoons under the politically appointed Dodge were ineffective remnants of the Mounted 
Rangers and only saved by Dodge’s promotion to the territorial governorship of Wisconsin, a move that allowed 
twenty-four-year Army veteran Stephen Watts Kearny to professionalize the force.  Watson, Peacekeepers and 




Long in 1820, albeit as a force of pacification rather than a small exploring party.89  This was the 
most formidable, professional American expedition to go west of Council Bluffs.  Most 
importantly, it was a mobile force free from dependence on rivers or orders to protect Santa Fe 
convoys. 
 After meetings in June with the Iowa, Otoe, and Omaha, the dragoons proceeded to the 
Pawnee villages.  The welcome the troops received was reminiscent of that which greeted the 
Ellsworth commission and intended as a display of continued Pawnee power.  After halting the 
column to meet with the principal chief Angry Man, the troopers faced the same mock attack 
from several hundred Pawnee warriors who displayed their horsemanship and surrounded the 
command.  Captain Ford was unimpressed and thought the warriors possessed “a great deal of 
Timmidaty,” and while they made “quite a display but I believe One hundred of our command 
could whip One thousand of them on the prararie.”90  More impressive to his military eye were 
the Pawnee earthen lodges, which he viewed as perfect fortifications impervious to small arms.  
Sergeant Evans was more impressed that the Pawnee possessed more “energy and enterprise 
about them that is if an Indian is supposed to possess interprise,” and that they had a shrewd eye 
for trade and the value of goods.91  Lieutenant Kingsbury recorded similarly favorable 
impressions of a rich country and a people “wanting but a little instruction and industry” to 
become fully civilized.92  Despite their recent military setbacks, the Pawnee retained a strong 
sense of core identity as military men and powerful brokers in the Great Plains trading networks. 
 Pawnee independence was most evident in their initial reactions to the arrival of the 
dragoons.  To sow dissension between the Pawnee and their Arikara allies, a Kansa Indian 
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spread the rumor that the troops were there to exterminate the Arikara.  The Arikara fled to their 
Skidi neighbors, so alarming the Pawnee that they prepared for war until reassured by Dougherty 
of the peaceful intentions of the troops.93  The Pawnee continued to exist outside of effective 
federal control and engaged in wars with the Cheyenne, Arapahoe, and Sioux as well as Santa Fe 
traders.  They remained nervous about federal reprisals for these acts despite six years of efforts 
at rapprochement.   
Lieutenant Kingsbury decried the Pawnee as “inveterate in their hostility,” and “if not 
restrained by the influence of the whites, would be very formidable to their enemies.”  Yet their 
“high opinion of the power of the United States,” meant that it would be easy for the government 
to in a short time “exert a controlling influence over them.”94  Such a dissonant view of the 
Pawnee among the military observers reflected an inner tension among officers convinced of 
their newfound military power, but fundamentally unsure of their ability to reshape the regional 
geopolitics while the Pawnee retained their autonomous power. 
 Dodge and Dougherty met with the collected Pawnee on June 23, 1835, and set out to 
alleviate Pawnee fears and reinforce the necessity of settlement before a full reset in the 
relationship with the United States.  Emphasizing the newfound federal role as regional 
peacemakers, Dodge offered his services and proof of his effort to settle inter-tribal wars in 
1834.  He wished to reprise the performance between the Cheyenne, Arapahoe, and Pawnee.  
Curiously, his insistence on Pawnee unity as “the first importance” that the four bands maintain a 
“friendly union” to prevent outside interference or “to lose your standing among your friends,” 
seemed to be at odds with a classic policy of divide and conquer.  Pawnee unity and power were 
the problems for federal officials trying to penetrate Pawnee society with missionaries and 
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political overtures.  Counseling the chiefs to handle instances of violence, raiding, or warfare as 
an internal Pawnee policing matters appeared to reverse course for unclear reasons.95  With the 
exception of some Skidi warriors who joined the Arikara in raids on the Cheyenne, Dougherty 
reported that Pawnee behavior for the preceding year was commendable.96  As far as he knew. 
Perhaps the message was one of flattery to continue the process of ingratiating federal 
officials to Pawnee leaders in an appeal to the success of their leadership.  More likely is that 
Dougherty realized, and counselled Dodge, that the Pawnee were not susceptible to shows of 
American force at their villages.  Here the Pawnee were most secure in their power, as they 
demonstrated with their military displays.  It was turning out to be a good year for the Pawnee.  
They had a “large and very promising crop of corn, beans, and pumpkins growing . . . and owing 
to the numerous hordes of Indians who have recently come along the east side of the Mountains . 
. . the Buffaloes have been driven in nearer to them than they have been for some time back.”97  
The carrot of aid promised in 1833, if dispersed at that point, would have been useless 
government spending wasted on a people in a more secure position than at any point in years.  
Flattery and promises of help with foreign affairs were the only means to affect some changes in 
Pawnee-federal relations. 
 Pawnee responses offered more proof of a strengthened position.  Angry Man of the 
Chaui strongly doubted federal desires for inter-tribal peace and internal policing, saying that 
only time would prove whether they heard, or more accurately, agreed with, Dodge’s talks.  
While Angry Man blamed his son-in-law Big Axe of the Skidi for causing the trouble, Big Axe 
claimed that his young warriors would not listen, despite the general change of heart among his 
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people for better relations.  It was fundamentally the same argument presented again and again 
for federal officials: they were good chiefs who loved the Americans, and they tried to act as 
leaders and got punished for it by their people, but that they could not always control their young 
men who were to blame not listening to their wise leaders.98  Benjamin O’Fallon heard it in 
1819.  So had Dougherty in nearly every council since.  It was a compelling fiction that could not 
be disproven and mended fences between leaders while preserving independent authority. 
 This responsibility shell game covered the internal debates among Pawnee leaders about 
the rapprochement and their relationship to neighboring tribes.  Angry Man cited peace efforts as 
the main reason behind a newfound ability for safe travel and inter-Indian cooperation.  “I am 
desirous to have as many red friends as possible wherever I go,” he told the council, hinting at 
the Pawnee need for more allies in their wars against the Sioux.  Mole in the Face of the 
Kitkahahki reminded the council of the devastating effects of recent calamities on Pawnee 
leadership, that “our chiefs were all killed and our people lived like wolves.”99  Leaders of all 
four of the individual bands alluded to their dependence on federal gifts and favor for their 
continued power among their people.  This was a half-truth.  Their recent ascension to the 
leadership after the crises of 1831-3, their tenuous hold over the younger warriors, and the 
diplomatic challenges facing the collected Pawnee nation made good relations imperative. 
Peace came at a price.  Because of federal insistence on peace, “some of our friends 
accuse us of being squaws,” and that “makes some of our neighbors say we ought to wear 
petticoats,” lamented Angry Man.100  To maintain their chiefly authority, they needed to maintain 
their status as war leaders and brave men.  To do so jeopardized their necessary shift toward a 
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potential federal alliance.  Previously, Pawnee leaders could accommodate both desires by 
making peace in the East and South and focusing military efforts on the West and North.  There, 
wars with the Cheyenne and Sioux remained avenues for martial displays of chiefly authority 
where warriors could prove fitness for future command and office.  Establishing a stark claim for 
the feminization of Pawnee leadership marked the lengths to which the chiefs were willing to go 
to please their federal counterparts.   
Arguing within the lingua franca of martial diplomacy that their core political identity 
was under threat had worked well as a diplomatic tool in the past.  It followed Petalesharoo’s 
1819 pronouncement of feminine frailty if he acceded to federal requests to punish his young 
men.  Like previous exchanges, such claims were easy enough to make in council and just as 
easily forgotten when Pawnee military attention turned toward their distant neighbors beyond the 
vision or reach of federal officials.  From appearances in the council, the Pawnee leaders 
operated within the same diplomatic framework of the previous twenty years: offer apologies, 
argue their own weakness, display the reality of collected military might, and wait for the 
Americans to go back east after distributing their gifts.  The turning point came the following 
day, June 24, when the command turned westward into the heart of a war zone. 
Federal insistence on projecting power to the far West was in part to make peace between 
the Pawnee, Cheyenne, and Arapahoe.  Two Skidi Pawnee accompanied the dragoons, ostensibly 
to assist in making peace with the western nations.  More likely they were supposed to keep tabs 
on what the dragoons were actually doing.101  Meetings with the Arikara produced a universally 
favorable impression of a proud warrior nation long-feared by Americans in Indian Country.102  
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Arguing that the current Arikara course of constant warfare was unsustainable, Dodge pursued 
the twin goals of settling Native Americans on defined reservations and ensuring the regional 
peace requisite for spatial transformation.  Becoming the friends of the United States, he argued, 
would guarantee the survival of their nation.  Should they continue to attack Americans and 
make war with their neighbors, “ruin and destruction must await you.”  He threatened the 
Arikara with swift future retribution and warned that his small force was a peace mission and not 
representative of the full military might of the United States.  They had to choose between good 
and evil, upon which choice their national fate depended.103 
At the heart of Dodge’s pronouncement was the larger federal belief in the power to 
affect realistic changes in the region.  Describing his 1834 efforts to make peace in the 
Southwest and near Ft. Leavenworth, Dodge reiterated the federal conception of spatial 
dominance and thinking in terms of continental Indian policy that all the nations were 
interconnected.  Leavenworth’s campaign of 1823 accomplished very little to change Arikara 
behavior, but the appearance of the mobile force of dragoons, combined with the very real threat 
of annihilation by the Sioux, meant a sea change in the limited options of the Arikara.104 
From the Arikara it took three weeks’ march to reach a view of the Rockies.  The 
mountains appeared to the military men as “ruined castles” with a “form of immense fortification 
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with turrets and rock-crowned battlements.”105  Awed by his surroundings, Evans recorded the 
“truly grand and majestic” view of the “beauty and sublimity of those Mountains” such that 
“every eye was struck with astonishment and wonder . . . [of] this grand scene of nature.”106  
Here was a confrontation with the North American wilderness in its purest form.  It was at once a 
fortified, foreboding, and natural boundary, yet sublimely beautiful enough to capture the minds 
of each man in the command and draw men west just for a glimpse.107  The Rockies presented a 
very real problem for Dodge and his superiors.  They formed a natural limit for federal power: 
cavalry was ill-suited for the mountains, nor could American forces survive easily or cheaply so 
far from supply lines.  Reconciling the need for mobile power with a continental vision of 
control meant imitating the natural fortifications of the continent.  Only a dramatically expanded 
fortification program could hope to compete with the natural defenses of the continental divide 
and support further expansion into the mountains.  Where the cavalrymen reported the beauty 
and fertility of the plains they crossed, in contrast to what Stephen Long described as a desert 
less than two decades previously, the mountains were the next formidable barrier to federal 
expansion.  The mountains were a limiting force checking the continental claims of control. 
Dodge’s troopers were still interlopers, a fact reflected in their attitudes toward Native 
Americans.  Camping about Pike’s Peak and Fountain Creek near a spring that the Arapahoe 
considered the origin spot of their people, the dragoons discovered the basin filled with items left 
as offerings.  Evans reported these were promptly pilfered as souvenirs or discarded as garbage 
items of “Indian trumphry.”108  Destroying the shrine of a nation the United States was trying to 
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impress encapsulated the underlying purpose of the expedition, to erase Native American 
independence with clear indications of federal control.  This was not a temporary expedition, but 
a harbinger of future federal dominance as military discipline, arms, and power in numbers 
provided cover for dictation and disrespect.  That this desecration occurred to the west of the 
Pawnee revealed the changing U.S. attitudes about the possible range of federal power. 
 Overconfidence in their abilities as peacemakers and a military power followed the 
command toward Bent’s Fort near the Mexican border.  Dodge pursued the most pressing issues: 
concluding a regional peace among the Cheyenne, Arapahoe, Blackfeet, and Gros Ventres, 
impressing them with federal power, designating chiefs, and making introductions to a few 
Pawnee representatives to initiate peace talks.  Self-congratulations over this last effort were 
belied by the fact that Skidi representatives had already initiated diplomatic overtures the 
previous year.109  The August 11 council revealed the depth of enmity between these peoples, an 
enmity not easily reconciled by a hundred dragoons already low on supplies. 
Representing his nation, the brother of the principle Skidi chief hinted at the difficulties 
of peace.  He “spoke very Independently . . . [and said to the council that] they had made friends 
before but so soon as the Schians [Cheyenne] could find it convenient they Stole their horses and 
killed one of their men,” laying the blame at the Cheyenne for what in reality was at least several 
generations of hostility.  It was the third or fourth attempt to make peace in recent years.  The 
Skidi leader reiterated his fearlessness at being in the heart of his enemy’s country, but kindly 
pledged not to kill any party sent to the Pawnee villages for talks.110  Little Moon of the 
Cheyenne stalled.  He expected the war parties dispatched prior to the dragoons’ arrival to return 
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soon, and their successes or failures would drive the next phase of negotiations. “I know but 
little,” he told Dodge in council, “what I do know I have told you; wait until our war parties 
return; I shall then know what to say.”111  It was also a direct message to the Americans not to be 
too comfortable with their apparent superiority.  Many Cheyenne warriors were absent, giving a 
false sense of relative federal power. 
For all of Dodge’s efforts, peace remained outside of federal abilities to dictate.  He 
extolled the potential of Pawnee-Cheyenne friendship in terms of food security and mutually 
shared hunting grounds on the Platte.  Dodge was either contradicting federal policy to settle the 
Pawnee as farmers or woefully uninformed about policy.112  He could implore, he could 
designate official chiefs, he could suggest the benefits of closer federal relations and trade, but he 
could not dictate.  Numerous trading parties from Taos highlighted the porous Mexican border.  
The few Americans remained weak figures among many.  Settling the big questions of federal 
sovereignty, border security, or exercising control over Native Americans’ foreign policy 
remained elusive. 
Such limitations revealed themselves in stark fashion four days later.  The dragoons 
arrived at a Cheyenne village on August 14 just after the return of a successful raiding party 
against the Comanche.  The detachment camped nearby and met with the chiefs and warriors 
who left their own village unattended.   The following morning the dragoon camp resounded 
with gunfire from over the hill, throwing the Cheyenne in the camp into a panic.  The dragoons 
formed a battle line around the camp and prepared for an imminent attack.  A war party of more 
than 100 Skidi Pawnee and some Arikara, led by their principal chief Big Axe, appeared over the 
ridge.  Ostensibly the gun fire was a means of friendly announcement of their arrival for peace 
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talks.  Neither Ford nor Evans believed the story.  Both thought it was a Pawnee raid interrupted 
by the surprise presence of the dragoons.  Evans had seen enough of Indian tactics to record that 
given the existing hostilities, Big Axe’s intentions were “to come to this Shyan encampment fall 
upon kill and murder all they could and drive off all their horses,” as the “encampment was 
composed of old men women and children, the principal men and warriors out on a buffalo 
hunt.”  The Pawnee apparently thought the command went up the North rather than the South 
fork of the Platte, and thus would have been well clear of the raiding party.113 
Such a chance encounter had profound consequences for Pawnee strategy and ideas about 
spatial power.  Previous Pawnee campaigns occurred nearly completely out of sight of federal 
officials.  The Pawnee imagined their western frontier to be unrestricted.  One can sense the 
shock Big Axe felt at seeing the dragoons where he expected easy plunder.  The American 
presence instantly altered his plans.  Not wanting to go back on his previous promises to Dodge 
and thereby jeopardize federal aid, he agreed to a peace council.  In the totality of Pawnee 
dealings with the Cheyenne, one aborted raid counted for little.  The appearance of federal troops 
where they were unexpected and novel was dangerous.  It meant a greater restriction of Pawnee 
strategic possibilities.  Formalized U.S. relations with the Cheyenne and Arapaho meant the 
Pawnee could not concealed their military activities in the West with the same ease as heretofore.  
Even if the dragoon presence was temporary, their mere appearance signaled an altered 
diplomatic and strategic situation that threatened the core of Pawnee political power. 
 Dodge used the moment to argue for a new era of coexistence.  Signaling federal desires 
for the nations to come together in peace “that you should all live in the same country,” and that 
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“you will make your children friends; they will, when grown, take each other by the hand.”  Such 
optimism about future relations was in part predicated on making the region a collective hunting 
ground for the uncivilized tribes, as Dodge promised that “you are poor: you have no country 
that your great father wants.” 114  In the immediate term this was true.  Debates over the Western 
Territory said little about the Far West.  The region beyond the Pawnee was still unorganized 
Indian Country.   
In the wake of all these negotiations, Dodge sought to burnish his reputation and eagerly 
promoted his successful work in 1834 and 1835.  He argued that “the good effects of the 
expedition are thus becoming apparent, and it will probably have the effect to establish peace 
between all the different tribes between the Arkansas and the Platte.”  Here they could remain 
independent, “as they will thereby have an extensive country opened to them, covered with 
innumerable buffalo, where they can hunt in safety without fear of being attacked by their 
enemies.”115  Such emphasis on unity and continued nomadic hunts remained starkly opposed to 
policy for Native Americans within the imagined borders of federal control.  Federal policy and 
pleas from resettled tribes to that point insisted on the security of borders as a prerequisite of 
settlement and civilization efforts.  Dodge either spoke without understanding this or signaled a 
policy shift that placed the Far West beyond immediate federal control or interest. 
 Despite the actual limitations of his campaign, Dodge’s effort to shape the understanding 
of his actions proved successful.  His return to Fort Leavenworth in September 1835 garnered 
strong praise from the War Department.  After the disaster of 1834, the 1835 expedition proved 
the capabilities of the dragoons, having lost only one man, no horses or supplies, and achieving 
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apparently significant diplomatic victories.  Major General Edmund Gaines, commanding the 
Western Department of the Army, hyperbolically lauded the expedition as an extraordinary and 
unprecedented feat of great men on par with George Washington.  Eager to boost his command 
in the face of the growing Texas rebellion, Gaines recommended honors and awards be given to 
the expedition to reward and retain the now highly experienced troops.116  Gaines looked toward 
the near future when U.S. cavalry might be needed to secure the southern borders in the face of 
Mexican civil war and possible American filibustering efforts.  The dragoons proved that such 
thinking could be translated into realistic power projection.  A new agency and fort that Dodge 
recommended near the head of the Arkansas River could secure peace in the entire region.117 
 Concerns about federal territorial integrity remained at the fore of Indian and military 
policy.  Continual problems with the porous borders challenged any notion of federal sovereignty 
along the New Mexican frontier.  Just as Benjamin O’Fallon and William Clark worried about 
Pawnee interactions with the Spanish and Mexicans in the early 1820s, the presence of Taos 
traders and whiskey in putatively federal space kept open alternative sources of goods and 
influence.  Establishing the racial boundaries remained an important subtext of the expedition as 
part of limiting foreign incursions.  Ford, disgusted by the Mexican traders near Bent’s Fort, 
described them as “the meanest looking race of People I ever saw, don’t appear more civilized 
than our Indians generally.  Dirty filthy creatures.”118  Evans was less interested in establishing 
racial distinctions, he was simply glad for the flour and whiskey they provided to supplement the 
diminishing supplies.  Kingsbury’s official journal claimed the Mexican whiskey peddlers were 
confined to the opposite side of the border, conveniently omitting why the dragoons failed to 
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enforce trade regulations.119   
Whiteness here was predicated on not just skin color, but bearing and comportment.  
Encountering one of the Bent brothers and Ceran St. Vrain at their trading post, Ford was 
relieved to see “the first White men we found living in Indian country . . . they appear to be 
much of gentleman,” as they entertained the officers.120  Whiteness was based on wealth and 
genteel behavior, with settled positions, fortifications, and the outward appearance of power.  
Their trading fort, complete with artillery, offered a martial example of American identity where 
Indians came to trade.  The Bents and St. Vrain were settled and not quasi-Indians chasing trade 
across the plains like Indians chasing buffalo.  Mexican traders were neither genteel nor settled, 
but were to be guarded against as potential enemies on par with wild, warrior Indians.  The irony 
was that once Indians ceased to be noble warriors and plains savages, they decreased in racial 
status.  Ford viewed the more settled Otoe as having lost that air of wild nobility.121  Native 
Americans that chose acculturation to white norms gave up the martial status that earned respect. 
 The Pawnee had been masters of their space in John Treat Irving’s view because of their 
unchecked freedom of movement.  Dodge’s campaign did not automatically extinguish this 
freedom.  Dragoon operations were still limited by costs, pressing needs elsewhere, and too 
much space for one regiment to cover.  Pawnee acquiescence to federal plans for the Western 
Territory were bargaining tactics to secure aid.  Now, the Pawnee faced the choice of continuing 
their martial traditions of westward raids or losing much needed aid to fight against the Sioux.  
Stalling or polite deferrals to federal demands no longer sufficed.  The Pawnee entered the fall of 
1835 at a heretofore unthinkable crossroads for their strategic future as they faced more stringent 
                                               
119 Evans, “Hugh Evans’ Journal,” 210; Dodge, “Journal of a March of the Dragoons,” ASP:MA, 6:139. 
120 Ford, “Captain Ford’s Journal,” 566. 




requirements for settlement, the curtailment at least in some degree of western military 
expeditions, and the increasing presence of missionaries in the heart of Pawnee territory. 
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Chapter Five 
Remaking the Village 
 
 
 Between the dragoon expedition of 1835 and the start of the Mexican-American War in 
1846, the Platte Valley switched control.  The United States looked toward continental mastery.  
Federal officials developed the ability to project power and enforce federal control across vast 
distances.  Pawnee leaders, pressured by Sioux attacks, federal encroachment, and unsuccessful 
diplomatic overtures for alliances and aid, could not sustain the mobile military power that made 
them regionally dominant.  Pawnee overtures for a renegotiated relationship to the United States 
occurred while federal officials were distracted by a major war in Florida and the unsettled 
Texan-Mexican conflict.  Rebuffed, the Pawnee adopted a limited, fixed view of power, 
confining themselves into smaller spaces that required greater protection.  The process inverted 
notions of military power between the United States and Pawnee from what they had been a 
generation earlier.  The United States had a mobile cavalry force able to range far into the West.  
The Pawnee fortified their villages and consolidated their space.  Imagining what was politically 
possible changed, with dire consequences.   
Lewis Cass viewed the dragoon expedition as an unqualified success.  Dodge’s men 
proved American fantasies of continental power could be realized.  As part of a continental 
thinking about Indian spaces, Cass and his subordinates began drawing connections between the 
West, problems along the Mexican border, and the Second Seminole War.  He saw a common 
Indian problem for federal power rather than isolated individual tribes competing for attention, 
alliances, or hostilities with federal interests.  As John C. Calhoun envisioned almost two 
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decades earlier, Cass pushed an expansive nationalist version of federal power in the West 
predicated on military efficiency and large-scale construction efforts.  Cass planned for eight or 
nine new forts along an 800-mile frontier, connected by military roads, and with a force of 
dragoons patrolling the boundaries.  With faith in dragoons as “a species of force particularly 
dreaded by the Indians,” this barrier and accompanying Removal would provide the secure and 
permanent frontier long-desired by policymakers.  It was an expanded version of plans agent 
John Dougherty argued for years earlier, and largely involved by-passing the Pawnee in favor of 
continental rather than regional strategic planning.1 
By ignoring the Platte and its people, the United States did more to further the cause of 
conquest and incorporation than nearly three decades of engagement, diplomacy, and military 
governance.  Infighting among missionaries and government employees created factions within 
Pawnee leadership and village circles, drawing the nation into the petty squabbles of self-
interested white Americans.  Indian agents spent more time settling disputes among whites and 
themselves than advocating for federal policies or on behalf of their putative Pawnee wards.   
Mixing direct local control of forts with the long-range force-projection of cavalry 
eliminated the dichotomy between white and Native American lands by pushing federal authority 
directly into territory previously at the extreme edges of the control.  Federal success depended 
on limiting the ability and willingness of nations like the Pawnee to move beyond the confines of 
territorial or village boundaries.  Implementing this change of mindset was at best ad hoc and 
hands-off, but therein lay its ultimate effectiveness over previous efforts and universal systems of 
                                               
1 This plan was estimated to cost $65,000 for the forts, and $35,000 for the road from Red River to Minnesota, to be 
built by troops. It would join the 2,500 miles of military roads built between 1815 and 1831, and seen by Cass and 
other westerners, as essential to development. Cass to Thomas Hart Benton, January 14, 1836, ASP:MA, 6:13; 
Dougherty to J. B. Brant, December 16, 1834, ASPMA, 6:14-5; Harold B. Nelson, “Military Roads for War and 
Peace, 1791-1836,” Military Affairs 19 (Spring 1955): 1-14; Prucha, Sword of the Republic, 191-2; Wooster, 
American Military Frontiers, 82. 
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control.  Certainly the process of land cessions and effective federal control proceeded slowly.  
Simple mistakes over land cessions cost time and money such as an 1838 treaty to clarify 
previous cessions by the Otoe-Missouria and Omaha.2   Staff reshuffles in the 1830s and 1840s 
coinciding with the death of long-time superintendent William Clark in 1838 further complicated 
the process. 
Pawnee leaders met the new reality with far less enthusiasm than their federal 
counterparts.  Placed on the defensive, they faced the daunting task of keeping their core territory 
Pawnee.  Their strategic situation resulted in part from Pawnee successes at maintaining 
autonomy through the previous two decades.  Pawnee leaders kept traders with their inherent 
socio-political problems largely at arms-length, successfully deflected the heaviest resettlement 
of Eastern nations to outside Pawnee territory, and negotiated some concessions to avoid direct 
federal control of their lands.  White cultural encroachment from missionaries and technical 
assistance in the form of farmers, blacksmiths, and teachers came at the Pawnee invitation and 
for Pawnee strategic plans. These combined factors had the unintended consequence of moving 
the center of federal strategic interests away from core Pawnee territory.  With the treaty of 1833, 
the establishment of Indian Territory away from Pawnee lands, and increased Pawnee interest in 
better relations, federal officials perceived the Pawnee as less threatening than only five or ten 
years earlier, and therefore less deserving of attention and resources.  
This chapter traces the readjustment of Pawnee thinking in response to the changes in the 
regional political situation from 1835-1846 that threatened Pawnee territory.  The ongoing 
                                               
2 Dougherty to Clark, May 11, 1838, “Articles of a Treaty, made at the Otoe Village, Big River Platte, between John 
Dougherty, Agent Indian Affairs, being duly authorized on the part of the United States, and the Otoe and Missouria 
and Omaha tribes of Indians,” LROIA: StLS, Roll 751.  The treaty had to clarify confusing language that allowed 
for continued Indian claims on the land, at the potential cost of $60,500 over seven years, plus the expense of 
sending a delegation that included Pawnee leaders to Washington. 
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consequences of Removal policy and formation of Indian Territory to the south and Sioux 
attacks from the north squeezed the Pawnee core.  Infighting among missionary and federal 
officials complicated diplomatic endeavors for security.  Yet this is not a story of societal or 
political collapse.  Even within the more circumscribed boundaries of Pawnee power, refocusing 
on the territorial core and the village fit within a larger Pawnee cosmology of sacred geography 
and cultural identity.  It is important to frame the changes of the mid-1830s to mid-1840s within 
the Pawnee religious and political cosmology.  This outlook emphasized sacred spaces and 
relationships between celestial bodies/deities, their earthly animal intercessors whose powers 
gave leaders their abilities to heal, govern, and order society, and the chiefs and priests who 
received these powers and maintained the sacred spaces, power bundles, and rituals.   
In the end, the strategic situation for federal and Pawnee leaders inverted itself.  Federal 
officials thought expansively, even in the midst of the debacle of the Second Seminole War, as 
they had not in almost twenty years.  Pawnee leaders looked toward maintaining the sacred and 
political core.  Where Pawnee horsemen once fought wars far into enemy territory, their fights 
now took place on their doorsteps.  By 1843, Pawnee leaders evidenced a certain desperation for 
military support, including artillery.3  That the Pawnee did not receive any spoke to a federal 
disinterest in using the Pawnee as effective auxiliaries against the Sioux, who continued to 
receive weapons from the United States.4 
 Federal policy, either intentional or through neglect, that sought to transform the regional 
                                               
3 Daniel Miller to David D. Mitchell, December 24, 1843, LROIA: CBA, Roll 216. 
4 By 1840, the federal government was fueling Sioux expansion at the expense of the Pawnee, Otoe, Omaha, and 
others near Council Bluffs.  Sioux bands under Council Bluff Agency jurisdiction received guns as part of their 
annuities by the close of the 1830s.  The original document is unclear as to the amount of either $11.75 or $1,175, 
the latter seeming to be more likely.  Whether this was intentional policy or merely poor communication and 
planning among bureaucrats did not change the net result.  Joshua Pilcher, “Statement showing the amount to be 
invested in the several kinds of annuity goods required for the Indians on the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers for the 
year 1841,” December 14, 1840, LROIA: StLS, Roll 752. 
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geopolitical and spatial relationships by constricting the Pawnee worked.  The Pawnee were in 
the same strategic situation as those early garrisons at Fort Atkinson: surrounded, outnumbered, 
and thinking with a limited vision to defend the sacred and territorial core of Pawnee lands.  
Villages were more akin to American forts of the 1820s; isolated and defensive.  Federal 
counterparts and Sioux enemies became the mobile powers thinking and acting as expansionists.  
Here, Manifest Destiny was predicated on getting the Pawnee to think of their worlds as limited 
and circumscribed to their villages and environs.  American forts were no longer there to model 
ideal behavior and living as Fort Atkinson had.  Western forts transitioned to limited police 
stations and depots.  The Pawnee became the isolated, under-siege garrison society they had so 
easily dismissed at Fort Atkinson in the 1820s. 
 
5.1  The Platte Valley in Context 
 
Events outside the Platte Valley shaped the possibilities available for those within it to 
imagine their futures.  To the east, Florida distracted federal officials who pumped men, money, 
and attention into the Second Seminole War.  To the far south, the Texas war for independence 
and the increase in Comanche raids both against Mexico and within Texas began diverting 
significant amounts of federal attention not being used in Florida as the Mexican-Texas-
Comanche conflict evolved into the Mexican-American War by 1846.  To the immediate south, 
the consequences of Removal were ongoing with more and more peoples who also competed for 
Pawnee resources forced into present-day Kansas and Oklahoma.  Of the most immediate 
concern, however, the increased Sioux advances south into the Platte squeezed the Pawnee and 
their neighbors. 
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Federal attention was far from the Platte Valley after 1834 as the War Department 
struggled with the quagmire of the Second Seminole War.  It swallowed men, resources, and 
careers while threatening to rend the nation apart.5  Of immediate concern for the West was the 
perception of federal weakness.  News of the Seminole annihilation of Major Francis Dade’s 
company in 1835 precipitated a panic among officials along the Missouri who reported 
celebrations of the defeat.6  Problems continued to grow by 1837.  John Dougherty feared the 
repercussions in the Platte Valley among Native Americans and mixed-race people with access 
to news from Florida who: 
 
boastingly and with great exaggeration relate all they have picked up concerning Oseola, and his 
feats . . . fly from the Pottowattamies and Kickapoos to the Sacs, from the Sacs to the Ioways, 
from the Ioways, to the Otoes and Missourias, from them to the Pawnees and Omahaws, from the 
Omahaws to the Ponkaws and Sioux, by whom it is rolled on from tribe to tribe throughout our 




Boasts among some of the regional nations threatened to open a new front of a pan-Indian war.  
Dougherty recorded popular sentiments that “if they were compelled to take up arms against the 
whites it would be seen they were quite as good warriors as the Seminoles.”7   
With thousands of soldiers tied down in Florida and little money or manpower to spare, 
such concerns played into persistent federal fears of pan-Indian confederacies.  The situation 
made regional control a greater necessity and meant that all actions had to be done cheaply and 
without blowback such as an armed or invigorated regional Indian power.8  Ironically, such 
                                               
5 Scallett, "‘This Inglorious War’; Watson, Peacekeepers and Conquerors, 209-38. 
6 Richard Cummins and Matthew Duncan, “Proceedings of a Council Held at Ft. Leavenworth on the 13th June 1836 
with the Kickapoo, on instructions from Headquarters Right Wing Western Division (Atkinson),” LROIA: StLS, 
Roll 751. 
7 Dougherty to Clark, February 1, 1837, LROIA: UMA, Roll 884. 
8 From 1835 to 1842, 10,000 regulars and 30,000 militia volunteers cycled through Florida.  At any given time, the 
bulk of the U.S. Army was stationed in the region.  While only 55 volunteers and 328 regulars were killed in action, 
the drain on men and resources strained the Army nearly to the breaking point.  Watson, Peacekeepers and 
Conquerors, 202. 
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federal desperation and fear did not preclude the War Department asking Dougherty to recruit 
1,000 Native American volunteers for Florida.9  Armed Indians were useful, so long as they were 
very far from home. 
 A different foreign relations crisis garnered attention to the far south of the Platte.  
Beginning in the 1830s, the Comanche, Kiowa, and Navajo abandoned long-standing peace 
arrangements with Mexico and raided deep into Mexican territory.  These conflicts merged into 
the decade-long struggle between Texas and Mexico sparked by the Texas independence 
movement.  This situation further drained attention from what had been the priority for Removal 
efforts with the continued construction of a multi-ethnic space of forced migration in what is 
now Oklahoma.  An active war zone on the southern side of Indian Territory and the possibility 
by the 1840s of Texan admission to the United States meant the Platte was now a strategic 
backwater for federal interests shifting toward a future conflict with Mexico.10 
By 1836, the Pawnee joined a spectrum of Mississippi and Missouri valley nations 
feeling hemmed in from the south as the forced migration of new arrivals to Indian Territory 
competed for resources in Kansas and Nebraska.  Even more pressing, however, was the danger 
from the north as increased Sioux incursions posed the greatest threat to Platte Valley residents.  
In mid-June 1836, Missouri Sac chiefs complained to agents John Dougherty and Matthew 
Duncan at Fort Leavenworth about “the great fog of white people, which is rolling towards the 
setting sun,” and fears of being “devoured soul and body by the cut throat Sioux.”11 
                                               
9 Dougherty to Clark, September 4, 1837, LROIA: CBA, Roll 215.  Desperate for additional men accustomed to 
guerrilla tactics in Florida, Indian agents recruited amongst the tribes around Fort Leavenworth with the Delaware 
sending a party in the late-1830s.  McCoy to Joel Poinsett, July 1, 1839, LROIA: StLS, Roll 752 
10 Delay, War of A Thousand Deserts, xv, 212-27. 
11 Report of Council with Chiefs of the Missouri Sacs, June 12, 1836, LROIA: StLS, Roll 751. 
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Combined, these pressures constricted the Pawnee freedom of action.  Continued federal 
strategic neglect, missionary inroads, and increased Pawnee desperation served as holding 
actions for federal officials until they could pursue the full-throated expansion initiated with the 
dragoons and envisioned by Cass.  Pawnee leaders then faced the serious prospect of disunity 
over foreign policy in the face of an empowered Sioux expansion effort, lack of access to the 
weapons and supplies promised by negotiators in 1833, and little strategic power to bargain with 
as federal commercial and foreign policy interests shifted to Texas and New Mexico. 
 
5.2  Preserving the Pawnee Core 
 
By 1836, the Pawnee strategic outlook was constrained by the outside powers of the 
dragoons and Sioux, internal divisions over the role of missionaries and federal workers within 
Pawnee society, and the existential threats to both Pawnee villages and the cosmological 
underpinnings of identity and culture.  These factors forced an evolution of Pawnee strategic 
thinking from a policy of aggressive expansion into one of measured defense, albeit one aligned 
with core values of security and cultural identity.  Rather than capitulating to federal domination, 
the Pawnee pivoted to policies that worked within their understandings of geopolitics and 
cultural needs.  This pivot had the unintended consequence of being precisely what federal 
officials wanted: a curtailment of Pawnee power projection and ability to shape regional politics.  
To be clear, this was both a conscious policy on the part of federal officials and an accidental 
result of neglect and lack of direct control where chaotic infighting among missionaries and 
overburdened agents brought a beneficial chaos to disturb what had been a general Pawnee 
political and social cohesiveness. 
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Underlying the Pawnee strategic perspective were deep cultural understandings that 
informed their larger political world.  Pawnee cultural metaphors about the need to defend 
people and sacred space provided a framework to shift political priorities.  In doing so, the 
Pawnee maintained their core identity as they navigated external crises. 
Settlement, not nomadism, remained the norm of Pawnee life.  It had deep cultural roots 
as seen in part of the hako ceremony.  In relating its rationale for being a protector animal, the 
woodpecker explains in the story that “security is the only thing that can insure the continuation 
of life.  I can, therefore, claim with good reason the right to care for the human race.  I build my 
nest in the heart of the tall oak, where my eggs and young are safe . . . While I have fewer eggs, 
they hatch in security and the birds live until they die of old age.  It is my place to be a protector 
of the life of men.”12  Security of the people was paramount.  For a people who spent the 
previous century almost perpetually at war at all points of the compass, the metaphor of sturdy 
fortifications protecting a societal core mixed with the ability to fly out and project power linked 
cultural belief to a political agenda.  The more circumscribed abilities to range beyond the 
Pawnee core by the mid-1830s, however, did not alter this foundational belief in the priority of 
village or core territory security.   
Moreover, the ceremonial script argued that security was far more important than 
numerical success.  Though the turkey had more eggs and “wherever I go my young cover the 
ground,” the offspring were vulnerable and easily devoured.13  The metaphor offered both a 
reassurance that despite years of disease and war decimating the population, this was less 
important than maintaining the core beliefs.  So long as a strong, secure core remained, Pawnee 
                                               
12 Alice C. Fletcher, “The Hako: A Pawnee Ceremony,” Twenty-second Annual Report of the Bureau of American 
Ethnology to the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, 1900-1901 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1904), 173. 
13 Fletcher, “Hako,” 173. 
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losses did not detract from their central identity as Pawnee.  The land cessions of 1833 and the 
limitations on foreign expeditions placed on them by the dragoons and Sioux altered the 
expansionist policy of the previous fifty years.  What looked like geopolitical setbacks and the 
limitations of Pawnee power could easily be interpreted as a return to first principles of Pawnee 
society.  Rather than wasteful expansionism, strengthening defensive power marked a careful 
recalibration of priorities.  The situation was not yet an outright existential crisis. 
As Douglas Parks and Waldo Wedel outline in their discussion of the geography of 
Pawnee sacred places, the location of specific sites formed a sacred geographical system.  These 
were mythical meeting spots of animals and places where the temporal and celestial came 
together.  Pawnee belief in descent from the stars was linked to a physical geography of 
underground or underwater sites denoted by physical features like bluffs, springs, or islands. 
Here, animals met to confer power on selected individuals, the shamans and chiefs responsible 
for power bundles and maintaining the cosmological and temporal order.  The places were 
“rahurahwa:ruksti: 'u, “(being) holy ground.”14  Animals served as the temporal intercessors for 
the gods of the cosmos.  Each had the ability to confer powers to priests, but without a strict 
hierarchy or exclusive system.  All animals figured into this cosmology.  Their meeting places 
accrued significance for Pawnee rites and social order.  Such places were central to Pawnee 
religious and cultural life in ways unique among their neighbors.15 
The larger Pawnee confederation was reaffirmed through the four-pole ceremony where 
chiefs and priests responsible for sacred power bundles and maintaining celestial-temporal 
                                               
14 Parks and Wedel, “Pawnee Geography,” 143-5. 
15 James R. Murie, Ceremonies of the Pawnee, 2 vols., Smithsonian Contributions to Anthropology, no. 27 
(Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1981), 67-73, 205; Murie, Pawnee Indian Societies, 600-1; Parks 
and Wedel, “Pawnee Geography,” 144, 147, 152-4. For a detailed map of sites relative to early-nineteenth century 
Pawnee settlement, see “Pawnee Village Sites and Animal Lodges” from Parks and Wedel. 
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balance arranged themselves in conformity with geographic space.  As James Murie observed 
toward the end of the nineteenth century, “a circular embankment was thrown up with an 
opening to the east . . . the bundles . . . and their keepers had fixed positions according to their 
rank and the geographical relations of the respective villages.”  Political authority and social 
order derived from this point.  Chiefs responsible for power bundles appointed “one elderly 
warrior as his personal aid and advisor.  Only those who have reached a certain high grade of 
distinction can serve in this capacity . . . one brave for each village and he selects three men to 
act as police under his direction . . . These are strong and aggressive men.  Their function was 
purely that of village and camp police.”16  Political order derived from the relationship to the 
sacred places and martial identity. 
Protecting this geographical core and the well-spring of Pawnee identity thus became the 
political priority as expansionism was replaced by land cessions and Sioux attacks.  At least two 
sacred spots—Pa:hu:ru' (Hill That Points the Way) and Kicawi:caku (Spring on the Edge of a 
Bank), Waconda or Great Spirit Spring—were south of the Platte and already ceded by the 1833 
treaty.  That the Pawnee ceded these places suggests either the precariousness of the Pawnee in 
1832 and 1833, beset by enemies and disease and willing to trade space for time.  Or, perhaps 
more in keeping with Pawnee cosmology and politics, ceding the land did not cede access or 
rights to the spaces.  Speaking about access to buffalo, Petalesharoo of the Chaui told Barclay 
White, head of the Central Superintendency that “our fathers owned both the land and the 
animals feeding on it. We sold the land to the whites, but reserved the buffalo.”17  A similar logic 
applied to sacred spaces.  Given their status as mythical places visited in dream-states, the land 
cessions of 1833 may not have been as catastrophic a loss.  The Pawnee would still retain access, 
                                               
16 Murie, Pawnee Indian Societies, 552-4, 557. 
17 Quoted in White, Roots of Dependency, 201. 
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at least metaphysically.  These were also sites on the periphery of Pawnee lands.  The other sites 
identified by Parks and Wedel were in the heart of Pawnee settlements.  Any threat to those sites 
was a threat to the Pawnee core itself. 
 
5.3  A Confusion of Federal Strategies 
 
At the same time that the Pawnee struggled to reconcile their cosmology with changing 
circumstances, federal efforts to dictate policy to the Pawnee suffered from bureaucratic 
squabbles, reorganizations, and staff changes as officials resigned, died off, or were ousted.  A 
reorganization of gift and annuity payments made Army officers more responsible in the latter-
1830s.  This undercut the power of agents.  As Joshua Pilcher complained, it “degraded them in 
the estimation of those they are appointed to govern.”18  A larger military presence in contracting 
goods, accounting, and dispersal of funds, as well as opening bidding for annuity goods to 
Eastern companies meant further delays and mistakes as new officials stumbled to learn the 
nuances of trade, timelines, and the difficulties of travel.19  In trying to reorganize itself the War 
Department succeeded in both undermining its influence and confusing its agents in the field. 
Further confusion came from efforts to regulate trade under the Intercourse Act of 1834. 
Trade theoretically brought federal control and Native American dependence, a point not lost on 
top military and civilian officials looking at ways to reform federal operations and control Native 
Americans.  Major General Edmund P. Gaines suggested a more direct military-controlled 
system of trade in a strategic overview to Commissioner of Indian Affairs Carey A. Harris in 
                                               
18 Pilcher to Clark, December 26, 1837, LROIA: UMA, Roll 884. 
19 Ethan Allen Hitchcock to Crawford, August 27, 1838, LROIA: StLS, Roll 751; Hitchcock to Crawford, February 
8, 1839, LROIA: CBA, Roll 215. 
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1838.  With Florida on his mind, Gaines assumed a perpetual state of war with the Western 
Native American nations, such that if “officers can learn in peace touching the character, habits 
and country . . . the better shall we be prepared . . . to subdue them.”  The key to eventual 
military control was to give license to military officers and sutlers to engage in Indian trade.20   
Such a move threatened Harris’s department and encroached on civilian control, as well 
as the business of the many politically powerful trading companies.  Despite agreement on 
principles of military preparedness, Harris could not imagine “any measure, that will induce the 
frequent resort of Indians to military stations, or draw them from their own Country, where 
settled habits may have been, or may be formed,” or so he reported to Secretary of War Joel 
Poinsett.21  This bureaucratic turf war epitomized Washington’s problems of conflicting policy 
goals.  Officials who often agreed on ends differed so vastly on means that agents in the field 
struggled to know the exact course of action.  Such divisions of course benefitted the private 
traders ranging throughout the Missouri watershed.22 
 None of this wrangling fulfilled Pawnee needs or treaty obligations.  The United States 
still owed the Pawnee large amounts of goods, arms, and support for blacksmiths and farmers.  
Dougherty reported that the long-simmering conflict with the Sioux from the fall of 1835 
through the summer of 1836 cost at least 10 Sioux and 20 Pawnee lives to the point that the 
“Pawnees thus harassed are desirous (many of them) of moving their village up the Platte one 
hundred miles higher than their present location, whilst others wish to remain.  Thus divided, 
there is little probability of their making a location with the view to receiving the aid of the 
                                               
20 Gaines to Carey A. Harris, May 25, 1838, LROIA: StLS, Roll 751. 
21 Harris to Joel Poinsett, June 8, 1838, LROIA: StLS, Roll 751. 
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Government in farming, etc., etc., agreeably to treaty stipulation.”23  By 1840, the Pawnee were 
still receiving annuity payments per their treaty of 1833 with goods, two blacksmith 
establishments, $2000 worth of agricultural tools, $1000 for education, and four farmers at 
$2400 a year, but these goods suffered delays and only partially fulfilled the obligations. 
The numbers belied the realities on the ground.  Agent Joseph Hamilton noted that the 
Pawnee were insufficiently settled to fulfill any parts of the treaty other than annuity goods and 
the blacksmith shops, but that he would “break up a piece of land one season, 25 guns and 
ammunition to be given to farmers, in case Pawnees remain at home all the year.” 24  Such a 
material breach of the treaty, with the Pawnee continuing their cyclical hunting routine and 
spending considerable time away from their villages, meant that very little of the agreed to aid 
reached them nearly ten years after ceding lands south of the Platte. 
 Prevarications from federal officials about the status of Pawnee settlement fit into a 
preconceived narrative rather than appreciating the full realities of the situation.  Pawnee villages 
remained roughly in similar places between 1836 and 1840.  Pawnee hunting and farming cycles 
remained relatively stable.  The biggest change was the increase in violence between the Pawnee 
and their neighbors.  Feeling more squeezed than ever before, Pawnee warriors fought back and 
took what they could, threatening to reignite a regional war.  The Kansa captured and flogged a 
young Pawnee man in search of wild horses, sparking raids and counter raids that Dougherty 
warned would end in bloodshed before the end of the summer of 1836.  Pawnee leaders 
complained even more about Delaware encroachment on their hunting lands.25  Skirmishes with 
the Omaha resulted in seven dead Pawnee and two Omaha.  Dougherty reported that “they were 
                                               
23 Dougherty to Clark, June 8, 1836, LROIA: CBA, Roll 215. 
24 Joseph V. Hamilton, September 20, 1839, “Annual Estimate of Funds Required for the Current and Contingent 
expenses of the Council Bluffs Agency Upper Missouri for the Year 1840,” LROIA: CBA, Roll 215. 
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both to blame and with some difficulty I got them together and prevailed upon them to make 
peace again.”26   
Dougherty viewed this period as critical for the entire region.  “Unless the contemplated 
cordon of military posts be established in the course of 12 or 18 months,” he warned Washington 
directly, “our frontier from Red River to the Lakes will be one scene of bloodshed, far be it from 
me to give alarm when there is not occasion, but such is my opinion and I feel bound as an agent 
of the government to give it freely.”27  These small-scale conflicts revealed a subtle change in the 
Pawnee strategic situation.  It was not just distant enemies with whom they fought, but 
neighboring peoples on their immediate doorstep.  These groups were themselves being 
squeezed into greater conflict over smaller spaces by both whites and the Sioux. 
Some federal officials did not immediately grasp the changes occurring in the Pawnee 
world.  Dougherty reported that “the Sioux and the Pawnees are the two master tribes in the 
Upper Indian country, and it is they who govern nearly all the smaller ones; this and other 
reasons, why I think it good policy to invite them together; let them travel and see our large 
cities, and it will give them some idea of our strength.”28  Distracted with their own strategic 
problems in Florida and Texas, officials in Washington did not seem overly concerned with 
Dougherty’s plans or the regional dynamics. 
 
5.4  Seeking Alliances and Fortifying the Core 
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Perhaps realizing their predicament, Pawnee leaders looked toward the United States as a 
neutral arbiter to buy some time against the Sioux, or even as a potential ally.  Pawnee, Omaha, 
and Otoe leaders wanted to be included within a regional conference already planned for the 
Sioux, Sac, and Ioway.  Pawnee leaders pleaded with Dougherty that the Sioux and “themselves 
had been and are still daily killing and plundering each other, had never known what peace was, 
and that perhaps if they went together to see and talk to the President of the United States, a 
lasting peace might be effected; they really were very urgent in expressing their desire to see 
Washington.”29  The resultant visit in 1837 included sixteen Pawnee leaders, but they arrived too 
late to meet the Sioux.  Despite failing to address the most pressing Pawnee strategic need the 
trip still helped settle disputes with the Omaha.30  Conflicts continued to simmer, however, 
undermining the stability and settled perspective necessary to convince federal agents to release 
funds, provide weapons, and hire workers per the 1833 treaty obligations. 
By 1838, evidence appeared of rifts within Pawnee leadership over the appropriate course 
of action, or perhaps some hubris about being able to conduct business as usual without making 
any substantive changes in behavior.  After the chiefs returned on April 15, reports reached 
Dougherty that younger Pawnee warriors were again fighting nations to the west, likely the 
Cheyenne, as well as pushing into Mexican territory, “carrying on a war as usual,” in both 
directions.  This information suggests either that the chiefs had little control over their younger 
warriors or they did not think such actions mattered in relations with the United States.  Any 
peace overtures to the Sioux apparently had little effect as “the young men of the Sioux and 
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Pawnees have parties out against each other constantly stealing horses and occasionally a 
scalp.”31  It put Dougherty in a difficult position as a supposed diplomatic arbiter. 
Even hopes of a renewed peace with the Omaha evaporated, despite their mutual interest 
in fighting the Sioux.  Pawnee raids took 64 horses from the Omaha, three from the Otoe, and 
another four from nearby whites since Dougherty’s peace intervention less than a year earlier.32  
Such actions, while minor in themselves, reinforced a sense of powerlessness to make 
substantive changes in Pawnee behavior by federal officials.  Dougherty adopted a tone of 
exasperation and resignation in meetings with the chiefs.  He reminded them of the very recent 
promises made in Washington and asked the chiefs to “recollect them,” and that “I am your 
friend, but do not wish to be laughed at by you, or made ashamed of you.”  Threats to stop 
annuity payments eased tensions at least temporarily.33  While the patronizing tone fit into a 
narrative of a father scolding children, Dougherty’s concern for larger strategic goals and his 
own sense of personal embarrassment ran deep throughout the council.  Having spent more than 
double his allotted funds for the delegation to Washington, such a quick reversion to the status 
quo meant the funds were wasted.34 
Professional embarrassment aside, of greater concern was the rapidly deteriorating 
security situation along the Platte and Missouri by the summer of 1838.  It was a familiar 
situation through the 1820s and 1830s.  Constant skirmishes meant the possibility of larger 
conflicts and threatened to bring the whole region into a general war.  Smaller nations grew 
nervous about being caught up in the great power struggle of the Pawnee and Sioux.   
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Ottawa, Potawatomie, and Chippewa leaders highlighted three regional points of concern.  
First, a smallpox outbreak destabilized the regional nations through 1837 and 1838, increasing 
the chaotic and violent responses of people under pressure.  Second, the leaders suggested that 
without a strong federal military presence the region was about to erupt in inter-tribal warfare on 
a grand scale as a matter of defensive necessity.  Finally, they urgently requested a promised 
“military post; in order to keep peace among our neighbors and ourselves,” the leaders told Col. 
Stephen Watts Kearny of the dragoons.35  Kearny admitted to his superiors that he had no idea 
what treaty, let alone fort the leaders referenced.  He urgently requested relevant treaties and 
information be sent to all field commanders.36  It was yet another example of agents and officers 
in the field working at cross purposes with Washington.   
Two competing federal strategies took shape at this time: strict boundaries and sealed 
borders patrolled by cavalry, or direct engagement and control secured by forts within Indian 
Country.  Agent Joshua Pilcher confirmed the desperate need for a greater control over 
boundaries.  Denouncing the long-anticipated strategy of more forts linked by roving patrols as a 
“chimerical scheme,” Pilcher despaired of federal power over Indian Country.  Only the heavily 
patrolled, natural barrier of the Missouri River could offer the protection and racial separation he 
desired.  “I cannot believe there lives a man so credulous as to think it practicable to prevent an 
extensive and constant intercourse,” he warned, “unless it were by posting a chain of sentinels at 
hailing distance along the whole line of frontier from the Sabine to the shores of Lake Superior.”  
Pilcher suggested a series of specific actions.  First, seal the borders and keep a distinct 
boundary.  To show federal largesse and power he argued, deposit “a small quantity of corn and 
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a few goods and blankets, furnished at the expense of the government, and to be issued . . . when 
circumstances seem to require it,” so that “hundreds of Indians would be relieved from extreme 
hunger, protected against the chilling blast, and the government and all its officers charge with 
the management of Indians, will be looked up to with gratitude, as protectors and benefactors.” 37  
Second, leave the Indians to fend for themselves.  If they start a massive war amongst 
themselves, the U.S. frontier would be well away from it.  It was isolationism at the extreme and 
counter to prevailing attitudes, though it had the benefit of costing almost nothing.  One could 
see the logical conclusion that once the inter-tribal wars subsided, federal officials could exercise 
authority over the remaining people.  Dougherty disagreed, pushing Clark and his superiors for 
more forts, especially at the mouth of the Platte as the seat of a proposed Council Bluffs Agency 
and what was essentially a return to 1819 policy.38 
Social instability, low-level raiding, and pressure on borders only increased.  More 
incursions by unlicensed white traders and other intruders added yet one more element of 
contention.  Federal authority beyond Fort Leavenworth was scant at best.  Pilcher argued that 
orders from Harris and Clark to arrest a Sioux murderer or take hostages to ensure his arrest, 
were farcical as “it will require an emense military force.”39  By the summer of 1839, Dougherty 
warned Secretary of War Joel Poinsett that only a dramatic increase in federal power would 
suffice to quell the regional concerns.  An act of Congress was necessary to grant the secretary 
authority to better police and enforce the Intercourse Acts and forcibly remove intruders, but 
Dougherty placed greater hopes for a new fort situated someplace above Fort Leavenworth.  It 
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was a “point of importance,” that required Dougherty “to urge upon you the great necessity of 
the immediate establishment” of a new post.40  While such calls could be seen as hyperbole, 
Dougherty’s twenty-plus years of experience in the field and close relationships with the regional 
nations could not be discounted.  If he thought the situation was dire, he was probably correct.  
But it was a big ask.  Considering the Indian department disbursed between $300,000 and 
$400,000 a year in operating costs, not counting military expenses in the region, another fort was 
another fort too many two years into a crippling national financial crisis.41 
Dougherty did not stay to see his policy recommendations implemented.  He resigned his 
post in June 1839 after roughly twenty years in the field.  It followed the death of William Clark 
the previous September.  Their departures meant that nearly 60 years of collective diplomatic 
experience and interpersonal relationships disappeared.  It also meant the loss of two strong 
advocates for a regional peace between local and removed nations as Pilcher replaced Clark for a 
time as superintendent.42 
 While federal officials dithered about expanding a military presence and whether or not 
to become more deeply involved in the regional conflict between the Sioux and Pawnee, Pawnee 
leaders faced a mounting crisis.  Since the early-1830s, Sioux raiders appeared increasingly well-
armed.  A Teton (Ogallala or Brulé) Sioux attack on the Skidi village killed 19, as the Sioux 
“came well supplied with firearms” while the Pawnee had only seven guns in the whole village.43  
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It was a preview of the situation at the close of the decade.  Through the ensuing decade the 
attacks continued.  Between the fall of 1835 and June 1836, Sioux and Ponca attacks on the 
Pawnee villages killed 20 Pawnee and took 200 horses.44  Sioux attacks through 1838 meant it 
was unsafe for the missionaries to settle among the Pawnee.  John Dunbar’s annual report to his 
superiors at the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions in 1839 detailed 
continued Sioux harassment of the Pawnee villages.45  Until federal agents secured a peace 
between, both the missionaries’ property and lives were at risk.   
Estimates suggest that more than 500 warriors and civilians died in combat between 1835 
and 1845.  Sometimes entire war parties disappeared.46  Given the devastation wrought by poor 
hunts and subsequent food shortages, losses of hundreds of horses mainly to the Sioux, and the 
fact that Pawnee raiders often left on foot leaving themselves vulnerable to ambush by mounted 
enemies, the losses were not surprising.  Missionary Samuel Allis brushed off these concerns 
with a certainty born of religious zeal, naiveté, and a belief that the Sioux were always friendly 
towards the whites, so it did not matter.47 
Eager for assistance, Pawnee leaders seemed to at least tolerate missionaries if they did 
not fully welcome them.  Dunbar thought the tribe the friendliest one between the Missouri and 
the Rockies and “readily listen to the truths of the gospel.”  Returning from Washington, the 
Pawnee chiefs stopped at the temporary mission at Bellevue and reported their favorable 
impressions with American civilization, at least according to Dunbar’s understanding.  Their 
“passage on the railroad excited their admiration to the highest pitch.  They said the white man 
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does many things like Te-rah-wah,” suggesting a conflation of whites with the gods of the 
Pawnee cosmology.48   
A very different interpretation of this scene occurs when one removes the patronizing 
missionary lens.  It becomes one in which the Pawnee leadership, having failed to meet and 
make a peace with the Sioux in Washington, faced continuing a protracted war.  They saw 
American technology as desperately needed.  Missionaries were useful, but peripheral figures to 
fulfill what federal agents had not: a means of effective communal defense for a people in crisis.  
While speaking with Dunbar, the Pawnee leaders suggested they were finally willing to 
acquiesce to the demands of the 1833 treaty and “become fixed at some place.”  Why they 
evinced this shift had perhaps less to do with their visit to the United States and more with the 
devastating problems facing them at home.  The spring 1838 hunt went poorly.  Their blacksmith 
was fired, depriving them of needed weapon and tool-making or repairs.  They lost many horses 
over the 1837-8 winter.  Missionaries might be the avenue to pursue the long-sought military 
alliance with the United States, acquire the promised weapons, or even serve as unwitting human 
shields in the villages.49 
The year 1838 appeared to a be a turning point in Pawnee strategic thinking as two major 
setbacks further complicated the situation.  Sioux forces burned the Chaui village while the 
people were out on their spring hunt.  Lodges could be rebuilt, but people could not be replaced.  
During the winter, Skidi hunting parties fell upon a party of Sioux, killed some, and took about 
20 women and children captives.  It was a pyrrhic victory as the captives soon succumbed to 
smallpox.  The disease quickly spread to their captors, aided by malnutrition from unsuccessful 
hunting.  From there the other Pawnee villages became infected with the disease that killed many 
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of the children who had not been exposed during the previous epidemic.  One count suggested 
2,500 Pawnee died in all.  The toll from the disease, combined with the warfare and malnutrition 
from continuously unsuccessful hunts, meant the overall Pawnee population declined 
precipitously.  An actual census listed 6,244 members less than two years after the epidemic.  
From a population that numbered well over 10,000 less than a decade earlier, this was a 
devastating decline.50   
Among the casualties was the beloved son and presumptive heir of the primary chief of 
the Chaui.  In a mix of grief and concern about the loss of his power as a spiritual mediator who 
could not save his own children, the chief led a party south.  Its intent was initially unclear. 
Dunbar suggested it was a raiding party aimed at the Comanche or Kiowa, but it may have been 
to join them on raids further south into Texas or Mexico.  Such a raid would have solidified the 
chief’s perhaps now tenuous status as a leader.  Reports upon the party’s return suggested it was 
a diplomatic mission to the Comanche and Wichita.51  The diplomatic move signaled a need to 
secure allies on the Pawnee south, perhaps as a counter to the new arrivals from the East 
encroaching on traditional Pawnee hunting grounds.  Given previous Pawnee-Comanche 
alliances and joint raids into Mexico, both scenarios are quite possibly true.  It demonstrated a 
certain amount of political desperation as the inherent risks of each policy could have further 
isolated the Pawnee and cost lives they could ill-afford to lose if unsuccessful. 
The moment revealed a deep split within broader Pawnee leadership and the different 
bands of the nation.  The Chaui looked toward extending alliances to other nations and American 
missionaries while reinforcing political leadership.  The Skidi reached toward a revitalization of 
tradition and a return to the Morning Star sacrificial ritual.  As the Skidi victory introduced the 
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smallpox epidemic and became linked with the unsuccessful hunt, they needed a reversal of 
fortune.  It came at a terrible price for one of their captives.  Dunbar blamed the “deeprooted 
ferocious superstition” of the Skidi, in typical disgust at the behavior without a more careful 
analysis of what it represented.  He merely provided gruesome details and refused to add 
commentary except that “the dark corners of the earth are full of the habitations of cruelty.”  
Though invited to the ceremony, leaders of the other bands refused to witness it.52   
This radical approach of renewing the sacred bonds of Pawnee cosmology fit within a 
larger pattern of Native Americans looking toward restoration movements at times of political 
and social upheaval that fractured otherwise unified groups.53  It was the Skidi who only several 
years earlier had promised to give up a Cheyenne captive to federal officials, only to then kill her 
before she could leave the village.  Despite promising to cease further sacrifices, the extreme 
stressors of epidemic and starvation suggest a renewed focus on tradition rather than 
accommodation, a protection of core identity and place rather than the outreach of those more 
closely aligned with federal officials. 
The difficulties of 1838 pushed the Chaui, Pitahawirata, and Kitkahahki closer to the 
federal orbit.  While visiting the agency and mission at Bellevue in the fall, Pawnee leaders held 
serious talks with both federal agents and missionaries to guarantee fulfilment of treaty 
obligations in preparation for consolidating their villages and settling permanently.  This was a 
major concession point and suggests just how desperate their situation was.  Chaui chief Us-a-ru-
ra-kue-el pushed for either the government or missionaries to begin the settlement, implying that 
at least some buildings be erected after which his people would move in.  It was a delicate 
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balance of pushing federal agents for real progress without fully committing themselves or 
alienating allies who could be helpful.  Fifty-two plows and harness delivered in 1838 as well as 
new blacksmiths and farmers provided some reassurance of federal good faith.  Dunbar reported 
his missionary station was still at Bellevue, too far from the actual Pawnee villages to be of any 
use, yet he remained hopeful.  From the Pawnee viewpoint he was useful as an intermediary to 
convince federal agents.54 
Returning in the spring, Pawnee leaders repeated their requests.  While “alleging they 
were ready to comply” with the stipulations, the answer from the agents was delay and 
obfuscation with promises to submit the request in writing to higher officials in Washington.55  
Pawnee actions suggest that this was only one aspect of their policy to bring in federal 
assistance.  Movements through 1839 were ones of consolidation as the Kitkahahki moved closer 
to the Chaui.  Their leadership urged Dunbar to move to the villages.  “They wish to have their 
smiths, farmers, and teachers to be with them as soon as may be,” though Dunbar perhaps did not 
see this as a strategic hedge against Sioux attack.  Additional whites would be convenient human 
shields.  Overall Dunbar was hopeful that “unless government shall in some way interfere, we 
now have some confidence with reference to the improvement of the Pawnees.  We have seen 
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enough to know that what government does for the improvement of the Indians may be done in 
such a way as effectually to prevent their improvement.”56 
Pawnee efforts to direct government policy remained strong in the face of delay.  
Dougherty’s replacement as agent, Joseph Hamilton, seemed far less interested in managing the 
Pawnee.  He delegated Dunbar and Allis to scout for new village sites, hire farmers, and act as 
teachers—even though Allis was barely literate—effectively outsourcing government work to 
contractors.  They in turn deferred to the Pawnee.57  Capote Bleu of the Kitkahahki wished 
Hamilton “would tell the president that he loved his land very much,” and was loathe to leave his 
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new village south of the Platte.  Despite this, consolidation remained the prevailing sentiment.  
Dunbar reported that “the eyes of all those who were for removing at all were directed to the 
country on the north side of the Loup Fork . . . This may be said to be a place of their own 
selection.”58  It was also more strategically defensible. 
Dunbar’s map shows the Pawnee villages all within an easy ride of each other.  While the 
Skidi and Pitahawirata moved first to the Loup fork of the Platte, the Chaui and Kitkahahki 
contemplated joining them.  Once accomplished, the villages would be no more than 20 miles 
apart at the farthest point, consolidated, and easily united for defense if given proper warning. “If 
the treaty stipulations are fulfilled,” Dunbar urged Hamilton, “I have little doubt all the Pawnees 
will be on the ground in one year from this time,” thus fulfilling a key policy goal of permanent 
settlement and consolidation away from the ceded lands south of the Platte.59  Though hands-off, 
Hamilton wanted to accomplish what his predecessors had failed to do: settle the Pawnee.  To 
that end he anticipated that the missionaries would begin assisting the farming and teaching 
operations by the spring of 1840, provided the Pawnee followed through with the intended 
move.60 
Central to this Pawnee movement was the fear of Sioux attack.  It drove policy 
considerations.  Pawnee leaders urgently pressed Dunbar for aid in addressing the issue.  “I hope 
you will not fail to recommend an effort on the part of our government to conciliate the Sioux 
and Pawnees,” he wrote agent Hamilton.  Yet despite this urgency and Hamilton’s willingness to 
fulfill treaty obligations, the agent still withheld the most needed material: weapons.  By the fall 
of 1839, only an assistant blacksmith served the Pawnee, though Hamilton informed superiors 
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that he would “break up a piece of land one season,” and have ready “25 guns and ammunition to 
be given to farmers, in case Pawnees remain at home all the year.”61   
Despite promises made in the field, Washington officials seemed determined to scuttle 
any understandings.  Commissioner of Indian Affairs Thomas Crawford stuck to a strict 
interpretation of the treaty: no farmers and no aid until the Pawnee were settled for a whole year.  
It was an unreasonable stance, given the realities on the ground.  Reverend David Greene, 
heading the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions and Dunbar’s superior, 
asked incredulously how could the Pawnee “at once, settle down, become agriculturalists, and 
without utensils, or cattle, or seed procure the means of subsistence from the soil?  Would they 
not almost inevitably starve?”  Crawford was wasting the moment.  The Pawnee “appear very 
desirous to locate themselves and have the treaty stipulations carried into effect the ensuing 
spring, that they may try the new proposed manner of life; and fears are entertained that, if 
disappointed now, it may be long before they will be in so favorable a state of mind again,” 
Greene argued.62  Crawford’s inaction squandered the best chance to implement the stated 
federal policy since at least 1833 to bring the Pawnee into a limited, settled territory directly 
under the control of either federal or missionary officials.  Strong, federally-aligned Pawnee 
leaders were ready to guide the process.  Whatever his rationale about the treaty stipulations, 
Crawford’s intransigence divided Pawnee political unity and undermined those seeking better 
federal relations. 
This continuation of broken promises further split Pawnee leadership between those 
seeking accommodation and those looking to remain more strictly independent.  Though the 
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record is unclear, it was probably the latter who continued raiding into Mexican territory in the 
spring of 1840, seeking to recoup some of the losses of horses and wealth of the previous years.  
Hamilton reported a party returned with seven captives whom he ransomed and sent to St. 
Louis.63  Even with limited resources, the Pawnee could still project force beyond their borders, 
complicating federal relationships with Texas and Mexico. 
This was a rarer occurrence than ever before.  Lack of weapons blunted the effectiveness 
of any Pawnee expeditions and meant they could not defend themselves from their closest 
neighbors who were in similarly difficult positions.  The Omaha and Otoe-Missouri habitually 
raided Pawnee crops and food stores when the latter went hunting.  Otoe raiders took or 
destroyed most of the 1839 corn crop leaving the Pawnee “entirely destitute of provisions,” and 
as Dunbar warned “their subsistence for this life is very precarious.”64   
Even in rare moments of cooperation such as a joint hunting expedition with the Otoe-
Missouria, Pawnee power was routinely curtailed by the lack of weapons.  The former, armed 
with rifles, convinced their Chaui companions to hide from a rushing bison herd while they 
killed enough meat for both.  When out of bowshot, the combined Otoe-Missouria force “fired 
upon them killing six of them on the spot . . . the seventh escaped though badly wounded,” and 
brought news back to the main village.  Rather than immediately initiating a war, nine Pawnee 
leaders went to the agency to demand federal officials mediate a restitution.  Pleading poverty, 
the Otoe and Missouri authorized a payment of two horses and $300 worth of goods, including 
50 pounds of gunpowder and 100 pounds of lead, to secure peace.65  That the Pawnee accepted 
this rather paltry amount for six dead warriors suggests the difficulties they themselves faced.  
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Something, especially military supplies, was better than nothing, or worse another open war that 
none could afford.  For a nation that less than ten years earlier could fight three or four major 
enemies at once, this unwillingness to avenge their people or risk the displeasure of their hoped-
for American allies highlighted a dramatic reversal of fortune. 
Pawnee leaders continued espousing a desire to relocate and consolidate through 1840.  
By the fall they had yet to move north en masse to the Loup fork.  They waited for the promised 
assistance and the preparation of farmland by government agents.  The idea of moving, Samuel 
Allis reported, held “a good deal of feeling and interest by the Pawnee, but . . . it is my candid 
opinion they never will [move] until our government, or Missionaries first go among them and 
build; and we need not expect any thing further from the government until we break the ice.”66  
He had reason to doubt federal interest.   
Pawnee leaders repeatedly appealed for a decision on settlement and aid at their October 
annuity council.  They spent considerable time discussing locations over the summer and wanted 
the matter settled.  Hamilton “studiously . . . avoided allusion to the subject.”  Department 
instructions again urged delay and obfuscation as Crawford preferred to hand-off the matter to 
the next presidential administration the following spring.67  Unless the new administration acted 
promptly upon taking office the planting season would be pass before arrangements could be 
made, effectively ensuring that any new farmland or government assistance would arrive too late 
to be utilized in 1841.  Such inaction fed a now familiar circular pattern of self-fulfilling 
criticism of the Pawnee for not fulfilling the treaty conditions and refusal to provide the means 
by which they could comply. 
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By 1841, Dunbar and Allis viewed the situation as proof of government negligence.  
They moved to establish the Pawnee mission near the proposed consolidated village sites in the 
hopes that their initiative would push the Pawnee still south of the Loup to relocate.   Dunbar and 
Allis reached their site 30 miles above the Loup junction with the Platte [near present-day 
Fullerton, NE] on May 17 and commenced operations.68  Pawnee leaders visited, found the site 
agreeable, and suggested they would move their villages that following year.  No doubt this 
decision was spurred by the loss of another Skidi war party of 50 men to the Cheyenne in the 
spring of 1841.  Daniel Miller replaced Hamilton around the same time.  Miller appeared to be 
more engaged and energetic, though not in positive ways for the Pawnee, whom he treated with 
contempt.69   He encouraged the movements and supported Dunbar and Allis’s recommendations 
for employees, but continued the more hands-off federal approach, preferring to let the 
missionaries do the primary work.70 
The combination of pressure and example worked.  Dunbar reported that by May 1842, 
nearly 300 Pawnee representing all four bands relocated to the mission site.  The Chaui, 
Pitahawirata, and Kitkahahki planned a unified village about a mile away, the Skidi only four 
miles.  Many of the principal Pawnee leaders including the first chief of the Chaui, the principal 
chief of the Kitkahahki, third and fourth chiefs of the Pitahawirata, and two Skidi leaders were 
among the early arrivals.  The principal Pitahawirata chief wanted to come but was too ill.71   
Miller was pleased with the success.  Judging the treaty conditions fulfilled, he appointed 
two farmers, a blacksmith and striker, ordered the second smith to remove from Bellevue to the 
                                               
68 Dunbar to Greene, July 31, 1841, PML, 279-80. 
69 Miller at times withheld supplying farmers per the 1833 treaty because he did not want the Pawnee to feel entitled 
to servants or consider themselves to be above white government employees. Riding In, “Keepers of Tirawahut’s 
Covenant,” 153-61. 
70 Allis to Greene, September 1, 1841, PML, 284; Dunbar to Greene, April 26, 1842, PML, 301-3; Allis to Greene, 
May 13, 1842, PML, 305. 
71 Dunbar to Greene, April 26, 1842, PML, 302. 
 286 
new village, and hired Allis as the promised teacher.72  Nearly a decade after the treaty, David D. 
Mitchell, who replaced Pilcher as Superintendent of Indian Affairs in St. Louis, relayed the news 
to Washington.  He recommended that, as “the Pawnees . . . evince every disposition to comply 
in their parts with the terms of their treaty; it will therefore be incumbent on the Dept. as early as 
practicable to take measures for the erection of the mills promised for in the treaty of 1833, and 
also, to place the necessary arms in the hands of the farmers for their protection.”73  Finally, the 
Pawnee thought they would get what they needed: resident blacksmiths and farmers; a teacher; 
and perhaps most importantly, a consolidated, defensible population center with arms and 
resident whites who might shield them from attack. 
It was not enough.  No guns were delivered in 1843.  Almost immediately the 
missionaries and government workers split along theological lines as well as over how to behave 
toward the Pawnee.  Financial concerns, accusations, and political snipping meant that the 
missionary station was never the cohesive force federal or missionary board officials wanted.  
Investigations, letter-writing smear campaigns, and general ill-disciplined behavior diminished 
any claims to authority emanating from the mission or agency as Miller became embroiled in the 
factionalism.74 
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While distracting and potentially explosive for any hope of good relations with the 
Pawnee as a whole, the missionary infighting did not matter as much to the Pawnee themselves.  
Principal Kitkahahki chief Ter-er-it-tit-a-kush looked past the problems to see the benefits of 
selective use of white technology and cultural norms, even suggesting that those who rested on 
Sundays were more productive later as “our labors are continued from day to day – it is hard – 
we drag out life – not enjoy it.”75  His comment contained volumes, suggesting the continued 
struggles of his people to recover from the two epidemics, military setbacks, bad hunts, and 
failed crops.  It also betrayed a sadness and weariness of the struggle, especially given what he 
saw during his trip to Washington in 1838, and the need to bring that temporal and sacred power 
into the Pawnee orbit.  Squabbles among the missionaries did not solve the bigger strategic 
concerns.  What mattered was the Sioux threat and the ability to mount a defense against them.  
For that, the Pawnee needed the security of their farms, their villages, and above all guns.  None 
of which happened. 
 
5.5  Sioux in the Village 
 
Despite their concerns and constrained circumstances, the Pawnee seemed to get a respite 
in 1842.  The village relocation appeared to be underway with minimal problems.  No major 
conflicts immediately threatened the Pawnee.  While 1842 passed relatively calmly, providing 
federally-aligned chiefs with proof their policies worked, it gave a false hope for future success.  
Allis reported that three Pawnee war parties left the villages in March 1843 to raid horses, from 
which 80 or 90 warriors died.  A Sioux raid on the Skidi village several months later killed four, 
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wounded some, and took 100 badly needed horses.76  These defeats merely built into a larger 
story of loss and deepening crisis through the remainder of the decade.  Raids along the Santa Fe 
Trail, had been a traditional source of revenue for a generation, but became increasingly costly as 
U.S. troops openly fought Pawnee and Comanche raiders.   
For decades, the Sioux—not the United States—had been the principal strategic concern 
and the principal military antagonist facing the Pawnee.  In the 1840s, the Sioux perceived the 
collapsing Pawnee circumstances.  They saw the military opportunity they had long been 
seeking, and they did not have any reservations about taking it.  Sioux attacks on the Pawnee 
villages themselves signified a loss of control over their core space and a dramatic reversal of the 
Pawnee strategic position from less than fifteen years before. 
By mid-June 1843, a general panic set in among the Chaui, Pitahawirata, and Kitkahahki 
mission village.  Dunbar’s station was less than a mile from the village, “in plain view” of it, as 
he reported, suggesting just how much the Pawnee were relying on their white American guests 
to provide cover.  Signs of a large party of mounted warriors appeared in several places near the 
village.  Horse trails through the grass, moccasins, feathers, and other evidence of scouting 
parties pointed toward an imminent Sioux attack.  With at most only 1,000 warriors between the 
entire Pawnee nation scattered at the different villages, or out hunting and raiding, ranging 
outside the villages was not an option.  Whereas in 1835, several hundred Pawnee could mount 
an expedition to Cheyenne territory, they could not, nor dared not risk moving too far beyond the 
protection of their village in 1843.  Without enough horses, men, and guns to mount a serious 
scouting party or counter-attack, the village waited apprehensively for what they seemed to know 
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was coming.  On the morning of June 27, that threat manifested as 400-500 Sioux warriors that 
later reports labeled as Dakota and possibly Yankton, but the precise Sioux bands are unclear.77 
Sioux forces launched a coordinated attack just after dawn.  A small party killed a lone 
Pawnee man tending horses.  The seven Sioux then fled, drawing out a small group of mounted 
Pawnee in pursuit.  They immediately encountered a large detachment of Sioux who killed three 
Pawnee.  Allis, viewing the scene a day later recalled the bodies “literally filled with arrows, and 
a gun barrel thrust into the body of one by two feet.”78  The Pawnee fell back to their village, 
harried the entire way.  Accounts suggest that Sioux forces planned a three-pronged assault from 
concealed positions along the streams surrounding the village and separating it from the mission, 
blacksmiths, and farmers.  The village was completely surprised and nearly surrounded.  
Villagers had little time to mount a defense against such a large body that Allis reported 
stretched a mile when arrayed in battle line.79   
Such a massive attack directed at a village rather than smaller, isolated parties on the 
prairie was unusual for the typical style of regional warfare and suggests that the Sioux were 
both emboldened enough to think they could win, well-armed enough to carry the fight to the 
heart of the Pawnee, and that their enemies were weak enough to offer minimal resistance.  After 
years of seeing Pawnee performance in the field and taking captives, perhaps the Sioux realized 
their long-time enemies were no longer the regional power they had been only a decade earlier. 
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It was also unusual for how long the fight lasted and how bloody it became.  The Sioux 
were all mounted and well-armed with guns.  Dunbar watched from a short distance away and 
reported “the greatest confusion” in the village as the Sioux forces rode right into its heart, 
killing a number of women and children.80  Using their lodges as makeshift forts, Pawnee 
fighters took the high ground and fought back against several concerted charges.  Sioux forces 
rotated their troops.  Multiple detachments made attacks while others rested or stole horses.  The 
attackers set a number of lodges on fire and drove civilians out into the open where many fell as 
they fled to more secure places.  Allis watched the “truly distressing” scene before him, as he 
and the other whites “saw the dead, burning lodges also the confusion, heard the shrieks and 
cries of the women and children.”81   
The battle raged for more than five hours.  It was hand to hand combat at its worst.  
Dunbar’s wife Esther recalled “both parties would be indiscriminately mingled, pell-mell in the 
work of death, and filling the air with the most fiendish yells and shrieks.”82  The principal 
Kitkahahki chief Capote-Bleu led the desperate defense standing his ground with a lance and 
tomahawk in the face of repeated Sioux charges.  Dragoon Lieutenant James Carleton praised the 
chief’s “gallantry” and “spirited resistance,” after interviewing witnesses.  Carleton had known 
the chief for several years and had exchanged gifts.  The officer eulogized the bravery of a fellow 
warrior who fell after taking a dozen bullet wounds.  Acknowledging that “had he lived with us 
and fought as he fought there, and have fallen, his name would have been immortal.”83  It was 
perhaps easy to romanticize the trope of a noble, Indian warrior, but having seen the ruins and 
interviewed survivors, it seems that Carleton was truly and deeply moved.  With half the village 
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on fire, terrified civilians sheltered in the remaining structures, and enemies determined to stay 
and fight, this was a desperate struggle for the survival of the Pawnee nation.  That it was in the 
heart of the village rather than some distant prairie battlefield merely emphasized the dire stakes. 
Despite Capote-Bleu’s leadership, the Sioux burned 20 of the 41 lodges, stole more than 
200 of the increasingly scarce Pawnee herd, killed 68, and wounded 26.84  Reinforcements from 
the Chaui village about 10 hard miles away helped drive off the Sioux, but were too tired to 
pursue.  The Skidi, though only four miles away refused to engage, claiming they wanted to 
defend their own village should a second attack come.85  Except for a brief pursuit of the Sioux 
rear from which they recovered a few horses, the Skidi gave further proof of the deep divisions 
within Pawnee society by refusing aid.  The attack so “fritened away” the survivors that they 
departed early for the hunt, “and left some of their corn onhoed,” reported Allis who visited the 
“desolate place” the following day and helped bury the dead.86  Dunbar recorded that “some of 
the best and bravest men of the tribe lost their lives,” including Capote-Bleu, who “was a firm 
friend of the whites, and one desirous of improving himself and his people.”87  Allis confirmed 
that those killed “were those that had fulfilled the treaty by moveing, consequently they are in a 
bad situation, from the fact that those that are opposed to moveing make use of every thing like 
the present calamity to induce others not to move.”88  Moreover, interpreter Louis LaChappelle, 
a federal employee for almost a decade and Capote-Bleu’s son-in-law, died in the attack as well 
as the Pawnee wife of blacksmith Michael Seedlow.  Despite efforts to safeguard his wife in the 
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blacksmith shop, Sioux warriors killed her in front of Seedlow who was subsequently whipped 
by the attackers.  Property losses totaled more than $10,000.89 
This was national news.  The St. Louis Era picked up the story on July 13, and by July 
29, Niles’ National Register republished the limited account based on Seedlow’s letter to a friend 
in St. Louis detailing his wife’s murder.  The Sioux attack was expected for some time, stated the 
Era, as “these Indians have exhibited hostile feelings on several occasions.”  Most importantly, 
the United States was treaty-bound to defend the Pawnee.  This was now a matter of national 
honor and law.  Yet “we are surprised that some efforts have not been made to prevent these 
murders,” the paper wrote, pointing to the abject failure of the federal government.  “If the 
Indians are not entitled to protection,” they mused, “certainly those in the employ of the 
government may claim it.”90   
The paper foreshadowed the next several decades of Pawnee, Sioux, and federal 
relations: a shift from a tripartite regional power to one of Pawnee weakness, federal ascendency, 
and increased or continued federal hostility toward the Sioux.  Direct confrontation of Sioux 
aggression and assertion of federal supremacy was the only logical response for the press.  Had 
the idea not occurred to officials before, this would have been the ideal time to seek more formal 
alliances with the Pawnee, arm them, and use them as auxiliaries against the rising power of the 
Sioux.  As usual, little changed in federal policy. 
The Sioux attack of 1843 tore apart the heart of Pawnee society when they most needed 
unity.  The result could only be described as apocalyptic.  Returning survivors constantly 
searched for new signs of attack while scavenging the remains of the village.  Dazed and 
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disoriented “in their sad condition,” lamented Dunbar, “they seemed to be more than usually 
inclined to plunder themselves, each appropriating to his use whatever came his way, instead of 
restoring it to its rightful owner however needy he might be.”91  For a people whose reputation 
was for social cohesion, strong leadership, and control of deleterious things like alcohol and 
debt, such behavior showed the trauma of the attack and its ability to unmake Pawnee society.   
Warnings passed from Miller and Dunbar that the Sioux intended “to exterminate them,” 
further unnerved the Pawnee, though thankfully no other Sioux attack manifested that summer.  
But in the fall, an attack by an unknown party suspected to be Sioux, Cheyenne, or Arapahoe hit 
the Skidi near their hunting camp on the Platte, about 160 miles west of the mission.  Losing 
seven people as well as most of their goods and food placed them in a desperate situation, though 
they killed enough bison to survive the winter, barely.92  Miller advised their consolidation to 
two new mutually supportable villages, a point they eagerly accepted.  Some moved that fall and 
the rest following in the spring of 1844.  Importantly, each village was built for defense.  
Government farmers and smiths assisted in building a sod fence around each village, effectively 
turning them into forts whose earthen lodges and walls offered a modicum of protection.93  
While not impregnable, nor as heavily armed, this fortification was designed to be a serious 
deterrent to future attack.   
Survival was the primary concern.  Defense of a core Pawnee territory meant defending 
the homes of their families rather than far-ranging hunting grounds or sacred places.  What 
geographic boundaries they fought to protect through the treaty of 1833 now meant little 
compared to an existential struggle for the survival of the Pawnee people.   The reversion to 
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purely defensive settlement was a profound statement about the fortunes of a people who had 
fielded some of the best light cavalry forces in North America capable of ranging from the 
Dakotas to Mexico.   
The Pawnee consolidation fulfilled the federal goal of small, easily monitored, and 
controllable villages.  It did not provide much else of benefit to the Pawnee themselves.  Colonel 
Stephen Kearny of the dragoons requested a two-month expedition to show the flag and bring 
some measure of regional stability, but the plan, “not being deemed necessary by the Secretary 
of war and Commanding General, to be sufficient at this time,” went nowhere.  Yet Washington 
officials expected him “to do all in his power, to reconcile the difficulties now existing between 
the two tribes mentioned and the Sioux.”94  This was difficult with the regiment confined to Fort 
Leavenworth. 
The attack did finally move Indian department officials into action, or at least the 
discussion of action.  Specifically this meant furnishing the long-promised arms to the Pawnee.  
Miller reminded Mitchell of the commitment to supply 100 guns and ammunition and that swift 
action was necessary.  He expected a “furious attack” by the Sioux in May or June 1844, which 
necessitated more alacrity than the government had previously shown.  Miller pleaded that if 
supplying guns was all that could be done, “it may save them from a ruinous defeat.”  Failure to 
do so would be a violation of federal promises and duty.  Pawnee blood would be on American 
hands.  He warned that “the Pawnees will say, if our Great Father had done as he promised, by 
giving us the guns and ammunition we would been able to have protected our wives and children 
from slaughter; and our property from waste and plunder, by Defeating our Enemies.”95   
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For Miller, the implementation of federal guardianship over the Pawnee would 
demonstrate that “we are the enlightened and strong,” and “are endeavoring to win over from 
heathenism, the ignorant and weak.”  It was a national duty.  “We have much to reflect upon, to 
be able to do our Duty,” he pleaded with Mitchell, “as to acquit ourselves before our fellow man, 
and to feel conscious, of not having neglected a command of Almighty God.”  This was not a 
half-hearted inquiry, but a determined call to fulfill national obligations, regain some honor for 
failing to prevent or avenge the attack, and perhaps assuage a guilty conscience for previous 
inaction.  Even should “the Pawnees meeting with a Defeat, with those guns and ammunition in 
their hands; and the entire property falling in the hands of their Enemies, if such should be the 
result, we have only done our duty,” he concluded.96  Miller delivered fifty available guns, but 
needed more.97 
Pawnee leaders needed more.  Their strategy was to turn their villages into American-
style forts with earthworks to stop cavalry, strong defensible earth lodges should attackers enter 
the village, and both small arms and cannon.  They pleaded with Miller not just for more guns, 
but bigger ones.  Repeatedly, the Pawnee spoke “of the propriety of having big guns at their 
villages, with a view of frightening the Enemy out of their country.”  Artillery, not just rifles, 
would be the decisive factor.  Miller argued that with the new fortified villages, “the most 
effectual way of deterring the Sioux, and preventing them from making attacks in future upon the 
Pawnee villages,” was to supply several pieces of field artillery, “and that, an occational report of 
these guns when the enemy was in hearing, would so intimidate them, as ever after to consider 
the Pawnee villages so fortified . . . as to forbid attack.”  Such an overwhelming show of force 
would change the nature of regional warfare.  Miller reported that those “well acquainted with 
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the Indian warfare – and of their timidity when chances appear to be even equal,” could attest to 
the value of artillery.98   
Thomas Harvey, who replaced Mitchell as the St. Louis Superintendent, forwarded the 
requests with his endorsement for immediately providing the promised rifles as “they seem to be 
absolutely necessary for the protection of both farmers and Indians.”  Such measures were as 
much about protecting the missionaries and government employees as the Pawnee, but the end 
result would still be the same.  Artillery was another matter, though.  Larger guns would make 
the Pawnee more independent.  Instead, “I should also be gratified if the wish of the agent could 
be complied with, by furnishing a small swivel for each of the Pawnee villages,” he suggested to 
Crawford.99  Swivel guns were close combat weapons.  Their effectiveness as large shotguns 
firing grapeshot at close range made them a good last-ditch defense.  Their relatively portable 
size made transport easier, but they were not the impressive, army stopping, long-range weapons 
the Pawnee desired.  Only one per village was more for show than combat.  A gun crew would 
have to be constantly on the move to each critical point, especially if the Sioux repeated their 
multi-pronged attack strategy.  But, either because of specific policy determinations or from 
apathy among top officials there is no evidence the swivel guns were ever supplied.  Perhaps this 
was swayed by reports that “the whites that are at the Pawnee villages do not expect that, the 
Sioux will molest them [the whites] as is manifest from the fact, of their remaining there.”100  
Pawnee lives were expendable, white Americans were not. 
 That the Pawnee wanted field artillery shows their strategic conceptions of warfare and 
military power had already changed.  By digging in, the Pawnee ceded the remainder of their 
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territory to the Sioux and their western enemies, the Cheyenne and Arapahoe.  It was in many 
ways a fulfillment of the woodpecker and turkey dialogue from the hako ceremony: security of 
the people was paramount.  Territory, sacred or not, was expendable. 
All the concern among federal officials over the Sioux-Pawnee conflict was apparently 
merely for show, however.  By only partially fulfilling the need for guns, the United States 
shirked its treaty provisions.  Moreover, it did not do anything to make an effective peace 
between the two groups or provide for the military defense of the Pawnee per treaty obligations.  
Inquiries about securing some sort of peace failed.  Agent Andrew Drips serving among the 
Sioux found it “utterly impossible to keep the Sioux from going to war against the Pawnees, a 
few days before I left Fort John a war party of the former returned from one of the villages of the 
latter bringing with them ten scalps, principally of women which they found some distance from 
the villages digging roots.”101  After spending the winter of 1844-5 along the North Fork of the 
Platte with the Sioux and Cheyenne he despaired of making any changes.  Crawford agreed, 
annotating the report that, “I do not see that anything more can be done in regard to the hostilities 
between parties of the Sioux and Pawnees – Col. Kearny will do all that can be done in the 
contemplated dragoon excursion,” effectively passing off the problem and the consequences.102   
Within 18 months, federal officials went from very concerned to completely indifferent 
about the state of affairs.  Worse, the 1845 annuity for the Yankton Sioux, who had probably 
participated in the 1843 attack or would at least be trading with Sioux bands that had, included 
proposals for furnishing more than 1000 lbs. of gunpowder, one ton of bullets, and more than 
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100 guns.  In 1846, the request was for 1200 lbs. of powder and 3,000 lbs. of lead.103  Either 
federal officials did not realize what they were doing, did not care, or were undertaking a 
conscious effort to destroy the Pawnee.  Regardless of intention, the effect was the same.  One 
side of a war of extermination was being heavily armed.  The other side was prevented from 
properly defending itself despite assurances of support and friendship. 
 If the underlying indifference was racially motivated, in that concern for the safety of the 
white Americans was the only concern of the department, federal officials made a grave error.  
By June 1846, Sioux raiders, perhaps emboldened by the lack of punishment and weakness of 
the Pawnee, returned.  Pawnee parents feared for their children’s safety and left some with the 
government employees.  They had begged Dunbar for years to accept some into his care, though 
he “uniformly declined,” as the “care and anxiety on their account being very great, besides the 
additional exposure of my own family and effects to savage violence.”104  So much for his 
supposed Christian values.   
The Pawnee left for their hunt on June 12 and two days later a Sioux party raided the 
village, burning some structures.  They then approached the government workers who were 
hiding some of the Pawnee children, threatened them, and tried to force their way into the 
buildings.  Several Sioux shot at, but missed Samuel Allis and another white man.  Three days 
later, a second larger party of Sioux came by, forcing all the whites to shelter at the government 
buildings.  Hostile words, some horse thefts, and pot shots taken at Samuel Allis disabused the 
missionaries of any pretense of Sioux friendship.  The threat convinced both the government 
workers and missionaries to abandon the post as soon as possible.  By June 30, Dunbar was at 
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Bellevue, more than 100 miles away.105  Sub agent R. B. Mitchell reported the Sioux left the 
Pawnee village “reduced to ashes.  The Blacksmith and others employed their by the government 
believe if they overtake the Pawnees they will exterminate them.”  Thanks to the bravery of the 
government employees, 30 Pawnee children fled safely to Bellevue.106 
 The mission was abandoned, the government station abandoned, one Pawnee village at 
least partially burned, and the Sioux emboldened.  It did not matter to federal officials.  On April 
26, 1846, Mexican cavalry attacked U.S. troops under Zachary Taylor who had entered the 
disputed territory between the new American state of Texas and Mexico.  President Polk got his 
long-desired excuse for war.  The Platte Valley was now a backwater of a backwater in federal 
strategic concerns.  While Kearny’s forces did pass through on their expedition to New Mexico, 
making peace between the Sioux and Pawnee, or punishing the Sioux was not the priority.  
Pawnee villages could be easily bypassed by emigrants to Oregon or dragoon patrols ranging to 
the Rocky Mountains.   
 Beyond the Pawnee core, the situation was no better.  In the fall of 1847, a group of about 
60 Pawnee returning from a raid to the south stopped near the small post of Fort Mann along the 
Santa Fe Trail.  Captain William Pelzer ordered his men to bring the Pawnee inside, and about 
30 came to accept the promised gifts and food, leaving their weapons outside.  When they tried 
to leave, Pelzer ordered them arrested, and the troops fired on those who resisted.  At least two 
Pawnee died immediately, perhaps two dozen were wounded, of whom maybe 10 succumbed to 
their wounds.  Reports suggest that some soldiers actually turned their weapons on their 
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106 R. B. Mitchell to Harvey, June 28, 1846, LROIA: CBA, Roll 216.  Mitchell reported the missionaries hid the 
children under their floor, but Dunbar’s own admission and report contradicts this claim. 
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comrades to prevent a worse massacre.  Pawnee leaders demanded compensation.  None arrived.  
Apparently the only disciplinary action was Captain Pelzer’s removal from the region.107 
 That such a massacre did not cause an immediate war with the United States revealed the 
tenuousness of the Pawnee strategic situation.  They could ill-afford to fight the Army, nor could 
they further alienate a government upon whom they were still desperately hoping to supply 
weapons and an alliance against the Sioux.  Pawnee leaders could not deliver what they needed 
for defense.  Nor could they carry out the basic governing function of protecting their people 
from attack or avenging their deaths afterwards.  The Pawnee villages were isolated, island 
settlements in an American prairie controlled by a continental power. 
While not inevitable, the almost total collapse of Pawnee military and political power by 
1846 was dramatic for its rapidity.  By 1859, Indian Agent William Dennison counted only 820 
men and 1,505 women in the nation, a mere fraction of the more than 10,000 little more than a 
generation earlier.108  The Pawnee did everything right from their strategic point of view.  They 
maintained a territorial and agricultural core as well as a largely cohesive social and political 
structure that prevented many of the ill-effects brought by traders such as alcohol.  They directed 
federal policy and shaped the contours of the West and the formation of Indian Territory through 
military power.  They traded space for time and resources, bargaining that good relations with 
the federal government would supply them the necessary equipment and assistance to maintain 
                                               
107 Miller to Harvey, March 20, 1848 LROIA: CBA, Roll 217; Riding In, “Keepers of Tirawahut’s Covenant,” 144-
5.  Pelzer is sometimes misspelled Pilzer or Peltzer.  Pelzer was part of the Missouri volunteer battalion stationed 
along the Santa Fe Trail and the U.S. Army supply routes for New Mexico, sometimes labeled as Indian Battalion 
Missouri Volunteers, Battalion of Missouri Volunteers for the plains; Gilpin's Battalion Missouri Mounted 
Volunteers; Oregon Battalion; and Separate Battalion of Missouri Volunteers.  Fort Mann was little more than a 
supply depot with one cannon and some small arms, a stockade, some barracks, and storehouses.  The troops were 
ill-equipped, ill-trained, and suffered from dissension between Anglo-American and German ethnic groups within 
the unit.  The incident was national news and reports from St. Louis were reprinted in Niles’ National Register, 
January 1, 1848, 275. 
108 William Dennison to A. M. Robinson, July 16, 1859, quoted in White, Roots of Dependency, 207. 
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their political independence and military power.  The United States squandered an opportunity to 
turn the Pawnee into close allies and use their military power as a police force for the Great 
Plains, helping interdict alcohol and traders, offering a counterbalance to Sioux expansions, or 
using them as a wedge to isolate and fight the Comanche, Cheyenne, and Arapahoe.  It required a 
vision of relations no federal officials were willing or able to comprehend.   
From their position as the main Native American power between the Sioux and the 
Comanche in 1830 to their fall to a minor client nation within the U.S. orbit by 1850 revealed not 
just a series of misfortunes—two smallpox epidemics and several bad hunts and crop yields—but 
a concerted federal policy of neglect and incompetence.  Luckily for federal officials, the Pawnee 
political decline ultimately promoted United States sovereignty over the Platte Valley nearly five 
decades after its titular acquisition.   
The Pawnee did not disappear.  They did not die off.  This political fall in some limited 
and deeply tragic ways made the Pawnee nation stronger.  Territorial consolidation forced the 
four bands together.  Population losses forced them into even greater unity for cultural and social 
survival.  They suffered greatly, but they retained a core sense of political, social, and cultural 
identity.  Pawnee strategy shifted to survival and recalibration of what it meant to remain 
Pawnee.  In the ensuing decades, this increasingly meant alliance with the United States, service 
with the U.S. Army against the Sioux, Cheyenne, and others in the wars of the latter-nineteenth 
century, and ultimately, the Pawnee choice to relocate to Indian Territory in Oklahoma to 






 Making Nebraska was a process of state-building outside of the typically understood 
processes of European imperial collapse, federal territorial expansion, and narratives of Native 
American dispossession.  Between 1819 and 1849, the region was deeply influenced by events 
like Indian Removal and U.S. expansion toward Texas, but within its own history of Native 
American conflicts and alliances as a strong Native American power pushed back against federal 
ambitions.  Uncertainty, diplomatic scrambling, and the general failures of people to fully control 
their space marked a place central to North American history, yet marginal to historiographies of 
United States Indian policy, continental expansion, and Native American political histories.  
After 1849, Nebraska fits into a framework of settler colonialism that tried to erase the history 
and the people from the broader historical consciousness.  But the Pawnee did not disappear, nor 
did the United States become the unquestioned master of Nebraska, Kansas, and Oklahoma. 
The history of federal and Pawnee interactions from 1819-1849 is one of spatial 
transformation.  For federal officials, the land transitioned from an unknown, far away space to a 
known, bounded place.  For the Pawnee, it was a dislocation of the familiar place and the search 
for new identity and rootedness in an unfamiliar political landscape.  Forts, agencies, and 
territorial boundaries remade spaces into administrative places just as they helped dislocate fixed 
places into contested space for those who lived there.  In just over a generation this process 
remade the greater Platte Valley as both groups looked to find a sense of rootedness, of a need 
for something familiar to claim as central to identity in the midst of unfamiliar places and 
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cultural disruption.  For the United States, this was a continuation, modified, of the process of 
military expansion and political incorporation of the East.  For the Pawnee, this was a 
recalibration of what it meant to be Pawnee and a retrenchment of deep cultural norms of 
gendered power and social identity. 
The story of their interactions from 1819-1849 is about the unintended consequences of 
foreign policy between multiple regional powers that included, but was not limited to, the United 
States and the Pawnee.  What choices each made about alliances, warfare, accommodation, 
resistance, and political-cultural identity mattered, but they were also subject to the vagaries of 
bad luck, the decisions of others, and the problem of geography.  Sometimes living in the wrong 
place between the wrong people matters more than making calculated strategic choices.  The 
initial years of prolonged contact between 1818 and 1830 saw two regional powers vying for 
local supremacy, and the U.S. learning hard lessons about the limits of their power on the Great 
Plains.  Little more than a generation later federal officials were the presumptive masters of a 
continent and thinking about territorial management on a scale seemingly impossible during the 
tumultuous 1820s.  After 1844, the United States and Pawnee took radically divergent paths.  
The Pawnee, who at one time had raided into Mexico, or who were able to fight the Sioux, 
Cheyenne, and Arapahoe simultaneously, could no longer defend their own villages from attack.  
They ceased to exist as a regional power.  Meanwhile, the United States moved beyond its 
original limited power of infantry in fixed fortifications trying to secure a border along the edge 
of the Great Plains.  Federal troops and officials entered a transcontinental space with the 
capabilities to manage it, control the Native American polities within it, and the incorporate the 
land into a national framework. 
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After 1849, the options available for the Pawnee-federal relationship became constricted 
by the loss of Pawnee mobile power and the political incorporation of Nebraska within a larger 
military-administrative state.  As the United States adapted to managing a continental empire, 
Nebraska’s incorporation within the traditional territorial system meant increased settler 
colonialism and the imperative to contain and nullify Pawnee independence.  Federal officials 
could not imagine any other alternative than domination of the people and land. 
The end of this story, however, is not about the disappearance of the Pawnee.  Nor is it 
about a simple narrative of triumphant conquest by the United States of a region it heretofore 
could not control.  This dissertation ends at a particular moment when the stakes of the regional 
political struggle changed for the two main claimants to the Platte Valley.   
For the Pawnee, this meant a shift in thinking about what was essential for political and 
cultural survival and how to accomplish those goals.  In practice this meant even closer relations 
to the federal government for an alliance and protection, culminating in the decision to relocate 
the nation to Indian Territory in the 1870s to preserve the people.   
For the United States, this moment marked a shift in domestic politics from the struggles 
of regionalism, primarily the tensions between East and West, to the struggles of sectionalism 
and the conflict between North and South.  The United States won the contest for the Platte, but 
it lost the war for national development.  Territorial expansion forced the sectional divide over 
slavery into open, violent conflict nearly as soon as the region was incorporated as the federal 
territories of Kansas and Nebraska.    
The story of Nebraska shifted from the bilateral diplomatic relationship of regional 
military powers, to one focused on the domestic concerns of national survival and identity for 
both the Pawnee and United States. 
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 Some federal officials recognized the divergence of national fortunes almost immediately 
in the wake of the Sioux attacks of the mid-1840s.  By 1848, it was readily apparent.  Agent G. 
C. Matlock’s interactions with the Yankton and other Sioux bands near the Upper Missouri 
Agency highlighted the changed relationship.  In council with Sioux leaders, Matlock reminded 
them “that they must cease killing [the Pawnee] unless they did there Grand Father was 
determined to punish them,” and “dwelt in length upon the impropriety of war – upon any terms 
with there neighbours.”1  The Sioux bristled at the instructions and “question[ed] the right of 
their Grand Father interfereing in their domestic feuds and pety wars with other tribes,” Matlock 
reported.  He lamented that “unless something is don to put an end to existing hostilities with the 
Sioux and the Otoes, Omehaws, and Pawnees, the latter tribes will soon become extinct.”2  The 
Pawnee were in a war for national survival and losing, badly. 
Matlock’s analysis revealed several key points.  The Pawnee, rather being the dominant 
power as a series of previous federal officials warned, were helpless victims.  Federal officials 
viewed them as wards worthy of compassion and protection rather than a competing geopolitical 
force.  Matlock felt confident enough in federal ability to project military force against the Sioux 
of the Upper Missouri that he could threaten retaliation.  To that end, he and Superintendent 
Thomas Harvey started work to prevent arms reaching the Upper Missouri, as guns were of 
“very little use for any other purpose than that of war – they use arrows in killing buffalo.”  
While his predecessors felt so isolated from reinforcement as to be powerless, Matlock’s 
confidence showed a changed attitude about federal notions of control, their ability to project 
                                               
1 G. C. Matlock to Harvey, June 16, 1848, LROIA: UMA, Roll 884.  Matlock previously met with sixty Pawnee 
leaders in April, all of whom were eager to have the United States broker a peace between the two groups.  Such a 
united eagerness for a third-party intervention suggests the precarious situation in which the Pawnee found 
themselves by 1848.  Matlock to Harvey, April 22, 1848, LROIA: UMA, Roll 884. 
2 Matlock to Harvey, June 16, 1848, LROIA: UMA, Roll 884.  Matlock also reported that Sioux war parties took at 
least 22 Pawnee and 28 Otoe scalps the previous fall, and several war parties were out currently hunting the Pawnee, 
Otoe, and Omaha in the spring of 1848. 
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power, and their responsibilities as guardians of domestic dependent nations.  Unlike similar 
claims from agents like Benjamin O’Fallon in 1819, Matlock’s claims could be reinforced by the 
Army, now with more than a decade of experience projecting force across the plains.  Rather 
than thinking about a defensive frontier line, Matlock suggested a broad expansion of federal 
power in keeping with larger departmental changes including a self-sufficient fort in the heart of 
Sioux territory 120 miles from Council Bluffs.  It was a full-throated returned to Calhoun’s 
ambitious expansionist policies.3 
Federal plans to secure the Oregon Trail necessitated new forts along the route, including 
Fort Childs, soon renamed Fort Kearny, just across the Platte from present-day Kearney, 
Nebraska in 1848.  Importantly, Fort Kearny was about 90 miles further west up the Platte from 
the mission and village abandoned in 1846.  It signified the permanent change in federal thinking 
about the Pawnee.  Agent Miller complained that being on the south bank, it was “protection in 
name only” from Sioux raids.4  Being to the west of the main Pawnee villages it also suggested 
federal self-assuredness about the limitations of Pawnee power and that the post was not too 
isolated.  Unlike Fort Atkinson’s sprawling town-like complex of buildings described by the 
duke of Württemberg, Fort Kearny was according to traveler James Wilkins, “a Miserable 
looking place . . . being built primarily of sods,” with only a couple frame houses a full year after 
construction began.5  It was hardly a military stronghold meant to impress or awe the locals.  It 
did not have to be.  Rather than an imposing monument of federal authority and American 
cultural norms, Fort Kearny was just a waystation and depot.6 
                                               
3 Matlock to Harvey, June 16, 1848, LROIA: UMA, Roll 884. 
4 Miller to Harvey, September 10, 1847, LROIA: CBA, Roll 217. 
5 James F. Wilkins, An Artist on the Overland Trail: The 1849 Diary and Sketches of James F. Wilkins, ed. John 
Francis McDermott (San Marion, CA: Huntington Library, 1968), 39. 
6 The fort was approximately at the 1/6th point of the Oregon Trail, and offered a place to rest and refit before Fort 
Laramie, at least 30 days travel further west.  Richard E. Jensen, “Introduction,” to William Tappan, “William 
Tappan’s Diary, 1848,” eds. Ellen F. Tappan and Richard E. Jensen, Nebraska History, 82, no. 3, (2001): 90-121, 
 307 
Fort Kearny’s construction matched an increased interest in the far West with the shift of 
Indian affairs from the War Department into the newly forming Interior Department and the 
expansion of agencies westward.  D. D. Mitchell, again superintendent in St. Louis in 1849, was 
“struck with the several changes” over the previous five years.  In a massive report on the state 
of the St. Louis Superintendency, Mitchell looked much farther west for his long-term strategic 
thinking, urging councils and treaties to “include the hostile tribes of New Mexico,” among 
others near the Rockies.  “The ultimate destiny of the prairie tribes looks gloomy in the 
extreme,” he wrote, which would lead to even further violence as nations fought over scarce 
resources, suggesting the importance of a rapid increase of federal military power in the region.  
Mitchell wrote of the nations of the far West as “wandering tribes,” with an “abundance of 
horses and being as much at home in one part of the prairie as another,” in the same language his 
predecessors reserved for the Pawnee thirty years earlier.7  Four new agencies—Upper Platte, 
Salt Lake, Santa Fe, and Sacramento—in addition to a general reorganization meant that 
Mitchell requested $487,045 for operations of 13 agencies, sub agencies, and the main 
superintendent’s office in St. Louis for 1850.  Of this the Pawnee only accounted for $3,440 or 
about .007%, suggesting how little interest they garnered relative to the West writ large.8 
Pawnee leaders for their part saw this shift.  They still straddled the principal route to 
Oregon and California, but their limited ability to extract concessions revealed their relative 
weakness.  The Pawnee could not even protect themselves within their former core territory.  
Seven men died fighting during the journey to the incomplete Fort Kearny to negotiate a treaty 
                                               
citations refer to pdf copy from < http://nebraskastudies.org/1800-1849/forts-built/fort-kearny/> (11 July 2019), 1-
45; 4. 
7 Mitchell to Orlando Brown, October 13, 1849, LROIA: StLS, Roll 755. 
8 Mitchell to Brown, October 1, 1849, LROIA: StLS, Roll 755. 
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and land cession on August 6, 1848.9  It showed confidence for the Army to present the fort as a 
fait accompli and dictate the treaty ceding a swath of bottomland and bluffs stretching 
approximately 60 miles along the Platte embracing all of Grand Island (roughly between present-
day Grand Island and Kearney, NE).  The cession secured a heavily wooded military reserve for 
the fort’s construction and maintenance and a large area for settlers to rest after having traveled 
about 1/6 of the Oregon trail, all for the paltry sum of $2,000 in goods.  Supposedly, this 
included 150 guns, 500 lbs. of lead, 200 lbs. of powder, 500 flints, and 150 knives.10   
It was an instant arsenal, but too late to reverse Pawnee military desperation.  They still 
needed more and bigger guns.  Sharitarish of the Chaui repeated the long-running demand for 
artillery, “the big guns they talked so much about,” in exchange for stolen government mules.  
Perhaps remarkably, the Skidi whom missionary John Dunbar once considered the most resistant 
to change, pushed the hardest to conform to federal requests for resettlement north of the Platte 
and avoiding antagonizing federal officials.  Their stance suggested dramatically altered 
circumstances from a decade earlier.11  Weapons were the paramount concern for the Pawnee 
who still hoped to develop their fortification and defensive capabilities. 
Beyond the immediate need for defense, the Pawnee requests revealed a larger political 
culture debate within their society over how to preserve themselves as Pawnee.  On paper, the 
chiefs fully ceded their sovereignty, agreeing to “renew their assurances of friendship . . . their 
                                               
9 William Tappan, a civilian artist accompanying the Missouri Mounted Volunteers attached to the party building 
Fort Kearny kept the best record of the early days of the fort.  He recorded the construction party reached the site on 
June 2. Tappan, “Diary,” 13, 29.  Tappan records the treaty meeting as August 8, but the official record in Statutes at 
Large records August 6. 
10 Tappan, “Diary,” 30; Miller to Harvey, June 17, 1848, LROIA: CBA, Roll 217. 
11 Tappan, “Diary,” 30.  Ish-ka-op-pa, or He Who Has Killed Many, called out Pawnee leaders who had stolen 
mules, harassed travelers, and refused to resettle north of the Platte, “Do you not feel ashamed when he tells you that 
it is all yours now? If you do not you should. You know that you have not done as he [the US agent] has told you. 
Try now to do differently though I dare say that before the sun goes down in the west you will have done something 
wrong you will have stolen something, for so it has always been.” 
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fidelity to the United States,” and to refer all disputes “to such arbitration as the President of the 
United States may direct.”12  Political sovereignty was questionable, so preserving a cultural 
identity for the leadership took the form of remaining masculine, martial warriors.  While 
soldiers at Fort Atkinson in the 1820s obsessed about their status as men, Pawnee and other local 
Native Americans remained confident in their status.  Now, the Pawnee were under threat of 
losing their status as warriors and being incapable of fighting their enemies or protecting their 
people.  Their internal social and political cohesion was tenuous at best.  An alarm that the 
Pawnee threatened an attack on a military detachment and perhaps a wagon train on August 13, 
1849 sent Fort Kearny into action.  Immediately 350 men and two guns went out to destroy the 
Pawnee village.  The initial panic resulted from misinterpreted signs about a domestic political 
dispute over patriarchal status, law, and chiefly authority that divided the nation.13 
                                               
12 Treaty with the Pawnee – Grand, Loups, Republicans, Etc., 1848, Charles Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and 
Treaties: Vol. 2: Treaties (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904) 2:571-2. 
13 Chiefs warned the military escort to not stop in the Pawnee village for fear young men might rob them.  The 
troops misinterpreted the warning as threatening an attack on them and a nearby wagon train, sparking a panic at the 
fort.  The turmoil resulted from a year-long conflict between the bands arising from a domestic fight between a 
young chief Capan Bleu who in a fight with his wife, the daughter of Sharitarish, killed her.  Law dictated 
Sharitarish take his revenge.  Reports conflict with either Sharitarish severely wounding Capan Bleu, who then 
committed suicide, which was rare and frowned upon, or the elder chief succeeding in killing his son-in-law.  The 
conflict divided the Pawnee leadership. Tappan, “Diary,” 30-1; Daily Missouri Republican, September 7, 1847; 
Albert Watkins, ed. Notes on the Early History of the Nebraska Country (Lincoln, NE: Publications of the Nebraska 
State Historical Society, 1922), 180-3. 
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The locus of regional power was now far beyond the boundaries of Pawnee territory.  
With President Franklin Pierce’s signature on May 30, 1854, the Kansas-Nebraska Act 
effectively legislated away Pawnee independence.  Expansive boundaries of the new Nebraska 
Territory completely surrounded core Pawnee lands.  It was decided with little concern for the 
peoples living there.  The assumption, at least strategically, was that they did not matter as 
independent political actors, merely as remnants to be mopped up by land cessions, territorial 
government, militias, and if necessary federal troops should the rest fail. 
 The act forbade anything to “impair the rights of person or property now pertaining the 
Indians,” and precluded any lands not yet ceded as within the jurisdictional bounds of the new 
government “without the consent of said tribe, to be included within the territorial line.”  But it 
anticipated Native Americans wanting to be incorporated as they would be once “said tribe shall 
signify their assent to the President of the United States to be included within the said Territory 
Image 13: Detail of Morse and Gaston, “Kansas and Nebraska, 1856.” Image courtesy of Library of Congress: Geography and 
Maps Division. 
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of Nebraska.”14  The Pawnee remained distinct, but their options for independent action were 
constrained by law and by reality on the ground.  By 1856, two dozen counties were already laid 
out in Nebraska.  The Omaha were already confined to a reservation in northeast Nebraska.  
Pawnee territory was bounded by U.S. forts on the south (Fort Kearny) and west (Fort Laramie), 
both guarding the principal route to the Pacific and hemming in Pawnee movement toward their 
traditional areas of raiding, including the Santa Fe and Oregon Trails.  Sioux forces to the north 
and west added an additional buffer.  The Pawnee now lived within a contained space.  Federal 
claims to the landscape were no longer imaginary.  Mopping up Pawnee power, forcing 
assimilation, and reducing them to dependents on a limited reservation could now follow along a 
similar trajectory that so many other nations had experienced.15 
With territorial government, the United States finally brought the region into the federal 
political system.  No longer a distinct region, it was merely one more place within federal space, 
subject to the laws, regulations, and policies of a robust military-administrative state.  Disputes 
over the boundaries of ceded lands in 1855 and 1856 resulted in two small conflicts between the 
territorial government acting on behalf of encroaching settlers and the Pawnee.  They were 
familiar in a longer history of settler colonialism and dispossession of Native Americans.  The 
former assumed far more land was available, the latter considered white settlers to be squatters.16   
Treaty negotiations to settle these claims began in September 1857, resulting in the near 
total dispossession of the Pawnee from their lands.  In exchange for removing to a 15 by 30-mile 
reservation near the villages north of the Loup River and relinquishing approximately 10 million 
                                               
14 An Act to Organize the Territories of Nebraska and Kansas, 1854; Record Group 11; General Records of the 
United States Government; National Archives. 
15 For a detailed examination of Pawnee-federal relations in territorial Nebraska, see James Riding In, “Keepers of 
Tirawahut’s Covenant,” 230-75. 
16 James Riding In, “Keepers of Tirawahut’s Convent,” 233-5. 
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acres of land, the nation was supposed to receive $40,000 for five years, and $30,000 per annum 
afterwards, half of which would be in trade goods.  For a nation that had claims to parts of 
Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Colorado, and the ability to fight even further afield at their 
height, this was a near erasure of their spatial claims.  Two manual labor schools would be 
established, tools, farmers, laborers, and a steam-mill for lumber and grain represented similar 
demands from the 1833 treaty for technical aid.  But the tone had changed.  Gone were 
requirements for military assistance.  Now, “The United States agree to protect the Pawnees in 
the possession of the new homes,” just as “the Pawnees acknowledge their dependence on the 
Government of the United States.”17  It was the language of capitulation in the hopes of alliance 
and protection.  Read differently, the United States extorted submission through the vague 
promise of protection against external enemies.  There was no enforcement mechanism to hold 
the U.S. accountable for its promise. 
                                               
17 Kappler, ed. Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, 2:764-7.  The treaty was signed on September 24, 1857, and 
ratified on May 26, 1858. 11 Stats. 729. 
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Remaining warriors was the 
way to maintain a core Pawnee 
identity and perhaps mitigate the 
growing internal divisions and loss 
of external political control.  It was a 
strong desire that matched an 
increasing federal need for scouts, 
auxiliaries, and combat troops to 
counter Sioux and Cheyenne threats 
to U.S. interests beginning in the 
1850s.  The approach to enlisting 
Native Americans, first as scouts or 
auxiliaries and later unfulfilled plans 
to incorporate full companies with 
each regular regiment was, Robert 
Wooster writes, “formulated in the 
same manner as the government’s overall Indian affairs were – as a haphazard, inconclusive 
response to the distinctive conditions of the western frontier.”  Yet, beginning in the 1850s and in 
earnest as manpower needs of the Civil War and increased conflicts of the 1860s and 1870s 
demanded, large numbers of Crow, Navajo, and Pawnee joined the Army.  They first appeared as 
irregulars and later as organized units such as the Pawnee Battalion that authorized 100 recruits 
under Luther and Frank North for the Powder River campaign of 1865.18  Their service over 
                                               
18 Robert Wooster, The Military and United States Indian Policy, 1865-1903 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1988, reprinted Bison Books, 1995. Citations refer to Bison edition), 34-5, 112.  George Bird Grinnell, Two Great 
Image 14: Pawnee Scouts. “Portrait of Coo-Towy-Goots-Oo-Ter-A-Oos 
(Blue Hawk), standing, and Tuc-Ca-Rix-Te-Ta-Ru-Pe-Row (Coming Around 
With The Herd), sitting, Both in Partial Native and Military Dress, One 
Holding Rifle 1868.” Both were Pitahawirata Pawnee. Photograph by 
William Henry Jackson. National Anthropological Archives, Smithsonian 
Institution, BAE GN 01308A2/Broken Negative File 06253200 
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twenty years through several campaigns and nine major battles put them at the center of the 
much mythologized struggle between the U.S. Army and Native Americans on the Great 
Plains.19   
By continuing the wars started by their fathers, grandfathers, and older generations, 
Pawnee men could claim their status as warriors, put their enemies on the defensive, and secure 
the core of the Pawnee nation.  Posing for a photograph in 1868, Coo-Towy-Goots-Oo-Ter-A-
Oos (Blue Hawk) and Tuc-Ca-Rix-Te-Ta-Ru-Pe-Row (Coming Around With The Herd) showed 
their multiple identities as warriors and scouts with traditionally decorated pants, brass tack-
embellished Army uniform jackets, and blankets draped across their shoulders.  Coo-Towy-
Goots-Oo-Ter-A-Oos carries a Springfield rifle, perhaps it was a prop, but it was certainly 
symbolic of their status as members of a federally-backed combat unit.  Their faces appear 
defiant as they stare straight at the camera.  As their nation fought for its survival, these scouts 
embodied a continuity of the foundational identity of Pawnee martial masculinity. 
Within this history was a shift in the sacred.  While the land remained important, the 
sense of space and place shifted from the land to the people.  Removal to Indian Territory, 
following the massacre of a Pawnee hunting party in 1873, was again about preserving the 
people as a foundation of identity.  Drought and grasshoppers destroyed the crops, while white 
settlers surrounded the now isolated Pawnee reservation.  The first group of emigres fled to 
Indian Territory in 1874.  Land was a fixed thing, a place within the larger space of Pawnee 
culture and cosmology.  Without the people, the land was meaningless.  The people were the link 
                                               
Scouts and their Pawnee Battalion: The Experiences of Frank J, North and Luther H. North, Pioneers in the Great 
West, 1856-1882, and their Defense of the Building of the Union Pacific Railroad (Arthur H. Clark, 1928, reprinted: 
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1973).  The definitive study of Pawnee service with the U.S. Army during 
the period is van de Logt, War Party in Blue, 42-57 on origins of the Pawnee Battalion. 
19 Van de Logt, War Party in Blue, 8-9; R. Eli Paul, ed., The Nebraska Indian Wars Reader, 1865-1877 (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1998), 71. 
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between the sacred and temporal who gave space meaning.  Removal was about remaining 
Pawnee, a vital, voluntary action of preservation, even though ultimately tragic and done under 
duress.20  Doing so preserved a core identity. 
Pawnee masculinity was tied to the battlefield.  While recruiting for the 1876 campaign 
against the Cheyenne, Luther North encountered a deep-rooted desire to fight even among those 
who were too sick or elderly.  One old man tried repeatedly to join the scouts.  He begged to 
fight and crawled onto the train.  North “finally strapped him across the back.  The old man said, 
‘You have shamed me.’  North replied, “No you have shamed me.  Here you are an old man and 
I have to strike you, an old man, so you will know you cannot go.’ . . . so many wanted to go 
because life was hard on the reservation, they were hungry, and they wanted to be warriors and 
feel successful again.”21  Pitahawirata chief Resaru (Two Chiefs) who spanned life in Nebraska 
and the Oklahoma reservation recalled that “when I grew up I would sit among the old men and 
give heed to the wisdom of their words.  They would say, ‘A man’s life is not a happy thing. 
When a man is born they say, “It’s a boy,” and everyone says regretfully that it would have been 
better had it been a girl.  For it is the proper destiny of men that they should go out on the 
warpath and be killed.  It is a bitter thought that this child will some day have to lie dead on the 
plain.”  The “old men spoke bitterly about life,” according to his daughter Effie Blaine who 
passed along the words.22  The men spoke to the resignation of the difficulties faced from the 
1820s-1860s with the seemingly endless wars and military setbacks.  Yet they also spoke to the 
                                               
20 White, Roots of Dependency, 210-1, 381. 
21 Blaine, Some Things Are Not Forgotten, 10. 
22 Blaine, Some Things Are Not Forgotten, 9. 
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centrality of the military ethos within the notion of Pawnee manhood.  To be a man, to be 
Pawnee, was to be a warrior.23 
For Richard Burton, who passed through Nebraska on his 1860 journey to Salt Lake City, 
the land was a terrible place.  The people comparable to “Bedouin Arabs,” except for the Pawnee 
who were “Ishmaelites, whose hand is against every man.”  Their “propensity to plunder,” and 
who, “African-like, will cut the throat of a sleeping guest,” made the Pawnee “too treacherous to 
be used as soldiers.”24  Burton’s knowledge, mixed with his racial bigotry, was superficial.  He 
recorded almost as much wrong information as correct about the Pawnee.  He dismissed them as 
uninteresting and powerless, much like their landscape.  Such dismissiveness of the people and 
the land revealed an already changed narrative of the place less than a decade after federal 
incorporation.  Nebraska was merely an inconvenient, sometimes dangerous waystation on the 
road to something better.  The story of the place was rewritten.  The history covered over and 
partially forgotten.  The people, relegated to wistful reminiscences about their place as military 
masters of the Platte Valley, and written-off by outsiders.   
The space took on new significance within U.S. national history as a prelude to the Civil 
War, where its acquisition mattered less than the struggles to incorporate the space as slave or 
free territory.  The region became part of a narrative of North America as manifestly belonging 
to the United States and the struggles to give that space new meaning.  Nebraska could now 
become fully immersed in the larger process of American settler colonialism. 
                                               
23 The Pawnee nation proudly celebrates its military traditions with veterans of the Indian Wars, Spanish-American 
War, WWI, WWII, through to the present-day conflicts, including recipients of the Distinguished Service Cross, and 
a Congressional Gold Medal for Pawnee code-talkers in WWII.  Since 1946, the nation holds an annual Pawnee 
Indian Veterans Homecoming and Powwow on and around July 4.  Van De Logt, War Party in Blue, 238-40; 
“Pawnee Indian Veterans,” < https://www.pawneenation.org/page/home-boxes/pawnee-nation-culture/pawnee-
indian-veterans> (Accessed July 27, 2019); Toni Hill, “Pawnee Veterans Day Dance Honors Those Who Serve 
America,” Chaticks si Chaticks (Winter 2014), 11; Toni Hill, “Pawnee Code Talkers Honored by U.S. Congress,” 
Chaticks si Chaticks (Winter 2014), 12-14. 
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